

STUDIES IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

BY

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'RECENT ADVANCES IN THEISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION,'
AND OTHER WORKS

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TO

MY WIFE.

P R E F A C E.

PROBABLY the most unifying link of these STUDIES — whether the study happens to be ancient, mediæval, or modern, whether it be metaphysical, psychological, or ethical—will be found to be a certain spiritualistic element or idealistic tendency. It was the presence of such a spiritualistic element or tendency that mainly determined the choice of the subjects. Most of the Papers have appeared in German, French, American, and British philosophical or theological journals. To the editors of these journals I would express the indebtedness usual in such cases. But I owe more than customary gratitude to Professor Dr L. Stein, editor of the *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* and of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, for permission to reprint any of the double series of Articles which appeared in these important philosophical journals. Other journals that favoured me by publishing Papers here reprinted were the

Bibliotheca Sacra and the *Princeton Theological Review*, while in four other journals some parts of certain chapters appeared. To the executive of the Aristotelian Society, London, I am indebted for permission to reprint the Paper (now revised) on Bonatelli—a permission granted some years ago, but only now taken advantage of. Of the Papers that have already appeared, not one is now issued without revision or modification; and, in some instances, enlargement to some slight extent has been the result. There were other Papers I should have liked to include, but, for various reasons, I have not been able to insert them in the present volume. In the chapter on Origen as Christian philosopher, I have drawn largely from my former Paper on that thinker, as I wished him to have place in this philosophic succession.

JAMES LINDSAY.

ANNICK LODGE,
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satisfactoriness—Defects of Absolute Idealism—Subjective Idealism of Berkeley—Its shortcomings—Nature of spirit-knowledge—Disposal of the cognitive problem—Further criticism of Berkeley—Faults of philosophic systems in respect of Divine Personality—Views of Lotze, Biedermann, and Green—Nature and cosmic mind—Relationship of God and man . 207

CHAPTER XVII.

FRENCH PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

Its return to Spiritualism—Philosophical Traditionalism—Comte on positive social science—Comte and Hegel—Sociology—Law of the three states—Humanity in Comte's system—Comte's method of elimination—Merits and defects of Comte's treatment—Spiritualism of Maine de Biran—Eclecticism of Cousin—Psychology of Cousin and Jouffroy—Positions of Vacherot and Caro—Spiritualism of Simon, Saisset, and Janet—Liberty philosophies of Secrétan, Renouvier, and Ravaisson—Contingency theory of Boutroux—Renouvier's *Criticisme*—Its philosophic influence—Its merits—Treatment of the category of Relation—Renouvier's theory of knowledge—Defects of his Personalism—Composite character of his system—His neo-critical theory wanting—Bergson, Lachelier, Poincaré—Fouillée's *idées-forces*—Character of Fouillée's conceptions—Further discussion of Caro—Guyau, Cournot, Milhaud, Durkheim—Hold of Eclecticism in France—Criticism of the philosophy of the century . 238

CHAPTER XVIII.

ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

Italian philosophy in seventeenth and eighteenth century—Galaxy of Italian philosophers at dawn of nineteenth century—Philosophy in Central Italy—Phil

Southern Italy—Philosophy in Northern Italy—Philosophy in second half of nineteenth century—Vast activity of Italian philosophers in the last three decades of the century—Diverse forms of Italian philosophic thought—Place of Positivism in Italy—Mamiani and Francesco Bonatelli—Influence of Bonatelli's Spiritualism—Bonatelli's psychological merits—His metaphysical training—His introduction of German thought into Italy—His treatment of perception, of sensibility and intellect, and of conscience and thought—Attitude towards pure idealism and dualistic realism—Its unsatisfactoriness—Relations to Lotze—Bonatelli and Lotze both defective—*Prius* of all things—Ontological laws—Bonatelli's doctrine of the will—German psychologists—Italian philosophy of will—Psychologists on will and impulse—Volition—Recent psychology—Bonatelli on First Cause—Dynamic and mechanical causes—Knowing and being—Bonatelli on the transcendent activity of the Absolute . . .

254

CHAPTER XIX.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPAIN.

Philosophy in Mediæval Spain—Averroism—Philosophic positions of Averroës—Maimonides—Raymond Lully—Raymond of Sabunde—Philosophy among the Jesuits—Bannez and Molina—Dominicans and Franciscans—Fonseca and Suarez—Metaphysical system of Suarez—Relations of Suarez and Aquinas—Suarez on substance, existence, and the Absolute—Real concern of the Jesuit philosophers—Moral philosophy of Quevedo—Thomism and Scotism—Churchly-Scholastic philosophers in beginning of nineteenth century—*Fundamental Philosophy* of Balmez—His methodological—His philosophic criticism—Criterion—His views of certitude—His eclectic—His doctrine of First Cause—His con-

ception of the Trinity—Extension and time—The Infinite—The divisibility of matter—Balmez on existence and essence—His ethical positions—Spanish philosophy in second half of nineteenth century—Scholastic philosophers—School of Sanz del Rio—Krause, Hegel, and Kant—The most recent Spanish philosophical writers—Character of the Spanish *Weltanschauung*

270

CHAPTER XX.

METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF OUR TIME.

Need of metaphysical interest—Metaphysical thought in Europe—Metaphysics and Reality—Evolution and Teleology—Primary position of Metaphysics—Metaphysics and Ethics—Metaphysics as science—Metaphysics and Theology—Metaphysical theory of experience—Metaphysics and the Whole—Monistic tendency—Reason and the World-Whole—Substance—Self-activity—The World-Ground—Concept of the Absolute—The Absolute Spirit—Unity of world-grounding principle—Absoluteness of Deity—Experience and the transcendent—Knowledge and the Absolute—Determination of the Infinite—Absolute truth—Bradley and Caird—Science and Metaphysics—Spirit and Nature—God and world—Scientific metaphysics—Homogeneity of God and the world—Method of metaphysics—Sciences of Nature—Haeckel's monism—Shortcomings of Scientific monism—Spiritualistic monism—God as Fulness of thought and being—Synthetic mode of inquiry—Metaphysical view of the world—Pluralism and Monism—Question of ultimates—The Absolute Personality—Immanence and transcendence—Freedom of Deity—The Religious Consciousness—The Future Life—Immortality—Spinoza and Hegel—The Belief in God—Persistence and permanence of the soul—Implications of

—Theistic metaphysical needs — Lotze — Bergson — Metaphysical thought of Europe	285
--	-----

CHAPTER XXI.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF OUR TIME.

Psychological developments touching the soul — Starting- point of psychology — The self and psychic processes — Bosanquet — Interdependence of the faculties — Rational psychology — Humian and Kantian psycho- logies — Fichte's ego — Maine de Biran's ego — Psy- chology and Religion — Genetic method — Psychology and metaphysics — Content and process — Wundt's law of spiritual energy — Munsterberg's treatment of the soul — Psycho-physical views of Wundt — Need of illuminated thinking — Nature of psychological ex- perience — Aristotle, Kant, and Schleiermacher — Sub- jective experiences of religion — Explication of the psychical nature — Immediateness of spiritual life — Psychological insight of Augustine — Deeper psycho- logical scrutinies — Relations of body and mind — The Materialistic theory — The theory of Parallelism — The Interaction theory — The Dualism only relative — Spiritual psychology — Activity of consciousness — The Nature of Mental Activity — Functional psychology — Teleological character of self-activity — Ideational con- tents of Mysticism — Psychological view of mysticism — Indivisibility of the soul — The soul in newer psy- chology — Epistemology and psychology — The soul as cosmic fact	312
---	-----

CHAPTER XXII.

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF OUR TIME.

Development of the Science of Ethics — Ethical recon- struction — Ethics and scientific advances — Morality as rational — Morality as objectively valid — Hartmann,

CONTENTS.

Sidgwick, and Moore—Metaphysical basis of ethics— Ethicists and the Good—The Right and the Good— Autonomy of the moral ideal—The moral act—Objec- tive reference of the Good—Fouillée on obligation— Metaphysic of morals—Empiricism in ethics—Superi- ority of metaphysical treatment—Defective British method—Ethics and the totality of things—Sidgwick and Stephen—Ethics and the special sciences—Ethics and psychology—Ethics and the Ideal—Ethics as conditioned by metaphysics—Ethics as science of conduct only—Ethics of the Real—Ethical develop- ment a real progress—Faults of Utilitarianism— Spencer's Hedonism—Sidgwick's Universalistic Hedon- ism—Green's idealistic ethics—Category of moral ob- ligation—Bentham, Mill, Spencer—Originality of the ethical consciousness—Social aspects of Stephen and Gizycki—Freedom as ethical postulate—Evolutionary considerations—Wundt's evolutionism—Herbart's treat- ment of morality—Theories of value—Meinong and Ehrenfels—Metaphysical implications—Morality as a Totality—Ethics of universal character . . .	336
---	-----

INDEX OF AUTHORS AND SUBJECTS . . .	359
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STUDIES IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

THE PLACE AND WORTH OF ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

AN idea is only too current, even in Histories of Philosophy, that Oriental Philosophy has but little to say for itself. Even a thinker like Wundt has recently, like so many another before, struck a beginning for ethical philosophy only from the Greeks among the ancients. So, too, Windelband begins with the Greeks, content merely to remark that there were "some tendencies among the peoples of the Orient" towards philosophy, and that these have been "only recently disclosed." Yet we are not without signs that our Western Philosophy shall soon no more suppose that the Orientals had no ethical philosophy of their own, and shall no more neglect the *Weltanschauungen* of the thinkers of ancient India and Persia, the splendid intellectual structures of the Vedas and the Avesta. Without doubt, Oriental thought awaits such fuller justice at the hands of our more developed Occidental sympathies when the rather

belated treatment of the Oxford School shall, in such matters, be surpassed. Dr E. Caird permits himself to say that, while there is "a theological philosophy of India" earlier in development than Greek philosophy, yet "the thought of India, though often subtle and profound, is unmethodical," and does "not conduce to distinct and adequate thinking." But there is always something forced and artificial when the solidarity of mankind becomes a thing neglected or despised. We cannot neglect the moral ideal, vast and tormenting, which the immense and mysterious Orient discloses to us, even though that ideal left humanity all unquiet and unfree. Eastern Philosophy, no doubt—India alone excepted—identified far too easily philosophical theories with doctrines of religion, and even in India the connection of philosophy with religion was close. There it was, in fact, either a speculative development of these doctrines, or it was an instrument fashioned to oppose them. It is therefore evident that philosophy, strictly so called, can scarcely be said to have had its birthplace, in this full sense, in the East. But it is a grievous mistake on that ground to pass over Oriental Philosophy as of no account. Deussen has set a notable example of better things, but the prevailing habit of thought will be rectified only after much time. Not a form of polytheistic or pantheistic thought but flourished on Indian soil, so vigorous was the reflective spirit there. Because the construction of philosophical systems is so much more marked in the mental energy and mobility of Greek thought, we must not be deluded into the notion that Oriental Philosophy has not much to teach the Occi-

dental mind. Oriental dreaming and inactive Quietism did not keep the speculative ideas of the Oriental peoples from having much that was fruitful for the History of Philosophy. These must be garnered into the treasuries of philosophic wisdom. Already in the philosophy of India we meet many notions that recur in later historical developments. And, in truth, India has a vast history of philosophy all its own. Besides which, if philosophy be said to be only where thought is free of the dominant religion, is it always sufficiently realised how free and independent much of the Indian philosophical thought was? Lacking the clearness and massiveness of Greek thought, of Indian philosophy one may yet very well maintain that it, with its speculative freedom and variety, transcended that of Greece in height—no small achievement. We are Occidentals, and have seen but in part. Besides, we must do justice to Oriental Philosophy at the outset of any history of intellectual development, in order that the Græco-Oriental Philosophy of the Alexandria of the Ptolemies may take its proper place, in, and relation to, the historical development. No difficulty in translating Oriental mysticism and dreaming into terms of Occidental thought must keep these things done. Philosophy, taking thus its rise in remark the comparative absence of general philosophy among the Chinese, whose vague, indefinite, and uninspiring. for it is a clear, there is no speculation in India, so in China: viewing the World

That philosophy followed an *à priori* method—the mode of Descartes rather than of Bacon—and the lines of Oriental theory have here gone out in the study of nature in ways that are striking enough. It is not too much to say that there has been a speculative theism of China, which, spite of the blendings of materialism and agnosticism, has held to Divine Unity, however abstractly. For the Divine order of the universe was ontologically conceived in Chinese thought. Then it will allow Hindu philosophy, so expressive, in its wide and varied range, of the highly speculative character of the Hindu mind, to declare the infinite and eternal excellence of God. For in the unity and perfection of the Godhead does the Oriental find deepest delight. The early intrusion of the speculative element is, in fact, the surprising thing. Only after many strange glorifications was it destined to reach the generalisation of a Central One, self-existent, Lord of the multiform creation. Finely does this speculative element shine out in the deep and subtle idealistic philosophy of the Upanishads, which, however, often describe the nature of Deity in ways too purely negative. The idea of God as the Unknown and Unknowable—an idea—has played so large a part in modern thought that it was no product of the Alexandrian time. The creation of Herbert Spencer. It lies far from the philosophy. But that philosophy had no relation to God. He was for it the unmentioned. Such conceptions the philosophy sought to reduce to other truths, the thesis perpetually

present to Oriental speculation. Enough now to say that ancient emanative theory was strong just where modern evolution is weak, and weak just where modern evolution is strong—that is to say, emanative theory was strong in its hold on the forceful Supreme Power, and weak in its grasp of the processes of development. God was for Oriental thought the All, outside Whom there could be nothing by way of limiting Him. And so it took too easily a pantheistic tinge. Take the Vedanta and the Sankhya philosophies, chief of the ancient Indian philosophical systems. In the Vedantic philosophy, so potent and well-developed, we find a speculative form of conceiving Deity, which may be taken as that of a pantheistic system at once mystical and idealistic. In its speculative development, Vedantic philosophy bears the true impress of Oriental thought in its too light esteem for activity, its quietism, and its insufficient account of moral law. The Vedanta is religion as well as philosophy. The highest truth, according to the Vedanta, is that there is One, and only One, Eternal Being, to which there is no second. Indian theology is based on the foregoing conception of the highest verity, which finds expression in such sayings as “I am Brahma,” “Thou art that,” &c. Indian thinkers do not allow this to mean a denial of the finite, to which, in its manifoldness and differentiations, they allow validity so soon as they come down from the philosophical altitudes whereon they realise their identity with the Brahma. The One and Sole Ultimate Reality is the Brahma: all the universe is Brahma; and nothing has any independent being, divorced from Brahma. This—

so it is contended—is not to be taken as implying that man, in Indian thought, loses altogether his individuality, or quits his hold on the reality of the world. Though the Brahma is the Infinite, and, as such, alone has real being, though the world is *Maya*, or illusion, and individual souls are not allowed real existence, yet Indian idealistic thinkers tell us it was never meant to deny all reality to the universe, or to cast doubt on the existence of man, who, as thinker and critic of all that is illusory, cannot be himself illusory. Possibly Western thought should give larger attention to these reassuring aspects. The conception of the Brahma is, without doubt, the fundamental postulate; but Western thought is prone to feel left by the monism of the Brahmanic philosophy with but one vast blank void. Though transmigration is here so complete as to include cosmic as well as individual cycles, yet the Brahmins philosophically introduced the law of causality into the spiritual world, and made each transmigration the result of the previous life. Hence the conception came to wear the rigour, the universality, and the invariability of Fate. The tone of the Vedas may be taken as that of an optimistic polytheism, that of the Upanishads as a pessimistic pantheism. In the case of the former, philosophy arose as a natural product of practical religious needs viewed in their relation to the world-order. In sacrifice and prayer, for example, they felt the whole order of the world to be a dependent one. Vedantic philosophy is a system as monistic as Sankhya philosophy was dualistic, with Nature and Soul as the terms of the antithesis. The Sankhya system held the conquest of desire to be the

way of salvation from bondage to matter. The Sankhya philosophy denies a Soul supreme over all, such as the World-Soul of the Upanishads. The Upanishads have, for their fundamental note, the identity of the individual soul with the World-Soul, whose character, as God, they regard as incomprehensible. To the Sankhya doctrine, matter stands on one side, while it sees an infinite number of individual souls, without attributes, and known only in a negative way, on the other side. This stress on eternal matter gives Sankhya philosophy a realistic character. Buddhism denied the substantial character of the individual soul in a way which did not Sankhya philosophy, even though the dualism and pessimism of this latter philosophy were founts whence Buddhism flowed. In the groundwork of both Sankhya and Buddhist metaphysics, the primary substance of things manifests itself by the direct development of the world and contingent existences, without any direction or interposition of a Divine and personal Agent. Buddhism simply dispensed with the essentially metaphysical teachings of the Upanishads about a World-Soul, and the need of the soul's union with that World-Soul in order to salvation. The Buddhist mode of salvation was one in which every man could work out salvation for himself without reference to God or gods, great or small. The Brahmanic way of salvation was negated by the Buddhist dissolution of Deity—the eternal Brahma or personal Creator of the world—who, as the great Self, vanished with the entire heresy of individuality. 'Tis on moral virtue Buddhism relies: renunciation, as the path to service, is its aim. Buddhist philosophy has, in whole, its own points of

peculiar interest, such as its eternal system of moral retribution or Karma, its instinct for the avoidance of evil, its rejection of a super-phenomenal *ego*, its belief in moral causation, and its hope to rob evil of all power here or hereafter by the moulding of life and character. For the soul is yet allowed in Buddhist thought some moral kernel of its own. The points of contrast between such Orientalism and Hebraism are very evident, but we are not here concerned to go into these. We are only dealing with the place and suggestiveness of the study of Oriental philosophy. And in such study the Oriental mind of to-day must be no more neglected than the Oriental mind of the past.

Beautiful is the way in which Nature appeals to the Hindu mind as God's image, the abode within whose beauty and sweetness the Immanent Spirit dwells. But it is, to Western thought, not so wise, as might be wished, that Hindu philosophers have not thought more highly of objective existence and the world of appearances. Hence we see India present too many phenomena of world-flight and pessimistic world-conceptions. The importance of maintaining right basic religio-philosophical conceptions has been impressively taught the world by these philosophers. The fatal one-sidedness of Brahmanic monism has found its nemesis in the dualism, asceticism, pessimism, and political dependence of the Hindu nations. But it is more pleasing to reflect that, even when the Infinite has baffled the heights of Hindu speculation, Vedic sages are found to have seen, in all the forces and phenomena of Nature, the inworking light of Deity. So great, indeed, becomes the pressure of the

Infinite that the Hindu view of man is in danger of growing indistinct and unsatisfying.

In the Zoroastrian religion, we find the teachings of the Avesta different from Hindu thought in respect of the Divine Being, ethically and spiritually conceived. Its religious ideals enshrined the significance of the personal, alike in Deity and in man, in a striking way, contrastive with Indian thought. Despite the hostility of the rival kingdoms of Ahura-Mazda and Ahriman, the former is represented as so good and great a God and Creator that we are brought by Zarathustra very near to a monotheistic conclusion or termination of the conflict, which is all but illimitable in time. Ahura-Mazda, the omniscient Lord, is in Persian thought conceived as King, his kingdom being the good kingdom. In its faith in the ultimate triumph of the good, Persian thought outstripped the thought of Hinduism; indeed, the Persian theodicy is without a peer in ancient thought. The philosophy of the ancient Persians was no strict system; we yet find within its dualism—the most marked the world has seen—elements of an interesting philosophical character in themselves, and of importance for their influence on religious thought in subsequent times. Its enshrined Deity, Ahura-Mazda, causer of all causes, was a Deity more spiritual and free of pagan anthropomorphism than the early Jewish Yahveh as sometimes represented. In Him was centred all conceivable good. Mere abstractions, if you like, but very real and significant to that early time were the conceptions attained of the love, law, and power of Deity. Iranian thought held that this Good God could not prevent the evolution of evil in the

beings He created. Existence to it implied polarity; there could be no good without corresponding evil. It left its distinctive ethical principle in a relation too external, with a strange neglect of interior moral perfection. But Iranian thought, too, has its surprises. For it discovers a capacity for refined definition, which we are only too apt to think peculiar to the Occidental mind. It does so in certain ways for which it has been possible to claim a rational priority in respect of Greek speculative thought. And the moral interest of Zoroastrian thought surpasses the speculative.

To translate the vague and dreamy products of the Oriental mind into terms of Western thought may not be always easy; but, because the Eastern mind lacks the Greek love and power of definition, it by no means follows that European thought must wrap itself within itself, and refuse all community of thought with the Eastern mind. That mind may sometimes bring us needful reminder that there are truths which lie beyond the reach of precise definition, and that these may yet be truths to live by. To be true in life may sometimes be even more necessary than to be accurate in thought. Diverse as these Eastern modes of theological thought may be, the spirit of religion—which is one—can yet exist in all. It said much for Justin Martyr that he believed the seed of the Logos to exist in every race of man. Crude, confused, and inarticulate as the expressions of Eastern faith may often be, Western thought may yet discern in them elements of moral and spiritual character underlying every variety of credal expression. The worth of the eternal over the evanescent, the presence of immanent

Deity in every part of the universe, these and such like truths shine out impressively for us in Eastern—especially Hindu—thought. Near of kin to Hindu intoxication with Nature is the Oriental's conception of the Eternal Spirit as supremely revealed in man's own spirit. The philosophic defects of Oriental conception and presentation will by contrast carry much suggestive teaching for the Occidental mind. It is the total religious experience of human nature—Eastern as well as Western—that philosophy of religion has to explain; and, in so explaining it, it has its own part to play in keeping the couplet true—

“One accent of the Holy Ghost
The heedless world hath never lost.”

Too intently veiled in mystery was the philosophic teaching of the Egyptians to call for much attention in this connection. With them and other such ancient peoples as the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Phœnicians, speculative elements are but few, and need not detain us. And yet, surely no one can make a careful study of Egyptian religion, for example, without feeling that great speculative ideas, like the Divine Unity, and the Demiurgical Mind or Logos idea, developed by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, were present at least to the esoteric Egyptian mind. Enough, however, has been said to show how unwarranted is the customary philosophical neglect of Oriental philosophy, despite the suggestive character of its essential ideas. Surely justice can very well be done to the Greek mind, as an independent growth, with products all its own, without sharing this customary philosophical neglect of Eastern

thought, with all the suggestive character of its essential ideas. Why should we forget the stimulating influences which the Greek mind received from Eastern thought? Why should we overlook that the philosophic products of Greece undoubtedly incorporated within themselves Oriental notions and ideas, so that these neglected sources really are *matres cogitationum nostrarum*? Why, I would further ask, does Western thought so readily strive to enter into the fulness and inventiveness of Greek thought, and remain so easily content with a merely curious, somewhat idle, interest in Eastern thought? Why forget that in Greece, as in India and China, the laws of philosophical development were similar—philosophy here also being a product of religious needs, and the strifes and conflicts out of which new forms of religion arose? The answer is, of course, found in the historic circumstances, moral evolution, and political development which connect us, as Westerners, so much more in our European past with the philosophy of Greece. Windelband tells us in a footnote that Oriental philosophisings remain “so remote from the course of European philosophy, which is a complete unity in itself,” that, in his view, there is no occasion to “enter upon them.” This is at least in keeping with what the Latin poet said of Europe as *audax Japeti genus*. But there is surely in all this no sufficient reason for remaining content with an incapacity to make ourselves at home with different thought-conditions and influences than those which have dominated European progress. Philosophy has surely a yet more universal note to strike than this merely European one. It cannot, surely, forget that, woven of one

warp and woof throughout as is the universe of thought, not without Asiatic philosophy can it be made perfect. Indeed, it cannot well stop even there, for a reasonable apprehension of the World-whole is a world-historical phenomenon or appearance, characteristic of all cultured peoples whatsoever. Not in Greece alone, but everywhere that man has attained to a certain measure of culture, has he philosophised or thought upon the World-whole. Religion has been the point of departure. Philosophy is the fairest flower of universal human reason, and never the special preserve of any favoured nation or people, whether Eastern or Western.

CHAPTER II.

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE ON SUBSTANCE AND
EFFICIENT CAUSATION.

OF these two oldest categories of thought, substance and causality, the relation may first be briefly noted. Substance is cause at rest, as cause is substance in operation. We cannot conceive change, in its beginnings, without cause; but without substance, change, in its very idea, would be meaningless and absurd. A cause must be a substance, or being, in energy; but a substance need not be an active cause. In short, substance stands to cause in the relation of source to condition. Hence Hegel took substance to be cause of the modes, and modes to be the effects of the substance. Without causality, event or occurrence, there would be none. On the other hand, change need not make up the whole of reality, may indeed be only the visible or exterior side of things; one may still ask as to the ultimate elements, whereof things are composed, whether they may not have in themselves sufficient reason for their being and for the law of their combinations. Even if we do not see the substance of the world to be necessary, it does not yet follow that it may not be necessary. If the ultimate elements elude us in their

noumenal or substantial aspects, a permanent substratum of all existence may yet be postulated, as a necessity of thought. As Greek philosophy began with the search for substantial being—the permanent element behind the continual change of phenomena,—so it ended with the same quest: the quest of a primary substance we find steadily pursued by Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Xenophanes. Not all of these early philosophers held the permanent substance to be one: plurality of substances was already held in pronounced form by the Atomist philosophers; in this earliest stage, the Atomism of Leucippus was the final reply to Thales at that time possible. But it is the answer of Plato and Aristotle that is now to occupy us, for they both perceived that philosophy must have an absolute foundation. Plato poured a new technical and philosophical significance into the term *οὐσία*, as he did into so many others. To Plato, *οὐσία par excellence* is substance in the sense of that intermediary between ideas and things which may perhaps be best described as the principle of the realisation of form in matter, however far from the language of Plato such a mode of speaking may be. But his doctrine of primary substances, variously named as these are, is abstruse and lacking in explication. Essential being or *οὐσία* is his postulation for that which holds together elements of the soul known as “the same” and “the other” (*Timæus*, 35 A). As used by Plato, *οὐσία* was a special characteristic of the Ideas—the real existences (*τὰ ὄντα*) as distinguished from earthly appearances (*τὰ φαινόμενα*). Thus it comes about that Plato’s ‘ideas’

may be viewed as substances, since they were to him not only the real existents, but the causes of all things, and eternal. In the *Timæus*, Plato speaks of an element or substance that underlies all things, but this primitive matter has no substantiality of its own, reality being reserved for the Ideas. He separates the form or quality from matter, and hypostatizes it in the Idea. But these hypostatized or metaphysical entities seem only to afford another instance of the principle that "entia multiplicantur praeter necessitatem." Still, the pertinent fact remains that this substantial existence of the ideas is postulated in the *Timæus* (51 D). The one substance for Plato is, therefore, the Idea, which is sole reality. Matter is for him the $\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$ or non-being, yet he has for it a method of participating in Ideas. His conception is not free from difficulties of dualistic character, since matter exerts a limiting influence on the Idea, as though it were something external to it. His explication is not free from halting insight and obscurity, and the mistake of Platonism was to identify the negative or non-being with matter, or, at any rate, space. Such non-being is really the negation of substance, since it has no positive principle of existence in itself. The impersonal character of the Supreme Idea—the Idea of Good—in Plato is to be kept in view. But this is in keeping with his original assumption of some sort of primordial matter, as substratum of all motion and all becoming—in fact, nurse and mother of all becoming. This substratum Plato treats as seat of everything, yet no proper account of it is given; it seems to mean, with him, being conditioned by space, yet mere space cannot be conceived as a

substance. Substance, to Plato, must be a perfectly determinate object of knowledge, and yet the substratum is less known than its changeful states or aspects, and so his phenomenal world is left, as to its reality, in somewhat ambiguous and not very real state. And yet, Being in the full sense of the word is declared in the *Sophist* (248 E) to be inconceivable without motion, life, soul, mind, while reality is claimed in the *Republic* (477 A) only for such objects as bear the essential characteristics of mind. Reality or substantiality belongs to things, in the end, only as it is imparted to them by mind creative. To this result the *Parmenides* largely contributes. This substantial interpretation of Platonic idea has not been followed by Lotze, who took the notion of "Law" to be equivalent to that of "Idea," and who acutely represented Plato's ideas as no supra-sensible realities or substances, but universal laws, which have not existence like things, but which, nevertheless, as externally self-identical in significance, rule the operation of things. Natorp follows Lotze in taking the Idea to be a law, not a thing, though he has a position not quite that of Lotze. Passages in *Philebus* (16 D, 64 B), *Parmenides*, and the *Theætetus*, are taken in support of this view. But it seems scarcely necessary to read into Plato the clearness and consistency of the modern mind, and his treatment of the Ideas must remain susceptible to easy attack.

It is really with Aristotle that the substance concept begins. Substance is, to Aristotle, Being in the full sense of the term. From substance in general he passes to the study of sensible substance and substance super-

sensible. But Aristotle's simplest conception of substance is *τόδε τι ὄν*—that which simply exists, as existing by itself, and without other things. This *τόδε τι* is simply the individual of the concrete world, and such things as its figure, quality, quantity, &c., which are inherent in it, are termed its accidents.

But Aristotle calls the substance *τί ἐστίν*, just that it may stand out against *ποσός, ποιός ἐστίν*. [See *Categ.*, iii. 16; *Meta.*, v. and vii.] Aristotle's *first substance* being, as we have just seen, the individual subsisting in itself—*τόδε τι*—or that which neither exists in a subject nor is affirmed of a subject, Aristotle takes for his *second substance* that which, not being in a subject (*ὑποκείμενον*), may be affirmed of different subjects, to indicate their species or kind. The difficulty of defining substance Aristotle discusses in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*, showing how its elements cannot be substances, and yet how, on the other hand, they cannot be anything but substances (*Meta.*, vii. 13). He determines only with difficulty that substance should be defined only as to its form, and not its matter [*Meta.*, vii. 11]. He, in fact, leaves the subject inadequately defined, here or elsewhere, though he is not without inclination to take as highest substance that which is most simple, not realising that our ultimate must be the most complex and concrete, as that into which all else runs back for explanation. Aristotle speaks of *ὑποκειμένη ὕλη*, as conveying his conception of what was true of the material world, but not of the ultimate *οὐσία*, or Deity. But what marks the *ὑποκείμενον* as substance is, in Aristotle, its independence (*πρώτη οὐσία*) as a composite formed of the union of

essence or form with matter or *ἕλη*. Aristotle is unhappily perplexing in his use of the term *οὐσία*, even when attention is restricted to the nature of things alone, without regard to their existence. Substance to him was equivalent to *τὸ εἶναι*; first of the categories, it was distinguished from all attributes or properties (*συμβεβηκότα*) [*Meta.*, i.] In his divergence from Plato, Aristotle makes *οὐσία* not universal, but something individual and concrete. Sometimes it signifies the mixture of matter and form, at other times it is, as the substrate, taken to be pure indeterminate matter. He strongly condemns Plato's making the 'idea,' as substance, exist apart from that of which it is the substance and essence. | Plato's 'ideas' are not, to Aristotle, real substances or *οὐσίαι*, taking *οὐσία* to mean that which exists by itself. But for Aristotle, no less than for Plato, the general idea was essence of the particular, and was *οὐσία* so far as that meant essence. What Aristotle did reject was, any Platonic claim of right for ideas as existent apart from things, in which, as their form, they were immanent or inherent. If the relation of form to matter was, in Plato, that of reality to non-being, these two were, to Aristotle, correlative terms, whose union constituted Being. But his precise fault here was in not seeing how fully they were correlative with each other, so that the world of experience cannot be cleft by making so essential a division as he did between form and matter. (In the metaphysics of Aristotle, matter does not exist of itself or independently of form; it is in itself unknowable, and can be separated from form only through mental abstraction. Form is

the *ἐνέργεια* which brings forth the real out of indeterminate potentiality. { Matter is not non-being, as with Plato: it has a tendency towards that whereof form is the reality: { motion is that which connects form and matter as moments of one existence. The great gift of Aristotle to the discussion of the substance problem was the doctrine of substance as a self-active principle—the assertion of absolute reality, that is, absolute self-activity, as for him the absolute, which is primal presupposition of all knowledge. Essence, thing, or substance is, to Aristotle, that which admits of all change, in which respect he is closely followed by Lotze (Lotze's *Metaphysics*, vol. i. p. 74, Eng. edn.) Such essence is designated τὸ τί ἐστὶ by Aristotle, and is defined by form in its most complete sense. Having so dealt with Being or substance, Aristotle is ready to deal with the subject of Cause. We therefore pass to the treatment by Plato and Aristotle of the problem of efficient causation. In the reasonings of Plato and Aristotle there is an underlying assumption of causality. | Existence is *energy* to Aristotle; { to Plato it is intellect (*νοῦς*), but intellect which holds in itself all the ideas of the universe in their causal significance. } Plato and Aristotle alike placed being beyond thought—beyond knowledge. Plato, however, reaches a more practical result, when, feeling the inadequateness of the concept of substantiality or existence, he lays it down in the *Sophist* that the being of things is nothing but their power (*δύναμις*). Plato saw, before Aristotle, that, in the regress of movements, there must be a first term. The intellect (*νοῦς*), which is existence to Plato,

is something which holds in itself all the ideas of the universe in their causal significance. The psychology of Plato presupposed mind wherever there was motion, and so he was led to postulate Deity as Prime Mover of the universe, with subordinate or deputed deities. (See the *Timæus*, 41 B and 42.) Between the Primal Cause and ordinary mortals Plato set these inferior or subordinate deities, apparently, as a way of accounting for the shortcomings of the world. (See the *Timæus*, 41 C.) But a more important consideration, in the present connection, is that Plato expressly recognises the dependence of the world upon a cause beyond itself—*παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν*. (See *Timæus*, 28 A and B.) Plato, in the second book of the *Republic*, already treats in express terms of the Divine causality. He goes on, in the sixth book, to give his thoughts more precise form, when he explicitly says {the Good is not mere existence—*οὐσία*—but transcends it in dignity and power.} In the seventh book, he affirms the Good to be cause of all that is bright and beautiful in the worlds of the visible and the invisible—first and most profound of efficient causes. / Despising the outward and phenomenal, Plato rises to the recognition of a Supreme Cause, as real and infinite essence, indeed, but yet transcendently abstract and ideal. Created things are taken (sixth book of the *Republic*) as Plato's starting-point only that he may rise above them (*ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα*), and, making them "fulcrum" for his flight, advance to the Primary Cause which, as universal principle, is outside and above the point of departure—*μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰὼν*. (See the *Republic*,

vi., 511 B.) In the tenth book of the *Republic*, Plato distinctly claims for God that He is First Author or Creator—*φυτουργός*—of all things.¹ In the *Philebus*, with its theory of being, we find Plato speaking of a Supreme Intelligence—*νοῦς θεῖος*—which is declared to be cause of all things. This supra-mundane principle is for him determining cause—*αἰτία*—of all things. In the *Philebus*, indeed, Plato feels the pressure of the causal axiom in connection with all things as derived: he holds everything which comes into being to come of necessity into being through a cause—*ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι*. πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτων γίγνουτο; (See *Philebus*, 26 E.) This general Cause of the existence of the universe, as we know it, deserves, in Plato's view, to be regarded as the Reason of the world. (See *Philebus*, 30 A.) Still, we have to pass from the *Philebus* to *Timæus* and the *Laws* for any full development of cosmological theory. There Plato voices the difficulty of finding the "Author" (*ποιητής*) and "Father" (*πατήρ*) of the world, which already means the quest for an Efficient Cause. (See *Timæus*, 29 A.) In *Timæus* also, Plato introduces the idea of Conditions (as supplementary)—*ξυναιτίαι*—to the cause proper (*αἰτία*), an idea which was afterwards to receive alike important support and criticism. This idea of necessary cause (*τὸ ξυναιτίον*) was to Plato that of something without which true cause would not be cause. No very rigorous sense need be imposed upon passages of bold Creationism in the *Timæus*, wherein we find the creative personality and deliberate activity of the Demiurge. Enough that we have God dwelt upon as Personal Creator or Efficient Cause, Plato recognising that that

which becomes necessarily, becomes under the influence of a Cause. It lacks necessary being; it comes into existence in answer to a sufficient reason. But the Efficient Cause of Plato is Artificer rather than Creator, imposing, according to law, form on pre-existent substance, although one can hardly doubt that, in a deeper way, the real quest of Plato is for an Ultimate Cause, that is, principle of life and motion—in other words, of all Ionic manifestations of ceaseless process. And, indeed, if we take, say, the *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman*, all together, one can hardly help feeling that, in his religious metaphysics, Plato had deep and real hold on a *producing* Being in the Supreme Creator who is for him world-principle, so that his metaphysical conceptions can hardly be denied the possession of true dynamic force. Again, in the *Phædrus*, God is, as Personal Spirit, cause of the world's order and design—eternal cause, it is said, of eternal movement.' We must be content to remark that Divine causal idea clearly appears in such other works of Plato as the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, in both of which the Deity is spoken of as Father, Artificer, and Generator. So, too, causal idea recurs in *Theætetus*, *Laws*, and *Phædo*. In the cosmological reasonings of the *Laws*, for example, Plato founds upon the necessity of a rational cause to the actual state of things, setting out, in so doing, from the idea of motion. So, too, in the tenth book of the *Laws*, we have the principle of the Self-Mover propounded. Against this, however, Aristotle properly urged that a Self-Mover is *ex vi termini* impossible. We are now in a position to affirm, on the general question, that God is always and

everywhere, to Plato, Organiser of the World and Conservator of its eternal youth, immediate Cause of nature and self-moved principle, on which all cosmic movements depend. Such is Plato's Eternal—an essentially fixed quantity—throned high above, and inaccessible to, all change, and in Whom the idea of Prime-Mover is already present. It may be remarked, in this connection, that, although Plato has given less perfected and precise theory as to Primal Cause than we find in Aristotle, it does yet by no means follow that Plato is, to our modern ideas, less exalted, in his relative theological conceptions, than the great Stagirite. But, in our present connection, we can but regret that, in his grand emphasis on ethical ends, Plato fell short of any final or satisfying treatment of the problem of causation or real efficiency. Plato's interest passed from the metaphysical question of efficient causes into the ethical quest of the Good, or the search, after a Final Cause. The moral purposiveness of man grew in its hold upon Plato, until it effected this result of displacing efficient by final Cause. This somewhat tangential movement of Plato's thought is hardly to be deemed satisfactory, for the method and the result are not, strictly taken, really philosophical.

While the earlier thinkers of Greece were prone to accept change simply as a fact, Aristotle had surer grasp on the true idea of cause, as something that must be uncaused or self-caused. The Platonists saw that change must be referred to that which does not change, but they did not have a like apprehension of how truly causative or originaive Primal Reality must be—how little it could be mere inactive being. They were too

content to rest in the Supreme Idea, rather than in definitely postulated Efficient Cause. This Primal Reality of the universe, with its eternal energy, is, in nature, absolute and self-originate Reason, for such is Aristotle's view of ultimate Causation. In his *Physics*, Aristotle lays it down that nothing which is moved moves itself—*ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖσθαι*. (*Phys.*, vii. 1.) And, again, he designates efficient cause more precisely as moving cause—*τὸ δ' ὄθεν ἢ κίνησις*. (*Phys.*, ii. 7.) In the plainest terms, Aristotle postulates, in the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, a First Cause, without which the world would not exist. In formulating his four kinds of cause, Aristotle gave efficient Cause (*ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως*) or "moving" Cause (*τὸ κινήτικόν*) the form it was substantially to wear through the Middle Ages. ! Every movement argues a moving Cause, and such moving Cause must be actual being—no mere potentiality. Only such actual being can exert that *ἐνέργεια* which means the movement here involved. As Aristotle reads the order, law, and progress of the phenomenal universe, the First Cause—or Prime Mover—is to him such *ἐνέργεια*. He is content with no essence—*οὐσία*—of things *in abstracto*, but seeks that *ἐνέργεια* by which their activity is expressed. As the series of moving Causes cannot be endless, his First Cause or Prime Motor (*πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον*) is taken that he may escape from the finitude of the actual. The unmoved and "motionless cause of motion" is God. It will be observed that Aristotle allows to Deity no relation to the world save the motion which He communicates to it, and thus He remains in a state of separation from it.

His relation is one of pure transcendence; Deity does not appear as active and interested Cause of the life of the world. But it should be noticed that Aristotle, in holding to the independence of that Divine Reason which is the primary source of all energy, and maintaining its separation from the world, does not view the action of the Primal Cause—Divine Reason—upon the world-process as mechanical, but rather regards the self-activity of each and every part as having been provided for, through immanent energy which has been communicated to them.

Thus, then, we see the result of Aristotle's large concern with *φύσις*—an interest so different from that of Plato in final Cause—in a quite astonishing search after the attainment of Causes, and the maintenance of a scientific conception of the world. In his *Physics*, Aristotle argues, in a deep and basal fashion,[†] that movement cannot be self-caused, in the case of extended substance, and further, that motion must be without beginning and quite continuous.[‡] In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle makes movement consist of possibility passing into actuality, and takes the source of movement to be completely realised actuality. In other words, it is form pure and without admixture of matter. [§] But efficient cause, in his *Metaphysics*, often means a substance prior in time to the effect, whereas he elsewhere uses efficient cause as merely conditioning the effect, and not precedent to it in respect of time. It should be observed how important was Aristotle's distinction between self-activity—*purus actus*—and potency. It opens the way for distinguishing between the Primal Ground of things—complete in itself

and not moved—and the nature of things themselves, as conditioned in character and evolutionary in law. So far as it goes, Aristotle's insight was great, but it was, of course, halting in its issue. For his system was undoubtedly statical in character, and he neither felt the need nor saw the mode of relating the Primal Ground to the world of imperfection that is. No doubt, he may have meant to improve upon Platonic Idea by such external Cause as he invoked to convert possibility into actuality, but, however his hold on the facts of experience may have been greater, his method was yet too external to produce satisfactory results. So that, although Aristotle did so much for the subject of Causation, the influence of Plato's ideas overbore much of the effect properly to have been expected. For, too much was allowed to formal cause, so that efficient—as well as material and final—causes were left in the shade. And, of course, the imperfection of his idea of causation is to be noted, no less than his meritorious treatment, since he is even prepared to drop the notion of sequence, and does not regard cause as an antecedent with determining power. Causality only throws the explanation back upon an antecedent that continually flees us, and the only escape is by taking causality itself up into some form of self-activity, as the only category that explains itself. Aristotle has not dealt with the problem of efficient Cause or Principle as satisfactorily related to the world, but at least he gave invaluable aid and such a noteworthy contribution towards the solution of the problem as to be of imperishable memory.

CHAPTER III.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

RECOGNISING the religio-philosophical developments of ancient India, we yet find the beginnings of philosophy of religion first most truly laid in Greece. Here the separateness and systematised character of philosophical reflection are, no doubt, observable as never before. Religion attained to new self-consciousness in Greece, so that philosophical religion, in deeper, more reflective sense, appears. The Greek mind has greater mobility and constructive energy in the systematising of thought than was possessed by the Eastern mind, with its inactive, quietistic tendencies. Its free, creative spirit is finely seen in the construction of Greek religious conceptions and beliefs. But this is not to say that the Greek development was free from a stage of vague and unreflecting Spiritism. The external cast of the popular religion of Greece roused philosophical thought only by the antagonism it provoked to the absurdities contained in its legends of the gods. For here that which was first was not—even though it concerned the gods—that which was heavenly, but very much the reverse. A higher philosophic influence seems to have been exerted on early

Greek thought by the Orphic songs or legends, with their blendings of the earthly and the heavenly and their cosmogonic character. Greek search for a single principle, whence the cosmic order had been derived or evolved, was henceforth natural and intelligible. Nature to the Greek more than half revealed the soul within.

The thought of an absolute principle of unity first took clearly defined form in Xenophanes, who represents Eleatic Monism, naming his One Being God, and viewing Him as rational. He combats prevailing Polytheism, and the anthropomorphic conceptions of Homer and Hesiod. A striking feature of Greek religious development is its lack of organised unity, its absence of anything like unified tradition of fundamentally religious type. The sensuous forms and imaginative symbols of Greek mythology, as found in the poets, presented a naturalism so gross and crude that it could not but prove an easy prey to the critical shafts of developing reflection. In the polytheism of Greek religion the gods were not only humanised, but were terribly human—capricious, jealous, lawless, partial, and immoral. The religion of the Greek was mainly a religion of this world, for it was here he sought, for the most part, his compensations. And the gods must have been very troublesome to him, for so jealous were they of human success or prosperity that they must needs be avenging themselves on human *ὕβρις*. But in this connection the great trouble is that things were left by Greek thought in so impersonal a condition—that the sense of personality was so

ill-defined. Perhaps the best feature in the crude anthropomorphism of Greek mythology is the fact that their gods were social and happy. In fact, the entire humanity of the Greeks seemed to be reflected in their gods. The deities of their pantheon seem constructed after human patterns of beauty, intelligence, and strength. Their gods *are* men, in fact; super-human they are, only they are superior in courage or virtue to men. Free from dread and joyous was Greek life; for a Homer the divine lay in the human; in Homer and Hesiod faith in Justice survives. The idealisation of man played a large part in the religious thought of Homer. As pointing toward monotheistic unity, we have, even in Homeric times, the conception of Zeus as Father of gods and men. But syncretism was already well on its way, and Homeric religion is that of the cultured few rather than that of the people. Its outlook on the future life was one of gloom. In Æschylus there is realised no conscious antagonism to the popular belief in the order of the gods above. He has his plea for Zeus as pattern and protector of righteousness. Sophocles admits a more humanly operative rational element. Euripides is staggered before the difficulty of reconciling divine justice with human deed and doom. His pessimistic thought-world opened out on the whole life of his time, and he stands strongly marked by his rejection of the polytheistic religion, his recognition of the possibility and necessity of a scientific conception of the world, and his adherence to a moral ideal. The strife between *μῦθος* and *λόγος* assumes in Euripides

its sharpest form. But Euripides not only helped to destroy the fair world of mythology, but was also, in some real sense, pathfinder for man's free personality over against the weight of authority. Beyond all naïve conditions Euripides calls to the life of reflection, to whose rational ideal of life he remains true, recognising, with fine cosmopolite sense, that thus the race moves out of darkness into light. The Greek tragedians, in fact, raised the conception of the gods towards the ideal of perfect ethical Spirit in their efforts to purge of anthropomorphic defect. Taking all that has now been advanced, it becomes evident how inevitable was the antagonism that should follow philosophical reflection on such mythologic crudities and errors as have been adverted to.

Coming back to Xenophanes, we may remark that his sole Deity is raised above multiplicity and change, and is perfectly self-sufficing. The abstract monism of the Eleatics concerned itself, metaphysically, with the being rather than the origin of things. But it was on the origin of things that the Ionic philosophers fixed their attention, and Heraclitus voiced their origin, flux, change, and decay. Hylozoistic in principle as his theory was, Heraclitus emphasises the ceaseless flux of things—the restless activity of nature—the passing of things or their universal movement (*πάντα ῥεῖ*). A subtle, all-pervasive motion underlies this change—the exhaustless energy of the Divine Reason itself. But the goal of Heraclitus could not but prove a sceptical one, since the only criterion of being lay in the momentary sensible apprehension of the individual, and

fixed knowledge was not to be thought of. Heraclitus was, however, really complementary, not antagonistic, to Xenophanes, as Plato was swift to see. But the teleological reasonings of Socrates helped Plato to this synthesis; for Socrates held that what exists for a useful end must be product of intelligence, in which, as in organic structure, parts serve the whole. Anaxagoras, no doubt, had already suggested mind as mover of matter, holding that all things were in chaos till reason came to arrange them, but the idealistic character of his suggestion was not sustained in his too mechanical mode of explication. Thus the pre-eminence he postulated for Mind became lost in the physical working; still, the idealistic or immaterial principle had been brought into view, which was to prove ultimate gain. To Socrates there was a Divine Wisdom or Reason that fashioned and upheld the universal or cosmic order, and by him and his followers the rational element in Greek mythology was apprehended. The rational system of truth at which Socrates aimed was sought to be educed in psychological manner, the principle of this system being to him generically active within the human consciousness.

Plato passed beyond this psychological state into the ontologic, the idea becoming to him an ontological archetype. The defect here was that Platonism tended to make these archetypes external and independent entities, lying apart from the creative mind. Plato, noblest of pioneers in the sphere of the philosophy of religion, vindicates the character of the gods as absolutely good, and maintains the Divine nature to be

ultimate source of all goodness, truth, and beauty. In his later works the leading religious thought is just that of the Divine Mind, of which the human mind is taken to be, in some sort, a reflection. The gods of mythology were, to Plato, creatures of imagination, and ethically mischievous; and it was his firm belief in the ontological and necessary priority of reason to matter that made him hold to the soul as immortal. The Divine nature he takes to transcend the sensible, and in his philosophy of religion he postulates such a transcendence for Deity as makes a certain spiritual monotheism. His was the pregnant conception that in the goodness of God was to be found the reason for the creation of the world. But he failed to carry out this conception as due to self-manifesting Deity, not Deity manifested as something without, and so he missed bridging over the chasm between the real and the phenomenal. The dignity of the soul, the idea of the good, the conception of the ideal society, also received treatment of abiding worth at Plato's hands, for the sweep of his vision claimed for itself all time and all existence.

In the same line of conception as to Deity, Aristotle, with certain features of his own, follows; God being to him self-sufficient, contemplative, and alone. His positing a Deity who lives a life of such pure contemplation is no more free from criticism than Plato's position, which he criticised. Such pure thought does not get beyond itself to determine anything else. God is to Aristotle an eternal activity complete in itself, and contemplation is to him "the best and happiest

of activities." The obvious trouble in God's whole activity being thus contemplation, is to understand how He has to do with this changing and finite world. Aristotle conceives the world as really dependent upon God, and in need of Him, who is to Aristotle its Prime Mover, the original cause of all existence. But this Prime Mover turns out on examination to be so rather in respect of logical priority than as first in time—in His unbeginning beginning. Aristotle endeavours, not very satisfactorily, to combine immanent and transcendent views in his conception of Deity, as a reaction from the transcendent universalism of Plato. But it was a great achievement that Aristotle not only made pure self-activity—*actus purus*—the primal ground, but also took things to be a dual synthesis of self-activity and potency. Following Anaxagoras, Aristotle transformed his *purus actus* into reason or abstract intelligence, which could not offer any satisfactory basis of mediation between the world and its Ultimate Ground. His recognition of the immanent end of every object raised his doctrine of finality far above the utilitarian teleology of later philosophers. What Aristotle had to say as to the union of the individual and the universal, and as to the function of the living soul in educating philosophy and science from experience within a social order, is of enduring interest.

Now, it will readily be seen that the point to which we have been brought by the thought of Aristotle is one which leaves a breach, to the healing of which the efforts of later Greek speculation were directed. Hence we

have Philo's hierarchy of beings bridging the dualism between God and matter, and those emanational attempts to mediate between the One and the many which are characteristic of the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus and Proclus. Before these endeavours we have, of course, the attempts of Stoicism to find unity in self-conscious thought itself, which took itself to be in perfect harmony or oneness with God as the principle of the universe, and troubled itself nothing about the world of matter or particular objects and events. Hardly are we called to follow out here these later systems of Greek thought, wherein speculative thought became subordinated to practical ethics, and the rendering of the individual sufficient unto himself became accounted a thing of fundamental value, in spite of the fact that such strength was too isolated for general result. We are only concerned now with the religious ideal of the Greeks in the most characteristically Greek forms and periods. That religious ideal we have seen to be the outcome of the highest type of polytheistic thought—the result of development that tended to an always greater unity. Never was the persistent Greek belief in Fate, as that to which gods, no less than men, are subject, without some underlying feeling of protest. And, indeed, Fate itself became less conceived as hard external necessity and assumed more the character of rational law. The elements of a perfectly assured world-order lay behind the impersonal guise of what seemed only blind and irrational Fate. The Furies turned at last to graciousness. The worlds of men and of gods were personal.

It is a pleasing religious development—in some ways

inspiring even—we have before us, from the beginnings of incisive criticism of the popular religious thought by Xenophanes up to the new philosophy of religion propounded by Plato, with the humanity, beauty, purity, truth, and freedom by which that religion was marked. For it should be noted what a growing conception marked all this Greek development of the human soul as Divine alike in nature and in destiny, and as of peerless worth in its rational and spiritual life. Highest to Plato was the idea of the Good—this all-ruling idea was to him absolute reality. Plato's conception of life is, no doubt, shot through with religion, for his is an entirely religious one, but his conception is yet a characteristically Greek one. It imports a high sense of man's connection with the All—an exalted union of the human with the Divine. But it obviously is not a religion of restoration, of renewal, of consolatory power,—lacking, as it does, real personal relation. It falls far short of being revelational in any historic sense. Plato is not a physician to the sick; his philosophy is that of the whole, sound man. But between God and man there is no real communion. On a metaphysical view, religion is to him speculation and nothing else—in God is pure and immutable essence found. On a moral view, God is to him the ideal of moral perfection—the good and righteous Spirit. Plato's moral kingdom is concerned with justice rather than love, but the justice is tempered with mildness and mercy. Matter is to him that which resists the action of God, and causes evil to be present in the world. Such a view of matter as non-pliant and impenetrable before the Divine Mind we can, of course, by no means accept.

Plotinus was able later to affirm the unreality of matter, in spite of the part it plays among real things.

Aristotle, like Plato, thought our understanding of life must depend on our insight into the great world of reality, for the content of human existence is gained through its connection with the All. Like Plato, he highly esteems form, and indeed he makes of the relation of form and matter something which rules all reality and constitutes the core of all life. But whereas Plato rent the world in twain by his severance of essence and reality, this severance was to Aristotle an intolerable schism, and he sought to steer his philosophic course toward apprehension of the unity of reality. Reality is for him the essence found in the actual phenomena. Aristotle does not, like Plato, set out from the idea, and work to the data of experience. Starting from the data of experience, Aristotle rises from the actual or empirical to the ultimate or universal. The synthetic and progressive procedure of Plato is in Aristotle replaced by analytic and regressive tendencies. Plato excels by the richness of his ideas and the spiritualistic character of his thought. Aristotle excels in his combined hold on the rational form-elements and the empirical data that fill these out. For Aristotle, with his monistic tendency, there is a Divine Oversoul, which is the source of the world as a realm of reason, and which is the originating cause of the eternal world movement. Thus the world does not wear to thought so contrastive and opposed a look as on the Platonic view. But it is, for all that, a very weak position Aristotle takes in assigning to God only the place of Prime Mover of the world, sustaining to it relations only

in virtue of the motion He communicates. We miss those Ideas in the divine mind which are archetypes of created things; we are certainly not brought near to God, since God is here separated from the world, to which He communicates movement. Nevertheless, his cosmology must be allowed to have more consistency than that of Plato.

In Philo, the Logos mediates between transcendent Deity and man. But the Logos conception is in Philo a vacillating and imperfect one, not reaching up to real personal result. But the merit must be freely accorded to Philo of having linked the best of Old Testament thought to the best of Greek philosophical thinking, in his conception of God, who is not only One, but the Good. The profound expression given to the Platonic philosophy by Plotinus meant, of course, a great gain in elevation. This is saying much, if we remember how great had been the elevation of Plato's teaching—how (in the *Republic*) he had taught the idea of the good to be regarded as cause of all science and truth, and had insisted on the good as far exceeding essence in dignity and power. But the transcendence of his Deity, the inapprehensibleness of His nature, kept his omnipresence from being so felt that men could partake in the wealth of spiritual life. This despite the stimulating and elevating effect of his conception of the One, the Ineffable. No doubt his affirmation of mystical ecstasy meant a certain unity of man with God, as involved in emotional response. But the lack remained in respect of the process being one amenable to the scrutinising view of reason. Reason was a too transitional

term in the process of return to God by ecstatic elevation, and the mysticism involved was a turning of the back upon experience. The thought of Plotinus has the merit, of course, of ridding us of anthropomorphism, but the price paid is a dear one—the dethronement of reason: dear, because a God unknowable can be of no service or interest either to faith or to philosophy. If philosophy could be content thus, it would have learnt and gained nothing. While the conception of God remained in Greek philosophy, as it culminated in Plotinus, very much of an abstraction, or limiting concept, it became in Philo a living reality.

Thus we are now in a position to mark the character of that development which constitutes the Greek philosophy of religion. We have seen the character of their early gods, their humanised or anthropomorphic deities, whose worship was yet the precursor of the worship of spiritual principle. We have noted the growth of subjective reflection from the philosophy of Anaxagoras onward. Very noticeable in Socrates is this emphasis on moral reason. In Plato the pre-eminence of ideas or reason we have observed to be conspicuous. His religion is ethical and mystical rather than metaphysical. Aristotle's stress on pure reason, after our own particular fashion, we have also pointed out. We have taken account, also, of the developing idea of unity as early conceived under the notion of Fate, which cast its dark impersonal shadow over the throne of Zeus himself. Besides which, monotheistic tendency was seen in the more or less conscious gropings after more spiritual principle. Nor have we failed to make some passing recognition

of their religion as that of beauty—the Divine being to them the eternally beautiful. We have seen the purification of Greek mythology by their poets and philosophers. Add to all these things that we have reckoned with the meditation and systematisation which they gave to eternal truths, principles, and ideas through their great philosophic thinkers, and it will be evident how extraordinarily great was the contribution of Greek philosophy of religion to the world's religious development. The greatness of that contribution has been enhanced by the persistent influence exerted by Greek systems and ideas on all subsequent generations. But this is said without sharing the defective and one-sided views of those—among whom are distinguished philosophical names—who treat early Christian Theology as only a weak reflex of Greek Philosophy, and quite fail to realise the nobly creative and independent power of early spiritual thinkers like Aristides, Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Clement, and Origen. When we are called to deal with the relations of Greek Philosophy to early Christian Theology, *Suum Cuique* must be our motto, if we have insight enough to perceive how real and great were the power and portion of that Theology in itself, as they are revealed in its historical development.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS.

A SIGNIFICANT circumstance was the fact that the Stoic philosophy, in the eventide of its existence, produced three men of such nobility of mind as Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In their more developed type of thought, Stoicism was best represented. In their hands, indeed, Stoicism became the noblest of imperfect ethical theories. Marcus Aurelius was the last of the significant Stoics—one, too, in whom pagan ethical philosophy reached its greatest depth, and its finest flowering.

The Stoicism of the time had become an eclectic religious movement, and the old pantheism of the school had given way, it seems not too much to say, to thought of more theistic tendency. Abandonment to the Will of Deity, and impregnable concentration or entrenchment in one's self, despite the moral and intellectual loneliness which such individuality may involve, are the assiduous inculcations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. In him the Stoical synthesis of pantheism and individualism reaches its highest. His *Meditations*—the last great product of Stoicism—had a certain inner and mystical affinity with the Neo-Platonism that should follow—a result not to be wondered at when philosophy became, in

the Emperor's mystic speculation, so largely concerned with the affairs of practical life. The enforcement of virtuous life has precedence, with him, over subtle speculation as to the origin of things. For interest had been transferred from metaphysical speculation to practical ethics. For all that, his system is not without metaphysical foundation: this is found in its theory of Nature, as moral support and guide. His discussions of ethical problems are neither systematic nor exhaustive—there is no attempt to make them so. His work is not an intellectual system of the Universe: the ethical philosophy it presents does not derive from being part of a philosophical system which offers itself as an organic whole. There is, however, this fundamental conception underlying all his teaching, namely, that all things form one whole, and constitute a unity. This is in accord with the essentially monistic character of Stoicism. He teaches that this whole is so wisely ordered that the wisdom of each part lies, after the Stoic teleology, in seeking the good of the whole. Hence the Emperor can say—"All parts of the Universe are interwoven and tied together with a sacred bond. And no one thing is foreign or unrelated to another. This general connection gives unity and ornament to the world. For the world, take it altogether, is but one."¹ The unity and the ideal significance of things he grasps, after the Stoical fashion, which was impelled to these under the demands of reason. But, of course, this universal reason in things is still too much an abstract potentiality. Again he says—"If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head lying any-

¹ vii. 9.

where apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, or does anything selfish. If you have detached yourself from the natural unity—for you were made by Nature a part, but now you have cut yourself off—yet, in your case, there is this beautiful provision, that it is in your power again to unite yourself.”¹ Of course, the trouble is, that Stoical thought leaves this organic unity of mankind a thing too abstract, subjective, and purely ideal. Once more says Aurelius—“He that frets himself because things do not happen just as he would have them, and secedes and separates himself from the law of universal nature, is but a sort of ulcer of the world, never considering that the same cause which produced the displeasing accident made him too. And lastly, he that is selfish, and cuts off his own soul from the universal soul of all rational beings, is a kind of voluntary outlaw.”² We thus see the world to be objectively conceived by Aurelius as a unified thing—a cosmos to which all belong. But the unifying power remains too mysterious in his thought, and we are not shown how man, as part, may become reconciled with the whole. Still, this unity of the world was strikingly conceived by him as giving unity to man’s life, all the parts or members of the one body being most closely connected. The alternative is always present to him—“either Providence or atoms rule the Universe.”³ He has his own position clearly defined, however, in his preference for Providence, with its boundless possibilities and hopes, rather than chance, with its attendant resig-

¹ viii. 34.² iv. 29.³ iv. 3.

nation. He shares the Stoical belief in Divine Power as having given us all we need. Very beautiful is the completeness of his contentment with all things—"All things are harmonious to me which are harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing is for me too early or too late which is in due time for thee. All is fruit to me which thy seasons, O Nature, bear. From thee are all things, and in thee all, and all return to thee. The poet says, 'Dear City of Cecrops!' Shall I not say, 'Dear City of God'?"¹ His view of man's duty, therefore, is to live agreeably to the course of Nature, and harmoniously with other men. His individualism, so virtuous and strongly marked, takes a prevailing optimism for granted, and puts itself into harmony with the ethical cosmos. For all that, he keenly feels the impotence of man, borne along on the world's current. But, of course, the fact of evil is a trouble in face of the Providence to which reference has been made. But Stoical courage simply refused to admit the fact, and took the world for perfect. Such evil as there might be must be for the general good. This is precisely one of the defects of the moral philosophy of Aurelius, that the reality of the antagonism of evil to the good is not more decisively felt, and so, too, with respect to the reality of righteousness. A heart that should beat more violently in sympathy with practical triumphs of righteousness, than the philosophy of Aurelius compelled, was something that could come only by that teaching being transcended. Sincere as Stoical thought always remained, it seems lacking in thoroughness here. It could not, and did not, feel, in any adequate

¹ iv. 23.

manner, the difficulty of reconciling the pessimistic aspects of the world with its faith in the perfection of the universe. Hence hope springs not eternal in its breast. Resignation is to it the whole of virtue, be it to goodness or to necessity.

The Deity that, for the Emperor, rules and pervades all things is one that might very well suggest the Deity of monotheism. Only, acquiescence in the Divine will here partakes too much of indifference to what *may* occur, and acceptance of what *must*, as though it were some fate which neither divinity nor humanity can change. For, though Marcus Aurelius, like Epictetus and Seneca, attains some sense of the personality of Deity, yet it is by no means uniform or persistent.

To the ethical philosophy of Aurelius, the soul was indestructible—the dominant and guiding principle of life. In its principle of reason, he found the secret of man's relationship to man, no less than to God, the universal reason. Hence he can say, "Though we are not just of the same flesh and blood, yet our minds are nearly related."¹ This brotherhood of man, says Aurelius, will lead us not only to strive for the common good, but to pity and forgive. Man is to him the crown of nature. Yet the nature of man is to him social, but his social eagerness to serve mankind is not such as to make him break unrestrainedly with the cosmic claims which are so central in his thought. Here, too, there is a prominent element of resignation before the injustice of men. Man's relation to the Deity is, in Stoical ethics, of fundamental importance. They make God and reason

¹ ii. i.]

finely identical, and our true good, therefore, lies in conformity with the mind and will of Deity. The life of reason is, therefore, that whereon Aurelius insists. Reason is to him the judgment-forming power, and can subject all passion. "Hold in honour your opinionative faculty, for this alone is able to prevent any opinion from originating in your guiding principle that is contrary to Nature, or the proper constitution of a rational creature."¹ For, in Stoical thought, a rational nature is subjectively conceived to belong to all. Not only that, but as a rational being, man is expected to rise above himself—beyond his own individuality. 'Tis in keeping with such a nature the Emperor says, "If any man is able to convince me, and show me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change, for I seek the truth, by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance." Such, then, is the Emperor's firmly enounced doctrine of humanity, with the dignity and duty that pertain to every man, and every man's work. Dutiful and sincere we must be, and there must be no acting a part, in our going beyond the self. And if, according to Stoic fatalism, everything is necessarily determined, the determination is along lines that must be optimistically conceived. So the nobility of the Emperor, in keeping with this, says, "It is not seemly that I, who willingly have brought sorrow to none, should permit myself to be sad."

When we turn to the Stoic theory of virtue, as represented in Aurelius, we find the inwardness of virtue remarkable, and it is absolutely self-sufficing.

¹ iii. 9.

Virtue is to him primarily cosmic: it is something due to the universe or God. We are free to be moved only from within: the calm which is consequent on just and virtuous action makes just, righteous action that in which our inner reasoning alone finds rest. The good man is lord of his own life: he is such a king among men, by reason of virtue, as had never before been dreamed. Virtue is to him superior to life's varying fortunes. Thus arose the conception of the impossible wise man of Stoical thought. And the impossibility of the realisation led to its becoming tempered, in the later developments, with practical and practicable forms and insistences.

The Emperor's inculcations contain very much that is undoubtedly excellent, as to the wisdom of life. Powerless were the darts of destiny against the inner refuge of Aurelius, with his lofty tranquillity of mind, and deep quickening of soul. Such an ethical view of the world as his need not be opposed to an intellectual one, but the ethical one was more deeply satisfying. The good will, in its detached exercise, was for him supreme virtue, but with the formal self-consistency of this will he was too well content. The chief fault I should find with it is that it leads too much to passive and quietistic excellences, and has too few insistences on the active forth-puttings of heroic virtue. I mean, we can easily fear disturbance too much, and carry the limits of prudence too far. It seems to us more important to have the soul cultivate the plenitude of its own energy and power for the performance of actively and generously heroic

virtue. We need not too readily fear the world-city and its claims. The good will is the great thing, but not as a mere internal state, rather as something which goes forth in labour for the whole, from morning until evening. When the soul is too exclusively thrown back upon itself, there are attendant dangers of pride and self-confidence. Still, quietistic excesses apart, the insistence on the importance of *being*, rather than knowing or doing, has its own value. Those petty and untoward things, towards which Stoicism fosters a contemptuous disregard, may, under higher and more positive ethical law, become sources of joy, strength, and worth. But it is only just to the Stoical view to remember that its indifference to outward things was only a relative indifference—as compared with the absolute renunciation of ideal moral life—and was even essentially religious, since the outward things were taken to be at the disposal of Deity, in whose wisdom we must confide.

The Stoical theory of good and evil—both alike absolute—came to be modified, and room and place found for things as human and actually existent. The egoistic and altruistic tendencies were not perfectly harmonised, the stress remaining mainly on the former, and the essentially social character of virtue being imperfectly drawn, even though a certain utilitarian interest and tendency are far from wanting in the teaching of Aurelius.

The future life is left in uncertainty by the Emperor, though he seems not without some sense of the continuance of life after death. He scarcely ever touches

on the question. He prefers to centre attention on the life of the present. Every day may be his last, yet other-worldliness he has none. "Though you were to live three thousand, or, if you please, thirty thousand years, yet remember that no man can lose any other life than that which he now lives, neither is he possessed of any other than that which he loses."¹ But his reasoning is as noble as it is peculiar, in this connection, for, just because we have but this all too brief life, we must the more be careful to live it well. "Hark ye, friend; you have been a burgher of this great city, what matter though you have lived in it five years or three; if you have observed the laws of the corporation, the length or shortness of the time makes no difference."²

It will be seen, from all that has now been advanced, that the ethical philosophy of Stoics, like the Emperor, came short in this, that it set out from the formal principle of ethical law, and never got the length of the real principle on which goodness, right, and duty must depend. Its whole conception of the principle remains too abstractly conceived: the right, the good, the ideal, must be chosen for their own sakes, but still it is not brought out wherein the right, the good, the ideal do actually consist. The clearest we can gain is its emphasis on the good will, as a state in itself, and apart from all things outside of it—which is certainly a noble ideal. Its theory of virtue never transcends itself. The virtue remains defective, in that it consists too much in outward action, to the

¹ ii. 14.

² xii. 36.

neglect or disparagement of such interior dispositions as charity, beneficence, tenderness, and spontaneous love. And, when it is introspective, its self-questioning is too persistent, and lacks inspiration from without. It forgets how exterior and universal in its aims moral effort must be, no man living for himself, or being complete in himself. In this way of thinking, there is the tendency, too, to retire too readily from the world, and to sacrifice too little to save and improve it. True individuality comes not of the soul's repression, but by its advance in the service of thought and life. The soul grows cosmic, not by abstraction of itself from the world, but by claiming all things as its own. At any rate, 'tis but a cold and soul-desolating ideal to which it can attain, by dint of proud and self-reliant will. Virtue thus becomes easily too personal and subjective. In Marcus Aurelius, however, appears at times a tenderness which transcends Stoicism proper. The ethical philosophy of Stoicism, at its highest, had need to be lifted into the sphere of personality, and the realm of ends—rational ends for which alone self-denial or renunciation is necessary. But then it will have passed out of the twilight of abstraction into the sphere of noonday—the light of real principles, principles of love that concern persons, human and divine. We are not now concerned to follow it thither. It is enough now to note how far Stoic speculation can carry us.

With Aurelius, as with Epictetus, man's own self-development is that with which nothing in the shape of outward circumstance must be allowed to interfere.

But he overlooks too largely the warfare within, no less than without. Man's inner world is more than Stoical calm, and there are higher things to be said than the Emperor has known. Nor is destiny, from a higher view-point, merely the cross-grained thing it seemed to these Stoic philosophers. Still, high credit must be given to Stoical thought for the way in which it advanced on Aristotle, and anticipated later and higher thought, in teaching the will of man to conform—in virtue of its free internal dispositions—to the outer limitations imposed on man's power. Its modified determinism made strength of will the prime requisite of man's adjustment to the world's order, and of his control of passion. The unique triumph of the will's perfect self-mastery before all exterior issues, and the priceless worth of the will's inward or inherent goodness, were great and valid ideals to set before men. But they must not be so conceived that the isolated inner life shall be loosened from the effort after universality.

A graver and more severe law is required than the Stoical obedience to the law of nature and reason, even though we admit the value of the sacrifice of desire to this Stoical subordination to Nature's law. The life of pure reason is, to Stoical thought, the true life, for the rational is, for it, as we have seen, the real. But such life of pure reason can never be the true, the ideal, life; for not apathy or indifference is our need, but always more and fuller life. This false attitude to life is a grave defect of Stoicism: its aloofness and contempt were a default of life. Life is the

one thing needful; life laughs to scorn oppositions, troubles, losses, failures, and makes them minister to its own progress and development. Life must be at once intense and expansive, so shall it be generous and fruitful. Of such life the law is, to him that hath shall be given. But it is sad to see so noble a soul as that of the Emperor unable to project his own serene rationality into the system of the world as a universal principle, and to behold him equally unable to carry forward his own sublime adherence to moral ideal into faith in eternal moral ideal at the core and centre of a world that seemed to be its contradiction.

To the Emperor Marcus Aurelius must be accorded high, though discriminating, praise for his contribution towards the imperishable glory of Stoical ethics, in his setting forth of the intrinsic worth of moral personality, the triumph of man's self-conquest, the actualism of energetic fulfilment of duty in midst of his scheme of lofty idealism, the fundamental place of Divine order or law; for these, and such like insistences, made the Emperor the important connecting-link he was between pagan and Christian thought. The emphasis of an Aurelius on the inwardness of self, and the interior certitude of moral virtue, was a foreshadowing of the teachings of an Augustine.

CHAPTER V.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS.

EQUALLY in philosophy and in theology the doctrine of the Logos has been of prime importance. Yet that importance is still found, frequently, appreciated in very inadequate manner. It is usually said that, as matter of history, the doctrine took ontological rise in the idealism of Plato, forming the mediating principle between the transcendent world and the world of phenomena. This is true, only if we remember that it had already been employed by Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, as a principle of reason or law, to explain the order of the world. It gradually worked its way into a central position in philosophical thinking. The philosophical Logos was essentially cosmological and metaphysical. The Stoics took all activity to imply a Logos or spiritual principle. As operative principle of the world, the Logos was to them *anima mundi*. Philo, again, adopted this Stoic use of the word Logos, whereby it denoted a rational principle immanent in nature and in man, although he derived the contents of the term more from Plato. Philo's Logos is, in fact, like the early Greek *νοῦς*; "the constitutions of all other things" are supposed to be found in the Logos. Thus the philosophical Logos is reason absolutely, or

absolute idea, a strong enough Idealism. In the same way, the term Logos became the constructive norm of theological thinking. It is evident that the Logos principle had a history in Greek philosophy ere it came to be Christologised in the Church. The application of the term Logos to the interpretation of the Person of Jesus, in the Gospel of St John, does not at all carry with it that the doctrine was in any full or adequate fashion realised, even where this Gospel might be known. Had it been so fully grasped, it would have sufficed to dissipate all notions of external being or imperfect deity or separate nature, in respect of the Logos. It is easy to see how thought tended quite readily to associate the title Logos, so suggestive of reason ruling in the universe, with the idea of Christ as a cosmic force, and to come short of apprehending the real personality of the Logos. St John's Gospel opposes certain positions of Gnosticism by its identification of the Jesus of history with the mediating Logos of Greek philosophy. For the Logos figured in the Gnostic writings, where it appeared as an æon distinct from Christ. The philosophical Logos meant the Reason, St John's Logos was the Word, and to him it meant a distinct hypostasis or personality. Subsisting in God, as being or hypostasis, was the Infinite Thought—reflection and counterpart of God—which is, in fact, the Logos. The Logos was to Philo, however, distinct from God, and subordinate to him, being, in fact, placed by Philo outside the Divine sphere. St John is again distinctive in identifying the Logos with the Messianic idea. Furthermore, St John lays his main stress on the incarnation of the Logos, an idea wholly wanting

to Philo. Philo is dualistic, John is not; matter is to Philo evil, to John divine. While the creation of the world was all that Philo sought through the Logos, St John claimed, in addition, its redemption. From all which it is evident that the doctrine of the Logos—whatever may have been the case as to the term itself—was not derived by St John from Philo, being so essentially different from his.

It is matter for some surprise, no doubt, that the Logos doctrine is not more in evidence in post-Apostolic Fathers anterior to Justin Martyr, and for some regret that not more material is available for the guidance of our conclusions. Justin makes evident the influence of Plato, and says he wishes to be Christian, "not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all points like."¹ Justin shows, no doubt, the influence of Platonic and Stoic modes of thinking in connection with his Logos ideas, but not so much can be drawn from this as has frequently been done. It would be easy to name recent philosophical writers who have shown no real insight into the creative intelligence that led men like Justin to take the Stoic idea of the Logos, and find the Divine reason, immanent in nature and in man, to be incarnated in Jesus Christ, in the manner of the great Apologists. What insight is there in supposing, as these philosophic writers have been well content to do, that the Christian thought of these Apologists was but a pale reflection of Greek philosophic thought, without independent and creative power? As Justin says, when blaming Plato for lack of spiritual

¹ *Second Apology of Justin*, xiii.

understanding, "It is not, then, that we hold the same opinions as others, but that all speak in imitation of ours."¹ The Apologists really set out to prove Christianity a reasonable religion, and God's reason they found revealed in the Logos. Greek thinkers they certainly were, and not lacking in independent power.

The cosmological aspect of the problem holds Justin at the outset, but the ethical—or mediatorial—interest of the Logos principle also attracted him. The function of the Logos was mediatorial, and, in its revealings of the Father to men, it linked the two worlds—human and Divine. To Justin, indeed, the Logos had been revealed in creation, in humanity, in history, in Greek philosophy, in Old Testament revelation, and, most perfectly, in Christ. In the Logos are the unity and harmony of the world guaranteed. Writers like Justin are sometimes quoted as suggesting the view that the Logos was but an "aspect" of the Divine. No doubt, the Son is often spoken of by Justin in terms that suggest an emanation or product of the Father's essence: he holds the Son to be "numerically distinct" from the Father;² but the word "aspect" might easily obscure the fact that Justin, nevertheless, holds Him to be God;³ in power "indivisible and inseparable from the Father";⁴ "in will" not distinct from Him.⁵ Justin does not, however, make the Logos a personal totality in Himself, and apart from the Father. The whole Logos having become incarnate in Christ, there is a superiority in Him over all previous teachers, to Justin, in respect of completeness

¹ *First Apology of Justin*, lx.

² *Dialogue with Trypho*, ch. 129.

³ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

and finality. Christianity is to Justin the true philosophy as well as the perfect religion. As a Platonic transcendentalist, Justin carried his idea of the Logos as reason far out into sympathetic relation towards pagan philosophy and faith. In such discussion, it is to be remembered that the doctrine of the Logos is metaphysical rather than historical. Not Jesus pre-exists before His advent, but the Logos—the Christ or Eternal Son. This metaphysical and speculative character of Greek Christian thought ran up into the transcendental metaphysics of the Councils of Nice and Chalcedon. 'Tis a common mistake of our time to suppose that this philosophical conception of the Logos drew thought off from the historic Jesus, and gave an alien development to His religion. But this is to fail to see that the Logos idea—as a principle or means of revelation—was the very idea which made the Christian religion reasonable to minds that had been steeped in the wisdom of Greek philosophy.

Athenagoras brought into clearer view the personal existence of the Logos prior to the Creation. He says, "God's Son is the Logos of the Father, in idea and in operation," and further that the Logos is "the first product of the Father, not as having been brought into existence," but because "He came forth to be the idea and energising power of all material things."¹ Athenagoras thus repels the idea that the Logos first acquires personal existence in connection with the Creation. This, of course, while he recognises His operation therein.

¹ *Apology*, x.

When we come to Clement, we find the doctrine of the Logos centre and support of his whole system. He held that the Logos—equal with, but distinct from, the Father—was manifested throughout the history of the world, and finally incarnated in Jesus Christ. Greek philosophy to him “purges the soul and prepares it beforehand for the reception of faith.” The Lord Himself is to Clement the living Logos—the “Hortatory Word,” in the high theological sense of the term “Word.” The inner mind of God is revealed in the Word, according to Clement, for He is the full revelation of the Father. Clement does not follow Justin and others who—founding on the ambiguity of the term *Logos*, as meaning both *reason* and *speech*—had distinguished the “immanent Word”—the Reason which is *in* God—from the “exterior Word,” which meant the Word as Revealer. To Clement, thought and word are, in God, one. Clement held to the immanence of the Divine Word in the universe—a doctrine which became typical of Greek theology. The Pre-incarnate Word, in his view, prepared the world for the teaching of the Logos. This view of Deity as the secret force of Creation has been found strongly accordant with the advances of science.

In the strong hands of Origen, the Logos doctrine became marked by his teaching as to the eternal generation of the Son—who was regarded as eternally a distinct personal Being. This added strength to the Logos doctrine, putting it on firmer metaphysical basis by taking the Son more completely out of the category of created beings, and rejecting all Sabellian theories of a temporal evolution. Origen also opposed all emanation theories,

and held a difference of essence in the Son from the Father. The Son was not, however, of any created essence. 'Twas thus Origen subordinated the Son to the Father, who alone had absoluteness and self-existence. The Logos doctrine was central in the Christology of Athanasius, and, in its Origenistic form, became the mainstay of the Nicene Christology. In Athanasius the cosmological idea of Christ, as eternal and necessary principle of mediation between God and all created things, outruns the soteriological aspect of Christ as Saviour of men. To him the Logos mediator must be essentially Divine—"very God of very God,"—else the cleft between finite and infinite could not be removed.

It must be evident, from what has already been advanced, and without carrying out our statement into further detail, that the unique triumph of Christian speculative genius was to make the Logos no mere external and subordinate, but an immanent personal principle in the very nature of the Absolute. For, as Hatch properly enough remarks, a transcendent Deity became incommunicable the more the conception of His transcendence was developed; hence the need of such intermediate Logos. As such, it could mediate between God and the world. The discovery of Christian reflection was thus the great one that reason is rooted in personality. Personality, that is to say, was seen to be an immanent category of the Divine Logos or the primal Being. Identical in essence with God, the Logos becomes thus distinct from God. For He has thus an origin, as God has not. The Logos principle was incarnated in the personality of Jesus. The unity between the

Divine Spirit and the human was thus from the outset assured, and is due to the Logos being the immanent principle of the soul of man. But, of course, it was still imperfectly apprehended, and had to fight against counter-dualistic influences issuing from Neo-Platonism. It is this ideal principle of the Logos that overcomes the dualism of actual life. It makes a knowledge of the Absolute possible. It gives a rational mediation to the world process. Only through the ideal Mediator, in whom it centres, can a sinful race be ushered upon a spiritual life that is infinite. The emanational and mediational features of later Greek speculation significantly wore a quasi-personal aspect, which fact makes it the more necessary to realise the significance, in the new Christianity, of the category of personality. Of course, earlier impersonal and abstract elements could still less yield advance. So we see this importance of the Divine Word or Logos felt in theological reflection—in the manner already set out—from Justin onwards, so that from this time the eternal immanent self-evolution of the Logos comes into view as capable of offering resistance to Greek ideas of dualism. Sympathetic as men like Clement and Origen were towards Greek philosophy, it still remained to them more a propædæutic than a dominating influence. It sought to make the moral faith of religion rational, to satisfy the intellect as religion satisfied the heart and will. In modern philosophy the Logos principle still has place, being none other than the principle of self-consciousness—the principle of innermost life and consciousness—or, as increasingly conceived, of living

spirit. The Logos is the immanent principle of our spiritual being. And it is the principle which makes possible to us a rational conception of the nature of absolute Being. By it absolute and relative are brought together. The Logos of God has come down to men as ideal Mediator and Redeemer of the race. The historic Logos has thus become the medium of the highest spiritual revelation to men. The Logos was the Crown of antecedent religious evolution, and, as the Divine Logos, formed the living bond of union between the first Creation and the second.

We have now followed the development of the Logos doctrine from the dim apprehension of it by Heraclitus, as the reason of the world, up to its modern significance. It was this Logos doctrine of Heraclitus which the Stoics chose to make central. After them Justin Martyr is found speaking of the "Spermatic Word." This λόγος σπερματικός was by them held to be the vital principle of all formative forces—being, indeed, the creative Reason in its active and productive power. So from Justin onwards we find this Divine World-Reason fully embodied and revealed in Jesus as the Logos, whose personality has in consequence supreme and all-conquering effect or power of impression. To Justin the "Spermatic Word" was, in some sort, a racial revelation; but he found the whole Word or full Logos in Jesus Christ—a second God. The same conceptions of the Logos that we find in Justin occur in Philo, but the former does more justice to the all-important category of personality. The Logos is to Philo not only Divine

Reason resting in itself, but also "uttered Reason." For the Universal Logos carries in it the distinction between the thought of God in itself and that same thought when it has become objective. The Logos is, to Philo, constitutive principle of human individuality. Now, it was precisely this doctrine of the Logos, with the new significance it bore in Christianity, that began to bridge over the chasm between God and the sensible world, which Greek dualism had left. It was a doctrine whose origin was laid by Origen in the Son of God as *eternally* begotten of the Father. To him it was no emanation, says Harnack, but an effluence of the nature, due to an internally necessary act of will—a view which certainly does not lack in subordinationism. But, for Origen, the world finds its unity in the Logos, Mediator between God and the world, and complete manifestation of the hidden Deity.¹ Even with the Stoics, the doctrine had this religious significance, that man in his essence was taken to be kindred with God. Philo started from the Stoic idea of the Logos as basis of his teaching on the subject, connecting it, however, with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, with the Aristotelian *νοῦς*, and with the Hebrew Wisdom. For Philo, the Logos is the Mediator that establishes the connection between the transcendent Deity and the world set over against Him. For him, man arrives at union with God by means of the Logos, whom to know is to realise man's destined end and way. For Philo, the Logos is 'Reason' rather than 'Word,' and metaphysical

¹ *De Princip.*, i. 2, 4-8.

rather than personal, for personality was not as yet defined. But the Logos was, strictly taken, not a person to Philo, but a *tertium quid* which was more than merely a spiritual principle. The shortcoming of the Greek mode of treating the Logos idea, as compared with modern methods starting from man's self-conscious spirit, was that it rested the whole case too much on thought or knowledge alone. It left too much aside the world of man's concrete moral interests and duties for a pale reflective ideal. Modern thought cannot follow the ancient mode of simply seeking to connect God and the world; it must first know man, find out God, and make certain of the reality of the world, before proceeding to their correlation. The significant influence of philosophy on early theological thought really consisted in the way in which the philosophical idea of the Logos worked itself into, and operated upon, the theology of that time. But this must not be taken in any exaggerated form or sense that fails to recognise the creative and independent power and intelligence of the early Christian Apologists, working in perfectly reasonable and natural direction upon the materials existing to their hands. They recognised the necessity that Christianity should plant firm foot in the existing intellectual world of Greece and Rome. The Logos might be but a principle, or an idea, but it represented to the Greek the principle of revelation—the means whereby God gained access to, and contact with, His world. And, to Philo, the Logos was the archetype of human reason, which latter, by reason of the Logos, made

the ascent to God. If we take the development down to Athanasius, inclusively, it seems as though the centre of gravity of the Logos doctrine lay, not in the historical Christ, but rather in the eternal Logos as being the eternal divine spirit of the Incarnate Lord. Even when we turn to Irenæus, we find him resting the case for Christianity on the fact that the Divine Logos became man in Christ, in order to effect the unity of man and God. In opposition to Gnostic dualism, Irenæus put forward his strong claim for Christ, laying stress on man's union with God—in advance of the Apologists—rather than on knowledge of God, even while he, too, retained the philosophical idea of the Logos.

It has been charged against the Logos speculation that it has been apt to sit loosely to particular historic events and occurrences. But however this may have incidentally been, it has not been shown to be in any wise essential. In the historical development, the point from which thought actually set out was the identifying of the Pre-Incarnate Lord with the Logos. But we can by no means agree with the position of those who to the historic Logos or God-Man assign only a transitory and contingent significance, reserving an essential and abiding significance for the ideal God-Man or Eternal Logos. On the contrary, religion centres not merely in the Logos, but in the Absolute God-Man, who is for ever First-born of many brethren, the Consummator of all things, and the Head of the Church redeemed, which receives out of His Divine fulness for evermore.

CHAPTER VI.

GNOSTICISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

THE history of Gnosticism runs up to the end of the second century, and is most instructive. Recent research has shown that it may be most wisely taken as but a single phase in a much wider movement. We are here concerned with it in its religious significance under the influence of Greek speculation, and in the interests of philosophical monism. The theology of the Gnostic sects was set in a fantastic cosmogony, rather than embodied in a reasoned system; they professed an esoteric doctrine or Gnosis; the most characteristic feature of their later teaching was, belief in a subordinate agent, the Demiurge, by whom the visible creation had taken place.

Gnosticism is to be distinguished from Christian teachings on the one hand, and Hellenistic influences on the other. We need not, like Irenæus, regard it as something only evil, for it not only proved a half-way house for some on the road to Christianity, but compelled to a Christian philosophy of religion. Nor was the Gnostic movement the artificial thing Bousset has lately made it out to be. Their method was syncretistic; they inclined to mix mythology with philosophy;

and the result could by no possibility prove a satisfying philosophy of religion. They, however, made the need for it felt, and in some sense paved the way for it. Great was the clash of ideas in that early time—Jewish, Greek, Syrian, Babylonian, and Persian—and there is little need for wonder, therefore, that Gnosticism was a strange compound. Gnosticism was, in fact, an eclectic philosophy issuing out of this ferment—a ferment increased by the desire to explain Oriental systems and cults. Anterior to Christianity, Gnosticism was open to the influences of Persia, Babylonia, and India, and was influenced by the ferment of Oriental religions, which resulted in a religious syncretism running into very different extremes. But its final outcome is seen in the Manichæan System, while a predominantly dualistic character marks its entire history. It was on this primary dualism that Greek philosophy acted.

The Gnostics have been styled the “first Christian theologians,” but with doubtful propriety. For, though their indirect usefulness was so great in bestirring the Church to a rational comprehension of her tenets, yet it would be rather inappropriate to apply the phrase—as has sometimes been done—to men who, if they had had their way, would have seriously imperilled, not to say absolutely destroyed, the distinctive life and character of Christianity. Indeed, the weapons that withstood and vanquished Gnosticism were drawn from the very armoury of Christianity, so that to speak of their somewhat fantastic attempts in the light mentioned seems rather a misuse of language. Gnosticism took

its distinctive character from the fact that these endeavours were made, under the ruling ideas of sin and salvation, with a view to relate the ideas of Greek philosophy with the myths of Oriental religions. The crude mythologies had a philosophical value put upon them that imparted a change of character to the whole Gnostic movement. It was rather in spite of the Gnostics, than by their aid, that Christianity proclaimed and perfected its doctrines of the one morally perfect and omniscient God, of moral evil, of a real Incarnation, and of an ethical redemption. And not from the facts and doctrines of New Testament time did these "first Christian theologians" pretend to derive the elements of that *Gnosis* which, amid much that was commendable, freely admitted the vagaries and errors of sheer intellectual arrogance, and exalted them into the knowledge that was to dethrone faith.

The finest feature of Gnostic theology was, after every deduction for error, its aspiration after a theology that should really embrace a world-view—comprehensive and broad. They pursued the ontological problem—sought how the finite and material came from, and coexisted with, the infinite and spiritual. The Absolute Being was thus a main object of their thought. They set out from the Platonic axiom that God is good, and nothing but good. It was with them a fundamental belief that the Creator of the world is not God, the Supreme Being. That Creator is either a subordinate agent, or an inferior being. He may be evil, or He may not be unfriendly. He is the Demiurge, and so not that God who sent a

Redeemer into the world. And the Redeemer, so sent, was not a real incarnation of the Divine, but One whom they viewed after a Docetic fashion. He was One, that is, no longer unique—whose humanity was no longer real. But again, the moral problem held the Gnostics. They wondered how the world, in which so much evil prevails, could come from a good Creator. They therefore sought a theodicy, and turned their attention to the origin of evil. They set an ethical dualism between spirit and body—setting, in fact, nature and spirit in absolute opposition to each other. They bridged the gulf between the transcendent Deity and the world of matter by a vast succession of spiritual powers or *Æons*. Like the Platonists and Greek schools generally, they thought not of man as making his own evil. Evil must come, they thought, from matter, and must, in fact, be the work of that being who created a material world. This belief is a characteristic and persistent feature of Gnostic theology. There is nothing Christian about it, and it is not even Platonic. For the Platonist was confident enough that evil was not to be explained through a God.

Another prevailing feature of Gnostic theology was its making salvation consist of enlightenment or knowledge rather than faith. In their hands Redemption lost both its universality and its moral character. Their theology assumed for its *Gnosis* a higher worth than the *Pistis* of the Church. Their pretensions on behalf of their *Gnosis* were like those of Philo, who claimed to have a secret lore that came by way of oral tradition. They represented Christ to have given an

esoteric teaching to His apostles, different from the teachings of the Church to the people. Yet their position, taken all in all, should perhaps be looked upon as supranaturalist, rather than rationalistic.

The two great divisions of original Gnosticism were the Jewish and the Pagan. Judaic Gnosticism was the first to come into contact with Christianity, but the pagan Gnosticism was most influential in its results upon it. For Christianity, though a living power, needed a philosophy. Basilides, Valentinus, Marcion, Tatian, and Bardaisan would give it one on a Gnostic basis. But the Gnosticism of Basilides and Valentinus was not the pure Hellenism it has often been represented to be: their Gnosticism is much more Oriental—is, in fact, Orientalism masked in Hellenism. Judaic Gnosticism we find pluming itself upon a hidden wisdom, special illumination, and exclusive mysteries. Theirs was an exclusiveness of an intellectual sort. On the other hand, the apostolic insistence is on mystery that is no longer mystery, but made open and manifest. Judaic Gnosticism attributed to angels what belonged to the Logos, the Eternal Son. Besides these vague mystical speculations and esoteric teachings, there inhered in this incipient Gnosticism a baleful ascetic tendency. From the Judaic form of Gnosticism, the transition toward later Gnostic doctrine is marked by Cerinthus. Cerinthus attributed creation to an angelic Demiurge, and paved the way by his angelology for the coming of that time when a later Gnosticism should transform the angels of Cerinthus into ideal powers or Æons.

When we come to Hellenic Gnosticism, we find fantastic attempts to solve the problems raised by philosophy by means of a mystical interpretation of the Scriptures. These attempts were results of the working of Christianity upon the speculative tendencies of the Greek mind, with its inherent craving for intellectual clearness. Gnosticism was, in fact, essentially a philosophy of religion, whose starting-point was the ultimate principle of things, even the Deity who was raised beyond all thought and expression, and from whom all things were deduced. The Gnostics believed in revelation in a general sense, and adhered to the reality of the revelation given in the Scriptures, albeit they rejected portions of these writings as due to inferior agencies than God. By Hellenic Gnosticism the Divine authority of the Old Testament was admitted, but it was viewed as containing a hidden philosophy, by which account was taken of the liberation of spirit from the bondage of nature. The allegorising method was resorted to, so that the contents of the Old Testament were interpreted as symbols of this hidden truth. For dreams of a Messianic kingdom they substituted a mystical philosophy with a whole series of vague personified spiritual abstractions. And the same method was applied by Hellenic Gnosticism to the New Testament. To it the inner light, on which it prided itself, was necessary to such Gnosis or illumination as was supposed to give true mystical interpretation of the sacred record. The Gnostics' problem was to explain the relation of the God of pure monotheism to the world and to man.

The two great representatives of Hellenic Gnosticism were Basilides and Valentinus, the latter a less consistent thinker than the former. The great work of Basilides is the *Exegetica* in twenty-four books. But his teachings are also preserved in the writings of his son and chief disciple, Isidore. Origen tells us he also composed odes. The cardinal fact for Basilides is the suffering of the world. In the Basilidian system, the universality of suffering is base, and the extinction of suffering is goal. He uttered the paradox that "the martyrs suffer for their sins," because to him it seemed better to take suffering as a consequence of sin or inherited tendency to sin, rather than admit the Divine constitution of the world to be evil. Basilides has a philosophical purpose: the mystery of suffering—the burden of existence—weighs upon him: he would justify the ways of God to men. And here we come upon the keystone of the Basilidian system, which is the law of transmigration. Transmigration is to help the complete purification of the soul. Basilides lays down that the soul has previously sinned in another life, and bears its punishment here. Despite his fatal bondage of rebirth, man's will is in this life free. Salvation is therefore possible to him, but only the elect are saved. The system of Basilides is of markedly dualistic character in its theories of nature, of man, and of the intermediate agencies between God and the world. In the Basilidian psychology, the soul, in the ordinary sense of that term, can hardly be said to exist. But the metaphysic of Basilides affords firmer ground, for there is no doubt as to his postula-

tion of a God, albeit a God of the most abstract and remote character. The obvious fault of this procedure is, that it assumes the idea of God without showing how that idea is necessarily presupposed by the contents of experience. The Absolute is for Basilides unpredicable, unknowable, inconceivable, and the energy of his expressions could not be surpassed. In fact, the complete transcendence and absolute inscrutability of God could not be expressed with more complete disregard of the logical consequences than we find in Basilides. This doctrine of the absolute transcendence—the complete incomprehensibility—of Deity, as set forth by Basilides, had a great influence on the Christian philosophers of the Alexandrian schools. Hence we find Clement able to say that God is “beyond the One and higher than the Monad itself.” Basilides makes much of negation. “Not-Being-God” is his name for Deity. He speaks of absolute existence as absolute nothing, in a way which anticipates Hegel. The “Not-Being-God” deposited an ideal cosmic germ or transcendental cosmic seed, which constituted at the same time the aggregate forms of the actual world. He says “the God that was not, made the world that was not, out of what was not.” The God so conceived—as “the God that was not”—was the logical result of the negative movement from the world to God. It was in danger of making God a purely indeterminate being, of whom nothing could be known or said—a kind of deification of negativity. Yet Basilides held the world to be infinitely complex, and he meant God to be infinitely determinate. The truth is, our

knowledge of God is always relative and partial, but it is true and valid, so far as it goes. We know Him in a most real way, as the self-conscious, self-originating, and self-manifesting Deity. Basilides strove to preserve the absolute perfection of God, and would not allow to Him thought, perception, or will, with this end in view. A mistaken and unnecessary denial, of course, which would empty the notion of God of real meaning for us. How the actual existence of the world became evolved, however, Basilides does not tell us. We must "ask no question as to whence." The actual world, as flowing from an ideal world laid down by an ideal Deity, seems to us rather fictitious. But some things in the evolutionary process of Basilides are made clear. The primal seed mass, in which all entities are stored up, acts without exterior aid or control. And again, the whole is a process of ascent. "All things press," he says, "from below upward, from the worse to the better. Nor among things superior is any so senseless as to descend below." Thus does the process of evolution run by differentiation and selection, the only law on each unit being that imposed by its own nature. Starting with the notion of the Trinity, as found in the baptismal formula, Basilides develops his philosophy of religion with the aid of two ideas, the Sonship and the Evangel. The Sonship is, with him, deposited in the cosmic germ. But it cannot remain there. It must be restored to its fellowship with the Father. Its evolution is the history of the world-process. It is, moreover, a collective germ, carrying the seeds of many sons in itself. He has

before his view the Son in the bosom of the Father, the Son by whom worlds were made, and the Son who is the historic Christ. There is little of a Docetic character, it must be said, in his religious philosophy. The Evangel is the knowledge of things supramundane and celestial. It is, in fact, the fourfold wisdom of knowing the Father, the "Not-Being-God," the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It is a philosophy of religion made up of elements, Gnostic, Buddhist, and Christian, the last-named forming, in his own belief, the chief factor in his system. The scheme is meant to show how power came to men whereby they could become sons of God. But it is deeply tinged with Buddhist conceptions, though partaking of historic character, and of such clearness of definition and formulation, as Buddhism never knew. The Gnostic philosophies were, in fact, pagan, but they taught men some things which are too easily forgotten. One of these was, that the origin of evil may and should be inquired into. Another was, that the pre-existence of the soul is a truth not to be easily left behind, as is evidenced by the lateness of the poet who has dared proclaim that the "soul that rises with us" hath had "elsewhere its setting," and "cometh from afar." As for Valentinus, he held the Original Father to be before any created being. In the same negative fashion he made Him the sole Uncreated, without time, without place, without any of whom He sought counsel. He is the unnameable, incomprehensible, and unbegotten God. He calls this Divine Being also the *Depth*. This shows how he conceived the infinite fulness of the Divine nature, as

something of which positive predications could not be made. This transcendent fulness keeps God from being defined in a way which reminds one of Spinoza. The Pleroma or Fulness of the Divine Life was, according to Valentinus, constituted by a series of thirty supernatural powers or Æons. Man is a creation of the Demiurgus. Jesus came into the world to free men from their subjection to the Demiurgus, but all men do not share this redemption. The Gnostics have received the spirit from Jesus. They rise beyond faith to the *Gnosis*. In the *Gnosis* they learn the mysteries of the Pleroma, and are free from the law of the Demiurgus. Valentinus has sometimes been taken as less consistent and influential in his thought than Basilides, but it does not lack in comprehensiveness. The saner elements of the Valentinian philosophy are drawn from Platonic sources. But the fantastic elements superadded detract from its value as a scientific system.

Clement of Alexandria championed the cause of orthodoxy against Basilides and Valentinus. In his *Stromata* he sets forth what he conceives to be the position of the true Gnostic, who is for him the mature or well-advanced Christian, whose "whole life," he says, "is a holy festival." His true Gnostic or perfect Christian he took to be quite superior to the ordinary believer. His Gnostic is exempt from natural passion, is superior to pain and pleasure, is one with the will of God, and is in a blissful state of pure love. So strong is his mystical tendency. Yet there is little of system in Clement's setting forth of the truth, which retains a broadly practical vein. The distinctive feature

of Gnosticism is, as we have seen, its making a speculative religious view of the world—or religious knowledge of the world-process—take the place of a practical doctrine of Christian salvation. As against the Gnosticism of Basilides and Valentinus, the Christian thought of that early time held to a universe created in love by the one Infinite Deity, and not by any rival power or subsidiary creator. The Person of Jesus could simply not be adjusted to the conception of such a subordinate power, or to endless genealogies of æons and emanations from the Godhead. The speculative vagaries of Gnosticism are thus in reality a striking tribute to the unique and exceptional character of the Person of Christ. So, too, the Christian thought of the period held that evil by no means inheres in matter, but is to be traced to the will of responsible creatures. This, because the world was taken to be originally and essentially good. Nor did that thought share the Gnostic despair as to the great mass of men, for to it the many would, in the Word made flesh, find redemption. But the shortcomings of the Gnostic speculations, in these and like respects, did not keep them from being of great service to the development of Christian philosophy. They brought into view and prominence the final problems of life, as well as the question of origins. They gave them answers which, by very reason of their being only partial and inadequate, led to fuller and more satisfying formulation and explication. They had the merit to draw attention to the use of exegetical methods of dealing with the New Testament, albeit their own methods of use were ex-

tremely arbitrary, when not something worse. The lasting service which Gnosticism, as a philosophy of religion, rendered was, to impel the Church to set forth a true Gnosticism over against that which it considered false, and this while maintaining the positive historical character of Christianity. Thus, from the contents of simple and practical Christian belief, a Christian theology eventually resulted. That theology was drawn out after such ideas of scientific method as then prevailed.

CHAPTER VII.

AUGUSTINE'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

NOT without good reason did Ozanam pronounce Augustine's great work, *De Civitate Dei*, "the first genuine effort to produce a philosophy of history." For, though not a philosophy of history in the strict and proper sense, it yet more nearly approximates to a philosophy of history than any work of ancient or mediæval times. Not Tacitus, not Thucydides, not Aristotle, nor even Plato, but Augustine, first conceived a true law of progress in human history and society. His philosophy of history as an unfolding of Divinely-ordained plan may be discounted because it proceeds from religious postulates rather than by the sheer and sole principle of development. But it nevertheless represents history in whole as guided by principles and marked by stages; and proof of such Divine plan is all we can yet attain by our more scientific methods of studying historical phenomena. Too theological, however, it neglects secondary causes, and depreciates secular life and culture. Written to defend the City of God against the calumnies of her foes, Augustine spent about thirteen years over his great undertaking, whereby, in twenty-two books, he sought to justify the ways of God in ordering the course of human

history. We do not now mean to look at this massive work in its whole proportions and historico-theological aspects, but to concentrate attention upon those parts of most significant ethical import and bearing. His treatise is really a cosmology. Augustine stood forth to defend the new faith both in respect of fact and of ideal. Most learned, noble, and influential of all his works, the "City of God" leads up, in its great argument, to the contemplation of that city which should not only survive the changes and revolutions of time, but even acquire new power and energy, until the time when it would pass into the sphere of new, Sabbatic, and eternal rest. Augustine's teaching, so wide in the range of its speculative treatment, has influenced the development of Christian philosophy more largely than that of any other thinker. Imperfect his philosophy of history might be, but it was both great in design and suggestive in idea. To him there are not many wisdoms, but one, in which, he says, are infinite treasures of things intellectual. These treasures he would set forth in the growth of humanity.

So early as Book V. the perplexing problem of the relation of the Divine fore-knowledge to the human will emerges. Here Augustine holds that the religious mind abides by both the free-agency of man and the fore-knowledge of God. He has already said that our wills are included in the order of causes embraced by the Divine fore-knowledge; and, in the precedence he gives will over intelligence, he is apt to take away from the freedom he had psychologically bestowed on will. To deny the prescience of Deity is to him sure proof of insanity. Divine prescience and human freedom form to him an antinomy,

since both can be proved, and both are to be believed. He contends that this compatibility of man's freedom of will with Divine fore-knowledge does not mean agreement with blind fate. Augustine does not deny that natural causes are efficient; they run back at last into the will of God. Man's will is to Augustine a cause in the order of nature. It is the effective cause of human works. The only efficient causes are the voluntary in the domain of spirit. God has fore-knowledge of the effects of every cause—consequently of the effects of the human will. He draws this fine conclusion—"Therefore we are by no means compelled, either, retaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He is prescient of future things, which is impious. But we embrace both. The former, that we may believe well; the latter, that we may live well."

Having, in Book VII., commended the teaching of Varro, in respect of its theistic tendency, and also criticised it for its final pantheistic issue, he proceeds, in Book VIII., to point out the shortcomings and incompetence of Neo-Platonism, animadverting on its spiritualism, particularly with regard to its demonology. But Augustine has high opinion of Plato, to whom he appeals against the Platonists. *Quidquid a Platone dicitur, vivit in Augustino.* The method is more to Plato, the results are dearer to Augustine. In Augustine there are fewer shadows and phantoms; for the sun has risen. He commends Plato for his teaching as to God and goodness. God is to Augustine at once the principle of truth and the principle of being. "If, then, Plato has declared the

wise man to be one who imitates, loves, and knows this God, and shares in His blessedness, why should we consult the rest?" It was in the fact of the Incarnation that the philosophers found a stumbling-block, which most of all separated them from Augustine. Augustine is prone to think their pride—especially in the case of Porphyry—kept them from liking the humiliation and ethical sacrifice involved in it. He holds all our trouble to spring from the will, and to him, therefore, the Incarnation and Sacrifice of Christ offer that restoring power which the will needs, and for which the Platonist seeks in vain. If the Platonists had understood the Incarnation, they would have found in it "the highest example of grace" (Book X., ch. 29)—in other words, it would have been to them the satisfaction of moral needs that men had long felt.

When, in Book XI., Augustine proceeds to deal with the Creation, he finely anticipates those moral arguments whereby the beauty of the universe is set in relation to the spirituality of its Creator. Noteworthy also is the way Augustine, in touching on the question of time, takes account of its objective correlate—changes in the external world—a factor not to be lost sight of when we estimate a theory of time like that of Kant. Augustine follows Plato in treating time as having been created—a rather daring idea to propound. In his doctrine of Creation, Augustine steers clear alike of Platonic positings of primary matter, and of Neo-Platonic emanationism. He diverges from Plato in making creation without intermediate agency. He treats creation as from nothing. This nothing is one with unreality. So at least it appears

in Augustine's theoretic treatment, and in the theology which followed him. Yet it does seem a valid criticism to say that the nothing is, in his actual dealings with it, not the unreal thing it appears, but is, in fact, highly real, although negatively so. That is to say, the nothing, in some very real sort, does enter into the nature of the creature. Evil is to Augustine, as to Plato, merely the negation of good; it disappears when things are viewed as a whole. One important result of this reality of the nothing undoubtedly is, that we are saved from giving up creation as an unthinkable mystery, as men have been so often wont to do. To no such agnostic position did Augustine, in any real or actual way, drive men, whatever his modes of phraseology might tend to do. For Augustine's own thought clearly found in the nothing—or the reality of the negative—that which for him explained much. This reality of the negative or non-being is to be held by us without ascribing to it any positive nature or constructive categories whatsoever, if we would stand on sure philosophic ground. In this eleventh book, Augustine further brings out that the Creation was the revelation of the Divine Goodness. Man is encompassed by the works of God, who is never without witness in the world. Man is, psychologically, according to Augustine—the greatest master of psychological analysis in the ancient world—made up of threefold powers—a power of Memory or unified self-consciousness, a power of Intelligence or contemplation, and a deliberative capacity of Will. Important these are as showing that Augustine understood the will to be no isolated thing apart from its environings.

Now are we brought up to Book XII., wherein the origin of evil is dealt with. To this subject Augustine passes after giving a fine anticipation of the modern theory of the struggle for existence and the law of natural selection. Augustine had thrown off Manichæism, but the great problem it raised he never threw off. That problem was just the relation of evil or negation to God or the Absolute. In this twelfth book, as in certain other parts of his writings, the subject finds rich speculative treatment. He laid foundations, in fact, for a true gnosis of non-being. The Manichæan doctrine of the positive nature and eternity of evil is explicitly rejected by Augustine. In Book XI. Augustine had already said that "there is no nature of evil, but the loss of the good is called evil." Here, in Book XII., he views evil as springing up "when the will, turning from the better of two alternatives," chooses some "inferior thing." Such false choosing is, in Augustine's view, a fault, and "every fault injures the nature, and is consequently contrary to the nature." It is desire of the "inferior thing" which has made the will evil, not the fact that his will was a nature. "For if a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say than that evil arises from good, or that good is the cause of evil?" Evil is, with Augustine, a *defect* rather than an *effect*. He views it as "result" of a "*deficient*" cause, not an "*efficient*" cause—"a negative rather than a positive factor in our moral history." It is *defection* from the good that is the cause of evil. Evil, as defection from the highest perfection, is essentially a retrogression towards imperfection and nothingness. An evil will, Augustine maintains, has no efficient cause. Its

falling away, or deficiency, he means, is to be sought within the will itself, without any exterior origination. In these views of Augustine we must, however, be on our guard against viewing evil as something unreal. Even taking evil as *defect*, it is surely none the less opposition to the will of the Infinite—opposition which is of the essence of sin. Goodness has no need of evil. Its only postulate is the possibility of evil. Evil has no positive cause outside the will that turns to it. God is here to Augustine “the highest essence, that which supremely is,” and an evil action is movement away from Him—therefore towards nothingness.

These things bring us to the consideration of Augustine’s philosophical theory of the will. He finds the source of evil in man’s will as free. For the very notion of will, to him, implies freedom. The evil of the will he ascribes to “moral perversity,” for to him the will is self-moved, and free in its possibilities of choosing the good. The question of the nature of the individual and his environment comes into new prominence under Augustine’s treatment of the will. It is the abiding merit of Augustine, in his philosophy of voluntary action, to have brought in a new conception of the will, contrastive with that which had prevailed in the old Greek philosophy. This conception of free-will is a dominant note in the writings of Augustine, elsewhere no less than here, so that in him the will gains quite a new primacy.

In Book XIV. he graphically describes the two rival cities—the City of God and the earthly city—both of them founded in love. But the former springs from love of God, the latter is grounded in love of self. Earlier in

this book he has shown how all vice whatsoever springs from misdirection of the will—from the evil working of the mind, and not from the flesh. This insistence on sin, as springing from the mind, not from the body, is very explicit in Augustine. It is man's will that has suffered serious injury. And the will is source and substance of the life that is spiritual: *Voluntas est quippe in omnibus: imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.* The Fall involved, on its negative side, a loss of that instinctive choosing of the good from love of God, which alone constitutes true freedom of will, in the view of Augustine. The Fall broke the unity of the human race, and rent it into two cities or societies. Virtue is declared by him to be "the art of living rightly and well"—the capability of the will for the good, strengthened by the practice of the will in well-doing. In Book XIX., Augustine shows how many and conflicting were the theories of the Supreme Good. Varro had alleged as many as 288 sects to exist in consequence of divergent opinions on the *Summum bonum*. The ideal life cannot find room, Augustine shows, in the strife which exists even among the cardinal virtues of these philosophic sects. But the City of God will use whatever there is of good in the earthly order. Our life will be redeemed in the motive which inspires it. Says Augustine—"While there can be life of some kind without virtue, there cannot be virtue without life." "That which gives blessed life to man is not derived from man, but is something above him." All purely human virtues, if they bear no relation to God, are, in Augustine's view, vices rather than virtues—a narrow, depressing view.

In Book XXII., Augustine maintains that "evil had never been," were it not that the "mutable nature"—mutable, though good—"brought evil upon itself by sin." It is this mutability of the creature which is, in Augustine's view, the negative cause of evil. Not that mutability is itself evil, but that the contingency which it implies means for us a liability to evil. The mutability of the creature is, for the deep vision of Augustine, the root-possibility of evil. And, in speaking of the beatific vision, Augustine asserts that the last freedom of the will shall consist in a free-will by which the creature cannot sin—"not able to sin," even as our free-will is in this life one "able not to sin." But this emphasis on evil has not kept Augustine from setting forth man's splendid capacity for progress, and the amazing advances he has made.

We have now presented, in as succinct a form as possible, the main ethical issues raised in Augustine's great work, in justification of what was said at the outset as to its importance for subsequent philosophical development. The pity is—from a philosophical point of view—that Augustine's work ends in an eternal dualism and irreconcilable antagonism. Philosophy craves some more satisfying teleological end of the world-process, even the supremacy of the good, wherein God shall be seen to be all in all. But this, of course, must be sought without underestimating the power of evil, or the misery of man's will, or the force of the struggle whereby the godless world shall be overcome, in the teleological movement whereby things tend towards that which is better. But the reality of evil can be faced without giving way to absolute and Parsee-like dualism, in which the unity of being shall

be violently rent and broken. Still, Augustine has the merit to have anticipated Herder in the way in which he finely set forth the impossibility of the God of order, beauty, and regularity, having left without the regulating laws of His Providence the growth, vicissitudes, and decay of nations. It seems to me a virtue, in the early treatment of evil by Augustine, that he laid so much stress on the principle of evil. That keeps its results or effects from being unduly turned to pessimistic account. In the spirit of Augustine, we account it needless still to confound evil with imperfection and development, or to regard evil as necessary to being that is relative. Quite mistaken is the view of those who think evil must in some way work for the good. Evil is no part of God's eternal purpose, and in itself does not directly contribute thereto. Augustine, in Book XXII., expressly reminds us that God did not deprive the angels of their freedom of will, although He foreknew that they would fall. All that our relativity ought, in this connection, to be made to bear is the tendency, the proneness, the liability to evil. We come far short of probing the problem of evil, if we treat it simply as the pressure of our own finitude. We must pierce to its issues of profound moral significance; for these *moral* aspects do not allow us to rest in evil as simply inevitable. In the *metaphysical* aspect, it should not be forgotten that our imperfection is evil in a sense which here belongs essentially to the finite universe. As one has well said,—“A universe without it is no longer a universe distinct from God, but would be nothing but the universe taken back again into the absolute being of God.” The problem of

moral evil grows most luminous in Augustine's hands when set in relation to the element of choice and the free causality of man, and in these respects one might very well claim him as a precursor of the ethical theism of to-day. For the existence of moral evil, justification may be found in the fact of freedom. Freedom without the possibility of evil is not thinkable. There is not a little true ethical philosophy in Augustine's contention that our action grows morally evil, as we reject the ideal good which is the law of our being and choose to drop into a lower than our normal orbit. This is not to make evil only shortcoming in respect of such ideal, or to treat it as mere mistaken course, and not also spiritual disorder and rebellion. It was none other than John Stuart Mill who said that "good is gradually gaining ground from evil, yet gaining it so visibly, at considerable intervals, as to promise the very distant, but not uncertain, final victory of good," and who declared that "to do something during life, on even the humblest scale if nothing more is within reach, towards bringing this consummation ever so little nearer, is the most animating and invigorating thought which can inspire a human creature." Confessedly the darkest of all enigmas is the problem of evil, and Augustine has an abiding title to gratitude in that he has striven to deal with it, as with other such problems as the fore-knowledge of God and free-will. There is no unwisdom like that which, either in philosophy or theology, sits down before these problems as insoluble. The speculative impulse in man refuses to be so silenced. The old problem of the fore-knowledge of God, discussed by Augustine, is still with us, threatening

to swamp the human, on the one side, or, on the other, to limit the Divine. In another of his works, Augustine points out, what is here worth remembering, that the Divine fore-knowledge is knowledge rather than fore-knowledge. His knowledge is without succession, and is fore-knowledge only from the human standpoint, not from the Divine. It is in this connection that freedom appears so necessary. For moral command and moral responsibility are quite meaningless, if we are not really free, and lords in this respect of our own destiny. Besides, in retaining for God absolute knowledge and absolute will, we are really and in effect attributing evil to Him, since we are then His slaves, and not His free children. In the end a final and complete reconciliation of the Divine and the human here lies beyond us, even though we have made many points of advance in apprehension of the problem since Augustine's day. We have not yet been able to rid ourselves of the irrationality of a universe in which evil finds a place. Not even the philosophy of Hegel has brought us deliverance. The problem of evil we still have on our hands, and we cannot be brought to view evil as good in the making. That way of thinking is simply the fallacious result of an abstract way of viewing the rise of moral evil—a way quite out of harmony with its connection with a world of real and concrete persons. We are here, in fact, brought back very much to Augustine's position, wherein we find the really good to be the good will or self, and the really evil will to be the evil will or self. However evil may be overruled for good, and beneficent result brought out of it, it is a most fallacious procedure to

overlook that it never is, nor can be, any part of the plan, purpose, or appointment of the Eternal. It comes at last to this, that the true moral personality of man must be maintained, and the standing difficulty is to reconcile this with the absolute perfection of Deity. The way of harmony and reconciliation is to be found alone in that spiritual unity which is the result of our feeling that "Our wills are ours, to make them Thine." This is a possible concrete spiritual unity which we may realise in God, so that for us spiritual coherence in the universe may be found. No doubt, the ultimate unification, of which we speak, demands ethical qualities and is impossible to mere thought. The purely intellectual or speculative element will not suffice, and it is precisely on this rock that all-sufficing intellectual systems of philosophy come to grief. The dearly-won unity, which is already ours, we can hold fast in the confidence that a final synthesis assuredly awaits us, albeit it lies in advance of even our latest philosophies of human history. What wonder, then, that it lay beyond reach of "the first philosophy of history"? The development of humanity, Augustine took to be analogous to that of the individual, but not without being aware that, in the case of the former, age tends to perfection, not to weakness. But, if the speculative terminus of our problem may not be fully reached, the issues so running up into the future, at least the final judgment must be a teleological one. Our look must be forward cast, for the spiritual monism we seek must not only unify by its principle, and bind all things in one, but must yield a philosophy of history,

which shall furnish a clue and a solution to the course of the vast evolutionary movement, and in which the glory of the spiritual and the material—the City of God and the earthly city—shall be blended in one ineffable and harmonious splendour.

CHAPTER VIII.

ORIGEN AS CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER.

ORIGEN rose to the height of representing the Christian world-view in a comprehensive system. The work of Origen, both in Theology and in Ethics, possesses a peculiar value for our age. He furnishes us with an example of living interest in the speculative problems of Christianity. He shows how we may retain dogma, while finding place for a larger and freer use of reason. Origen is in spirit very *modern*, with large, positive, and direct end in view, to which all refuting of scepticism is but preparatory. Foreshadowings of modern efforts to reconcile science and faith are found in Pantænus and Clement, the latter of whom is not behind Origen in this respect. The same object inspired Origen, whose eclectic spirit sought to harmonise Christianity with Philosophy, in pursuance of the aims of Pantænus and Clement, and to destroy Gnosticism. Not less remarkable than the breadth and thoroughness of Origen's system was the moral earnestness that pervaded it. He would have men traverse the whole circuit of knowledge; in fact, he ran up the whole gamut of the knowledge of his time in a way that was without parallel, but he failed not to keep before him,

as life's main pursuit, the ends of moral perfection and the Christian ideal. He offered unaffected welcome to all knowledge and all science, in the high faith that these could only serve the great final ends of truth. Origen was a mighty reconciler of antagonistic views, a wondrous harmoniser of opposites, but his conciliations were ever made that thereby he might, in his own bold and courageous way, lead up to higher truth. The Hellenic impulse for knowledge made the theoretic needs of Origen so great, that Theology was for him a necessity. Christianity was to him the highest philosophy. Not but what Christian doctrine relies upon its own evidence. Origen maintains it does so. But, so doing, he holds it finds foundation deeper far than all the dialectics of the Greeks. It should be borne in mind how transitional the time was. Ideas, principles, and tendency are what we find in Origen rather than definitely articulated system. God to him was incorporeal, spaceless, timeless, unchangeable, as we shall presently see. Ardent theist he was; one of his great principles was the unity of creation as answering to the thought of God—of God as infinitely good and just. In fact, to a mind like Origen's, all things, in heaven above and the earth beneath, must be reduced to organic unity. But this unity Origen reached, along the lines of the Incarnation, in a way that the Neo-Platonist philosophers never knew. And another principle, like unto this in its greatness, was the power of moral self-determination on the part of rational beings. We have still no grander conception open to us than just this of the vast unity of things,

not only in relation to, but even in dependence on, the free action of the individual. What dualism exists is for Origen fruit of finite will at war with the Infinite Will, and therefore not a necessary antagonism at all. In fact, he, in a metaphysical direction, spiritualised or idealised the corporeal world, so that it became, in his hands, pierced through and through with spiritual agency and function. It is, in fact, a prime virtue in Origen that for him deeper or more ultimate reality, than that which belongs to the sphere of personality and its relations, there is none. A spiritualistic monism his philosophy thus was, and, as such, of deep interest for the spiritual thought of to-day, which feels the necessity, in some sort, of being so too. For there is no ground why reason should not always have more to say on the things of faith. Origen opposed the pantheism and fatalism of his time; self, the world, and God were for him the ultimates of all religious philosophy. They were for him the great ultimates of reality and of knowledge, but they were not all known in like ways. The cosmogony of Origen, says Hatch, was really a theodicy. For Origen the soul has a spiritual sense of its own, which must be trained. Hence the fine spirituality of Origen's conceptions of the unseen world. Origen started from the conception of God as a spiritual and unchangeable Being, Creator of all things—in fact, endlessly creative. Unfolded and revealed He is from eternity in the Divine Logos. Ineffable and incomprehensible is God—above wisdom and being. He is, to Origen, a Being “Whose nature cannot be grasped or seen by the power of any human

understanding, even the purest and brightest.”¹ God is to Origen an absolute, incorporeal unity. He is without limit. Space and time are shut out from His being. The Omnipotent is He, but not yet so as unaffected by His goodness and His wisdom. The absolute immateriality and transcendent nature of the one God, with all the implications of personality, were exhibited by Origen with clearness and fulness that command the sincere admiration of to-day.² Not that Origen did not take his own way of compromising the Divine transcendence, for clear as he kept the personality of God, he hesitated not to qualify the Divine Infinitude. The Divine power could not for him be infinite, else it could not understand itself. Nor could the Divine knowledge be infinite, else it could not be comprehended. These unsatisfactory positions of Origen spring from an undue anthropomorphism on his part. They are the result of his confounding the Infinite with the Indefinite or wholly undefined. Origen’s notion that God can no more be infinite, if He form a conception of Himself, is really absurd, since the very definiteness of Deity makes Him comprehensible to the Divine intellect.

The Logos was with Origen an historic Person. He was the Divine Son, and, as such, subordinate, but the subordination is of office and person, rather than of essence, at least in his intention. Perfect Image of the Father was He, in Whom had been hid the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. It was, in fact, the capital doctrine of the Alexandrian theology that

¹ *De Princ.*, i. 1, 5.

² *Ibid.*, 6.

God had become Man. The Logos is for Origen the compendium of the Divine, world-creative ideas. For him both speculative and religious needs are met in the Incarnation. All creation has its being in Christ. In Him, too, is the life of humanity, by its very constitution. He is the perfect manifestation of the hidden Deity. It is the aim of Origen to avoid, in speaking of the Son, all emanative or partitive theories. Origen represents God as begetting the eternal Son, the Logos, in an eternal manner, and, through Him, the world of free spirits. "The God and Father of all things is not the only being that is great in our judgment, for He has imparted (a share) of Himself and His greatness to His Only-Begotten and First-born of every creature, in order that He, being the Image of the Invisible God, might preserve, even in His greatness, the Image of the Father."¹ The Logos is the Archetype of all things. He fills, He permeates, the whole creation. Of paramount importance is the relation of the soul to the Logos. In Trinitarian matters, Origen held, as we have seen, to the eternal generation of the Son, whose perfect manhood and perfect Godhead he upheld, even if we should not always find him speaking quite the language of late catholicity. Like the union of iron and fire in a furnace is to him the union of these natures in Christ.² The real personality alike of Father and Son is what Origen most strove to exhibit. He advanced upon Clement in his clear and vigorous assertion of the hypostatical distinction of the Son. But it cannot be said that Origen's mode of

¹ *De Princ.*, i. 1, 6.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 6, 6.

speaking of the Son's subordination to the Father is always free from reproach. The Son is but a "Second God."¹ He really brings not out, with sufficient clearness or explicitness, in every case, the subordination as being of person, not of nature or essence. For Origen regards not the Son as God in the absolute and primary sense, and the eternal generation does not carry with it for the Son the essence of the Godhead in this absolute and eternal sense. The Father is for him the fountain-head of Deity. Now, in so making the Father the Monad in this absolute and original sense, Origen was really lending countenance to a developmental mode of representing Deity that cannot consort with a thoroughgoing doctrine of eternal Trinity. No doubt Origen was scared by Sabellianism in his shortcoming with respect to the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, but we are here just to learn to know when to be scared and when not. With his doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, Origen was unable to unite the ideas of consubstantiality and immanent necessity in such wise that the absolute essence of the Godhead is seen to belong to the Son no less than to the Father. Hence to Origen the Son is God in a derived sense, the Father being sole primal and absolute One. If Origen did not bring forth the full truth as to the Trinity, he at least paved the way for those who should come after and supplement Origenistic defects.

As for Creation, it is for Origen without beginning, being, in fact, eternal and necessary. This is required

¹ *C. Celsum*, v. 39.

by Divine omnipotence and goodness. For if God be eternally omnipotent, then, in Origen's view, there must from eternity have been that on which He could exercise His power, and so no less in the case of His goodness.¹ From eternity there must have been created being. Besides, a change would have taken place in God, if the world had had a beginning in time. There has, then, never been a time in which a world did not exist.² The world, for Origen, is made up of spirit and matter, and matter is never found without qualities, although it may be notionally so conceived.³ Origen cannot understand how distinguished men should have lent themselves to the opinion that matter is the result of chance rather than of its being formed by God Himself.⁴

Of Christ as Redeemer Origen may not always satisfactorily conceive, yet he insists on Jesus as the bond of union between God and mankind. "From Him there began the union of the Divine with the human nature, in order that the human, by communion with the Divine, might rise to be Divine, not in Jesus alone, but in all those who not only believe, but enter upon the life which Jesus taught."⁵ He ascribes to Christ's death a significance, not alone for this world, but for all worlds of creatures. Strenuous as Origen is for the freedom of man's will, he yet holds that man's part in his salvation is vastly less than God's, "the first and chief cause of the work."⁶ Rational beings

¹ *De Princ.*, i. 2, 10.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 1, 4; also iv. 34.

³ *C. Celsum*, iii. 28; also vii. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iii. 5, 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ii. 1, 4.

⁶ *De Princ.*, iii. 1, 18.

are what they make themselves, vessels for honour or dishonour.¹ "All rational creatures are of one nature;" God has made them, God is just.² Created beings make themselves what they are through their choice of good or evil, in the exercise of their freedom of will.³ He retains, in verbal ways, the Pauline distinction between "soul" and "spirit"; but his psychology is really dichotomous, soul for him existing somewhere between "flesh" and "mind" or "spirit." The spiritual nature of man's soul Origen deduces from the very nature and range of human cognition. Man has a kinship with God, in virtue of which he desires and can know the truth. We know as we progressively become like God. "It is one thing to see, and another to know: to see and to be seen is a property of bodies: to know and to be known, an attribute of intellectual being."⁴ In truly Platonic fashion, Origen makes the reality of the idea of the good a postulate of primary importance. He grounds the speculative in the practical: he who would reach true knowledge must pass to it from faith through philosophy. Man cannot be merely body, else God were the same. For man has knowledge of God, and the corporeal can know nothing higher than the corporeal.⁵ "We are of opinion that every rational creature, without any distinction, receives a share of Him"—the Holy Spirit.⁶ Origen shrank not from the extreme individualism which led him to adopt the theory of the pre-existence of souls, oblivious of all considerations of race unity and connection.

¹ *De Princ.*, iii. 1, 21.² *Ibid.*, iii. 5, 4.³ *Ibid.*, ii. 9, 6.⁴ *Ibid.*, i. 1, 8.⁵ *Ibid.*, i. 1, 7.⁶ *Ibid.*, ii. 7, 2.

For Origen, Nature exists only for sinful men, clothed upon with the world of sense, and it will cease to be when these have found their way back to the bosom of the good. For, though Origen's eschatological ideas hold to future retribution, they view it as having ameliorative intent, so that at last evil will fade away, and good far-off accrue to all.¹ Origen argues to the immortality of the soul from the way in which our knowing and thinking substance persists in its desire and power to know God and truth.² To the fact of resurrection he holds, but the resurrected body is to him a body spiritual and ethereal. Origen so far spiritualises the conception of the resurrection that he will not hear of our appearing in the resurrection in identity of substance. For him there will be a final restoration for all who have fallen away from God, and he takes the *Apocatastasis* to be universal.³ But this Restorationism Origen held in distinctly esoteric fashion.⁴ It has not always been observed that his cosmological and psychological speculations are really interwoven with his Ethics.

Origen held the study of Greek philosophy a necessity for the vindication of the faith and the meeting of the sceptical. Into the study of the Greek philosophy he boldly plunged, donning the philosopher's mantle. He made his study of Platonic and Stoical philosophy more thorough under the guidance of Ammonius Saccas. As the circle of the sciences was, with the Greeks, a preparation for philosophy, so Greek philosophy was itself,

¹ *De Princ.*, i. 6, 2; *C. Celsum*, v. 15.

² *Ibid.*, i. 6, 3; ii. 10, 3.

³ *De Princ.*, iv. 36.

⁴ *C. Celsum*, vi. 26.

to Origen, a preparation for Christianity. The idealism of Plato, paramount for three preceding centuries, abidingly impressed Origen. But, however absolute Origen's idealism might be, it was an idealism that stirred to action. He believed in God's care for the *individual* finite being no less than for the *whole* of things. His optimism was large and wellnigh unmeasured. Origen's psychology found place for the Platonic theory of the pre-existent soul, which he held in the imperfect form that life here is a state of punishment. Intellect will always reassert itself, and the worth of the cardinal Greek virtues—practical wisdom, self-control, righteousness, and courage—was recognised by Origen, who believed their attainment the result only of much culture and introspection. Origen's ethical advance was made on distinctively Christian grounds. He holds by indeterminism, at the same time adopting a theory of Providence accordant with the doctrine of Predestination. For him freedom is necessary to virtue, and good and evil are based by him on this freedom. He runs the differences of the world back into freedom; ethical quality determines everything, according to the use made of freedom; freedom is thus source of all differences in souls. But in what does freedom consist? With Origen, it is the spirit that judges between evil and good, and in such judging is freedom.¹ The origin of moral evil Origen finds in the exercise of free-will. He traces error of judgment, as of conduct, to perversity of will. Whether in matters of good or evil, man's will is for Origen the ultimate efficient.

¹ *De Princ.*, iii. 1-5.

But reason and will are not distinguished, as might be wished, by Origen. Reason seems to have ruled for him over all external incitements, and it may well have been that he took choice to be a function of the reason. With Origen ethics meant life, and not merely theory. The ethical determination of the will was in his view of supreme moment. Not in God's inability, but in our wayward wills, lies our hindrance.¹ Ethical influences Origen finds everywhere, so that his emphasis on moral conduct could not have been surpassed. We fall from good through the freedom of our will, wherefore our will must be rooted and grounded in love of the Good, yea, of God.² Sooner than impair the freedom of our will, God was pleased to restrict His own prescience. With Origen, who so emphasised the moral end of philosophy, the development of ethical philosophy seems to have passed more to the Western mind. Perhaps Origen allowed the mantle of the Platonist to obscure his Christian distinctiveness, and permitted an excessive idealism to cover the world of actual and concrete reality. His unfruitful mode of allegorising Scripture was due to this idealising tendency. But there is no mistaking his nobility as an ethical philosopher: the eye of the pure in heart can for him alone discern the truth. "By this divine light, therefore, not of the eyes, but of a pure heart, when the mind, God may be seen by those who are worthy."³ Origen's theory of knowledge had more

¹ *C. Celsum*, vi. 57.

² *De Princ.*, i. 5, 3; i. 6, 3; ii. 1, 2; ii. 4, 3.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 1, 9; so also *C. Celsum*, vi. 69.

than theoretic character—it bore, in fact, a mystical aspect that carried in it an ethical relation. It did so in virtue of Origen's *αἰσθησις θεῖα*—that Divine sense which denotes the consciousness of man in its higher cognitive activity—which made the Christian contents the subject of our freest knowledge. For the human soul or finite reason can unify itself with the *λόγος*, finding true knowledge in such intercourse as results from this unification. Origen's entire defence of Christianity, on its human or subjective side, may be said to have centred in the saying of Jesus, so beautiful and pregnant: "If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from Myself" (John vii. 17). Origen tried to understand the manifoldness of the world from an ethical standpoint, so that the congruence of the natural with the spiritual might be seen. Our concluding reflections on this study of the philosophical theology and ethics of Origen are of all the Church universal owes to Origen as the most comprehensive of ancient Christian thinkers—one whose influence was lasting, wide, and deep. On Gnosticism, on the relations of faith and knowledge, on psychological, cosmological, and practical religious problems, he shed a new and great light, whereby the absolutely rational character and the peculiarly ethical modes of Christianity have for ever been made clear. He is a living inspiration, because his spirit and principles we can still share, even when we can by no means accept his opinions; can welcome all science, all knowledge, believing it can only serve the great final ends of the

truth. We can cultivate a spirit of inquiry, broad and catholic as his; can seek, like him, that finest breadth of thought which is so rationally constructive as to bring the treasures of thought, past, present, and to come, into relation and subjection to the mind of Christ. The fine speculative bent of Origen by no means kept him from holding firm and fast to essential truths and historic facts of Christianity.

Seeds of thought sown by Origen, which might not always be accordant with each other, were unified in his rich, strong, and striking personality. The love of truth—truth in all its depth, objectivity, and amplitude—was for Origen first passion and last in all rational beings, and therefore was it he sought an all-sided, Christian world-view of knowledge or *γνώσις*. He sought, indeed, as Harnack says, the sphere “of clear knowledge and inward intellectual assent emanating from love to God.” We must, with him, widen faith to cover all the facts of life, reality, experience; must take all knowledge and all science as in some sort revealing God to us; must find, in the Son of God Incarnate, the key to all creation, all history, all life, since in Him all things are ours, and He is God’s.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS.

FOR constructive power, impressive skill, daring boldness, sustained nobility, and imposing beauty, the system of Plotinus has hardly ever been surpassed. Pantheistic his philosophy is not: the One and the All are not identical in his system: the One is transcendent, not immanent, though impersonal and unconscious: all things wait upon the One, but the One depends not upon all or any of them. Rather his system seems to constitute a theism of transcendental type, but with a method of mystical, as well as rational, character. Still, it is easy to see how this system has often been regarded as pantheistic, for, in that ecstasy whereby mind knows the Infinite, the mind seems to become absorbed in the Infinite Intelligence, and the soul loosened from individual consciousness. His was the creative spirit that called Neo-Platonism into being. And Neo-Platonism was destined to vanquish every philosophical system that should array itself against it. Whatever was best in Plato and Aristotle was seized and assimilated by Plotinus, the influence of the former on his mental upbuilding being specially great. To the teachings of these philosophers Plotinus imparted new vitality

and interest. His three hypostases, indeed, subsumed distinctive principles of Stoicism, Peripateticism, and Platonism. There fell to the lot of Plotinus an environment rich in elements for an intellectual nature. For it was an environment charged with elements inherited from second-century materialism and mysticism, naturalism and hedonism, moralism and spiritualism. Founder of the Neo-Platonic school he became under these conditions. And its philosophy is essentially a philosophy of religion. He proved his power by piercing direct to the metaphysical heart of Plato's system, that he might rend it in pieces for the feeding of his thought. Plotinus, however, differs from Plato in setting the One above all ideas. It is his "philosophy of the One" that proves so fascinating an element of his teaching. But the Absolute One remains a bare and extreme unity, and is not conceived by him as a unity of differences. Indeed, in this emphasis on the unity of pure or abstract being the idea of diversity disappears, and recourse is vainly had to a world-soul for reconciliation of the one and the many. It is characteristic of Plotinus that the ideas have a distinct existence in the Divine Reason. The One, the Ineffable or the Spiritual, is, as the unity of all things, unfolded in intellectual, and afterwards in sensuous, terms. The categories used by Plotinus in respect of the second element in the Plotinic trinity, which is Intelligence—image of the One—were being, rest, motion, identity, and difference. The preferences of Plotinus lie towards pure, abstract speculation. He holds by the essence of God as the absolutely One and unchangeable. He, the One, has neither Form,

nor Will, nor Thought, nor Being. God, as the One, is to him source and spring of all good. The Plotinic triad runs back to Plato—the Primal One to the Platonic idea of the good, mind and soul to the Demiurgus, and world-soul of Plato. The Primal Good is a principle of absolute and indivisible unity. First Cause He is, but only in an abstract, metaphysical sense. The whole cosmological thought of Plotinus takes a teleological form. Reason is rooted in this highest or Ultimate Good as its principle. The One, whose nature we thus seek, is not anything that exists. His One, as the Power of all things, is yet, and therefore, none of them. As the absolute unity, his One is the cause of all existence, and must therefore go before it. In fact, the “First” is to Plotinus raised above all determinations, so that we cannot strictly predicate anything here. A great demerit this of the system, since this supreme abstraction of the unity of existence, away from existence itself, robs it of all relation to the things it creates. It is the negation of all contents. The One and Good is placed beyond thought, though it is the first principle of things. For, Plotinus holds the One to be Plato’s *πέραθόν*, which in reality is “above good.” To this Absolute Good all reason and life aspire. All things are drawn to God—a God who is Goodness without love. And our aspiring is through the soul—not the seeking of the outward eye. The One is seen with “the eyes of the soul,” when it is turned away from other sights. His philosophy of the One affirms the transcendent character and inapprehensible nature of God in a decided way. He is transcendent, as

beyond all being and knowing. He—the One—is ineffable, because without predicates. It really amounts to this, that the One is set above all contention. Not known of knowledge, the One is known through something higher. It is known in the breaking of the bonds of sense, in rising, by Divine *Θεωρία* and contemplation of “the intelligible beauty,” from Matter to Spirit, from Soul to Reason, and from Reason to the One. This treatment of God as the inapprehensible One proved the very destruction of reason, though it was meant as its apotheosis. For it proceeded too much by the way of mystic abstraction, and insulated the Deity to such an extent that there was loss of real sense of man’s being *in* God, and of God’s being *in* man. The transcendence had its truth, but it was not the whole truth which this mode of thinking was shadowing forth. It had the merit, however, to emphasise reason as the great constructive power. God, as Ground of the world, is, when we come to anthropomorphic modes of speech, mind or rational spirit. Soul is one and many. The World-soul is chief of all souls. This World-soul is an attempt to join, by its mediation, the sensible and the ideal worlds. No longer needful, if God be taken as no abstract unity, but the One Spirit revealed in nature and in man. There is a plurality of souls, for they are increasing. But these individual souls are not mere parts of the universal soul, for this latter is present, is whole and entire, in all particular or individual souls. Man’s knowing soul runs back to spirit. The human was but an appanage of the world-soul, and here, as elsewhere in Neo-Platonism, its psychology runs into

a theological mould. 'Tis the body alone that is affected by emotions of pleasure or pain: the soul does no more than perceive what takes place in the body. The soul's perception of such painful or pleasurable states is quite passionless. Matter is no corporeal mass beside the One, but is, in fact, bodiless or immaterial—such is the metaphysically indeterminate position of Plotinus. Matter was his root difficulty, and proved chief obstacle to the unity he sought. He could but reduce it to its lowest terms, which is not to do away with its troublous presence. Matter is still with him, and is, in fact, eternal: it is never wholly done away in the thought of Plotinus. He took, in the last resort, a mediate view of matter, paving the way for the Manichæism of Augustine. The microcosm—the world within—is first object of care to Plotinus; the macrocosm—or world without—is but the reflex of what we so find in ourselves. The world is just a mirror, in which we see reality reflected. "But," says Plotinus, "you see the mirror, and you do not see matter." Mind or thought is thus to Plotinus the great reality. His spiritualism is reached by an introspective method of his own, easily distinguishable from Plato's method of analogy, and Aristotle's metaphysical method of interpreting the world. Plotinus is, however, much more at one with Plato and Aristotle in result than in method: he makes common cause with them in upholding spiritualism, only he is able to put the case for spiritualism in fuller form and clearer view than was possible to either of them. And how does he reach this higher result? By a more rigid insistence on the realisation of inner personality,

and on the significance of our self-identity. Plotinus has the great merit to have been the first philosopher to give precise and explicit account of such concepts as consciousness and self-consciousness. He makes such direct analysis of consciousness as neither Plato nor Aristotle had done, so advancing upon them by exhibiting a distinctive development of subjective interest and faculty. But indeed he is too subjective: he abstracts from a single side of our whole life, and makes an objective law for things out of this very abstraction. Nature is for him real only so far as it is soul. This means further inadequacy on the part of Plotinus, for such an idealising mode of dealing with Nature would soon rule out all real natural science, and land us in the dreamy and mysterious. The soul is the self, and can by no possibility be material. The soul is the product of spirit—its nearest result, and its activity renders matter corporeal. How matter can so proceed from the soul is more than Plotinus explains. He merely says it comes out of it, as Being comes out of Non-Being. Since soul so works upon matter, everything in the world of sense is this soul or spirit. Hence Plotinus is able to spiritualise the corporeal world, to idealise the Universe. Soul is, in fact, the central core of his system: everything, within and without us, is soul, and the trouble is just to make soul capable of explaining all the antitheses to be found in different spheres of being. It is, he holds, the fault of man—of his descent into finitude—that the soul has fallen from the universal nature that belongs to it. The outer, or material, is for him but as shadow of substance, or husk of kernel:

the substance or kernel is the hidden spiritual, or ideal. His spiritual monism would keep the unity in the soul of the whole, and yet provide for the reality of particular souls. The immateriality of the soul he at least defends by arguments, drawn from wider reach than Plato or Aristotle had known, and inclusive of feeling, as well as thought. When he comes to deal with the nature of thought—thought which to him is motion—he is able to maintain its incorporeal character in ways that form striking anticipations of modern philosophy. The advance of redemption from reality as given is the basal thought of Plotinus: his conceptual knowledge worked its way, as we have seen, through the different world-materials—body, soul, spirit—up to the presentiment of the World-Soul. Plotinus comes within near psychological view of modern idealistic methods, which yet elude his grasp. A real unity, however, he did attain by an idealism of his own. Besides which, it may be said that Neo-Platonism—minus its mysticism—was, in many of its leading aspects, a precursor of modern Idealism. A tolerably pure form of rationalism it was, with a subtle dialectic of its own. Plotinus relies on the divisibility of corporeal substance, and the unity of consciousness for the working out of his argument against materialism. He does not, however, separate between consciousness and its objects in any such absolute fashion as that of Cartesianism, for he allows to the soul, in some sort, divisibility and extension. As for personality, it does not seem as though individual personality were so truly provided for as it might appear in the system of Plotinus, since it rather seems lost in the

necessary movement of the universal life of spirit. For there can be no doubt that, in the system of Plotinus—emanational in effect in the end—there is a procession of all things from the Absolute, and an inclusion of all things in Him. Yet did not Plotinus wish the world viewed as an emanation from God, with the loss of substance attendant thereon. We return to Him by ecstatic elevation. The goal of Plotinus for individual personality appears to be merely that indeterminateness in which there is an unconscious unifying with the World-Ground, or a sinking into the All-One. For the finite spirit must put off all that belongs to it in this ascent to immediate experience of the Absolute One. But this is no more religion as a total reconsecration of all things earthly and human. Not only the so-called materialism of the Stoics does Plotinus vanquish, but also their fatalism. But his spiritualistic doctrine of free-will is not that of the moderns, holding to it as a fact of consciousness; rather it is a Platonising mode of conceiving the soul free as it truly realises the conditions of its own spiritual existence—that is to say, suffers no subjection at the instance of body or matter. For matter, though only an indeterminate element, and denied real being, is yet regarded as a cause of evil, and a limitation. If our wills were not free, thinks Plotinus, we should not be ourselves, but would be borne along by the universal movement. But free-will does not hang very consistently in his system. Nor is his definition of matter very satisfactory: he thinks about it as does Plato: it is a universal substratum; is void of form and absolutely indefinite; has no reality, but is merely the possibility of being, and is,

in fact, evil. He strove to solve the problem of physical evil by accounting for it in a variety of ways. He knew the world to be by no means perfect, and yet it was the world of the One, therefore the only possible world. He stood opposed to the Gnostic view of the world as evil, and at a stray time came within sight of evil as due to self-will, with, however, no consistent result. On the widest issue, we may say that in nothing is the philosophic genius of Plotinus more discernible than just in the way he concentrates his forces on the issues of spiritualism, as opposed to materialism. It is his abiding merit to have put the case for spiritualism with skill and force that had not before been equalled. This need not blind us to the defects of his mysticism, which tended to obscure the movements of thought, and turn it aside from reality and experience. Cognition becomes, with Plotinus, too little an appropriation of objective truth, too much something effected within the soul by a certain interior contemplation. And when, rising from self-contemplation, man attains to the contemplation of the One, he loses thought and self-consciousness, and a state of ecstasy supervenes. This is human cognition at its highest, in the Plotinian view. To this end mystical asceticism becomes essential. This somewhat unnatural feature of Neo-Platonism—an asceticism directed really against corporeal nature as something in itself evil—made it incapable of effecting the moral regeneration of Paganism. In his vision of the hidden and ineffable Beauty, Plotinus undoubtedly tends to despise the thought in which he had before taken delight, because of the movement which such thought involves. With great

power, Plotinus insists on the need to find, and recognise, beauty within ourselves, so that thus we may rise to the recognition of "the intelligible beauty." Such beauty is hid but from the soul that is by self-will blinded. We need hardly, however, deny, although saying these things, a place to meditation, or the mystic gaze of contemplation, on which Plotinus lays so much stress, for reason may be fully present where thought is least active in its search or out-goings. In such contemplation the soul is still distinguished from her object, while in ecstasy, or union with God, she is one with it. Such ecstasy transcends reason, and is the ultimate principle of all certainty. For, only in so becoming One with the Absolute do we transcend the dualisms that hinder knowledge. Such ecstasy we cannot command: we can only purify and prepare ourselves for it. 'Tis in virtue of such teachings that Plotinus is sometimes spoken of as the Mystic *par excellence*. The baneful result accrues when the mystical or ecstatic elevation becomes the negation of reason, and there is no doubt that this tendency was a real result of the teaching of Plotinus. Grave dangers lurk in the path of such direct vision as Plotinus inculcates. Short of these dangers even, the solitude he contemplates for us—as what he calls a flight of the alone to the Alone—is apt to be rather unfruitful. Besides which, it is a graft on his philosophy—a graft from his religion—and must be treated as such from a philosophic point of view. But the ecstatic and subjective experience was by no means either fount or foundation of his philosophy, as has often been imagined. Virtue, with Plotinus, is "obedience to reason," and the highest good is reached in being entirely

turned to reason, and "likeness to God." He follows Plato in holding to the doctrine of metempsychosis; only the purest souls are, in the future life, merged in God.

The influence of Plotinus on subsequent speculation has been great. It pervaded the Middle Ages, and pierced through the Renaissance. Senses there are in which he is metaphysical precursor of Spinoza, and of Spencer, whose Unknowable is declared in less self-consistent terms than that of Plotinus. This is not, of course, to say that Plotinus has conceived or defined, with adequate or satisfying definiteness, his primal One—which, in fact, he has not done. But Plotinus has continued to be an original spring of philosophic thought and impulse all through the history of speculation. The philosophy of Plotinus has the great merit of magnifying the constructive power of reason. It has the further virtue of emphasising that, as all thought involves duality or difference, so God must precede and transcend all thought, or, in other words, it had the merit of carrying the conception of God beyond all anthropomorphic modes of expression—to an Absolute, in which all thought is transcended, and all consciousness lost. But such an unknown God would be of little interest, since He could give no guidance to thought, and the entire movement of mind towards Him would wear an abortive and illogical aspect. So the Infinite must come into real relation to us. And to the Neo-Platonist, it seemed necessary to draw himself off from matter as an obstructive medium. His upward ascent from matter is in keeping with the native aspiration of the human mind. So the philosophy of Plotinus was able to give distinctness and elevation to

the Platonic philosophy. Where the philosophy of Plotinus seemed most to lack, was in its need of nearer and kindlier contact both with the moral problem of the world and with the social difficulty. Surely we may say that no philosophy can afford either to shut off God from the light of the world, or to shut off the light, that is in the world, from God. The Divine Life, in its unfoldings, enfolds our lives, so that, in making us partakers of its own nature, the Divine purpose in these lives may freely and surely move to its accomplishment.

CHAPTER X.

SCHOLASTIC AND MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE threefold cord of speculation which runs through the Scholastic Age is of far deeper import and more lasting interest than philosophical students have generally understood, and may therefore bear some consideration. Some explanation—if not justification—for this fact is to be found in the scant attention accorded to scholastic philosophy in earlier manuals or histories of philosophy. This defect is gradually becoming remedied, so that now, as not for two centuries at least, is realised the importance of studying the scholastic philosophy, with its abiding effects for good and for evil. In that study reckoning must be made of philosophic forces that were historically contributory to the scholastic outcome, and not merely of elements that were logically consistent or harmonious with it. The modern contempt for scholasticism has been an affectation inherited from the Renaissance. The philosophy of scholasticism should be understood as really not the same thing as mediæval philosophy. The ruling mind for mediæval philosophy is Augustine, whose Christian philosophy catches up the seeds of thought sown by Origen and Plotinus. The new line of development

struck by Augustine started from his stress on the principle of inwardness or inner experience—the *Innerlichkeit* of the Germans. The determinative thing for mediæval philosophy was the welcome it accorded to Aristotelianism, whose dialectics were its life-blood. Scholastic philosophy may be taken to centre in great schoolmen of the thirteenth century like Albertus, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, while mediæval thought was so wide in range as to include even such forms of anti-scholastic teaching as were distinctly pantheistic. Mediæval philosophy comprehended not only scholasticism, but also Neo-Platonic tendencies exemplified in mysticism, and comprised much more besides. Scholasticism is no more than one, and that perhaps the strongest, of the philosophical schools of the mediæval period. Scholastic philosophy of the thirteenth century was not only grounded in twelfth century thought, but even ran back to the ninth century monistic realism of John the Scot, as expounded in the *De Divisione Naturæ*. Scholasticism is the doctrine of the church scientifically apprehended and set forth. But scholasticism, as generally understood, is less a system than a chaotic compound of all the systems—a compound marked by a preference for judgments over facts, and for authority before free reason. Necessarily deductive was its method: from dogmatic premises it loved to forge its endless train of syllogisms: under these arid and angular syllogistic forms, however, reason managed to insinuate itself. The scholastic movement sprang from the fact that faith, willing to justify itself at the bar of reason, exemplified the Anselmic saying "*Fides*

quærens intellectum," and 'sought to present its doctrines free of absurdity. There was a distinctiveness of scholasticism that lay hid in its peculiar union of philosophy and theology: to it, theology went before philosophy — "*fides præcedens intellectum*": philosophy followed in the steps of theology, and justified it to men. For a philosophical synthesis was reached whereby the great Doctors of the West held, despite all individual originality, a certain body of doctrine in common—a body which is of the essence of scholasticism. But scholasticism, even in its early developments, was stoutly opposed by Abelard, who claimed self-evident validity for the fundamental position that rational insight must prepare the way for faith, since faith cannot otherwise be sure of its truth. Of course, Anselm—the real founder of scholasticism—insisted that the mind of man should develop itself after the manner and spirit of science, spite of the fact that certitude came by another mode—that, namely, of faith. But the aim of Anselm, walking in the steps of Augustine, was quite other than that of Abelard, for while Anselm aimed only to make the truths held by faith comprehensible to the intellect, Abelard started with thought or reason as the norm and test of truth, so proceeding in what would be accounted a more rationalistic fashion. In the schools it became the business of reason to vindicate theology as science. The dogmata of positive religion were to Anselm matters of necessary deduction. By Aquinas all hope was given up of proving Church dogmas by reason; he declared them not contrary to, but above, reason, whereas Scotus

was prone to make religion independent of reason. By Ockam all beyond experience was claimed for the sphere of faith.

The Realist and Nominalist Controversy which sprang up in the Scholastic Age soon ceased to be one of merely logical import. The discussion was one in which mediæval Europe was torn: rival theologies were fiercely pitted against each other: and kings and emperors were ranged in hostile camps. The Nominalist overthrow of universals seemed to leave an open door for rank materialism, wherein the universal deity and the universal principles of morality should no more be found. The Realist contention for the reality of universals—reality being taken as one and the same—tended, on the other hand, to favour pantheism, especially in the scientific direction, which Abelard was not slow to point out. There was, besides, the negative transcendentalism or mystic agnosticism of Dionysius, whose pantheistic and positivist tendencies were by no means unlit by faith and aspiration. The dominant thought of the time took substances to be more real, the more universal they were. Now the interest of that controversial time abides for the reason that the problem was both real and far-reaching in its issues. Inquiries of our own time like that of the origin of species are but new phases of the problem as to universals *a parte rei*, and these inquiries are found in fields of philology as well as in those of physical science. It was Abelard who insisted that universals can neither be things, on the one hand, nor words on the other, and who, with his stress on conceptual thought, gathered

up into himself the different strands of thought in the time. It is with the nature of these universals in the mind that we are philosophically concerned. We still want to know whether, in its general reasonings, it is thing or idea or name which is present to the mind. We know how wisely Hobbes—by Leibniz styled *plus quam nominalis*—has written on the subject, and how much more acutely Locke wrote than his critics have always understood. Words, no doubt, have a purely symbolic meaning for us, but they must bear a signification and represent an idea. But both idea and name must be brought into accord with things—things as they really are. It is the name which holds together the resemblances between particular things. Thus all the elements are necessary, each in its place. It was easy, before the Conceptualist position was reached, for Realist and Nominalist to demolish each other's position, just as it is still easy for the Idealist and the Materialist each to destroy the other's ground, without suspecting the while that a position may be assumed which not only preserves what is true in each, but also retains in a true form what they each deny. Universals as entities were to Aquinas fictitious, for to him, after Aristotle, individuals alone exist. Yet he did not hold to the Nominalist contention, that universals are mere names, representing no ideas in the mind or in things exterior to it. For ideas were to him archetypal of things created, and so were eternally existent in the Divine mind. General terms, too, had for him a certain real existence. It is in Roscellinus that the individualism is boldly taken which sees the truly real only in the

individual thing. The whole tendency of scholasticism was towards exhaustion in an arid Nominalism. What vital energy the later Nominalism had, went towards the fostering of natural science. Even the relation of God to morality came, in the Scholastic Age, to be involved in the controversy. But let it first be noted that Hugo of St Victor led, in the twelfth century, a remarkable mystical movement of ascent towards God. He denied a knowledge of the essence of God, but held to the *à posteriori* argument for Deity, making particular use of the evidence of the rational soul. The real problem about which Thomists and Scotists were at variance was the nature of God. In the Divine nature, will had a primary place with the Scotists. Will was not determined by intellect, but determined itself. To the Thomists, will and reason are so united in God as to be incapable of disharmony, reason supplying the guiding light of will. So to the Scotists the moral law is grounded in the will of God, and is upheld, but not as uncertainly, by His fiat, arbitrary as this may appear. It is to them good just because God has willed and enjoined it. Not reason, but groundless will, thus determines the good. The Thomists, on the other hand, clear the moral law of this sort of contingency, and ground it so necessarily in the nature of deity that it is quite impossible to conceive its being other than it is. What God commands He commands, with Thomas, because it is good, and seen by Him to be so. Not that either Aquinas or Scotus regarded universals from a Nominalist point of view, that distinction—such as it was—being reserved

for William Ockam. Both Thomas and Duns Scotus held, each in his own way, to the doctrine of *intelligible species*, by which a copy of the object was supposed, in the process of knowledge, to arise and be seen by the soul. But the powerful personality of Ockam, wittiest of the schoolmen according to Hooker, swept aside the theory of intelligible species as a needless doubling of the subject, the supposed *copy* in the mind being, in his view, no more than that *sign* for it which is found in our idea of it. Ockam, in fact, scattered seeds that should afterwards rise in an idealism, both epistemological and psychological. To Ockam the unity and existence of God were incapable of demonstration: he viewed the necessity for a First Cause in a purely hypothetical light. Ockam it was who set forth the opposition between dogma and reason so that, with him, an irreparable breach took place between philosophy and theology. Scholasticism may then be said to have played its part, and made an end of itself. It only remained for Dante, as poet of Thomism, to sing the swan-song of scholasticism. There can be no doubt that Duns Scotus, doughty champion of Divine and human freedom and precursor of modern scepticism, is a great name as thinker in mediæval philosophy, with a truly Scottish repugnance to what he deemed the servility of Aquinas before Aristotle. Yet it is the merit of Aquinas to have been far more coherent, systematic, and logically consistent than Augustine or Anselm, and his ethical doctrine touching the will is much more developed than that of Aristotle. Hardly any limit was set by Duns to the range and freedom

of the critical intellect, despite the fact that his faith rested on authority. For him the individual is *ultima realitas*. We can hardly choose but lean to the side of Aquinas, in the view he took of the Divine nature and moral law, since to us God is the absolute reason, and morality an embodiment of that reason. To ground moral law, as does Ockam, arbitrarily in the enactment of God's will, so that even if what is right had been wrong, and what is wrong had been right, it would have been our duty to obey, because it was commanded—is utterly to fail of perceiving how the necessary and universal truths of reason are grounded in God and His absolute reason. In Him law is eternal as the absolute reason. His command is in virtue of eternal law. His—the Divine—reason is over all His works. From the days of Origen to our own, the difficulty has just been to get thought to allow that larger say to reason in the things of faith which becomes it as that on which universal and necessary truths and principles depend. Scholasticism made the effort to reconcile faith and knowledge, and assumed at length the form of thinking that the faith of the church is absolute truth. Scholasticism succeeded in transcending Aristotelian dualism by its complete subordination of all other beings to God. It overpassed Aristotelian inquiry as to how God is ultimate cause of the world by declaring the glory of God to be the end of the world process.

On the foremost level of learning and spiritual force stood Scotus Erigena. He, paving the way in the ninth century for Anselm's movement, held true religion for true philosophy, and true philosophy for true religion,

and, starting from the primary unity of all things, he straightway unfolded a system of constructive thought that made for majestic pantheism. His thought is subtle, poetic, vague. Under all phenomena and all diversities, the one real thing for him is God, whose intelligence embraces all things. God is thus the most universal being in a way that accords well with his retention of the Neo-Platonic idealism. Among his Neo-Platonic traits are intuition, mysticism, and universal redemption. In Scotus Erigena we find remarkable anticipations of the Schellingian doctrine of potency. In Scotus Erigena, too, we have a precursor of Spinoza and Hegel, as Ockam is a forerunner of Luther and Melancthon. Erigena's principle was, *Auctoritas ex ratione processit*. He made one thing of philosophy and theology, and that one thing was philosophy, just as Anselm, on the other hand, made one of these twain, but that one was theology. No legacy of mediæval realism is more characteristic than the Anselmic mode of putting the Ontological argument for the Being of God—far more capable of forceful presentation than Anselm himself knew. Its form in the *Proslogion* of Anselm was that of presenting the idea of God in the human mind as necessarily involving the reality of that idea. God is, in the Anselmic presentation, "That than which nothing greater can be thought," and Anselm is able on occasion to insist that to nothing else can the structure of his reasoning be applied. The capabilities of the argument have been well made manifest in the ontological speculations of, and since, Hegel. The importance of setting forth the conception of an absolute being as a necessity

of thought—of showing that such a being as he pre-supposed must be thought—was not realised by Anselm. He strangely failed to urge, as against Gaunilo, what a necessary conception is that of the most real being, and how free that conception is from arbitrariness and contradictoriness. Imperfect in dialectical adroitness as his argument might be, Anselm yet did a great service to thought by his endeavour to give truth held by faith a scientific form. A deeper sense of the difficulties involved in setting forth such truths on rational grounds is found in Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, owing to the teachings of experience and deeper study of Aristotle. Already to Scotus Erigena, God had been the One Creative Source of all things; in this One Cause, “primordial causes” immutably subsist; independently of Him, the universe does not exist, but He exists in all things. Nature is constituted by the eternal archetypes of things. Erigena’s thought, so metaphysical in character, already meant the triumph of the universal. Albertus, later, put the notion of Infinite Being in place of Prime Mover.

Mediæval philosophy strangely failed to see the unsatisfactoriness of its treatment of logic as something purely formal and dissociate from reality. Hence the schoolmen did not realise that they turned the Christian dogmas into so many logical puzzles. This they did, despite the fact that they meant to apply reason to the data of revelation, and to find out necessary truth, of which God should be to them basis. The discredit, into which their system fell, sprang out of this divorce from reality and experience, into which the verbal subtleties

of the system betrayed them. The thought of Europe speedily left behind thinkers like Suarez and others, who in modified ways vainly clung to the old methods and principles. Philosophy had need of a freer atmosphere, in which the only authority should be that of reason. The method of scholasticism was that of subtracting the irrational elements from religion. It regarded religion as a Divine revelation; it started with a system of dogmas; it was a rationalised Catholicism. We have seen how, in Duns Scotus and William Ockam, the efforts of the age of the scholastics to reconcile religion and philosophy ended really in their complete disparity being recognised. A sorrowful result was this conclusion of the endeavour to prove and maintain the unity of truth, religious and philosophical. For all that, we hold to the view that the modern contempt of scholasticism is exceedingly misplaced. Current thoughtlessness allows the scholastic spirit of speculative depth and inquisitiveness, its unmeasured confidence in the powers of the intellect, its transmitted wealth of principles, elements, and terms, all to pass into the inheritance of to-day with rarely a word of grateful acknowledgment. Dogmatic in character, no doubt, the thought of that epoch was, but not without fruitful issues for dialectical thought, for theological formulation, and for ethical teaching and pronouncement. To it we may well apply those words of Dante that speak of magnificences yet to be known, so that the foes thereof shall not be able to keep silent—

“Le sue magnificenze conosciute
 Saranno ancora sì, che i suoi nimici
 Non ne potran tener le lingue mute.”

CHAPTER XI.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF AQUINAS.

THE vastest and most systematic genius of the Middle Ages was Saint Thomas Aquinas. His architectonic work, the *Summa Theologica*, embodies the whole philosophy of that epoch, expounded in the spirit of the time. That spirit was the spirit of Aristotle. Aquinas became the best representative of Scholasticism. Rosmini, who, in his *Teodicea*, speaks of Aquinas as chief among Italian philosophers, set himself to perfect the philosophy of Aquinas by purging it of this Aristotelian leaven, with the pantheistic-materialistic tendency it bore. Aquinas, however, had borne so great respect to the teachings of Aristotle that only when they came into tolerably clear antagonism to Christian truth did he deviate from them. It is thus easy to see why Thomism as a system lacked in logical completeness, acute and massive as it was.

But Aquinas is not to be thought of as a mere reproducer of Aristotle, as is sometimes said; rather is it true to say that, with the aid of Aristotle and the fathers, he brought forth a philosophy all his own. For such fathers as Athanasius, Basil, the Gregories, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, were all used by Aquinas, whose Aristotelianism is brightened with an effluence of Platonic eleva-

tion, and touched with the charm of Socratic method. Aquinas gave system to the teaching of the Fathers, the Areopagite, and the Lombard, doing for them, in reducing them to scientific form, what Aristotle had done for the Greeks, Egyptians, and Pythagoreans. Aquinas was, as we have just indicated, conversant with Plato and Aristotle, but also with the Alexandrians and Arabians. He includes substantially the whole teaching of his great predecessor, Augustine, whose *De Civitate Dei* was, in spite of its defects, the nearest approach to the *Summa Theologica*.

The procedure of philosophy—that of a rational ascent—which Augustine had so well described, is set forth by Aquinas also. Those who come to Aquinas will, as it has been put, find “their intellectual food cooked for them.” The fulness of his contents, the fineness of his distinctions, the depth of his thought, and the sharp-sighted clearness of his judgments,—all mark him out as the great thinker he was. His aim was to shape philosophy so that its support should be gained for the upholding of Christian truth or doctrine.

As a philosopher, Aquinas sets out from a principle from which he never seems to deviate—namely, the principle of the demonstration of the infinite by means of the finite.¹ Aquinas declares that reason can perceive and prove God through His works, for the existence of God is demonstrated by its effects—the invisible God is seen in His visible effects.² And, indeed, Aquinas, after Albertus Magnus, gives final expression to the distinction between natural and revealed theology; natural theology simply signifying the doctrine of God, as established

without revelation, to be found in the philosophy of Aristotle. In the case of natural religion, Aquinas took reason to be parallel with revelation in its working; whereas, in revealed religion, reason has merely ancillary functions, and works in subordination to revelation. God is an ineffable Being, in the view of Aquinas, and is raised above human knowledge. { God is to Aquinas, as he has said, after Aristotle, the Prime Motor. } This need for a First Cause is curiously based by Aquinas upon the impossibility of an infinite series of successive events, rather than upon deductions based on the universal science of nature. He holds we must advance from finite effect to infinite cause; for, though such effect may not reveal the entire cause, it can yet prove that it exists. Aquinas clung to the absoluteness of Deity, and did not fail to separate Him wholly from all created things. } He held that all beings are not purely possible, but there is something which is necessary. {

But indeed it was rather the externality of finite things to God, and their *quasi* independence of him, that Aquinas emphasised, making the category of causality the keystone of his thought. Of the alternatives of the Schoolmen, Aquinas preferred to lay stress on the *universalia in re*, and so laid stress on the creaturely essence, that the hold of Divine immanence was loosened. He, in fact, displaced the ontological argument of Anselm, that he might set up the Divine Existence in *à posteriori* fashion, since he thought the argument, to be complete, must be, at one and the same time, *à priori* and *à posteriori*. The reason lay in his accounting God the only being at once ideal and real, or Whose ideality was identical with

reality. 'God was to him *actus purus*, the absolutely reasonable substance, in Whom will is subordinate to reason.

Two forms of being are found by Aquinas in God—(real being and ideal being, the former viewing God in Himself, the latter regarding Him as archetypal idea. This distinction of being in God is afterwards found in Rosmini, but is not due to him.) Aquinas holds it impossible to know ideal being in God, without knowing His real being. He holds we cannot know God in His essence, but only through His effects.) The trend of the thought of Aquinas is unfavourable to ontologism, which has sometimes professed to shield itself behind his authority. (Man's knowledge of God, according to Aquinas, is analogical in character. / Being and essence are not distinguished in God: His essence is His being, says the *Summa*. [By being he means the actuality of every form or nature. Essence and existence being thus the same in God, as the First Efficient Cause, the act—as it is said—of existing is derived, in the case of secondary efficient causes, from this First Efficient Cause. Being, he thinks, is, in this First Cause, intelligence itself. God is to him distinguished as the self-existent being—a necessarily existing essence. This metaphysical essence of Deity is root and foundation of His specific attributes, as we shall see.

As God alone is being by His essence, for that His essence is His being, so every creature is being *by participation*, and its essence is not its being. The Divine immensity is, to Saint Thomas, an absolute attribute, the totality of the Divine essence not being something commensurable with totality of place. God is in His

Word: the Word is God: the Word God is the Idea. For the word, Aquinas expressly says, conceived in the mind, represents all that we actually comprehend. In God there is a unique Idea, and this Idea is God Himself. The idea is the divine essence with Saint Thomas, which all things imitate, in so far as they are good.

As to the world, Aquinas says reason cannot apodictically show that the world was made in time. The eternity of creation he does not affirm, though he does not think it can be refuted, so repugnant to reason is a beginning of created things. He allows that the philosophers have been able to recognise the first thing, but denies that they have, independently of faith and by use of their reason, been able to demonstrate that creation took place in time. Saint Thomas avers that the most universal causes produce the most universal effects, and the most universal effect, he thinks, is being. There is no impression which the mind more fundamentally gathers, in the view of Aquinas, from the object than that of being.

This idea of being is the first of all first principles, and may be expressed in the negative formula, "Being is not not-being." Then being, he argues, must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God. Creation is to him properly the work of God, Who produces being absolutely. And the visible world is created after ideas that are externally existent in the Divine Mind, such ideas being of the essence of God—yea, being, in fact, God. But the separateness of God from the creation has to be softened down, and this is effected by Aquinas through insisting on God as being in all things

by His presence and power. When his First Cause—which, we have seen, he conceives as *actus purus*—has been obtained, he must needs endow Him with attributes which will explain particular effects in nature and in man. He makes God one, personal, spiritual; clothes Him with perfect goodness, truth, will, intelligence, love, and other attributes. The world of effects, he thinks, is yet like Him, though they are distinct; for the effect resembles the cause, and the cause is, in sense, in the effect.

Aquinas starts from created beings in his mode of rising to God. He has a stringent definition of creation as “a production of a thing according to its whole substance” (*productio alicujus rei secundum suam totam substantiam*), to which is significantly added, “nothing being presupposed, whether created or increate” (*nullo præposito, quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum*). ‘Creation, that is to say, is the production of being in itself, independently of matter as subject.’ He distinguishes causality which is creative from causality which is merely alterative. { He recognises non-being as before being. { Creation is to Aquinas the “primary action” (*prima actio*), possible to the “primary agent” (*agens primum*) alone. Material form for him depends on primary matter, being consequent on the change produced by efficient cause. And Aquinas has much to say of the *rappports* between substance and its accidents, and of form as that by which a thing is what it is. God, as pure actuality, is infinite form, not being limited by matter. Intelligence, he expressly says, knows being absolutely, and without distinction of time. The processes whereby reason, as the active force of the soul, rises, for Aquinas, to God,

are those of causality (*causalitatis*), excellence or eminence (*excellentiæ* or *eminentiæ*), and negation (*negationis*). (All goodness and perfection for Aquinas exist pre-eminently in God.) Not always free from danger, however, is his mode of speaking, as for example, when he makes God simply the actuality of all things and separates potentiality from Him, or when he tends to identify thought and being. Being he expressly regards as itself the most perfect of all things, in virtue of its actuality; being itself is to him the actuality of all things, and even of their ideas. He holds a doctrine of final causes, wherein all things are directed to their end by a supreme and intelligent Being.

Aquinas holds to two degrees of Divine intelligibility: the first degree comes to us by natural light, and to the second degree we are guided by supernatural illumination. This distinction has a very fundamental place with Aquinas, and he thinks our confused and unpractised vision has need to grow in the use of the latter or higher light. So it, no doubt, has, but his former position that God, as Creator and Lord, is known through the things that are made, is one which seems rather to exceed the view possible to modern philosophy of religion, so deeply affected by Kantian and post-Kantian agnosticism. The light of human reason he holds to be a participation in the uncreated light of Divine reason; he takes the first principle to be known *naturally*, such knowledge being of God as the Author of Nature; and he regards this principle as the source of all human science and knowledge. It is on such a strong and assured foundation he will build his philosophical edifice.

God, having put within the soul its intellectual light, its knowledge of those first principles, which are the germs of the sciences, is, *par excellence*, the cause of human science in his view. ¶ Divine Reason is for him the law of all created things, and such law is eternal. | To Aquinas, substance means being which exists in itself, and not in another as its subject. *Substantia est res cujus naturæ debetur esse non in alio*. For ὑποκείμενον he uses *suppositum* rather than *substratum*. Substantial form is to him that which constitutes matter in its primary being, the form being that by which a thing is what it is. In virtue of God's intelligence, His life is, for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, immortal and eternal. And the human soul, which is for Aquinas most perfect of all the forms which matter is capable of receiving, is, in his view, also immortal, being the sole form which survives the dissolution of its corporeal organisation. | The soul is to him a being proper, an immortal substance, which comes not by generation, but proceeds from God by creation. Aquinas, in his threefold view of substance, held all essences save God to be made up of matter and form. The human soul, as immaterial substance, was, to him, conditioned as to its existence through its essence. It is important to observe, before we pass from these aspects, that Aquinas expressly holds intelligence to know being absolutely, and without distinction of time. Therein he has his points of contact with the thought of Augustine and of Dante.

We cannot dwell on the amazing comprehensiveness and subtlety of the religious and metaphysical philosophy of Aquinas: we have his ethical philosophy also to ex-

amine, but it can be best understood when his whole system of thought is kept in full view. The whole is to him always present in the part, but it is his philosophy in whole we shall most connectedly find from a broad survey of its parts. It may at this point be fitly recalled that his *Summa* is not only the Christian religion thrown into scientific form, but is also the orderly exposition of what a man should be. Hence the vision of the Divine Essence, of Whom he treats with such theologic power and fulness, is for him that perfect blessedness which he takes to be the ultimate end of man. God also, as absolute activity of thought and will, he takes to act for an end, which everything in the world subserves.

The high dignity of man is found by Aquinas mainly in his will, only there is this trouble, that man is apt, in the thought of Aquinas, not to carry sufficient answer, in his original spiritual constitution, to the commands of supreme will imposed upon him. He is more scientific than Augustine or Anselm in his treatment of the will—a treatment closely related to other parts of his philosophy. Though his psychology is so largely drawn from Aristotle, yet his theory of the will has the merit to be much more complete than Aristotle's, and has exerted large influence on European philosophy. He sets, as we have seen, the Divine will in a relation of dependence on the Divine intellect. So, in respect of man's nature likewise, Aquinas held the far-reaching doctrine that intellect is supreme; to him what reason approved, will obeyed. The good is commanded by God, in his view, because it is good,

and recognised by His wisdom to be so. He holds will, as a rational power, to be due to God. God both makes and moves it, but only to the willing of the good.

With fine clearness the Angelic Doctor says that God moves the will of man as universal mover and without this universal motion man cannot will anything, but at the same time man determines himself under application of his reason to a particular volition. Sometimes God moves men, he thinks, to a determinate particular volition of good, such being the case, in his view, of those whom God moves by His grace. But, even then, the grace, though premoving, is not predetermining. And grace, it may be said, is, in the system of Aquinas, rather apt to wear an external and accidental character, and to assume the form of power that is mechanical rather than vital in its cast.

Aquinas holds the object to which the will tends, to be presented by the intellect, and not by the will itself. Intellect is necessary in order to will, hence intellect is for him higher. Will, however, can direct intellect, and will is lord of its own life. By his theory of physical premotion, our free acts are foreseen and predetermined. If God wills our actions to be what they are, He yet wills them to be free. The will of God predestinates, but necessity is not imposed on events, neither is contingency removed. Aquinas can say that this or that particular action of a determinate character is not owing to any other agency than the will itself (*non est ab alio determinante, sed ab ipsa voluntate*).

Perhaps one ought to say that freedom, as it is found in Aquinas, seems to exist rather too verbally, and not to be sufficiently real. He is apt to appear as though trying to retain freedom and determinism at one and the same time. There is no lack of stress on freedom, as, for example, when he says the being is free that can rule its own action, for he is free who is the cause of himself; whereas that which is, by a sort of necessity, driven to action, is, he holds, in a state incompatible with freedom. Yet, though man's turning to God is ascribed by him to free-will, this turning of the will is declared impossible unless God Himself so turn it. So that, on the one hand, Aquinas in the clearest manner declares movement of the will to be nothing less than inclination of the will itself towards the thing wished. On the other hand, he affirms that God alone can change the will, for that He alone is cause of the power of inclination—cause, in fact, of the will, which He alone can efficaciously move.

On which it may be remarked that the will may, no doubt, be moved by itself as intrinsic cause, and may yet be open to be moved by God in His grace as extrinsic cause, so that there is no real inconsistency. And yet it seems not easy to hold the presentation of Aquinas to be quite unambiguous, and this more or less equivocal character of freedom in his hands is more surprising in view of his genuine doctrine of Creation, with the distinctness of the world from God which it involves.

In respect of the Divine relation to evil, Aquinas

teaches that the sinful act is both being and act, and that God is, no doubt, the cause of all action *considered as act*. But then, says Saint Thomas, sin is more than being and act; it is a defect—a defect springing from free-will as its cause, and not to be referred to God. That is to say, he makes God the cause of the act where there is sin, but not the cause of sin, since He is not the cause of the defect which there is in the act. His view of the character of evil is thus negative. His treatment of the emotions was striking beyond anything produced by Mediævalism; the passions he refers to the body, and divides them into two great types, the concupiscent and the irascible. The various forms and degrees of these passions he suggestively treats.

The optimism of Aquinas was of more moderate character than that of Leibniz, or Malebranche, or Rosmini. As against the strong optimism of Abelard, Aquinas held that God could create another world better than this present one, but could not create one better adapted to the end for which this world has been made. It is by the end in view, he thinks, the order adopted must be judged. Divine Wisdom is limited to a determined order, only as the end chosen requires the best particular means of attaining it.

The soul itself is, in the *Summa*, viewed—as already indicated—as the *substantial form* of a physical organic body endowed with rational life. This was in accordance with the theory of the Scholastics as to a radical substratum called *materia prima*—primary matter. Aquinas, like Albertus, made matter itself the principle of individuation, in which he was opposed

by Duns Scotus. His doctrine of the soul must wear to us a very materialistic aspect, unless it be carefully remembered that this substantial form was taken to be immaterial and perfectly simple. He expressly says that the human soul, which is called intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and self-subsisting. Although the intellectual soul has no matter, he says, from which it is constituted, yet it is form of a certain matter. The intellectual individual reaches his completed individuality in the exercise of reason and free-will. So the rational soul, he thinks, is properly said to have being, and to have been created or made. For being made (*fieri*) ends in being. Not from pre-existing corporeal matter could it have been made, or it would then be corporeal; and not from pre-existing spiritual matter, as in that case spiritual substances would be mutually transformed; therefore he holds it could only have been by creation. To him the soul, as immaterial, was immortal, and could not be conceived as otherwise. Man is to him the intermediate link between material life and spiritual or immaterial activity.

In his philosophy of knowledge, Aquinas makes man's cognitive power—like the soul from which it emanates—partake of a double character, material and immaterial. All knowledge begins for him from the data of sensuous perception. He distinctly says that our knowledge comes first from the senses, but maintains this does not mean that our sense-cognition is the complete and perfect cause of our knowledge, but rather that it supplies the material of the cause. He

discards the notion of innate ideas. The intellectual faculty consisted of the active intellect (*intellectus agens*) and the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). Aquinas held to the objective value of our knowledge in the most complete manner. The universe was for him mirrored—ideally and immaterially—in the mind of man, just as the likeness of a person is on a photographic plate. Such, in brief, was his epistemological position.

What men call Fate, Saint Thomas considers to be nothing but Divine Providence in its meanings and effects. Things which here seem done by accident are, he holds, to be referred to some preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. After Boëthius, he speaks of Providence as the Lord of the universe Himself, directing all things according to His eternal plan (*divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quæ cuncta disponit*). But he does not allow that one is attributing things human to fate, because one may choose to call the will and power of Deity itself by the name of Fate. One must say, however, that his own stress on Divine causality in second causes is apt to make Providence appear no more than fate in some sort, a circumstance which seems due to the influence of Arabian interpreters like Avicenna. And yet it seems due to him to say that as against the Arabian philosophers, Aquinas is not without strivings to recognise the efficiency of the second causes through which Deity works. His deterministic leanings were seen in his postulation of influence on interior constraint or inclination.

We may now make some remarks on features of this imposing philosophy of the Middle Ages. Its realistic character is obvious, the real being for Aquinas the rational. He completed, in a Christian sense, the work of Aristotle. He vindicated the superiority of the contemplative life, as Aristotle had done, making the contemplation of God—the vision of His being or essence—at once highest good and highest truth. We have in Aquinas a fusion of dialectics and mysticism. To dialectics we owe his system, with its theory of the superiority of intellect to will, and its organic connection of dogmas. To mysticism were due alike its base in love, and its apex in the beatific vision of God. His thought had been affected by the mystical agnosticism of Dionysius the Areopagite, on which he made some notable advances. His mind had suffered a strange cleavage whereby the Divine and the earthly became parted into two quite separate worlds. This dualism was due to an ecclesiastical supernaturalism so strong as to prove able to lay the foundation of his system on this dualistic basis.

The bold character of his ontology strikes the mind, which finds the match of it only in Hegel. Less direct, and less pantheistic, was his view of creation as emanating from God, than that of his master, Albertus Magnus, and so he represented the active will of Deity as that which, as Thought, wills and creates. The idea of order, as a ruling idea of the Middle Ages, finds in him its most symmetrical and proportionate expression. He develops it into a great living system, connecting the most manifold and

diverse interests, so that therefrom he, with systematising genius, builds up an all-embracing world-view. Christianity he brings into closer relation with science and culture, as these then existed. For grace comes to perfect nature, not to destroy it (*gratia naturam non tollit sed perficit*). A leader of the Christendom of his own time Aquinas was, making truth the quest of his comprehensive mode of thinking. For the most part, he made knowledge and theoretic reason precede will and practical reason, and this rational element is a very precious feature in Thomistic philosophy. The being of God, the grounding of the world in Him, and the soul's immortality, are to Aquinas truths already discoverable by reason. The unity of the Divine essence reason can receive, but it is otherwise with the triplicity of the Divine Persons. Reason is to him the precursor of faith, and with the independence of the former he joins its subordination to the truth of Christian revelation. Reason can at least overthrow objections to such revelation, even though its truths are above reason, and not established by means of it. Perhaps one should not err in estimating the elevation of his life, and his mild persistency in his immense task, as greater than his elevation above his own time. But it is certainly a tribute to his realising in himself the highest developed thought of his time, that the mighty Dante sits so closely to the thought of the Angelic Doctor.

There can hardly be a doubt that the defensive attitude of Aquinas towards Platonism bore him further towards empiricism than would otherwise have

been the case. The influence of Aquinas on the subsequent history of religious thought was undoubtedly great, and has lived on into the dogmatic thought of to-day even in the Protestant world. This was largely the result of Melanchthon's having taken up positions in sympathy with the Aristotelianism of Aquinas. Among subsequent thinkers influenced by Aquinas must be reckoned Spinoza, whose ethical and metaphysical philosophy owed much to ideas derived from the Angelic Doctor. For the place of Aquinas in the history of ethics is certainly not less important than his significance for the history of religious thought. In fine, one can think of no higher tribute to his work than is found in the fact that the greatest need of the world to-day is just that of an Aquinas to do for its vast body of synthetic knowledge what the Angelic Doctor did for that of the Middle Ages.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WYCLIF.

IT is a sufficiently new and startling idea to most minds, even among the cultured, that Wyclif also was among the philosophers. He has not been so numbered. Our famous historians of philosophy—Hauréau, Windelband, Erdmann, Weber, Ueberweg, Tennemann, Schwegler, Falckenberg, Höffding—have not discovered Wyclif, one of the most famous schoolmen of his time. Famous, indeed, as pure Logician, as Metaphysician, as Philosopher, and as Theologian. Only too well has the persecuting spirit succeeded in sinking his thought into oblivion. But accepted modes of thought are not always justified. No English name before Wyclif brought forth a philosophy more bold or broad. It is not quite creditable to English scholars that it has been so much left to foreign scholars like Drs Lechler, Boehringer, Buddensieg, Beer, and Loserth to do Wyclif justice. To the painstaking thought and scholarship of M. H. Dziewicki, of the University of Cracow, Austria, in his editings of the Latin works of this philosopher for the Wyclif Society, is greatly due the possibility of our now reaching some true and helpful understanding of Wyclif's system of thought.

Let us then go back five centuries, and look into the mind of this young Oxford philosopher. We find it full of thoughts that made him the sworn foe of Nominalism, which erstwhile had no less a name than William Ockam as that of its doughty champion. The *Logica* of Wyclif leaves aside argumentation and syllogisms, vital as these appeared to the Scholastics, his desire to counteract Nominalism, and give a realistic turn to Logic, being the reason. Now, to these Nominalists no general term is anything but an empty sound—a *flatus vocis*, as they termed it. That is to say, the general term has no meaning apart from the singulars to which it refers. The singulars, therefore, to which this term refers, are the only real things in the world. But it is, of course, much too bold a thing for Nominalists to say that resemblances or likenesses between persons or things are not denoted by these general terms, and, so far, they have to step down from their Nominalist pedestal. For it is evidently absurd to say that only singulars do exist in the world. To some extent every singular is its universal. This, while it retains its own distinctive individuality or peculiarity. Wyclif was fond of the mystery of the Trinity as an illustration. What the Father is—so Wyclif holds—is the Son, and is the Holy Spirit. Yet the Father is not the Son. Nor is the Spirit the Father. In such ways Wyclif sought to strengthen his position to the men of that time. He is Thomist in tendency, but his Platonism is prone to carry him away from Aquinas. Wyclif's thoughts and doctrines—fantastic as many of them must seem to the men of to-day—are drawn out

with great care, strength, and amazing logical exactitude; he is, in fact, a logician before all. But one with a metaphysical creed, and who is determined to demonstrate the existence of universals. His Realism was of extreme character. Small wonder that the logicians of to-day hold all real existence to be necessarily singular, and yet reject Realism, the general notion not being, to them, of any metaphysical significance. The conflict between Nominalism and Realism was indeed the basal one in mediæval philosophy, and the influence of Aristotle, though he was by no means a Nominalist, proved paramount in drawing off thought in a Nominalist direction, which so well harmonised with the interest of Science and exact knowledge of the concrete. For there can hardly be a doubt that mediæval thinking showed a tendency to identify the real with that which was merely abstract or logically existent, so that at last a Nominalistic type of thought is seen to prevail. The Realism of Wyclif took things to be as we know them to be—as they exist in our minds, and was thus forerunner of such Idealism as that of Berkeley and the German Transcendentalists of recent times. What, then, is the essential position involved in this philosophical standpoint? It is, as Dziewicki properly points out, that to be is to be perceived; that matter is nothing apart from the knower; that it exists as, and when, we know it; that the non-ego is posited by the ego, and becomes one with it; and that the external world is known by us only as a modification of ourselves, said world being, in fact, only such modification. Wyclif shares Scholastic subservience to the categories of

Aristotle, and we to-day, after all that has been said both for and against the Aristotelian scheme, still wait to know how these categoric principles determine thought, the while they do not of necessity come into consciousness.

The opponents of Wyclif, on the other hand, held that things are not as we know them. Their position thus anticipated, in important ways, the philosophy of Locke, the materialism of the eighteenth century, and the Empiricism and Positivism of to-day. The position is possible to these representatives of thought in virtue of the self-contradictions into which our knowledge at many points falls. Now it must be said there is truth both in the position of Wyclif and in that of his adversaries. For while, between thoughts and things—things which give rise to our ideas and thoughts—some resemblance must exist, yet we may not go so far as to postulate identity between things and our knowledge of them. Wyclif's place is with those who stand for knowledge in its basal character and worth. But any proper definition of knowledge, or discussion of its nature, there is not, for the day of epistemology was not yet. We may not carry the conflict so far as did he, but we can do no otherwise than admit that it has been due to this "Doctor Evangelicus" and those who have followed on his lines, that the foundations of truth stand sure. We may very well grant to Realism the truth of the types and classes, the genera and species, of science, without denying some wholesome force to the Nominalist contention that our conventional general propositions stand in need of the corrective influence

exerted by individual things. The Nominalist contention as to the symbolic use of language we may admit, but we deny the Nominalist insistence on a particular image or a pictorial representation. The Conceptualist position is certainly to be preferred, whereby general terms and relations can be thought or conceived by mind, and general terms do represent ideas in the mind and qualities exterior to it. The need and place for all these forms of thought—Realistic, Nominalistic, and Conceptualist—were eventually disclosed when writers like Albertus Magnus showed how universals are *ante res* in the Divine or archetypal mind; are, at the same time, *in rebus* in respect of their common nature; and are, likewise, *post res* as abstracted from things by the mind. Wyclif's hyper-realism comes out in his treatment of the Incarnation, wherein the Word is declared to have taken on Himself, not the nature of a man, but the *communis humanitas*, so that He became *communis homo*—the man. But theological implications we do not here pursue.

Wyclif has his own thoughts of God and of freedom. We ought, according to Wyclif, rather to say that God *is*, than that He *was*, before the world, eternity being, with Him, anterior to the creative moment by nature, not in respect of time. Wyclif reminds one of the Lotzean conception of God, not as conceived *in* time, but as the Founder of Time. To Him, as raised above the succession of moments in virtue of His Eternal Absoluteness, the beginning and the end are one. Certainly we cannot make time the form of His life, but must rather make Deity the seat of time. The metaphysical tendency of Wyclif is again seen in his dis-

position to discuss questions like the cessation of *non-entity* at Creation, and the Lordship of Deity anterior to the Creation. To-day, it may be remarked, we are still positing creative energy in Deity that annuls non-being, and calls forth, as the Logos, creaturely existence out of this sphere of non-being. In dealing with the Infinite, we find Wyclif haunted with that quantitative infinite, which has shown such wonderful persistence in philosophy from Aristotle's day to our own. He thinks that, analogically, all things, God and His creatures, are identical. *Omnia sunt idem in entitate*, he affirms. His realism goes far beyond the position of those who hold to analogical identity, but regard such identity as not real because analogical. God is to Wyclif identical with the creature in respect that they are both being. But Wyclif has his answer for those who think he identifies God with the creature, and makes substance to be accident. His answer is, in effect, that *that which* is being in the case of God cannot be logically concluded to be the same with *that which* we call being in the creature. God is to Wyclif the absolute Cause, and the mysterious Source of all things. Wyclif found it hard to steer clear of the dangers of Pantheistic tendency in the use he makes of the conception of Transcendent Being, as something common to God and the creature, and he eludes the danger only by great logical adroitness and argumentative subtlety.

In Wyclif's theory of Freedom the conception of possibility bulked largely. So largely, that at last in his peculiar use of it, as applied to God, he was driven to a hard determinism, while still upholding Free-will

as a dogma. In treating of the contingent, Wyclif held all indetermination to have its ultimate cause in God. Necessity and contingency are not absolutely opposed, in the view of Wyclif. It is, however, vain to try to evade the lines being sharply drawn between these two. Wyclif's doctrines of Necessity were anathematised by the Council of Constanx in 1415, for the temper of that time was such at least as could find no delight in bold paradox. Wyclif's thought, like that of some thinkers still, seems to fail to realise the implications of our being free and finite agents in a moral system of things. It does so because due scope is not allowed to the free self-determination of man, the causative agency of God so haunting it. No one who thoroughly understands what rational free agency involves would set our peccability, our liability to sin, in such close relation to God's Absolute Causality as Wyclif does, but would relate it more to our own free choice or volition. Wyclif strongly adhered, in his *Triologus*, &c., to the Augustinian doctrine of predestination, and tried to save freedom by saying that God cannot bring us to merit or the opposite unless we also will. Wyclif's strenuous opposition to Transubstantiation arose from his unwillingness to accept a metaphysical theory implying that an accident could exist without a subject.

Wyclif has his theory also touching God's relation to evil. He thinks God cannot make man commit moral evil, but, the sin taking place, He can make such fact of evil to be good, for the sin is true, and therefore, in Wyclif's view, good. A rather specious interpretation,

in our view, since the result or inference, as existing good, is credited to Deity, to whom, however, the premiss is not attached. Whatever exists must be good, Wyclif thinks, so that evil practically ceases to be evil and has become good—a position which is not without parallels in our own generation, though happily these are few.

Wyclif's theories of matter, space, and time are full of points of curious interest. He does not hold to the ordinary Scholastic dualism of form and matter. Matter and form are not absolute, separable realities, in his view; he postulates a sort of trinity—matter, form, and compound—in which all are different, though in a sense identical. He regards matter as eternal, and thinks matter and form should be treated qualitatively, rather than as quantitative parts. It is, of course, quite feasible to conceive matter as eternal, and yet retain creation as necessary to give it form. In the matter of time, Wyclif holds it also to be eternal. Time is everywhere, he thinks, and is eternal as the world. The word "is," with him, means eternity, being really significant of all time. Time needs a *before* and an *after*, and these are found only in movement, without which, thinks Wyclif, there is no time. But movement would be constituted, in his view, by the flight of imagination itself. Space is real, but only as peopled with corporeal substance.

We have now rapidly surveyed the claims of Wyclif—always so rational, always so critical—to be a great philosopher, no less than a great religious reformer. Little wonder if his merits, in the former respect, have been so shamefully ignored, when even his work, in the

latter aspect, has suffered so much neglect. There is no disputing the fact that the significance of Wyclif for the Reformation has not been truly comprehended or adequately recognised by Protestant Theology. It is, therefore, less surprising that a like fate has befallen his claims as a realistic philosopher. Yet as a philosopher he was, in his day, second to none, says Vaughan, while Shirley classed him with Duns Scotus, Ockam, and Bradwardine, as one of the "four great schoolmen of the fourteenth century." To do some justice to neglected names or factors in history is always one of the noblest and most pleasing of tasks, and we may, therefore, be sure that fuller justice shall yet be meted out to one whom Milton styled "the divine and admirable Wyclif." Admirable, indeed, he is, alike as man, religionist, reformer, and philosopher—one who, in many ways, suffered the reward of them that are in marked advance of their time.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA.

ONLY certain features of the philosophy of the great and admirable Spinoza, that more especially call for criticism, will be noticed in this chapter. It is peculiarly difficult to estimate Spinoza, or write of him at all, because so much depends on the standpoint from which we view him. It has been lately claimed for Spinoza that he is much less metaphysician than has been generally supposed, his metaphysic being really incidental to his work as ethical philosopher. But, if one chose to maintain the reverse view, it seems to me there would be much to substantiate that position. At any rate, there does not really seem to be any getting away from the importance of the metaphysical setting of Spinoza's ethical work.

To Spinoza, with doctrine less rooted in Cartesianism than has usually been supposed, God is Substance—the *is* of all things. God, as so-called *causa sui*, is universal existence. But his God is not the being that determines itself, only being that is without determination. That is to say, God, to Spinoza, is being itself—as fact, not as unproved postulate. God is *ens absolute infinitum*—being absolutely infinite. Substance is

the fundamental concept of the whole philosophy of Spinoza, and all our knowledge is reduced by him to the relations of causality. No other substance can there be than this Immanent Causality: God is the only self-subsistent, independent, and self-contained Being: He holds all causality within Himself. But Spinoza's substance is not opposed to spirit, since it may be said to carry within it all the immanent energies and functions of spirit. Yet the higher absolute of spirit, not substance, he fails consciously to reach. The oneness and infinitude of substance are unfalteringly set forth in his consistent and complete Pantheism.¹ The world is to Spinoza but the necessary consequence of the nature of God, and his affirmation of substance is reached only by negation of the negative and unreal things of finite existence. Substance is the sole and efficient cause of all things.

The ethical philosophy of Spinoza expressly and entirely excludes personality from its conception of God. "God is an extended thing," extension being "an attribute" of His. The Divine extension is infinite. God, the extended, is indivisible. Anthropomorphism Spinoza abhors, because every being would make the Ultimate Reality after its own likeness. So moral and personal qualities, powers of intellect and will, as we know them, have no place in his idea of God. Yet, alongside this, we have, strangely enough, the fact that the totality of being—in its essential and eternal aspects—has, for him, consciousness or thought. God is yet, for him, in fact, consciousness *per se*, eternal, all-

¹ *Eth.*, i. 1-14.

embracing, self-sufficing. His consciousness may be cognised by our reason. But it is, to Spinoza, not analogous to our own consciousness, which is but a "mode," and, as such, finite, dependent, transitory. Extension and thought or consciousness—disparate attributes by which the one substance is known to us—are rated by Spinoza metaphysically higher than finite things, which are but modes, while the former are the attributes. These two Divine attributes, extension and thought, are harmonised in the unity of the substance which they reveal; they are also parallel in their development. Things exist, for him, only in God as the modes of His reality. God or substance—the *ens infinitum*—is, to Spinoza, essentially active (*cogitans*), being, in fact, activity itself. In the fact that Spinoza's conception is thus dynamic, rather than static, he appears the more unsatisfactory in his results. In ascribing Divine power and infinite intellect (*intellectus infinitus*) to Deity, Spinoza makes his God as unintelligible as possible to us by declaring will and intellect in Him to be other than known to us.¹ On the side of thought, God is *ens absolute indeterminatum*—absolutely indeterminate thought. Yet he can speak of God loving Himself "with infinite intellectual love."² Spinoza says his not ascribing qualities like will and reason, in the sense in which we know them, to Deity, is, that the Divine may not be confused with human nature. There is thus, to Spinoza, nothing outside God as substance, and all valid transference of human qualities, like reason and will, to God is wholly done away.

¹ *Eth.*, i. 31.² *Ibid.*, v. 35.

From all which it is evident that God is, in some sense, mind. But God as Infinite Personality Spinoza does not know. His positing mind or thought (*cogitatio*) for God shows how hard it is to get away from postulating powers in God that are characteristic of man. The same is true of the Infinite love, of which man's love is part. His psychology, however, is deductive; the science of the soul is deduced from the nature of God, rather than sought by internal observation. All science is to him rational and deductive. Say, if you will, that Spinoza's substance is not being *in abstracto*, but an essence, which as *ens entium* persists behind thought and extension. The fact remains that his whole ascription of metaphysical attributes to this essence suffers from the lack of essential moral qualities. God can have neither love nor aversion.¹ Spinoza makes so much of the Divinity—without Whom nothing can be or be thought—that he cannot do justly by us, or the relative manifestations of the Divine. This, although the modes are supposed to be infinite as the attributes. Not but what there is an imposing intellectual grandeur in those conceptions of Divinity we have been considering, but we have still to inquire as to their intellectual consistency. Of their grandeur there is no doubt, for is not He the universal consciousness or true existence, with substance in eternity and modes in time? But as to consistency? How does the changeless and indeterminate background of substance or identical unitary Being explain or comport with the changeful modes and transient qualities of the

¹ *Eth.*, v. 17.

world we see? The unity of the world—its absolute unity—may be a fine phrase to conjure with, but we want a unity that will explicate the relation of the finite elements to the whole in which they stand, and be more than merely verbal. Of course, Spinoza gets beyond such an abstract unity in the concrete whole gained by his *Deus sive natura*, when he boldly identifies God and Nature. This monistic principle takes his idealism beyond the dualism then current. He had started out from Cartesian basis, and directed his endeavour towards reconciling the oppositions of ideal thought and real being, of *materia cogitans* and *extensa*, at the immense cost of postulating a single substance! His Platonising power exalted uncreated substance to the rank of absolute being, of which matter and mind, as relative, were but attributes through which it is manifested. But what we miss is a rational grounding of the attributes and modes in the nature of his absolute. God was the only “free cause,” the All-Real, making a Whole of Nature, in which He was necessarily expressed.¹ But the ontologic unity of Spinoza cannot be taken as satisfactory, with its static conditions or relations, and its absorption of the relative and individual. His solution lends itself too easily to a materialistic interpretation, for if matter and spirit be run into one substance, it is only too easy to make spirit but a quality of matter. A God is not so easily got out of the Spinozan substance, for God and the world are concepts that cannot be logically harmonised in such fashion. Of course, it would be to feed ourselves on a

¹ *Eth.*, i. Def. 7.

delusion to suppose we had reached a real unity when we had made God, or substance, simply the sum of finite manifestations. But the harmonisation of the attributes (*attributa*) and modes (*modi*) with the one only substance (*substantia*) is only effected by Spinoza by the peculiar and unexpected fashion in which he claims reality for these different ways in which substance necessarily expresses God. The unity of his Absolute of infinite qualitative content is curiously drawn from an aggregate of heterogeneous realities, each infinite in kind. One cannot choose but admire, however, the masterliness of his statement that God is a Being, "each one" of Whose attributes exhibits or "expresses eternal and infinite essence" or nature.¹ Spinoza is untroubled as to consistency, in holding to the worth of the finite world and the modes, the absolute substance—*Deus sive substantia*—notwithstanding, for, in Spinoza's view, these changeful aspects do not import unreality. They could not be unreal to him, seeing they are viewed as necessary. And yet we are obliged to hold he has really dissolved them, without meaning to do so, in the ultimate and abstract conception of being—being absolutely indeterminate (*non determinata*)—from which no way appears back to the concrete. There is a distinct lack of formative principle or *nexus*. How we are to get back from the eternal and infinite to the finite modes does not at all appear. The mechanical is left by Spinoza's rationalism, whose ideal of knowledge is geometry, in undisputed possession of the field. Things are in God, and stay there.² He is

¹ *Eth.*, i. Def. 6.

² *Ibid.*, i. 18.

their immanent, but not their transitive cause (*causa immanens, non vero transiens*).¹ And, while so remaining in God, things are yet supposed to proceed from Him—a confused representation. All knowledge, to Spinoza, involves the knowledge of God. His ontological position aimed at establishing the *self*-existence and eternity of Nature, rather than the *existence* of God. Individual or finite things are nothing by themselves, exist only in God, being but *modi* of the infinite substance. No proper relation of the Divine causality to them is shown. Spinoza's grounding cosmical existence in the nature of Deity is indefensible; in his theory of extreme ethical necessitation he appears to be without notion of self-conscious volition in Deity; he does not see that this would not yet make such volitional action matter of absolute contingency or indifference to Deity. If God is to him the only free Cause, that does not mean that God has freedom in the free-will sense, for God has no more will than He has understanding. These both belong to the world or the *natura naturata*. Again, Spinoza has no hold on the points of contact between the Divine intelligence and the human, and so he makes an absurd and irrational break between them. Nor is it apparent how so variable and transient a mode as the human spirit can so wondrously know the infinite as did Spinoza. But the important thing, from an ethical point of view, is, that the universe given us by Spinoza, with his immanent cause or monistic principle, is, as yet, perfectly non-moral in character, a metaphysical essence in tremen-

¹ *Eth.*, i. 18 and i. 29, Schol.

dous need of the infusion of ethical quality. Can any ethical redemption be found for it by Spinoza? Ethical distinction is found by him in the essential nature of things, whereby the good stands in essence distinguished from the bad—a purely axiomatic affair to the intellectualistic morals of our geometrical philosopher. One cannot choose but admire Spinoza's deep perception of the metaphysical basis of ethics, for the severance of ethics from metaphysics, so common in British and American thought, cannot hope to win lasting respect; but one feels the terrible void in Spinoza's ethics created by the absence of living personal centres—human and divine—of ethical quality, in which living sources, ethical thought, feeling, and purpose reside. Nothing, however, is wanting to the scientific rigour with which Spinoza works out¹ his intellectualistic scheme of morals, whereby man is at length led up, in the blessedness of his active emotions, to the pure impulse of knowledge or the ancient *Θεωρία*. Perhaps there is nothing finer in Spinoza than his admirable insistence on our living the universal life of reason as our highest good—our seeking before all “the intellectual love of God,” amid the illusions of sense and things finite. Spinoza transfers his own sublime thirst for knowledge to the race, finds the essence of man's soul in reason, and places the essence of reason in thought. Evil is to him that which hinders or prevents the perfecting of the soul in reason. But the perfection of Spinoza is a purely quantitative thing—a defect from which Kant should bring deliverance. Notwithstanding

¹ *Eth.*, iii. iv. and v.

the fact that all existence appears to the reason of Spinoza "under the form of eternity," he is yet able to put forward an ethic, and duties are not allowed to disappear as we might have thought. There is still to be striving after what Spinoza calls perfection. For him the first and only foundation for virtue is knowledge.¹ Certitude is, to him, found in clear ideas, which "are as necessarily true as the ideas of God." To his resolution of ethical activity into cognitive activity we shall return later. Enough now to remark that our growing knowledge or progressive virtue ceases to wear its gradual character when he comes to speak of our sharing in "the intellectual love of God," for God and we are become strangely one in the infinite love common to Him and to us. Clearly, though psychological acuteness is in the main characteristic of Spinoza, psychological consistency has here been to him no jewel.

Spinoza's ethical teachings on immortality² must always remain at a distance from men's real apprehension, the temporal relation having no place in it, and the personal aspect of it being so indistinct. All consciousness of the finite self, as such, has in fact vanished. The persistence of reason, however, he maintains, but it is an immortality speculative and impersonal. *Sentimus experimurque nos æternos esse*; and we are eternal here in life, and not merely after death. This eternity of mind means timelessness. No wonder, therefore, "a free man thinks of nothing so little as of death, his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life."³ For the "intellectual love

¹ *Eth.*, iv. 22.² *Ibid.*, v.³ *Ibid.*, iv. 67.

of God" can never perish, save only "in so far as it is related to the body."

The lack of moral quality, to which we have adverted, is seen in Spinoza's treatment of evil. It cannot, of course, be denied as within the *natura naturata*, but is explained as mere illusion, so little have its moral qualities and relations been appreciated. Our philosopher does not shrink from the rather barefaced acknowledgment of the consequence of his moral attitude—"no action considered in itself alone is either good or evil."¹ He means they are, according to his system, necessary, and neither good nor bad. This is certainly to sit loosely enough to moral distinctions of any thoroughgoing character, but is not surprising in one whose ethic exists or has place at all only in virtue of what we may call an interesting inconsistency. "Under the form of eternity," we should see him dissipate for us all moral duties and judgments of good and evil, which "rest" only "on comparison." His intellectualistic morals may conduct us to *Θεωρία*, with its calm and passionless bliss, but they belong not to the world of real life and imperative ethical endeavour. His whole position² is one which makes the good something merely relative to every man, and to every man's desire. Doubtless he advances to the notion of a true or highest good for the individual man, and for his advantage taken in whole, but such supreme good is still relative to the individual. And Spinoza believes that man does entirely according to his knowledge. What he knows, that he does—so active, in his view, is knowledge or reason. The pale intellectual cast of the

¹ *Eth.*, iv. 59.

² See Part iv. of the *Ethics*.

good, with him, is seen in the fact that it is but a *modus cogitandi*—an act of judgment. A bad action he views as only a wrong judgment, and an act is bad, by comparison, only because of its defect or want of being. Man's evil is, in his view, due to want of knowledge—man's knowledge of what makes for his own welfare; and to think one's own weal is, to his mind, to will or desire it. But in so making ethics a mere accompaniment and consequent of knowledge, Spinoza is, in our view, doing a most unwarrantable and defective thing. Life is assuredly more than thought or knowledge, and reality requires more than to satisfy the demands of formal reason. We can by no means consent to resolve ethics into a pale residuum of the life of contemplative reason, for man's life is shot through with ethical conflicts and strivings, and the world is entangled in this warfare. Spinoza seems to be haunted by the delusion of intellectualism—one still current—that knowledge is here power, whereas it is simply a condition of power. No impulses of pure knowledge will suffice for the overcoming of the passions, however impressively the knowledge be set forth. Knowledge avails only as yoked to the strength of will or the ethical force of character, which is the dominant factor in the process of ethical triumph. This undue exaltation of knowledge gives an air of abstractness and artificiality to Spinoza's whole ethical treatment, which is by no means congruent with reality as embodied in ethical life and conflict.

And so as to the passions. Spinoza's analysis of the phenomena of feeling and passion is very powerful and complete. He derives all the passions from desire. The

whole conception of Spinoza—with what I may call its amazing actualism—is coloured by his view of man as so rooted in nature that “a man is necessarily always subject to passions,” and cannot free himself from the domination of nature. Surely thin is the moral idealism in such a system, with its identification of the possible with the actual. There is no real freedom here; morality is product of the actual; and knowledge pales its ineffectual fires before the gusts and swayings of passion. 'Tis undisguised fact that only in and through God are evil actions here possible. But to Spinoza evil simply did not exist for God, but was mere *ens rationis*. What a strange reversal of all experience that Spinoza holds, not that men will not seek or do the good they know, but that the trouble springs solely from the fact that they do not know their true good. The truth is, Spinoza's ethical treatment is physical rather than moral—a sufficiently serious blemish. Spinoza's doctrine of the self and its love is neither a very congruous nor a very true one. He gives no answer to the inquiry, how the God, Who is the immanent centre and source of all things, is to be harmonised with a finite nature, which is its own centre. His whole thought is shrouded in an atmosphere of universal determinism, and his “supremely perfect Being” turns out to be no more than the mechanical Cause of nature taken as impersonal and unethical. In the same way, he fails to show how the finite mind, at one time but an evanescent mode of the infinite substance, has, at another time, become no illusory existence, but a nature laden with an individuality that is indestructible, and destined for blessedness and perfec-

tion in God. Spinoza's ethic is really one of pure self-assertion and self-seeking, and is marked by a strange incapacity to do justice to the negative elements of self-denial and self-sacrifice.¹ He has no understanding of the development of the higher life of spirit through conflict with the lower life of flesh, but, for aught that appears, is anti-ascetic throughout. Happiness is, for him, found in the life that is rational and free—found in virtue, to which happiness need not be sacrificed. "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself."

No more can we admit his doctrine of love, so often lauded as lofty and disinterested, to be the satisfactory thing it appears. Says Spinoza—"He who loves God must not endeavour to have God love him in return."² It is all very well to say that he means "the impure element vanishes from self-seeking when the self we seek is that whose essence is reason and the knowledge and love of God," and that God is so loved because "the taint of subjectivity is so absolutely obliterated." The fact remains that the words imply more and other than this. They imply an extreme of the very self-sufficiency which is supposed to have vanished. That man is so sufficient unto himself as not to need the gracious love of God, whereby his blessedness and perfection shall be attained, is surely far from having removed "the stigma of selfishness." An altruism so perfect and entire seems but a new form of selfishness, so supreme in its choice of self that it hath no need even of God or His love. If it is God that is loved, it appears absurd to affect indifference

¹ *Eth.*, iii. 6, 7 ; iii. 9 ; iv. 22.

² *Ibid.*, v. 19.

to His return of love, since, in loving Him, it is impossible not to be conscious that He, the All-Good, does and must love us. It is thus strange and really egoistic, that our love must wear such guise of disinterestedness as to care not whether the God we love has any appreciation of the outgoings of our virtuous affection. Such indifference is compatible with our love to God only if and when the God we love is an abstract ideal or an impersonal abstraction. In that event, the God we love can do so little for us that we can well afford to expect no reciprocating love, the object being incapable of emotion. And such, indeed, is Spinoza's God, one without affections, neither loving nor hating, and so without power of return. But, in truth, Spinoza's saying is pathological, symptomatic of the condition of one who has made fatal mistake in missing the personality of God. His position draws intelligibility from the circumstance that, in his view, God, the Absolute, loves no one, and so to desire that God love us would be to desire that God be no more Himself—in fact, inconsistent. It is an intellectual love, we are told, without blindness and without passion—a faint reflection of the love with which God loves Himself. But we may ask—What vitality belongs to it? Is it free from self-deception? Is it void of the peril of hypocrisy? The geometrical way, consummately perfect in its kind, can never satisfyingly deal with vital terms and interests. Love's relations must be personalised at both ends of the scale of being—human and Divine. Failure to see this marks Spinoza's ethical shortcoming. The only virtue or merit of the saying lies in its attestation to Spinoza's passionate devotion to truth as truth—to reality as it is,

whatever aspect it may wear. Philosophically, however, the disregard of the finite individuality of the subject, which his words imply, is inconsistent with the delight in pure self-complacency which he inculcates. "The mind's intellectual love of God," says Spinoza, "is the very love wherewith God loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He can be expressed by the essence of the human mind, considered under the form of eternity; that is, the mind's intellectual love of God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself."¹ When the positive element or character of the finite is so abstracted, then does finite existence actually vanish, and God really becomes all in all. Such is the result of his identification of God and man. The reality of the finite, and the worth of experience, are neither adequately regarded nor explained by Spinoza, whether we take the metaphysical or the ethical parts of his treatment.

It seems to me vain to attempt to palliate what Hegel called the "acosmism" of Spinoza, his making the Absolute "only rigid substance, not yet Spirit," or at least to claim justice in Spinoza to the reality of the finite. To say that for Spinoza there is no absolute dualism between substance and mode, between real and phenomenal; to urge that the reality of the individual is guaranteed in the relativity of the mode, because substance or God means with Spinoza existence itself, and the individual cannot fall outside but must be included within such existence or being; this is to make insistences so hopelessly dominated by the idea of a merely quantitative whole or still undifferentiated unity² as to

¹ *Eth.*, v. 36.

² *Ibid.*, i. 15, 16, 25, 29.

show that there is yet no real appreciation of the problem of the reality of the finite here in question. Reality may, no doubt, be spoken of as substance or its modes, but the modes have little enough in common with primary substance. Hence the connection between finite and infinite must remain very loose. The absence of intrinsic worth or reality in the Spinozan finite is the real objection, and it abides. The form in which his finite—as a wretchedly limited and necessary manifestation or expression of substance—exists, cannot be made satisfactory. Indeed, it was by the negation of all that is finite that Spinoza rose to his conception of substance, which absolute substance yet exists as manifested in an infinity of attributes and modes.

It is interesting to note how great has been Spinoza's influence on subsequent speculation. One may regard this as the more surprising, considering his confused methods and unclear modes of speech. His influence on Goethe, Hegel, and Schleiermacher is undoubted, and Schelling reproduced no small part of Spinoza. If we note these as amongst the many influences that have gone forth from Spinoza, we may with equal interest recall of how many influences he in his turn was the result—not merely, or even chiefly, of Cartesianism, but also of the later Schoolmen, of mediæval Jewish Platonists and Aristotelians, of Giordano Bruno, and, on his ethical side, of the Stoics. In fact, there are not wanting those who rank him with the Stoics and Epictetus, and treat his work as only so much moral theology. Certainly, it is more than doubtful if he remained as true, in his attempts to improve on Descartes, to Idealism as

were Geulincx and Malebranche. He is too prone to vacillate between phenomenalism and realism, and even comes near being too well content with an atheistic monism. Enormous energy and, on the whole, splendid consistency of thought mark the development of his system, viewed from his own standpoint, and there is an engaging fearlessness in disclosing his final convictions. One hardly needs to remark the fine scientific rigour and security with which his thought moves towards the recognition and elucidation of fact, without play of subjective fancy. There is no hesitation, no vacillation, in his laying bare the modern world. A spiritual and divine world it is, to his great credit be it said—a world of science, and not merely of scholastic conceptions—albeit thought or knowledge does not give to us, as it gave to him, the whole of ethics and of the wisdom of life. For his fine pedagogic influence we are grateful to Spinoza, although a critical study leaves him no more to us than a schoolmaster to bring us to some better form of idealism than his own.

CHAPTER XIV.

LESSING'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

LESSING is a figure of quite surpassing interest, if it were only for the fact that in him that great modern outgrowth known as German literature took its rise. He laid the foundations of Germany's intellectual life, freeing its culture from the fetters of theology. But our interest here centres in Lessing as one who may be fairly regarded as, in some sense, the founder of Philosophy of Religion in modern times. No doubt the natural theology of his age still held him in some ways, but he first applied the notion of a progressive historical development to the interpretation of positive religions. The evolutionary character of religion, the idea of revelation as a progressive training of the human race, and the conception of Christianity as but marking one great stage in the Divine education of mankind, such was Lessing's discovery. No doubt his originality has been often exaggerated, many of his ideas having been anticipated by—amongst others—Origen, Nicholas of Cusa, and Leibniz. From Leibniz he learned the notion of development, which he so applied in the historic sphere as to deepen the view of history. Spinoza he deeply studied, not, however,

attaching himself strictly to his system. But never before Lessing had this great progressive idea of the Divine education of the race been advanced with such strength of thought and charm of style. Much indeed it was to have it in days when men were driven to Deism for lack of any more spiritual theology. The conception of Lessing is, that in God's great school-book of Time, each of the historic religions is a lesson set for humanity's learning. This involves the non-finality of any one of them. Lessing not only held that "what we call education in the individual is revelation in the race," but, after working out his thesis that "education is revelation" and "revelation education," asks whether there is not for this purpose eternity before us ("Ist nicht die ganze Ewigkeit mein?")

Lessing works out his conception with a tendency too intellectual; his thought is too circumscribed, moving within Judaism and Christianity; what he aimed at is still our need, but on more comprehensive range. In his *Nathan the Wise* Lessing really seeks to inveigh against the bigoted adherence to a dominant religion, and against religious creed without correspondent life, going so far even as to identify religion with morality. This too exclusive stress on morality, to the neglect of truly religious world-view, is a defect or one-sidedness found not only in Lessing, but also in Kant and the prevailing thought of the time. But his aim, no doubt, was to insist on right doing for its own sake, as a counteractive to undue theological insistence on the doctrine of reward and punishment. Lessing's accept-

ance of revelation yet left him in the end—like his age—with only natural religion, for religion would become independent of even the New Testament. The historic religions would really become but forms of the one universal religion of humanity. In all this historic development, the ego or individual factor is, to Lessing, pure mind, and not nature, as might be wrongly supposed.

Religion is to Lessing always a thing anterior to its records, and it is this inner truth of religion which alone gives worth to its records or traditions. To distinguish the form from the spirit, and to discriminate between essential and non-essential—such was Lessing's theological aim. And this is not always easy: he makes Nathan say—

“To find the first true ring,
It was as great a puzzle as for us
To find the one true faith.”

The complete sincerity and independence of Lessing kept him from ever accepting truth on mere authority, and without the sanction of his whole nature. It is this strength of his moral nature which saves the clear reflective work of Lessing from coldness. Hence he is never a mere self-satisfied destroyer, but remains a spirit essentially religious and reverent, and keenly alive to the sway of cosmopolitan reason. He carries the Reformational spirit of free inquiry to its legitimate influence on literature, philosophy, and religious criticism.

Not against Christianity itself, of course, but only against prevailing types of Lutheran orthodoxy, were

the arrows of Lessing's criticism directed. He had a complete triumph over Goetze and others, and suffered in prestige perhaps more in the house of his friends, when Nicolai, head of the so-called Party of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), allowed the bright religion of reason to grow into a dull rationalism. Lessing's letters on Goetze and Bibliolatry do not, however, make pleasant reading, the current of controversial feeling is so strongly present in them. Amid the controversial elements occur clear and characteristic insinuations like the following: the letter is not the spirit, and the Bible is not religion; there was religion before there was a Bible, and Christianity before evangelists and apostles had written; the whole truth of the Christian religion cannot possibly depend upon these writings; if they were lost, the religion taught by them might still subsist; the scriptural traditions are to be explained from the internal truth of religion. Such were Lessing's insinuations, poured forth from a spirit scornful of those defences of the faith which he felt were enough to betray any cause.

With rare and noble courage Lessing published the *Fragments of Reimarus*, in scorn of consequence. In them what may be called the esoteric doctrines of that prodigy of learning, Reimarus, were set forth, in vindication of the sacredness of reason, and the supremacy of conscience, as against the pretensions of the orthodoxy of the time. As for Lessing himself, he was more critic than systematic philosopher and theologian, devising more than doing, and discovering weak positions more than defending strong ones. That is to say, he suggests and inspires more than he directly or system-

atically teaches. His work is unified by the idea of progressive humanity, by his keen interest in truth, and by his unfailing spiritual aim. The germinant and positive elements of his teaching have made his influence on subsequent thought great, as witness Hegel, Goethe, Heine, and many others. Hardly any of his passages has aroused more interest than that which, occurring in one of his controversial writings in 1778, contains the declaration that, if God offered him truth in the one hand, and in the other nothing but the ever-active impulse for truth, Lessing would choose to wander in error in order to win truth, rather than possess and enjoy it. However much it may have been praised, or however much it may attract and fascinate one, it is impossible to give it approval in any unqualified way.

For, what is truth that the honest seeker after it should be so much afraid of its possession? Why not be more careful to maintain the honesty and sincerity implied in our professed search for its acquirement? What but the possession of the truth gives to life its peerless value, objective truth being there to be sought? Life is surely possession as well as progression: it can be no mere seeking and becoming, with never a finding and being something positive and definite: it is a progress *in*, and not merely *towards*, the truth. Life is attainment as well as advancement, and the advancement lies through attainment. Besides, we need not fear that the truth will be so easily possessed, that our possession of it will be so easily completed. Our possession of it is never complete and once for all.

Lessing needlessly exaggerates a great truth, namely, that the truth does not exist for us till we learn to love and believe it. It should be noted that Malebranche and Richter both uttered similar sentiments to Lessing, so impressed, apparently, were they with the fact that true being is dynamic rather than static.

Lessing had no love for such orthodox conceptions of Deity as that of an extra-mundane, personal Cause of the world, and confessed he knew only *ἐν καὶ πᾶν*, not thereby, however, committing himself to thoroughgoing Spinozism. Lessing held to the complete rationality of Revelation, which goes not beyond reason as such. He held that the very nature of a Revelation calls for a certain submission of reason, but reason therein only expresses a just conviction of its own limitations. Reason is to Lessing a thing of becoming, and the form of Revelation is necessary to it as the integument of the truths of reason. The fact that it contains truth transcending our reason is to Lessing an argument in its favour—not an objection. "What would it be if it revealed nothing?" Gradual and progressive must revelation be, assuming some external and authoritative form, but not to be identified with any of its positive forms. Eternal truths, independent of historical evidence, form the sum of religion to Lessing. It will be seen how little Lessing attempts account of the manner, and even possibility, of Revelation. Even the Christian religion was for him destined to pass like the Jewish, and indeed Lessing sits lightly to all positive religions.

It seems a somewhat absurdly large claim Lessing

makes for human development, when, introductory to his *Education of the Human Race*, he asks: "Why will we not rather see in all the positive religions nothing but the order of march in which the human understanding in every place could solely and alone develop itself, and is still to develop itself further, than either smile or be angry at any one of them?" For he tends to find in the nature and development of man the foundation of the positive religions. His also is the idea that revelation makes known, much earlier, truths that would later be discovered by developed reason, but this idea is not new, being, in fact, derived from the Fathers and Schoolmen; only, it is given stronger and more pronounced form by Lessing. One must hold it for a somewhat absurd and mistaken idea, for truths discoverable by man's own thinking could clearly be no substitute for the historical action of God. Such a mode of thinking was made possible by the tendency to put truth or doctrine as thought by men in the place of God's historic self-revealings. Such a fore-shortening of human development might be no advantage, but very much the reverse; and, in any case, truths which man could himself have ultimately found without going beyond the terms of nature have no real claim to be called Revelation. We must account it as of the essence of Revelation that it deals with the secret things—not discoverable by man—that belong to God, and relate to Him.

But to Lessing, Revelation had no such intrinsic value, and carried with it no such absolute necessity: it could be dropped whenever it had served its edu-

cative purpose. In his view, that positive religion was best which had in it the least number of additions to natural religion, Lessing, like Kant, being infected too much with the abstract dualism of "positive" and "natural" so characteristic of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. History was to him but the record of "Enlightenment." But the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) was marked by an incapacity for understanding the real significance of history, and in the way he used the opposition between eternal truths of reason and accidental truths of history Lessing himself cannot be said to have transcended this incapacity. Only later was this opposition to receive clearer marking off and treatment.

The theory of the education of the race, as put forward by Lessing, has, no doubt, been thrown into the shade by the theory of evolution, with which, however, it may be said, to be in substantial agreement. Lessing's theory had the virtue to be historical, while the evolution theory has not always the merit of making a satisfactory thing of the facts connected with degeneracy. Lessing's conception of education—with its fatherly character of God, its great educational purposes for the race, and its eternity to work in—was indeed a great one, teaching how that which is in part is being continually done away, that that which is perfect may come. It certainly gave a new clue to the understanding alike of Revelation and Inspiration, and the strongly-marked ethical character of the whole process—in each of its three great stages or periods—deserves especial notice.

Lessing laid enormous stress on Individuality, and

makes it a kind of moral basis for man's life that every one should act in the direction of his individual perfection. But, while standing thus, in intuitive fashion, for transcendent Individualism, Lessing, no more than Herder, succeeded in giving it a speculative grounding. But the endless life for this perfection was the strange one of transmigration, for the Platonic teachings about transmigrations of the soul seem to have been quite accepted by Lessing. The position of Lessing as to man's personality was expressly this, "If I am, God is also; He may be separated from me, but not I from Him." Probably Lessing did not feel how true is the converse also, that if God is not—lacks personality—I am not, and cannot pretend to personality. The immortality of the soul—like the unity of God—was a truth, in Lessing's view, capable of demonstration. But as to immortality, he thinks we can dispense with the New Testament, just as, in the doctrine of the unity of God, he thinks we can dispense with the Old.

Lessing held with a strange tenacity to Determinism, loving necessity, it is often said, almost as dearly as did Spinoza. And he volunteered what must seem to us the rather astonishing opinion that "determinism has nothing to fear from the side of morals." But perhaps it were wiser not to take his isolated sayings too seriously. A kind of ideal Monism is what we find in Lessing, in whom thought is more spiritualised than in Spinoza, chiefly through the individualistic teaching of Leibniz. If Lessing's earlier leanings were towards Deism, it seems as though his later experiences tended to Pantheism. Pantheist, however, he is not, albeit Spinoza so deeply

influences him, for that influence is more on the historico-critical side than on the philosophical. His Deity was not without supernatural cast, although set also in natural relations; and the free and conscious Spirit, Who to him represented Eternal Providence, was able to determine His own ends. Development, as Lessing expounds it, need not, therefore, exclude Providence. Lessing even deals, in speculative fashion, with the doctrine of the Trinity, after the examples of Augustine, Aquinas, and Melancthon, offering what to him appears a philosophical equivalent. Lessing understands the Trinity in the sense of immanent distinctions. His own perfections are conceived by Deity in twofold fashion: both as single, and as united in Himself as their sum. God's thinking means creation, His ideas are actualities, and His creation flows from His conceiving His perfections singly. When He conceives them as united, then creates He the Son of God, His own eternal image; and then becomes the Holy Spirit, the bond between Father and Son.

On what are known as Mediational aspects of truth, Lessing has little to say, his views being predominantly ethical. Indeed, he is rather meagre in what he has to say of the Person of Christ in His whole historic relations, although he does deal with the Satisfaction of Christ and Original Sin. On the Resurrection of our Lord, Lessing has something to say. One of the Fragments of Reimarus published by him attacks the resurrection history, and Lessing agrees so far that the Gospel accounts cannot be rid of contradictions. But he does not on that account treat the resurrection as unhistorical. "Who,"

he asks, "has ever ventured to draw the same inference in profane history? If Livy, Polybius, Dionysius, and Tacitus relate the very same event, it may be the very same battle, the very same siege, each one differing so much in the details that those of the one completely give the lie to those of the other, has any one for that reason ever denied the event itself in which they agree?" Admitting thus the fact, Lessing does not yet seem to have seen its bearing upon religious experience or theological truth. The circumstance is, no doubt, interesting also as showing that Lessing did not always accept the conclusions of Reimarus, the publication of whose *Fragments* he yet thought would serve the interests of investigation and inquiry into truth. If less subtle, Lessing was certainly more candid than Baur in this matter. It was a pity that Lessing had not more to say on these historic relations of Christ, for then he might have had opportunity to cast light over the "foul broad ditch," as he was pleased to term it, of the distinction between accidental truths of history and the necessary truths of reason. He might even have seen in Christ's life, not an accident of history, but a deliberately purposed embodiment of truth for all time—might, in fact, have seen history become religion in Him. Lessing—as many, with less excuse, have done after him—shows a strange lack of perception in respect of the stability and enrichment that accrue to the idea from the historic fact. On the other hand, it is an equal error when they who cling to historic fact are so wedded to it as to lose sense of the truth that it is never more than symbol, representative of the process or idea.

Eternal recompenses, promised in the New Testament as rewards of virtue, are to Lessing only means of education, destined to gradual disuse; virtue will at last—in the stage of purity of heart—be loved for its own sake, and practised for no mere heavenly rewards. That is the time to which Lessing looks forward, when, in the invisible march of Eternal Providence, the “Christianity of reason” shall have come, and men will do the good because it is the good. How much that was both needful and wholesome in these insistences needs no pointing out, whether one agrees with Lessing in the entirety of his teachings or not. The insight and pregnancy of the expression which Lessing has, in such ways of looking out upon the future, given to his religious conviction have been very expressly noted by Zeller.¹

The analytic clearness of Lessing’s writings has been already noticed, but this is not to say that his work was always marked by self-consistency. It was much that his deep soul, and clear, comprehensive intellect, shunned the dry and arid Deism of his time, but more that he should have put forward such positive truths as he did, like so many germinal seeds of thought. Highly characteristic of the German spirit is his work, with its pre-eminent clearness and candour. Dogmatism of belief is what he opposes, the religion of the letter as against that of the spirit. The votary of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), his enlightenment yet leads him to Christianity as the religion of humanity at its highest, Christian truths being for him truths for reason. Lessing was a powerful precursor of Hegel, alike in his developmental treatment of

¹ E. Zeller, *Vorträge und Abhandlungen* (1877), vol. ii.

the positive religions and in his speculative treatment of dogmas like the Trinity. He gave the basal thought of Hegel's philosophy of religion in his theory of the education of the race, while the foundation for Kant's doctrine of ethics was laid in Lessing's insistences on the gospel of pure morality. If Lessing be held as estranged from positive Christianity, the degree of his alienation is matter on which there is still no complete agreement. What is beyond dispute is Lessing's significance for the Philosophy of Religion as a great seminal thinker. Prophet and harbinger he was of a more truly enlightened time than his own, and if the world has not even yet got beyond the faith of authority, that is no reason why we cannot heartily appreciate what the universal thoughts of Lessing did for the immediate and important future.

CHAPTER XV.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

THE philosophy of Religion propounded by the immortal Kant must be pronounced a thing fearfully and wonderfully made. Interesting and ingenious in the highest degree, it yields at almost every turn the contradictory and unsatisfactory. It is only intended now to glance at certain points in his philosophy of religion, more especially in relation to his rejection of theistic proofs, and his welcome of that moral presentation on which he greatly leaned. We know how largely determined the character of Kant's philosophy of religion was by atavistic influences, combined with those of the pietism and rationalism of the Germany of the eighteenth century. His own personality was contributive of that love of liberty in harmony with law which led him to lay supreme stress on the will to do good. Kant's conception of religion, subjectively viewed, as given in his *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, is by no means a satisfactory and adequate one, either in respect of man's religious history, or in regard to the content of religion itself, when he says it is "the cognition of all our duties as divine commands." The moral and practical certainty of conviction which for him constituted religion sprang, of

course, from the moral law. We do not forget, in our critical references to Kant, that Kuno Fischer properly pointed out how, though Kant might have varied in his thinkings about the *knowableness* or *demonstrability* of God, "there was not a moment in the course of the development of his philosophical convictions when he denied, or even only doubted, the *reality* of God." Zeller, too, testifies to the way in which Kant at every time held to the Being of God (*das Dasein Gottes*). Most important of all is Kant's own view of the matter, that "it is indeed necessary to be *convinced* of the existence of God, but it is not equally necessary to demonstrate it." Kant's arguments did avail against a Deity that stood in external and mechanical relation to the world. But such is not the God of the theistic philosophy of to-day, Who, as self-conscious and personal Spirit, is at once immanent and transcendent. Far from complete or final, the theistic proofs yet meet a need of reason. The argument for the Divine existence is a vast and complex, synthetic one—a whole of many parts—and the force is in the whole, not in any of the parts, each of which has yet its place and value.

The Ontological argument did not at all receive from Kant the effective treatment which even many philosophers have supposed. Kant missed seeing that Being is given, not predicated, in the affirmation of this argument. He sets out under the misapprehension that Anselm asserted that what exists *in intellectu* exists also *in re*, whereas Anselm maintained that existence is of necessity in the concept of God. There was truth behind the existential judgment of this argument which

Kant never saw. 'Twas a rasher thing than he supposed to say that *is* always is merely the copula of a judgment. Hegel did much better when he found the highest proof for the truth of a concept in its being a necessity to thought, and concluded therefrom to its necessity of being. Kant has the merit, however, to have cut away defective metaphysics at certain well-known and tolerably obvious points, but he was wrong in supposing that what we necessarily think, and think as necessarily existing, has no title to validity. It is no question of mere conceiving, it is one of necessary thinking. To say that "existence cannot be clawed" out of thought is obvious enough and beyond challenge in the case of mere imagining, but that is not thinking at all in the sense of this argument. It is thought dealing with the real—the existent, and the necessarily existent. The truth is, Kant's position is both illogical and irrational. To deny the passage to existence from necessary thought of necessary existence would be a more astounding feat of intellectual confusion than Kant dreamed. To what meaningless confusion would thought, in its ultimate principles and working, be reduced, if it should be held—as Anselm deemed impossible (*nequit Eum non esse cogitare*)—that God can be "conceived as non-existent," and this argument treated in the fictitious Kantian mode. The idea of this argument should never have been classed with those born of individual fancy, and its uniqueness and solitariness lost sight of. But the standpoint of mere abstract thinking assumed by Kant in respect of the relation of ideality involved is too low to be conclusive. Still, that we have even Kant's

argument about a hundred dollars in concept being accounted as good as a hundred dollars in purse, repeated as though it had some vestige of value, is warrant for recalling how Benno Erdmann described its use by Kant as barbarous. Hegel rightly urged that, in dealing with God, we are treating of an object wholly different in kind from any hundred dollars, and that, in fact, no particular notion or representation whatsoever is comparable to the case of the concept of God. Hegel further thought it would be strange, if the concrete totality, which we call God, should not be rich enough to include so poor a category of being as that here involved. Thought itself seems to demand an ultimate unity of things, and this argument is but an effort to give logical form to our belief in such an Ultimate. God is the Ultimate which thought so demands—is the ultimate concrete totality. There is in Him a principle which gives unity to the discrete multiplicity of the world. This is more and other than making Him a mere name for the All. But the weakness of the Ontological argument, taken by itself, remains in the fact that it can lay no determinate quality on this Being, Who is above all reality, to justify our marking Him off as God.

The Cosmological argument was to Kant a mere begging of the question—one in which a First Cause for all that is "contingent" was sought in an "absolutely necessary" Being. Such an overstepping of the sense-world to make said inference Kant could not approve. No more could he accept the conclusion to a First Cause from the impossibility of an infinite series

of causes or conditions, since, of course, we cannot make such a transfer of subjective principle to things objective. When we make such a transfer, Kant thinks it a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, and, as such, to be discredited. But Hegel, properly as we think, declares that if thought cannot go out beyond the sense-world, it were more needful to show how thought ever found its way into the sense-world. The truth is, there was no real warrant for Kant's assuming that causality cannot carry us beyond the impressions of sensuous experience. On such a view, where, it is always pertinent to ask, would be Kant's own warrant for taking causality to be even subjectively necessary? The very existence of non-empirical necessary ideas is proof that the kingdom of reason is not of this world. Kant's stress on the infinite series of causes is really irrelevant, the question being strictly one of the warrant for a First Cause, as determined by the lack of self-existent and necessary being on the part of the universe. Kant's objection to transfer of thought necessity to a necessity of existence certainly lacks in daring, consistency, and insight, for what thought or reason must *of necessity* think is to be taken as true—is elsewhere, in Kant's own teaching, so taken as true. There may, of course, still be raised the question whether the world can be an effect of anything outside itself, but the real question is for a Ground of the possibility of all finite things. It boots nothing that Kant, with his restricted causality—*i.e.*, to sensible experience—would have deemed an intra-mundane Cause illusory: modern science and modern thought have taught us to pass from phenomena to their supersensuous ground.

Kant had already found the non-sensuous cause of our sensations in a *transcendental object*, even though this object was to him a mere *nescio quid*. He accounted such a non-empirical causality necessary. To this object he refers our whole possible perceptions. Should the action of this *transcendental cause* be phenomenised, the results will be in perfect accord with the laws of empirical causation—a position which finds precise parallel in Hume. Kant denies significance to the principle of efficient causation in the sensuous world. But, with its subjective origin, he, unlike Hume, claims for the principle an objective value as related to objects of sensible experience. Kant, no doubt, admitted the need of something which is Cause of this phenomenal world, but, strangely enough, this same Kant, who recognised the principle of efficient causation in assuming the *transcendental object*, declines to find this primal and self-subsistent Cause in God. Our thought is not now content without reaching the ultimate Ground of these sense-phenomena. The spiritual character of the infinite and all-causing Force is thus brought into view. But when we thus enter the realm of spirit, purely physical and mechanical categories cannot have place, and so the Cosmological argument does not set them to do metaphysical—and for them impossible—feats. Because principles transcend the sensuous sphere, they are not therefore to be treated in Kantian mode as only subjective. Kant, however, felt the inevitable character of the question as to the source (*Ursprung*) of the Unconditioned, for the world, as finite world, cannot be its own Ground, and cannot be the cause of spirit.

Only in God, as prime source and ultimate sustainer, is its want—*δρεξις*—found. Of course, the real strength of the argument is drawn, as Leibniz properly divined, from the contingency of the world. This world of experience is not a perfect cosmos. It is not wholly rational and necessary, and so we must recognise the contingent. This contingent or dependent character of the world is evidenced in Nature, both as unified Whole, under the most complete generalisations known to science, and as viewed singly in any of its parts. We know limitation as surely as we know being. Everything is, in its turn, conditioned by something else, and is made what it is by its relations to other things. The number of relations is indefinite, and the complete rationality of such relations, as a system, is past finding out. While an underlying *nexus* of force makes everything also causal in its turn, yet there is no trace of existence, independent and non-conditioned. Parts of existential phenomena, everywhere throughout the universe, depend upon other parts not less dependent. No aggregation of these dependent existences can possibly make an independent and non-conditioned universe. Clearly, a universe so finite and dependent must have its Cause or Ground beyond itself. In whole, it must have an independent, self-existent Cause, as necessary correlate of its finitude.

The Teleological argument Kant treated not fairly, when he did not allow it to rest content with evidencing intelligence. Kant quite failed to appreciate how synthetic is the mode of this proof, building up from the principle of sufficient reason in a way distinguished from the

ontological and cosmological proofs. In his *Critique of Judgment*, Kant failed to keep in mind that the *à posteriori* argument need not give infinity of intelligence, but only intelligence in the Primal Cause of all things. His procedure really amounted to deriving the principle of finality in nature from the *à priori* concepts of morality. His initial error is to have connected nature with freedom as necessary to produce finality. His ultimate error was to have found in finality no objective result, but only a subjective necessity. The subjective necessity had its home only in Kant's imagination. We might as reasonably argue against the evidences of will, purpose, and design in other human beings. Trendelenburg properly pointed out that the object itself is, after all, needed, according to Kant himself, to say when this wholly subjective principle of finality is required. It was a gratuitous assumption on Kant's part to suppose that the argument was to carry us to a transcendental object, instead of merely bringing us, experientially, into contact with the Divine Mind or Intelligence. Kant's objection to this proof as yielding only an Architect, not an absolute and originaive Creator, is not at all to the point, since this proof is only concerned, in its strict and proper sense, with the order, purpose, and harmony of the world as due to reason or intelligence. Kant had been better employed in doing something to transcend Kantian dualism of inner and outer, instead of leaving Hegel's higher view of Nature to do this for him.

Kant's criticism of the traditional proofs is thus far less damaging than has often been supposed, and philosophers have allowed themselves to be imposed

upon to a needless and not altogether creditable extent. Turn we now to his treatment of the Moral Proof. In his *Critique of Judgment*, Kant has it that for this world, with such end as it bears, a Moral Author—or God—is to be acknowledged. And in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he says: "Belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature (*Gesinnung*), that the former can no more vanish than the latter can ever be torn from me. The only point to be here kept in mind is that this act of faith of the intellect assumes the existence (*Voraussetzung*) of moral dispositions. If we leave them aside and suppose a mind quite indifferent with respect to moral laws, then the inquiry raised by reason becomes merely a subject for speculation, supportable, as such, by strong arguments from analogy, but not by such that to them the most stubborn scepticism must yield." Conscience as the touchstone of revelation was, indeed, finely set forth by Kant, and the final outcome of his philosophy is a moral interpretation of the universe.

This does not keep us from thinking his Deity stands, both in his *Metaphysics of Ethics* and his *Critique of Practical Reason*, in a relation to ethics which is too external, and even superficial. His moral postulates were not postulates of life, but of philosophy. And yet, in rejecting merely intellectual grounds of theological belief, he was really falling back upon the vital interests of religious life. Religion becomes, in fact, purely a matter of faith with Kant, and such faith is strangely left without the support that intellect might be expected to render. Kant fails to put his moralistic proof under

the law of historic development, with the growing moral insight which such development brings, under working of that law of moral freedom which distinguishes the life of man's spirit from that of nature. This genetic point of view must be kept in mind, if we are to overpass Kant's standpoint, and to observe how far we are from being able to presuppose morality and its commands to be given as *à priori* content of the purely practical reason. Kant had a quite too great horror of bringing in the will of God to explain moral law, for why should we conceive such laws as other than reflecting, and harmonising with, the Divine nature? The ultimate sources of morality were by him inadequately conceived. He almost expunges rather than explains moral obligation, and only introduces Deity when he is in straits to effect an adjustment of the natural and moral elements involved. Also, the large part played by happiness, in Kant's thought, has been made more clear, with the effect of making our regret more keen at the place he gave eudæmonistic considerations in his system.

It is a great merit in Kant to have done so much for the moralistic theory of religion, guarding it as the apple of his eye in his *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*. But, with all its fine moral postulates, his philosophy of religion strangely fails of any adequate treatment of the knowledge of God in speculative or metaphysical ways. Religion cannot be so reduced to terms of morality. At the same time, the merit is his to have preserved the worth of personality by his fine postulations for the moral consciousness. For the range of Kant's practical reason is ethical rather than religious.

It is not to be supposed that we can in any wise impose the moral law upon ourselves, when the ethical idea in us is, in its absolute power and worth, to be run back and grounded in the Absolute Moral Ideal. Kant failed to keep the moral reason from becoming too abstract and humanistic; he might have kept the principle of moral autonomy and subsumed it properly under religion, had he adequately conceived the nature of man's soul. Kant strangely missed seeing the theoretic character of the moral proof, as drawn from Divine manifestation in moral law, else he would not have set it upon a separate plane from the other theistic proofs. He further failed to appreciate that such belief in God, as the moral proof really brings to us, must be shot through with elements of reason far beyond his imaginings.

The mistakes or misconceptions of Kant, however, do not blind us to his great positive merits. He rightly found the norms of morality in man's rational and spiritual nature. Detached errors, such as we have been pointing out, need not detract from appreciation of his work in whole, and in its higher qualities. How truly congruous is moral law with the essential nature of man was strikingly brought out by Kant, who nobly set it above ephemeral utilities. To conscience Kant gives back the Absolute, which he had taken away from reason. But it must, of course, never be forgotten that Kant never really transcends the dualism of experience, never really effects a higher synthesis between form and matter, between duty and inclination, between moral ideas of a really religious origin and moral ideas of judicial type. No doubt, he declares that no con-

tradition remains, but that is not to take away the duality—to carry the synthesis beyond the sphere of mere feeling. It was left for Fichte to continue and complete the work of Kant in this respect. The moral reason, as ideal, Kant rightly takes to be autonomous—self-legislating in the sphere of morals. But, between the moral reason and the Absolute, he has made an impassable chasm, so that morality and religion are unbridged. The noumenal world he had made a *Grenzbegriff*—a regulative concept marking out the limits of our knowledge.

But now he tells us that what the moral ideal—the moral consciousness—demands, must be true and may be known. Certainly his practical divorce or separation of these two kinds of reason—the theoretic and the practical—is unwarrantably great, even though he might himself acknowledge them to be, in the last resort, one. The notions of necessity and universality in moral action appear cold and bare in Kant's thought, which needs light and warmth from the synthetic processes and unifying powers of the mind. I do not complain so much of the individualistic character of his ethical thoughts as is done by those whose chief care is for social ethics. For the individual must do that only which he could make a universal norm. And the individual must work out his own ethical salvation, it seems to me, first of all in an individualistic way. That is beginning, no doubt, rather than end, but it is a needful beginning, and secured, as such, by Kant without yielding to what is subjective, aimless, and capricious. Besides which, it is to be noted how much Kant had got away from

needs of the individual, in his later enunciations of the moral postulates, to the moral needs of the universe.

But Kant was not very consistent in his use of the postulates, and so does not always increase the weight of his reasoning. Kant's ethical depth and purity lead him up to high appreciation of the religion which takes all its duties as Divine commands. A too legalistic conception, however. Also, it seems to me to have been—for individual experience—a suggestive view that Kant took, when he found in great religious truths or doctrines something to be repeated as ethical processes in the inner lives of good men. But the ethical must get beyond this individual aspect. History and experience alike show the need of human development for man's apprehension of the full content of the moral law of Kant. Kant's philosophy of religion was marked by lack of historic sense when he took the history of religion to start only with Christianity, which for him began the universal. But his philosophical conceptions are, in the religious sphere, lacking in warmth and vitality, and do not carry him beyond the icy region of the moral reason. His religion stands unredeemed by a single grand infusion or dash of Schleiermacherian feeling. This is the more remarkable, inasmuch as Kant left the moral law as, in reality, something felt, rather than intellectually apprehended or grasped. Some more adequate recognition of feeling should thus have been easy to him.

Even Spinoza does more justice to the affections than Kant, notwithstanding that Spinoza's own love of God is a still too intellectual thing. Not, of course, that it is

meant to represent Kant as wholly wanting in recognition of emotional experience or affectional power, but that his treatment is wholly insufficient. He has, for example, a noble and interesting passage, in *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, in which he says that spiritual edification can scarcely be anything save "the ethical effect wrought upon our inner man by devotion." After showing that "this effect cannot be the mental movement or emotion (for this is already involved in the conception of devotion)," he goes on to point out that "edification must therefore be understood to mean the *Ethical Purchase* that devotion takes upon the actual amendment and building up of the moral characters of mankind." The significant words follow: "A structure of this sort can only then succeed when systematically gone about: firm principles, fashioned after well-understood conceptions, are, first of all, to be laid deep into the foundations of the heart; from these, sentiments corresponding to the weight and magnitude of our several duties must rise, and be watched and protected against the snares and wiles of appetite and passion, thus uprearing and upbuilding a new man—a *Temple of God*." And this great penetrating thinker adds, "Evidently this edifice can advance but slowly, but still some traces of superstructure ought to be perceptible." Every one must stand with Kant, in his rejection of spurious devotion, whereby man, in the noblest part of him, is weakened, not strengthened. But Kant's Deistic setting made mystical elements of religion quite foreign to him.

Faith in God is, in *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, held to be necessary to the belief in the

triumph of good. Not with what is called total depravity, but with a tendency to evil in man's nature, does Kant concern himself. The reality of evil is for Kant ever menacing the sure advance of the moral life. But this postulate of faith in the Divine avails not in the end, for Kant's consuming zeal for human freedom leads him at last to look merely to an infinite process for the vanquishing of evil, without, that is to say, Divine assistance. This is no perfect triumph of good, but a prolongation of the struggle. And indeed it is a fault of Kant that he is so prone to make the good so much a thing merely regulative or potential. Further, Kant's moralism centres man too much in himself—in marked contrast with religion—hence it is so easy for Kant to make much of evil, with its moral culpability, and take no real account of sin. Man's discordant relations to God are *terra incognita* to Kant, man's discord being, in Kant, only with himself. Kant would not be troubled by exterior punishments: what he does not like is self-condemnation, for that would affect our cheerfulness and arrest our moral energy. He thinks radical evil in us carries with it guilt, in respect of which we are liable to punishment, at once necessary and morally hurtful. Harmony is restored, thinks Kant, by the idea of the Son of God or God-pleasing humanity. Our actuality is thus replaced by something better or higher, God regarding us in the light of this idea rather than according to our actual works.

But this replacement Kant works out in no satisfactory way. He leads us, no doubt, into a realm of desire for goodness, but, in his desire to escape atoning elements,

conducts to no actualisation. Redemption is not, with him, a question of the Christ suffering for man's sins, but of man redeeming himself by the suffering of his own better or higher being. Reconciliation exists for us, in Kant, only in the shape of self-redemption by means of our own moral volition. The idea of humanity well-pleasing to God is obviously too far removed from our actuality to influence our moral renewal to any great extent. What Kant fails to take any due and proper account of, is the fact of the loss of moral strength entailed by guilt not being in any proper way or sense atoned for. Peace of conscience and joy in God are thereby rendered inchoate and imperfect. Kant's whole treatment here is interesting for the way in which it foreshadows the Christian redemption in principle, but it is presage and nothing more, his ideal Christ an ideal and nothing more. The value of Kant's thought continues, however, to be that he taught men to find the highest good, not along the pathway of knowledge pure and simple, but rather along the lines of moral activity—the moral disciplines of the will.

One of the most valuable features of *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason* is its thought of the Kingdom of God, which has since been so fruitfully developed. It was a most pregnant and suggestive thing for Kant to say there is nothing good in the world save a good will alone. It is now better understood, however, that will never is without an intellectual element, nor intellection without will, if only the desire and will to know. The good will, as we know it, is never blind in its strivings after the moral ideal, but always illumined by intellectual

idea and conception. Kant, with all the excellences of his brilliant threefold analysis of reason, was yet, in his schismatic treatment of rational faculty, far from any adequate appreciation of the grand ultimates of religious thought and experience. Even the ethical and æsthetical moments, on which Kant laid such emphasis, lead us at last to a perfect and synthetic unity in the religious Ideal, of which there is in Kant no sufficiently firm, full, and steadfast apprehension and appreciation. There is always more in man, as really rational and religious, than is perfectly explicable in terms of reason, but Kant had only a very inadequate appreciation of this fact. Such being the case, it was more easy for Kant to fail of seeing the impossibility that the rich content and development of religion could spring out of so formal a principle as that of moral reason. A more distinctive place, and a more specific and peculiar function, must be claimed for religion than to be subsumed under ethics.

Still, Kant's work was, for his time, transcendently great. Only, the excess of purely moral reason in his religion transforms it into a defect, for the element of reason is neither properly fused with, nor related to, historical and experiential elements in his system. The error—which still lives on in high places—must be left behind of thinking the Kant of the Critique of Practical Reason corrector of an earlier Kant of the Pure Reason,—the error of thinking an absolute dogmatism (that of the categorical imperative) was, in Kant, the transformation of a radical nihilism. For Kant was, before everything, and at every stage of his career, a moralistic philosopher, and by no means became so only at close of his lengthy

inquiries. Kant never got beyond the need of a *Deus ex machinâ*—itself a proof, surely, that the theoretic and the practical reason had never been properly related and harmonised. Reason must be treated as one, and its sweep and sway taken as universal, but the rationality must be seen of giving full scope and play to the functionings of the emotional and volitional sides of our nature. For these latter have their own light and worth even for the reason, since life is deeper than intellect, and gives to reason so much of its zest and interest. Kant properly held knowledge to be coextensive with empirical science of nature, and, as such, incompetent to deal with theological truths, which must rest on faith. Faith he alleged to be a function of the human spirit not less original and significant than logical thinking.

The whole three *Critiques* of Kant really furnish only building materials for an enduring philosophic edifice, and must not be taken as the structure itself. His *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, which has importance as giving us, far more than has been recognised, his philosophy of religion, is a fruit or result of his entire criticism of reason, though insufficient and unsatisfactory in consequence. In the matter of revelation, Kant approximates to Lessing, to whom, be it said, he owed much, and from whom he might have learned more. The necessity of revelation lay, for Kant, in what he called the "radical evil" dwelling in human nature. He posits the principles of indwelling good and evil as ground of perpetual moral conflict. Evil is so unquestionable a fact in human experience that Kant does not hesitate to make it the initial point of his philosophy of religion.

Kant would build up the spiritual world he had destroyed. He lays this Divine Moral Order upon us with resistless might, making us treat it as absolutely real, absolutely Divine and Moral. For it is to our conscience his God reveals Himself. Kant's faith is a fine thing, as an active postulate or a free spiritual construction, yet never can we bring ourselves to believe that only in this one particular way has God revealed Himself, and not also in the superb workings of theoretic reason and speculative insight. Such reason is also God's gift, and indeed is there any higher? True, it is not self-sufficing, but must be linked to the light of conscience; but reason and conscience so united—as, in the complex being called man, they should always be—they will jointly bear us to heights otherwise unattainable and unattained. We cannot therefore acquiesce in the one-sidedness of Kant's moral stress. Excellent as it is in many ways in itself, it is neither true nor just in its relation to the revelations of reason or intellect—or rather, in its independence of them.

A satisfying philosophy of religion is possible only when, to the moral elements emphasised by Kant, justice is done to the emotional elements of Schleiermacher, and to the claims of objective truth represented by Hegel. Not without reason was it that a well-known German religious philosopher once remarked that the Kantian mode of treating religion was to make it merely a sort of dry-nurse to morality, to be shown to the door as soon as morality got stronger upon her legs. Kant, no doubt, has the merit, in his critico-speculative way, to make the moral faith of reason appear as a rational grounding of

religion, in which—more than in Hegel—reason appears in its practical and not simply theoretic aspect. But the two aspects are sundered far too completely, and set forth in far too abstract and one-sided fashion. His practical reason, as the *Critique of Practical Reason* clearly shows, gives itself its own laws, and the constitution and necessity of our own nature are left us as the only ground of obligation. This although Kant says the moral law is for all beings, even for the Supreme Intelligence. How subjective and relative our moral consciousness must, in value, be, when we are practically left as our own law-givers, is obvious.

It still abides the great merit of Kant to have sounded the supreme worth of the moral life in the way he did. The postulates of the practical reason are, with Kant, not really arbitrary, but are demands of reason itself in our efforts to realise moral end. In this self-attesting experience rather than in any metaphysical reality—whether spirit, matter, or substance—does Kant seek a principle of unity, and find a new ideal. And no more powerful influence, for the ethicising of its conceptions, has been exercised on subsequent philosophy of religion than that exercised by Kant. It was quite in the spirit of Kant that Schleiermacher declined to make religion a thing of knowledge, even the highest knowledge. How entirely is the atmosphere that of Kant, when Martineau is found affirming that “we are entitled to say that conscience reveals the living God, because it finds neither content to its aspirations nor victory in its strife till it touches His infinitude and goes forth from His embrace.” But Martineau profits by Kant’s mistakes when he goes on to say

how sickly and desolate moral ideals are, that are nothing else, and to deduce therefrom the need of religion, as carrying us far beyond the power of moral reason alone. Kant has borne the palm among modern ethicists, and has given to modern theistic philosophy its most vitalising influences, after every deduction is made for the defects of his presentation. This is Kant's enduring title to gratitude in the sphere of the philosophy of religion. It is, of course, a different thing from the worth of his system itself, but it is something sufficiently great.

CHAPTER XVI.

A CONSTRUCTIVE ESSAY IN IDEALISM: HEGEL AND
BERKELEY.

IN the following chapter I have tried, as far as possible, to avoid names and deal with arguments. There can be little doubt that some form of idealism is destined to be the philosophy that shall prevail. Some interesting questions arise. Will that form be Hegelian idealism? Or must we not look to a more developed form of Theistic Idealism? What, in such an event, will be its attitude to Idealism of the Hegelian type? We shall do some negative work first, and then pass up to more constructive effort. Idealism, whether of a Hegel or a Berkeley, seeks to interpret the Universe after the analogy of conscious life, and regards conscious experience as for us the great reality. Wisely enough, for in no other way can we know or find ultimate reality. Although the Agnostic position that we only know that we can nothing know, may still remain a possibility, it is so poor a possibility that the philosophic mind at least will never long rest in it. The great gift of idealism to modern philosophic thought has been the reality of the ego—the individual self or spirit. The imperishable service of

Idealism has been to make Materialism for ever impossible—to overpass the Dualism of mind and matter, in its triumphant assertion of spirit, or a supreme self-conscious principle as ground of all existence. This is a great deliverance, and it is impossible to rate it too highly. The logical priority of mind or spirit; the thorough dependence of matter on spiritual conditions; these grand insistences of modern idealism we must not fail duly to appreciate, because there are other problems to which idealism can give no answer. But our appreciation need not imply endorsement of every form of absolute and unqualified denial of any sort of independent reality to the world of matter, with utter and uncritical disregard of the part played by the object in making our thought constructions possible or worthful. Philosophical idealism of Hegelian type is true, so far as it goes, but it cannot carry us far enough. We seek not to destroy nor to refute it: we only supplement and perfect it, leading it on stepping-stones of its dead self to higher issues than those of which it is itself capable. That is to say, taken as a philosophy, we do not view Hegelian idealism as a perfect whole: it is a good foundation, but is no satisfying superstructure or finished fabric. The rock on which this form of idealism is shattered is its inability to offer any philosophical warrant or justification for its passage from the “spiritual self,” or “the unifying, constitutive power of thought,” to the world of other selves—the inability to do this individual self any more justice than is implied in making it a mere stage or moment in the evolutionary process. For a doctrine of evolution, it

need not be said, the idealism of Hegel essentially is. What we are now saying is, that the idealist principle—that of the spirit or ego—does not avail to philosophically explain the world of many selves or society, however needful society may be for our self-realisation. When the philosophical kingdom has suffered this violence at the hands of the Hegelian philosopher, we soon find that no just or adequate treatment has been measured out to the great facts of human freedom, remorse, and moral responsibility, and that the same result holds good in respect of the ancient and important problem of evil. It is vain to load the system with a strain it is plainly unable to bear. As often as it has been strained by sanguine disciples, it has snapped and lost credit even for that which, in less extravagant hands, it might have helped thought to accomplish. This is the unwisdom of philosophers who will have it accomplish all or nothing, who treat the Absolute experience as something thought out rather than eternally self-possessed, and who court for the system the doom of rejection. That theistic unity of the world which we seek is one in which we must maintain a relative independence for the self and for the world while we seek to combine and unify them. For what things the self, as idealistic, knows, it yet knows only as having discovered, and not created them. An idealism that shall be too abstract and intellectual is an effective barrier to such unity being attained. For it leaves us with only an abstract unity, into which the real differences that exist can never be taken up. The unity of the world must be a unity like that of our own individual

life. And this, as we know, is the unity of consciously realised end and purpose. The world is not the separate thing from us which we, in our abstract thinking, are so prone to make it. It is true that the unity which we seek is not to be sought by looking for some static substance that lies behind all things. And yet we, for our part, are not so fearful of the word "substance," with its parti-coloured significance, as to flee it altogether. We do not believe any perfect metaphysic of experience to be possible, but it shall bring forth its speculative construction of reality by means of the category of substance. We have not got away from the category when, instead of substance, we have preferred to speak of an Absolute Subject or the Absolute Experience, the ultimate reality or *substantia* being still Absolute or Unconditioned Being. But substance may be, and is, an infinitely more vital thing than the static existence which reality appears to us in our processes of abstract thought. Such thought is purely instrumental, and has action for its true end and issue. Ultimate substance or reality is activity, not passivity or static existence. Hence *spirit* is better than the substance category, in the end. The static being which abstract thought loves to ascribe to the Absolute is a nullity to be shunned. As an ideal for thought we may still keep it, but we must not allow it to mislead us.

We willingly grant that the Hegelian *Logic* should, in fairness, be viewed only in connection with the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy of Spirit*, and as having to do with the forms of pure thinking rather

than with concrete experience. By this fair and reasonable procedure we reach self-active mind as the final principle of thought. A very valuable result, it must be said, for theistic philosophy. But, so doing, and granting what has just been said, we do not get rid of the developmental view of God in the Hegelian system, nor of the mischief wrought of Hegelian metaphysic in construing the Universe so much in terms of the cognitive aspects of experience, to the neglect of those which are volitional and emotional. The vice of Hegelian idealism, as represented by some of its most noted recent expounders, lies just in this, that it makes thought constitutive of reality instead of interpretative of it, and, in so doing, gives the categories of thought an unwarranted place in the interpretation of the Universe. Hegel himself expressly holds that thought discloses the constitution of reality: for him, the truth is essentially in knowledge, thought is essentially objective. Thought is for us also, in an important sense, the great reality; but the thought of man may not make or evolve the world of reality; its function is to interpret the world as actually given to it; the combining unity of self-consciousness conditions that world of reality for us, but does not create it or impart to it objectivity. When we have just blamed Hegelian idealism for its practical neglect of the volitional, moral, and social aspects in favour of an insistence on the abstract and intellectual, we have not done so in forgetfulness of the good things spoken by Hegel of spirit as will. But these can only be taken as Hegel clearly meant them—in the light of the principles

embedded in his theoretic system, since on these Hegel's treatment of the will is based. No good can come of the confusion adopted by some of the latest Hegelian exponents, of making "thought" do duty in Deity for the synthesis of thought and will. We are open-minded enough to admit a certain force in these endeavours to make Hegel mean by thought, not abstract cognition, but the active life of mind itself, yet the question remains as to his warrant for making the unity of our being consist in thought. It remains, as Hegel's immortal merit, that he brought to men an altogether new sense of the power of thought or reason — the invaluable complement of the Kantian moralism. "The Infinite Spirit," Neo-Hegelianism tells us, "contains, in the very idea of its nature, organic relation to the finite;" and again, "the idea of God contains in itself, as a necessary element of it, the existence of finite spirits;" and yet again, "the nature of God would be imperfect if it did not contain in it relation to a finite world." But how can such *à priori* dogmatism as to the necessitation of the Divine Being be justified? Or why deify the world by making the Divine Nature or Being so dependent upon it? And why, as the system elsewhere, in keeping with this, does, make ourselves but parts and fragments of this one Infinite Spirit, which is the Sole Being and the containing Whole? Hegelian idealism rejects as preposterous the charge that, in virtue of its organic whole of thought, it destroys the self-activity of individual subject and identifies humanity with God, and there is apparently no reason to doubt that it is entitled to do so from the standpoint

of thought and its "intelligible system." But why may it not be otherwise from the point of view of reality or experience? Granted that the individual is part of an organic whole, and ought to comprehend in thought what the whole is, yet there is neither room nor reason for the purely evasive mode in which this abstract and intellectual idealism deals with what may be due to the individual man, as not existing simply for the organic whole, but as at the same time having worth in himself, and being at the same time an end in himself. There is thus a sense in which the individual is a whole as well as a part. The individual part, as part of reality, may well cry out, should he find very real sides of his nature sacrificed on the shrine of "organic" metaphor. The truth is, that neither in its dealing with philosophical developments, nor in its evolution of religion, nor in its handling of physical processes, can the Hegelian system bring satisfaction to any one who is deeply versed in modern knowledge. An "intelligible system" it may very well be, but it is a system with the radical vice of having no sufficient care that its every part shall contain experience and nothing else. This, too, while the analysis of experience, in its full concrete character or contents, is the precise demand made of every Philosophy by modern metaphysical thought. The Theistic Idealism which we seek is concerned to avoid any idealism in which the "I," with its tendencies and moods, and the external world, as something given, do not appear. But in Hegelian Idealism, as we find it to-day, the "I" and the World are not two elements with any sort of in-

dependent existence: they are merely two differences of a fundamental unity. That is to say, a real identity radiates through all plurality and difference. Consciousness is certainly our ultimate, but it does not give much impression of endeavour to do justice by empiric reality to have the ceaseless and facile iteration that the world has no independent being, but is merely a phase of the mind. Our individuality becomes at length lost in the Whole; but, related as all things are in the universe as a system which is one and rational, we cannot consent to things being thus thrown into one homogeneous heap. For the reality of the ego or self is one of the metaphysical presuppositions of the Theistic Idealism we are here concerned to maintain. In all this we are seeing the result of the categories being thrown into an "intellectual" system as though they were real and concrete. The result comes of treating the categories as a timeless conscious whole, with which, as a whole of knowledge, finite being can come into no conceivable relation save as it simply forms one of its component parts. When Hegel tells us that the real is the rational, we cannot but feel how much more it had been to the purpose to remember the senses in which the real is the individual. For he has not lightened for us the mystery of the individual and of things existent in time. Certainly the universe is more than a mathematical theorem; 'tis a thing instinct with life and vital possibilities such that no setting forth of Hegelian Logic can possibly exhaust these. For speculative thought must take reality, not as it should be to the dialectical movement of thought, but as it is empirically presented to it. Hegelian ideal-

ism, even in the recent form wherein experience is substituted for thought, is an outworn method; for reality is not to be so identified with experience, and this type of idealism has not yet found a concept large enough to be adequate to the whole nature of things. With the Whole, or the Universe, God, as self-conscious Being, must not be identified: He has the freedom, and the distinctness, of Absolute Personality. To human personality—with all the mystery that encompasses the path of our personal responsibility—Hegelian idealism can do no manner of justice. It can only treat it as illusion, more or less, and on this rock of personality—which it is persistently unable to appreciate save as related to “reflection”—the system is shattered and we fall into the hands of grim necessity.

Contrasted with these excessive intellectualistic tendencies of Hegelian idealism, we find a moralism of to-day that leans towards minimising thought until it becomes one-sidedly ethical. The Theistic Idealism we pursue may be obscured in this way also. For the universe must be intelligible to thought, since it is the revelation of reason—the expression of rational thought. Such ethical idealism arrays, in a way hardly to be commended, the volitional and moral and social aspects of man's life against those of thought. It does so because it regards these aspects as things that take us further along the path of truth. No doubt, every ethical elevation takes us somewhat along the path of truth, but does it effect this in separation from thought or knowledge or reason? There should not be even the semblance of such separation. In the strength of the contrast it employs between the two

sets of elements, such ethical idealism is not happy. It becomes lop-sided in so lifting the ethical impulse to obey out of relation to intellectual interest. Rather should intellectual interest give depth and base to moralism. Quite consistently with this, the absolute experience must mean the fulfilment of moral ideas no less than the answer to rational questions. It is quite possible to insist on the knowledge of the Absolute as a knowledge only for us, in such a way that our doctrine of relativity will come perilously near making our Absolute an unknowable thing-in-itself. We have no right to forget that there is a truth in the Hegelian contention that the ultimate reality of the universe is thought. We may not forget this because Hegelian epistemological failings erroneously make that thought too abstract and dissociate from being. If matter or world exists only for mind, we are well warranted in inferring a Mind for which the world, with all that therein is, exists—if, that is, we are idealist enough. Nor is ethical idealism quite fortunate in its account of our knowledge of the Absolute. From the Hegelian side, it is admitted that the Absolute cannot be completely comprehended, but is held that it must not be urged that the Absolute cannot be comprehended at all as it is in itself, for this would be the same as saying that there is for us no Absolute. Our knowledge of the Absolute must be held to be a real knowledge of the Absolute. Its relativity is sometimes pressed to a degree which makes us careful to maintain its reality. Though the Absolute, in its completeness, is a whole, of which we are but parts, yet we can know the Absolute in a way that is valid and real so far as it goes. The ethical

idealist must not, then, in a too strongly antithetic way, contend that the truth is for God alone, for man, too, has the truth, and it is precisely the priceless possession of the truth that makes man what he is. Idealists we must be content to remain, in that the universe is hidden from us by the veil of our ideas. The ethicist is right enough in insisting that the truth at which man arrives must not be held in unfruitful mode of intellect alone—must be translated into action. He is right in his contention that logical forms of argumentation must be made to fit in with the data of actual experience, the facts of real life. He is wrong only when he falters in following the sway of reason and the sweep of thought till these are really universal. Corrective and supplementary of an abstract idealism, then, we may take ethical idealism to be. An idealism must be ours in which reason and knowledge are the same in kind, though not in extent, as they are in God—an idealism so intellectual that no bar or limit is placed to knowledge or man's receptiveness of the Divine. We find a great truth in the affirmation of idealism, that reality is a spiritual whole, even the truth that our moral ideals and ethical functions transcend mere reason and its necessary relations. Philosophy has too often forgotten that God, as the Absolute Being, exists before all our thought and argumentation about Him, and that, when we do seek Him, it is sheerly from the impulse wrought in us of nature's revelations and those interior revelations that come through feeling and reflection. Being and worth, in and for Himself, we must certainly postulate for God, and not make Him of worth only for man or man's life.

There is no occasion to deny—if we defer—the infinite value and significance of human life, nor do we call in question the nobility of ethical zeal for the primacy of duty. But does not the absoluteness of His being and self-revelation exceed our experience, so that experience cannot simply be its measure? And when it is implied that God is of no practical account for man, unless man first find himself of infinite account, what a subjective criterion is set up! Assuredly we have no direct knowledge of human life as of infinite worth, and we see our suicides, therefore, lightly throw it away. Man is bound to know no less than to make moral estimate. True as it is that only as we value life do we reach out to a Higher than we, we yet cannot narrowly reason to God from the sentiments and verdicts of the moral life alone. We must have God, before the infinite value and significance can be ours that spring from our being consciously related to Him. What I deny is, the right to proscribe the speculative impulse in man—on whom rests an imperious obligation to seek truth for its own sake, whether it ministers to the magnifying of man's life or not. Thought is never to be sacrificed before a purely moral interest or human valuation. An intellectual interest has here its own power to deepen moral earnestness. What we have now seen, then, is how Idealism may assume an unsatisfactory development, either after a one-sidedly intellectual, or a one-sidedly ethical, type. But, for all that, there seems no good reason why these two lines of idealistic thought should not be drawn more closely together; such drawing together seems just the need of our time, and will be an augury of philosophic good.

The Theistic Idealism which we seek constructively to present is one constituted by the ideals of the Absolute entering into us, and being reaffirmed by us, as our ideals. For the Absolute is never the unrelated: a philosophical truism to say, it is yet a truism which Kant, Hamilton, and Spencer have made it necessary to repeat. The Absolute life enters into our life: the Absolute ideals become our ideals: the Absolute reason and consciousness are constitutive, as such, of our finite reason and self-consciousness. No sooner has this been said than Hegelian idealism, as a philosophy of immanence, proceeds to treat our finite selves as mere reproductions of the Infinite life. It does so for the reason that it has busied itself with the problem of our knowing the external world, and thinks it has reached a consciousness that is universal—attained a knowledge that is complete. But it has reached its objectively constituted experience at strange cost of the part played by finite minds in the whole matter. No unitary self-consciousness at which Hegelian idealism may have arrived can for a moment be admitted as that of the universe, so long as so important a part of existence is omitted as is involved in these neglected finite minds. We are in a social world as truly as we are in a physical world, Hegelian Logic notwithstanding. Our individual self or ego is not simply part of the universal or absolute consciousness, for a real yet relative independence is precisely what must be maintained for the separate self. Not that the self can have an independence of Deity in any absolute sense or in any way final, since God is its active Ground. But how, it will be asked, if God is its active Ground, can it

be independent and free? Now, it certainly could not be so under such teaching as that of Royce and others, who make our freedom frankly a "part" of the Divine freedom, and our consciousness a "portion" of the Divine consciousness. But it can be so in the sense that God wills for it the delegated freedom and independence of a selfhood which not even He will violate: it can be so in the sense of free and voluntary being, which none beside itself can, in quite the same respects, be: it can be so in the mutual commerce and social co-operation of two spirits, the finite and the Infinite. Is this to place a limitation on God's life? Why then prefer to impose on Him the limitation rather than He shall not be free to delegate so much to His creatures? My finiteness and limitation remain, just because I am not merged in the universal consciousness or absolute experience. The truth is, the trouble arises from the unreality of looking at foundational truth or ultimate reality from the mere standpoint of abstract thought, and even that thought as it treats part of reality for whole. For so we fail to treat reality as the process which it really is, and deal with it as in essence merely a static fact. Such process or movement, which sums up ultimate reality for us, can be known or thought by us, even though it can never wholly or actually come into our thought-experience. We come back to say that the unity of the world is that of a common end, just as conscious end makes the unity of our individual life. The trouble is, to find how God can have a conscious life inclusive of ours, and yet distinct from it. If we hold Him to be distinct in His being from ours—even by the whole diameter of being—we

may yet advantageously remember in this connection that, in the reaches of all higher relations, personality wears an inclusive rather than an exclusive aspect. All true persons thus come to be thus comprehended in personality of which it can be said, "I in thee and thou in me," as we say of the all-inclusive Reality. This, too, without a pantheistic issue. We can at least strive to do justice by the facts of personality. And when the mystery of the Divine Personality presses in closely upon us, we can profitably recall how it has been said to be part of human wisdom to be willing to be ignorant of some things with equanimity. But that can only be after speculative thought has done its best. If, now, we are made to participate in the common end which makes up the unity of the world, it shows that our lives, howsoever individual they be, are of an essentially social nature. But, if the finite self be of so social a nature, by what right shall we assume the Absolute Self to be so different? I do not find it necessary to say, as some have done, that God is not self-consciousness alone, nor personality alone, but a social being. So to speak is, I think, to misconceive self-consciousness and personality. Self-consciousness is so far from being concerned with self alone that only in the larger or social unity of the world is the self realised. The self need not be treated, and, in fact, ought not to be treated, as foreign to every other self, even though every self has, as such, a certain immediateness of experience which is inviolable. Nor is personality, however it may pertain or belong to the individual subject, something that is attained otherwise than through the social whole into which it enters.

Perfect, and free from becoming, as God's self-consciousness and personality may be, there seems no reason or need to read into them an absence of social nature or capability which we disclaim for these in ourselves. Nor do I feel the need, as some have lately done, to bring in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in order to solve the difficulties in which we are left by idealism. Already we have no reason to doubt that Perfect Being—internally personalised and externally individuated—may embrace a plurality of distinctive and personal manifestations. There seems, therefore, no need to insist, in the way sometimes done, that personality—our highest category—is inadequate to explain the multitude of selves, and that we must call in the aid of the "superpersonal unity" and the "multipersonal" found in the Trinity. Rather it is our conception of what is involved in "simple" personality that seems in need of rectification, as in itself wearing social character and implications.

The universe, then, we take to be in its core and inmost essence spiritual, for that which is fundamentally present in, and manifested throughout, the Universe, is spirit. Such spirit is, as we have seen, more than simply rationality, though rationality is so important a part of it. With Hegel we have taken spirit to be the *prius*, by which the world is posited. But we do not, with him, make the Absolute Life, in its infinitely rich fulness, the result of the self-estrangement of the Absolute Spirit in Nature. Our Idealism takes most gratefully from the Hegelian hand the spiritual principle pre-supposed in Knowledge, and the spiritual principle made manifest in nature and, further, the spiritual principle from which

they are both derived, this last being an inference from the correspondence and inter-relation of the other two. But the Deity, related to them as their free cause, we set above nature and man, as distinct from them, nor simply reproduced in them. The Hegelian epistemology, which, in its theoretic nakedness, has nothing better to say than that indeterminate reality passes over (as the determinate existence) into determinateness in our knowledge, we reject as painfully crude and unsatisfying.

We have seen, then, that reality is spiritual, and provides the real ideal, which is the true ideal. Fundamental reality, that is to say, is spiritual, the universe being ultimately grounded in reason, and based on rational thought. The Ideal is such basal reality for us, just because it is more than something merely subjective. The fundamentally Real of the Universe is for us just that archetypal Ideal which had its home in the mind of God. The physically real is but the manifestation of the spiritually ideal. The eternal laws and principles of reason, whereby the ideal so passes into the real, are all grounded in God. Thus in His light we see light. If there be a spiritual realism in all this, it is a realism that is, in fact, ideal. The world of real things is not a world of mere things, but of things that are to us an expression of the Ideal Mind. But this means not a Hegelian mode of treating the world as, in Schopenhauer's phrase, a "crystallised syllogism," as though logic were originative of Nature—not simply interpretative of it. Hegel's "Absolute Ideal" is powerless to create the world of actuality, for "without matter," as Kant said, "categories are empty." The

"Absolute Idea" is, in its self-evolution, of all things most inane, because it figures as thought—"the impersonal life of thought," as it has been termed—without a live Thinker. The search of Neo-Hegelianism for a principle of unity, and its sympathy with evolutionary conception, have rendered plausible a presentation in which things subsist without substance and originate without cause. But idealistic philosophers are not wanting who have discriminated beyond such a view, and recognised the unattained ideal of knowledge, in virtue of which, knowledge can never be the full expression of reality. The Hegelian identity of thought and existence has been quite outgrown by modern thought, which perceives that, while the Absolute may be revealed to us in the reality that we know, we cannot without absurdity postulate that there is no more Absolute than that which is known or thought by us. To treat all existence of the Absolute, beyond what has been "thought" by us, as non-existent, is clearly absurd. In our knowledge of reality, there always is such a periphery of indefiniteness as leaves an infinite progress possible to us. Our knowledge implicates existence or reality beyond knowledge itself as a process. The cognitive subject cannot fail to recognise that that of which he has knowledge exists without him, and cannot be one with his own mental state. Such dualism is essential to any theory of knowledge. It is the transcendent Real which is thus implicate in his knowledge. And the Ideal is this Real: the Ideal is the ultimate and transcendent Reality. God is thus not a result brought forth of

man's developing intellect, as though He were a pure product of man's reason, for whose discovery and interpretation philosophy is sole competent organ. For, as our knowledge of the physical world comes, only by the world having been before us, and now making itself known through acting on our sensorium, so we know God only because He, too, has been before us in His active self-revealings in the universe, and now makes Himself known to us through our rational and spiritual susceptibilities. Both our sense-perceptions and our spiritual perceptions are subject to definite growth, as required by modern psychology. This outward acting of world and Deity must be kept before the mind as presupposition of all science and all knowledge. Their existences and actings or processes are the constant presupposition and necessary complement of my whole conscious experience. So far as the material world of sense-experience is concerned, bodies and their operations must, I hold, exist independently of our sensations of extension, motion, and resistance, and matter must be credited with agency in virtue of its primary properties. The world cannot be allowed to be a mere system of possibilities of sensation, as with Mill and Berkeley, for our experience is of objective things, and not merely of sensations; it cannot even be admitted to exist, as with the Neo-Hegelians, only for experience, since our knowledge is precisely such as testifies to extra-mental reality. Our perceptions vary, however, independently of the objects, and are conditioned by the powers and view-points of the observer. But this does not keep one from regarding

our knowledge of the real or inner being of the phenomena of the material world as psychical or mental. It does not keep one from holding that the mind does not simply "copy" the world so impressed upon it, but, as active, sets its own seal upon the world of reality, and takes view of it which is its own. It does not keep facts fixed for us. I thus do not merely *think* of the Absolute as ground of all unity, root of all being, and condition of all consciousness, for God neither exists nor comes into being only through my subjective thinking or my ratiocinated knowledge of Him. He antecedently exists and acts upon me in the various lines of His self-revealing to my thought and life. This is wholly compatible with my being idealist enough to find the world, as known only through my powers of mind or idea, in the end a mental construction. Empirical reality, in its time-priority of existence, conditions my mental construction in its logical priority. The higher or spiritual perceptions of the Absolute Spirit give me a knowledge which is knowledge by every law of thought and every principle of fundamental Reason. For me, therefore, a true Idealism is the true philosophy, but it is a Theistic Idealism, and neither a lop-sided Intellectualistic Idealism, nor an exaggerated Ethical Idealism.

I call this Theism idealistic, both because it traces matter, originatively, to spirit, and because it makes spirit or conscious experience that through which alone created matter is known by us. The world is related to spirit in perception, and the only rational inference or interpretation is, that the world stands related in

its totality to an original Mind or Thinker, Who, as Absolute, is constitutive of the whole. But our Idealism is theistic because, eschewing the merely abstract unity of pantheistic conception whereby finite things are treated simply as elements or parts within a whole, it preserves that relative separateness and distinctness of things which are especially manifest in the case of the external world and man's conscious spirit. We say "relative" separateness and distinctness, for our Theism seeks to retain the concept of parts mutually related within one vast whole. Our Theism relates both the external world and man's spirit to the creative power or agency of God, which calls them into being and gives them direction. Hence the theistic conception of the constant dependence of the creature—no mere pantheistic simulacrum—upon God, Who has given us being of our own. Through this larger, more fundamental Reality, we find our way to unity, even the unity of a spiritualistic Monism, and escape the ensnaring meshes of the Dualism of mind and matter. This Monism is very different from that of the Spinozist or the present-day Materialist, for it is the doctrine of the Infinite Spirit of God as the one underlying Reality. This Spirit, as a unitary Being, forms the ground and principle of all other being. This Eternal Spirit is also the possibility of the interactions between individual beings and things: in a metaphysical sense, is Soul and Substance of all things; but such Monism is to be understood as, at the same time, ethical, that is to say, fully retentive of human freedom and responsibility. But our Ideal-

ism finds no difficulty in such interaction as is herein presupposed, or in the constant reciprocity between, subject and object. In the case of the external world, God is *in* the world no less than He is *over* it. In the material world God is made manifest, so that through it we know Him in His objective reality. This world of matter we take not as foreign to our spiritualistic nature, for we know it only as conform to our intelligence. It cannot, in respect of its existences and processes, be disparate and discontinuous with our conscious life, with which, in fact, it forms one whole. Even here there is the unity of subject and object amid all apparent duality. So the distinction between the immanence of Deity and His transcendence grows not into a separation, for then should we be left with nothing but an abstraction on our hands. In the case of the conscious spirit of man, we postulate a relative and substantial independence for it, God being immanent in man, yet transcending his finite spirit in such wise that man's freedom and responsibility are not impaired. Our selfhood is inviolable, as such, but not yet as originally independent of God. My life is unitary and self-contained, but it is yet essentially related to other lives. Each of these lives is marked by the unity of knowing the others to be in nature like itself. As opposed to human selves, God has a unity of consciousness within Himself, but not in such wise that it stands unrelated to these human selves. The *how* of God's being immanent in, and at the same time externally related to, our human spirits, belongs to the

inquiry into our metaphysical and ethical experience. Enough to say that more perfect adjustments are therein ethically possible to us. Theistic Idealism avoids the Hegelian mode of identifying God with man, so that the growth of man's spirit is taken to be the growth of the Divine consciousness. For the reality of human experience would then be our only Absolute, obviously a very insufficient one. Theistic Idealism, of course, recognises that the Absolute Life is a process in the sense of progressively realising its purpose in time, but it does not confound this with God's coming to know Himself. More mysterious, no doubt, in its working, is this case of the self, than that other of the external world, in consequence of the free play of personality in this mutual commerce of two spirits, the finite and the Infinite, but the interaction is not less real, and is more inspiring. Not merely formal, but real, freedom or independence of the ego must be maintained, for our personality is grounded in freedom. Our personality has no other content than the content of freedom, and formal freedom must always press on towards the end of real or material freedom. Herein lies a great defect of Neo-Hegelianism, which professedly makes much of freedom; its freedom is, and can only be, a merely formal immediacy bringing with it no real freedom for the individual subject. Better, however, than Martineau's total rejection of Idealism, is an idealistic position, chastened and tempered by the claims of empiric reality which preceded all conceptual thought; recognising *that* there is reality, vast, illimitable, beyond my

ken, though the *what* of such reality may be hid from me. So the survey from my idealistic watch-tower leaves me not with the cherished and delusive notion that there is no reality beyond what I perceive. The critico-idealistic methods of Neo-Kantists like Cohen, Natorp, and Kinkel are no more satisfactory than those of Neo-Hegelians. Cohen not only flouts the weakness of Kant in respect of the given, but has presented thought-processes as producing, from their activity alone, their content. The judgments of pure thought function, with Cohen, as determining moments in the construction of the world of knowledge. His attitude towards the given is unreasonable and full of contradictions. The content of thought is, for Cohen, unity, and not matter or stuff. Natorp goes so far as to hold the thought of the content, and the content which forms the object of knowledge, to be thought itself—so reducing us to an empty abstraction. In keeping with all this, Kinkel declares that thought must have no source or origin outside of itself. A doctrine of absolute relativity is the final result. A thorough comparison of Cohen's thought-world with that of Hegel is very suggestive, even though Cohen repudiates Hegel. Far too much Hegel left thought, in his system, the only substance, so that reason figures too largely as devoid of energy. But reason without energy soon sinks into nothingness. Just as little, on the other hand, does will act, in its free deeds, without reason or thought. A true psychology and a true metaphysic of the self are here a prime need. It remains the incurable defect of Absolute

Idealism that thought is so over-weighted as to result in a too complete suppression of energy.

I have said nothing of any aims which Materialism may have in the way of providing the unity we seek, for the Materialism of to-day infallibly lands us in subjective idealism, and can by no consistent possibility do anything to help us. The remarkable subjective idealism of Berkeley brought in the idea and power of God to account for our sensations and to escape the conception of matter, doing so in a way we cannot accept. For God and other selves, though implicitly assumed by Berkeley, are no more immediately experienced by us than is the world of matter. The imperilled existence of finite spirits in Berkeley's system was admitted by himself: we have no "immediate evidence" or "demonstrative knowledge" of their existence, he thinks. And so he was driven to bring in Deity as maintainer of that intercourse between spirits, "whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other." The Berkeleian difficulty of bridging the chasm that separates us from other personalities is one that is keenly felt in Neo-Hegelianism, to which objectively valid knowledge of the physical world appears much more easy than a like knowledge of other personalities. The only way found is by an appeal to common-sense, which cannot help assuming and acknowledging other personal individuals. But is this to be regarded as satisfactory? And why should physical objects be more valid, objectively, for me than personal objects? Surely I am entitled to find the personalities of my fellows as clearly and validly conceived as anything I can think

or know about physical objects. The only thing, of course, which can be said against that is, that man as spirit is not known by what he *is*, but by what he *does*. The spirit of a man we know only as we are of it: we know it in virtue of its activity or its movement, and that, of course, is to know it in a subjective fashion rather than as an object. There is still the question, whether men are known only as pure spirits. The truth seems to be, that the essentially social nature of the self is that which is really not understood and kept in mind. The epistemological difficulty disappears, and is no more existent, when that is understood, in the case of other personalities than of physical bodies. The cognitive problem—the impassable chasm—vanishes when, in proper pursuance of the idealistic position, other selves are not set up as entities outside the self, but viewed as objects lying within the consciousness of a unified self. Berkeley had to face the fact that God and finite spirits can be conceived as existing independently of our conceptions of them, but he certainly did not, and could not, prove that the world may not be conceived as existing in the same independent fashion. This, although all our data for such a belief are mental. He, in fact, wraps himself up in the world of his own conscious ideas, and begs the question again and again. The world is for him neither cause of our sensations nor counterpart of our ideas, and we are left so much in a sphere of mere assertion as to the non-existence of the world, that we hardly wonder Hume should have said Berkeley's positions admitted of no answer and produced no conviction. He must

again have recourse to an Infinite Spirit to find sufficient explanation of all the appearances in Nature. But we can see how naturally Berkeley took the position he did. If a thing's *esse* is its *percipi*, the human mind "exists not always": things must therefore be "nowhere when we perceive them not," or they must exist as "ideas in the mind of God." So, then, we cannot admit the world to be the unreal thing Berkeley made it, in so reducing it to terms of our own sensations, for we do not emulate his pathetically splendid scepticism in respect of the most powerful spontaneous beliefs of humanity. But neither can our Idealism view it as a world of matter divorced from, or independent of spirit. As for the creative process, its rationality may not lie open to us, but that is just to say we are finite, and that there are things of which we may know the *that* without knowing the *how*. As for our finite selves known to each other, we are in such knowledge already on the way to transcendence, and have over-passed experience.

Nothing is more vital to a proper treatment of Theistic Idealism than that a fundamental place be found for Personality, alike on its Divine and its human side. I confess to finding Personality rarely treated in any fashion calculated to impart any vitality to philosophical Theism! In only too many of the systems of the greatest philosophers, Personality, on its Divine side, is too much a mere side issue, or a kind of afterthought, a useful vivifier of irredeemable abstractness! Lotze's presentation of Divine Personality may not at all points claim our adherence, and the difficulties may be so

great as to prevent the elaboration of a perfectly satisfying theory, but these considerations do not in the least extenuate or justify weak philosophic temporisings with what ought always to have been felt to be essential to Theism of any vital sort. I am quite ready to admit that, from the side of science no less than that of philosophy, it is harder than ever to retain the personality of God. An infinite person seems to ordinary philosophical usage a contradiction in terms, while modern science contemplates the universe as illimitably vast, continuous, inter-related. Such an Universe the Infinite Personality must be able to fill and to form. Evolutionary science, often viewed as inimical to personality in Deity, must, in its teleological reference, be held to point to mind or personality in God. I will only say this, that the objections urged against Personality in God by philosophers, of any school whatsoever, quite fail to convince or satisfy me, even when they are not quite wanting in logical force. And the reason is obvious. We are here dealing with elements that belong to the larger logic of life, against which verbal quibblings do not avail. To the believer in the Absolute Personality, nothing has yet been advanced from any quarter that need keep him from holding to real and vital personality—stripped of all its accidental limitations—in God. It were easy to name philosophers of to-day who exhibit a truly wonderful and precise knowledge of what possibilities of being do *not* exist for Deity, when shorn of this, that, and the other human quality. But what wonder if the world remains unconvinced? Has not the dogmatism of philosophy here run wild? What

does Divine Personality really involve? It involves that God is the great Thinker, the supreme Willer, and the Sovereign affectional Moralist, all in One—I mean, in a conscious unity. These elements of intelligence, affectional or moral goodness, and will, are constitutive of Divine Personality, as we know or apprehend it. God is, as Personality, not mere cause of the world, but subject as well. The effect of recent discussions is to make one adhere more firmly to Lotze on one point, namely, that perfect personality exists in God only, and that talk of His being superpersonal must be discarded, on demand of the religious instincts and aspirations. We have had philosophers even maintaining the finitude of God, as a way of preserving His personality, and theological people have been found commending them for so doing. These things are due to failure to transcend a merely quantitative way of apprehending personality, without entering into its intensive infinity—its spiritual and ethical implications. Personality in Deity, it must be remembered, is, before all things, ethical, and must be deeply apprehended in its ethical bearings and relations if it is to be grasped and understood at all. Any state of mind indicative of servitude to formal logic will make little headway in solving the difficulties of Infinite Personality. It is personality that will understand, construe, and interpret personality, and it is along the heights of ethical and achieved personality that we must learn, in surer than the logician's way, the power and possibilities of personality on its Divine side. The vitality of the universe, and the immanence of the life of Deity, are truths which have

been much more vividly realised in our time, but confidence in the personality of God has, in really enlightened quarters, been thereby quickened, not quenched. No disclaimer of impersonality could be more complete than that of the newer philosophical Theism. There has been no lack of conceiving God through the world of finite experience, and such knowledge or conception of Him is true as far as it goes. For, though He be for us the Absolute Being, and, as such, a self-evident principle of reason, yet our knowledge of Him arises only on occasion of our experientially knowing Him in His objective reality. This is not to say that there may not be advantage, such as Biedermann suggests, in beginning within the logico-metaphysical idea of the absoluteness of God's Being, rather than with the empirical idea of man. When Green asks us to become all that the Eternal Consciousness is, he evidently expects us to perform the psychological feat of knowing all that the Eternal Consciousness already is. A psychology of the Eternal Consciousness we certainly do not meditate, for predicates applicable in our finite case do not hold for the all-embracing consciousness; but we assert that the knowledge of the Infinite Spirit must be knowledge from the inside, that is, of a subjective character, the Universe being the result of His own creative knowing and willing. God, then, as the Absolute Personal Spirit must be clearly affirmed. Of such pure spirit, indeed, we can affirm but little, except, with Hegel, its freedom, that is to say, its self-movement or activity. Such absolute Spirit we can truly know only in a dynamic fashion, not ontologically; that is to say, we know this spirit *as we are of it*. Such

is the nature of spirit-knowledge. Through this resolution of His personality into freedom or self-originating movement we arrive, through His creative results or processes, at Him Who is uncreate. From Him the physical universe must, as objective reality, still be distinguished. It is the result of the objective activity of the Absolute: its ether, its matter, its energy exist for the mind, not for the senses. Nature may supply the materials, but mind is the great world-builder. Nature is the expression of cosmic mind: it cannot be understood without thought and reason, and what can only so be understood must itself be reason and thought. However distinct from consciousness we make matter or the physical world, we yet know matter only in terms of our conscious experience, basing our knowledge of its qualities upon our sensational experiences. Whatever reality nature or the physical world may represent to God's experience, it still stands distinguished from Him. A like distinctness of existence must be postulated for ourselves, though made in His likeness. The fundamental reality of the Universe can only be spirit: its highest energy can be no other than that of spirit: the Absolute Being can be no less than personal spirit, for impersonal spirit were a contradiction in terms: the personal and self-conscious alone can love. The religious relation is thus one which involves recognition, on our part, of a real relationship between God and man. Though we know even God in and through our finite experience, yet this does not imply that we make God only an element *in* experience, or evolve Him *out of* experience, or fail to realise how small a part we know of Him—His absolute Being and working.

CHAPTER XVII.

FRENCH PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

FRENCH philosophy in the nineteenth century, while making its own all rich material like that furnished by Kant and Hegel, has not failed to maintain its own continuous character and distinctive features. Its Cartesian spirit has been as clearly manifest in the nineteenth as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A dominant spiritualism pervaded the philosophy of the seventeenth century, wherein speculative reason had finally cast off Scholasticism. Materialism and Sensism found vogue in the eighteenth century. The philosophy of the nineteenth century in France is a return to the spiritualism of the seventeenth century. In the first half of the nineteenth century, philosophy in France was largely concerned with questions of social reform and political philosophy. These were often courageously and suggestively dealt with. Philosophical Traditionalism, as represented by De Maistre and De Bonald, Lamennais, and Ballanche, looked on the critical spirit as one of danger. They urged, in ways extravagant enough, submission to the Church. Tradition, authority, and social life they set up as counteractives to individualism and anarchy. The

Abbé Gratry set forth his views on the knowledge of God and the soul, and on historical philosophy, in interesting, able, and valuable presentations. Saint Simon proclaimed a collectivism of his own, and the need for a learned and skilful clergy. Fourier propounded his "phalansteries," and dreamed dreams of an harmonious society wherein organisation should beget a happiness perfect and complete. Then came Comte denouncing all these endeavours as vitiated by the fact that an all-convincing social science—a science of practical politics—had not first been formulated. It was on the heights of such positive social science Comte hoped to gain a view-point which should embrace not only the good in the eighteenth century philosophy, as handed on by Condorcet, but also whatever of truth might reside in it after the damaging assaults of De Maistre on its negative character. Comte thus became the completer of Descartes, who had done so much to foster the positive spirit. A reform in philosophic method was the fundamental notion of Positivism. It was precisely Comte who first understood the scientific issues and realised the changed conditions of philosophy. He saw that philosophy may no more seclude herself in abstract thought, and construct theories to which facts must bend. Comte, realising the proud security whence the positive sciences now scrutinise the results of speculative philosophy, makes the creation of a positive social science constitute the fundamental unity of the whole philosophical system. The conception of a social evolution—of humanity as a developing organism—is set forth by

Comte in the *Positive Politics*, but had already been dimly apprehended by Condorcet. The historic evolution set forth by Comte is in marked contrast to Hegel's, since it is external—an exterior procession in fact—in place of the Hegelian development of spirit from within. A positive theory of knowledge could not, in his view, be separated from this new science of his, with its not very pleasing name of Sociology.

To every branch of knowledge he would apply one and the same method. And the method is no sooner found than the philosophy is formed. The utter inadequacy of his so-called law of the three states has been repeatedly shown, whereby he magnified into a supposed general and primary law certain phenomena of secondary and particular significance. Now, it is obvious that, in treating the transcendental as inaccessible to the intellect, Comte made his system defective and incomplete. He saw but one side of the shield, as Spencer has seen the other. And it is a logical weakness to treat humanity as an organism without extending the organic idea to the medium and conditions under which the social life of humanity is developed. Man or mind individual Comte would construe through humanity, rather than humanity through individual mind. The individual is for him only an "abstraction," and exists only through universal humanity. Humanity is for him supreme moral end, but he certainly unfolded no proper and universally related moral system. Whatever difficulties may attend the pursuit of an absolute philosophy, these we certainly prefer to a system which, like that of Comte, deceives itself as to what is Divine,

disbelieves the relatedness of the universe that stands over against man, and destroys its unity by treating the part as the whole. Even precursors of the positive philosophy, like Descartes and Bacon, were not able to resist the craving for an "absolute" knowledge. Comte proceeds by the method of elimination; he eliminates the theology resident in historical religion, and retains cult and ritual. An artificial and idealised abstraction is the result. Among those he most deeply influenced were Littré and Hippolyte Taine, the latter a thorough experimentalist and evolutionist of Spencerian type. Vain and preposterous as have been the attempts to take Comte's system in lieu of the great philosophies of the absolute, these attempts derogate not from the highly meritorious services Comte rendered. These are evidenced by the fact that over the broad realms of philosophical, historical, and scientific research the spirit of his doctrine may everywhere be found to-day as a deep, pervasive influence. Its great merit lies in its insistence on the objectivity of the true—on the fact that truth is found in nature and in history, not in the introspections of the ego. But it remains, of course, strange that a philosophy calling itself "positive" should mainly represent for us conclusions that are *negative*. For no one in the century, perhaps, may be so truly claimed the merit of having propounded a new system as for Comte.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, philosophy in France presents a somewhat striking contrast to what we see in the first half of the century. This is in respect of the fact that it presents no school so

dominating and centralising in influence as Eclecticism was about the year 1830. Now the influence of Kant is felt, and now that of Leibniz and Schelling. At other times evolutionary tendencies are manifest, due to the theories of Lamarck and Spencer, while at yet other points of time Comtean influences come into view. To this we shall return later.

It was as succeeding the destructive and passionate criticism of the eighteenth century that Maine de Biran became one of the founders of Spiritualism in France. Theirs was a spiritualism becoming enough, no doubt, but lacking in the ferment of life. In the hands of Biran and Royer-Collard it soon became an official spiritualism. Maine de Biran did not profess to find the absolute. He kept sure foothold on experience. De Biran, in some respects precursor of modern psychology, propounded "the immediate consciousness of self-activity" as "the primitive and fundamental principle of human cognition." He distrusted the idea of substance, which, in the philosophy of Descartes, had tended towards pantheism. He made for himself, in the end, a kind of *via media* between Stoicism and Christianity. The former he supposed to make too much of man's will, and the latter too little. His acute analyses overpassed sensationalism by bringing out the place and importance of the will.

Maine de Biran was followed by his devoted disciple Cousin, famed for his wide Eclecticism. Other founders of spiritualism were such disciples of Cousin as Jouffroy, Saisset, Vacherot, Janet, Garnier, Ravaisson, Jules Simon, Damiron, Franck, and brilliant essayists like Caro and Bersot. Cousin's method is eclectic, but

spiritualism is the soul of his system. His morality is exactly that of spiritualism, mediate and traditional. His Eclecticism was clearly not that of piecing together parts of other systems; that is just what it was not. It professed to base itself on observation and induction, to arrive at unity "solely by the aid of the experimental method." Of course, this method, in resting on observation that is complete, will include the truth in other and less complete systems; therefore does Cousin choose to call his method eclectic. So his Eclecticism has to do with the teachings of historical philosophy, whose psychological relations he clearly perceived, as well as with the facts of consciousness. And, as matter of fact, he soon brought into his brilliant teachings—for he was the most influential French philosopher of the century—elements that stood in irreconcilable contradiction to each other. The truth is, he was unable to abide faithful to his own method, and to carry analysis to its furthest possibilities.

Eclectic spiritualism waned after Cousin, and the decline of metaphysics of the school of Cousin has paved the way for the cult of science. Even Jouffroy, with soul athirst for certitude, did not find in the teachings of his master perfect satisfaction. Jouffroy made man the centre of his philosophical studies, and made will central in man. Man is a free force; to him there is an order universal and impersonal in God; all morality for him consists in respect for this universal order. The psychology of Cousin and Jouffroy, based on observation by means of consciousness and reflection, was used in support of a spiritualistic metaphysic.

Vacherot sat loosely to Eclecticism, and was not afraid to deal with the metaphysical problems in the attempt to found a new spiritualistic school. The idea of perfection, the conception of the infinite, the notion of the ideal, were all handled by Vacherot, who held perfection to be incompatible with real existence. Vacherot had a spiritualistic bent, and, after Cousin, tended to give an ontological turn to psychology. It has been, for him, rather unsympathetically put that "the idea of perfection is God, but that perfection has no existence." Caro has dealt with Vacherot's positions in severely critical fashion, leaving him only a shadowy Deity—a figment of the imagination. The infinite is, with Vacherot, simply the all—the all or nothing. The Deity of Vacherot's idealism is, when developed, merely an ideal one: he cleaves to the notion of a perfect Deity who does not really exist, for a true God cannot, with him, be living and real! The personality of Deity Vacherot, in short, denies: God, as the ideal of all things, exists for him only as He is thought: the real infinity is the world. Caro contends, on the other hand, that a God who does not exist is no God at all. As against Vacherot's contention that he yet guards the objective reality of Deity as perfectly independent of the mind, Caro retorts that Vacherot's God—as the Supreme Ideal—is a purely abstract and subjective conception, the mere product of human reason, the pure and simple result of our own intellectual operations.

Jules Simon treated natural religion in theistic fashion, doing so in a powerful manner.

Saisset rendered manifest how the personality of God

is maintained by pantheism always and only at the expense of personality in man.

Paul Janet was a steadfast supporter of Eclecticism, and laid down a morality which was a variation on the motives of Kantian duty, coupled with a doctrine of final causes. He headed French spiritualism in his time.

Damiron, as a moralist of the school of Cousin, rejected *à priori* every system that did not comport with faith in the beautiful, in God, and in the future life.

From various sides we see metaphysical speculation gradually asserting itself in the latter half of the century against both Eclectic and Positivist tendencies. We have the philosophies of liberty propounded by Secrétan, Renouvier, and Ravaisson, and the contingency theory of Boutroux. Ravaisson sought to establish an æsthetic morality, based on the identity of the good with the beautiful. Influenced by Aristotle, Leibniz, and Schelling, he showed philosophical leanings to a metaphysical knowledge in which real being, or the absolute, is disclosed by an intuition of the reason. By such disclosure reason becomes linked to the absolute as true principle of all existence, beauty, and knowledge.

Again, Secrétan took up for the main principle of his philosophy the idea of God's absolute liberty, and founded thereupon an argument for liberty in man. The problems of evil and of Divine personality did not escape him. But his pleadings for liberty constituted his deepest influence on French philosophic thought. Under Kantian inspiration, teachings like those of Lachelier and Boutroux have displayed idealistic tendencies. Boutroux has set forth the philosophy of contingency

with great power, and made his influence felt beyond the bounds of France. This is a form of philosophic conception with which the twentieth century will have to reckon. Boutroux takes cognisance of the postulates and results of the positive sciences, and seeks to do full justice to reality. He makes fine insistence on the value of the History of Philosophy, whose "great doctrines have in them a principle of life." Renouvier was at once idealist and phenomenalist, and proved an able philosopher. Renouvier stood out as severe critic of eclectic spiritualism. He blamed its method—or rather its lack of method—even more than its conclusions. Renouvier postulates a beginning for the world, holds the ascending series or infinite regress of causes to have had a first term, takes liberty and contingency to pertain to the world of phenomena, and thinks man's liberty and personality capable of being critically established. For Renouvier is nothing if not critical. His system he calls "Criticisme." It leans at points to Leibnizianism. His stand for individual freedom is a bold one. Pantheism and fatalism he would avoid by a rigid exclusion of the idea of substance. Conscience is for him the revelation of the absolute, and the main stress of his ethical teaching lies on duty. This form of Neo-Kantism has exerted great influence on French philosophic thought, under Renouvier, Brochard, Pilon, and Dauriac. As "Criticisme," it may be allowed to have made, in certain critical respects, an advance (as idealistic phenomenism) on the older metaphysics. A system of Personalism, his thought, no doubt, is in its more positive and constructive aspects. He modifies and supplements Kantian

criticism by subsuming all the categories under the principle of the relativity of knowledge, and by making them all modes of the category of relation. Expressly he holds Relation itself to be "the most general relation which all other relations presuppose," and consequently to be "the first of the categories." It was as rejecting the Unconditioned, substance, and noumena, as so many "intellectual fictions," that Renouvier regarded it as necessary to represent the total synthesis of phenomena under the aspect of Personality. He thought the Kantian philosophy was "practically bent upon the ruin of the person," all whose modes are phenomenal. This he says because of Kant's adherence to the realism of substance and the noumenon. Renouvier's theory of knowledge rejected all notions of the infinite, of substance, of thing-in-itself, and confined knowledge to the limits of the knowing mind, where it was purely representative. The person, with his modes of consciousness, was for Renouvier ultimate fact. His phenomenal knowledge, he thought, can know real relations, and therefore true existence. For knowledge must be judged by what the person can know, and not by what, on critical hypothesis, he can not know. Outside consciousness there was, to Renouvier's idealistic phenomenalism, nothing; but the phenomenal series was not supposed to give certainty, which came only through rational belief. Renouvier's belief in the person as a real knowing subject is less a moral postulate, as with Kant, than an epistemological one. His personalism is developed on the intellectual side, to the neglect of the ethical aspects. His belief is drawn from the relations

of our consciousness to objects in a phenomenal world. For Renouvier, "no objective representation can be more than *subjectively* objective"; and we have merely ideas roused in us by the presence of objects or bodies, but no real perception of bodies in themselves. A kind of natural belief makes them known to us. The thought of Renouvier, setting out from Kantian base, developed, in the manner now indicated, in the direction of pure relativism, but his system suffered so many influences that it became fantastic and composite, and somewhat heterogeneous in its answers. His thought somewhat strangely failed to perceive that purely relative values imply absolutes which must be, in some sort, known as the foundation of said relativisms. Renouvier sought a synthesis of Kant and Hume, sought to purify Kantian system by the pluralism and phenomenalism which were the result of Hume's rigid analysis of experience. The noumenon or thing-in-itself is thus, as we have seen, not allowed to appear in Renouvier's neo-criticism. The law of phenomena is for him the *à priori* element in experience, in which respect Renouvier does not seem quite so logical as Hume. Critical and suggestive as parts of the neo-critical theory are, one cannot regard such a mixed system as satisfactory.

Boutroux and Poincaré have stood for the indeterminism which has been so marked a feature of the "neo-critical" school. Bergson is spiritualistic in his metaphysics. Poincaré holds that science would not be justified as it is, in its conclusions, "if it did not reveal to us something of the nature of reality." To him the real is the objective, that is, community among thinking

beings. Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Boutroux all oppose to the "demi-spiritualism" of Eclecticism that true spiritualism to which matter itself is immaterial, and nature is explicable by mind. Fouillée has propounded a system of philosophy which has the great merit of being broad, comprehensive, and consistent. Its dominating idea is that of the *idées-forces*. In his view, an idea is not a mere reproduction or representation in the mind of some object outside itself, but is at the same time a force working for its own realisation. In this way ideas are real factors in our mental evolution, for they condition actual changes wrought within us. Not only so, but they have consequential effects on the world without us, as we give them outlet in our outward actions. The bold and striking conception of Fouillée is that the idea is a form of volition as well as of thought: it is, on his precise showing, no longer a form, but an act, conscious of its own direction, quality, and intensity. We see what an important law is thus suggested by his *idées-forces*, though, of course, it remains to be seen whether it will prove an adequate foundation for the vast superstructure he has sought to rear thereupon. It is on this basis Fouillée tries to rear a monism of *idées-forces* that shall overpass any propounded by idealism or materialism. For critical skill, constructive power, modernness of spirit, and metaphysical acumen, the philosophical work of Fouillée deserves great praise, whatever may be its final appraisal. He has shown a most worthy conception of philosophy as the study of "reality itself both as fact and consciousness"—reality "not immobile and as if crystallised in the past," but "in the process of

becoming" and determining "the future." Fouillée and Renouvier have done more than any other thinkers, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, for philosophy in France, Fouillée by his idea-forces opposing merely mechanical views of the universe, and Renouvier opposing the unintelligible as being, in fact, the self-contradictory. Fouillée rejects the philosophy of contingency, which Renouvier accepts. Dauriac also has ably defended contingency against Fouillée's attacks. Hardly behind Fouillée and Renouvier has been Caro, in respect of his brilliant exposition and defence of spiritualistic philosophy. The highest problems of thought he, not always without a certain hardness, confronted and treated with a rare power of philosophical polemic. Caro is a striking and beautiful philosophic personality, maintaining his positions with singular skill, lucidity, and grace. These positions range themselves round such subjects as God, the soul, the future life, and duty. The God for Whom, as a spiritualistic philosopher, he contends, must be a God living, intelligent, and loving. Only such a God carries for him real perfection—the perfection of thought and love. Reason is able to conceive such a Deity, he holds, and the religious conscience can approve Him, not blind Necessity. One of the most recent French metaphysical treatments is the "creative evolution" of Bergson, from the standpoint of the modern scientific view of the world. Its synthesis is too abstract, merely psychological, and lacking in reality.¹

Guyau took for his main idea that of life—life as a principle of natural power, expansion, and fruitfulness.

¹ On Bergson, see also chap. xx. p. 310.

He strove to show how, in this way, the individual and the social points of view might be reconciled. Guyau possessed great depth of feeling and charm of style. That able and distinguished thinker, Cournot, has sought to base his philosophy on a group of fundamental ideas gleaned from the various sciences—such ideas as order, chance, probability. He seeks not certainties in his philosophy. Cournot's caution and freedom from dogmatic certitude have militated against the power and prevalence of his teachings. His "infinite probability" is in striking contrast to Comte. Milhaud has made "a kind of normal objectivity" the quest of science, and applied the same criterion to religion itself. Durkheim, greatly influenced by Comtist ideas, adopts practically the position that God is society, and that, in desiring Him, we are only seeking to attain the highest realisation of ourselves. God does not disappear in humanity, rather humanity discovers God in itself, and fervently worships Him for very reason that it has found Him there.

Having completed this brief review of French philosophical developments in the nineteenth century, it only remains to be said that the official philosophy in France is still mainly Eclecticism. Its nearest danger is that of being content to teach. Its most serious lack has been fruitful development, and that is serious enough for a philosophy. An eclectic philosophy that shall be comprehensive enough for this time must, I decidedly think, be one that shall reconcile and do justice, in its vast synthesis, to those three great philosophic types, or fundamental philosophic methods, represented by what I shall call Naturalism, Rationalism, and Moralism.

Cartesianism thought to solve the problem of the universe by clearness of thought. In opposition to Cartesianism, the sensationalism of Condillac thought to find all the knowledge possible to us through the correct interpretation of our sensations. The moralism or Neo-Kantianism of Renouvier teaches the supreme worth of conscience and its revelations. What I maintain is, that the Eclecticism of France must find room to do justice to all three spheres or types of reality: (1) to the world of empiric reality, mediated through the senses; (2) the world of abstract truth, to which we are brought through the forms and processes of thought; (3) the world of ideal values, revealed to us in the imperatives of conscience. How hard it is to get the justice we desiderate for all these three spheres of truth or reality, the history of philosophy is a standing witness. Yet an Eclecticism that shall neglect any one of these three factors is instantly open to damaging assaults in the interests of the neglected factors. Happily, in most recent years, some of these desiderata are being met, as in the philosophy of the sciences by Bergson, the classic rationalism of Hamelin, and the philosophy of action of Ollé-Laprune. The weakness of French philosophy in the nineteenth century arose from its bifurcated movement—its tendency critical and its tendency reconstructive. And not only so, but in France, as elsewhere, we find at the close of the nineteenth century, philosophies rather than philosophy. There the rich and fruitful results of the philosophical specialists awaited some unifying power or process, whereby the lost sense of totality should be brought back to men's minds, and the unity of

knowledge be restored in a rich and comprehensive philosophy. French philosophy of the future must, perforce, partake less of a merely national character, and more form part—like other national philosophies—of European philosophical development. To that development it has already contributed its peculiar share of clearness of idea, lucidity of expression, precision of statement, positiveness of spirit, fruitfulness of method, richness of principle, acuteness of thought, and wealth of system. Perhaps we shall await, with most interest, the fortunes of critical idealism and the philosophy of contingency in France during the twentieth century.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

ITALIAN philosophy in the nineteenth century forms an interesting record. To do it justice, it is necessary to remember how, when philosophy revived in Italy in the seventeenth century, the subjectivism of Descartes and Malebranche, and the Sensism of Locke, and still more of Condillac, became there the prevailing influences. The eighteenth century was a time of recuperation for Italian thought, which was led by jurists like Giannone; metaphysicians like Vico, founder of the philosophy of history in its modern treatment; and legalists and economists like Beccaria—with his immense services to justice and humanity—Filangieri, Genovesi—who inaugurated doubt, criticism, and observation in Italian philosophy, but without leaving any great, original system—and Galiani. At dawn of the nineteenth century we have Ventura, making philosophy, after Aquinas, dependent on Revelation; Gioja, like Condillac, finding, in an empirical mood, the true revelation in the facts of the world; the influential Romagnosi, with strongly marked legalist and intuitionist tendencies and principles; Galluppi, a con-

siderable philosopher, with clearly-defined realistic tendencies; the great Rosmini, with his leanings to idealism, and his emphasis on being as the universal and all-embracing idea; the powerful Gioberti, with judgments framed after an ontologistic cast; the admirable Mamiani, with an ontologism cast in more realistic mould; Vera, with vigour and independence enough to impart some vitality to Hegelian thought in Italy; Franchi, with his powerful rationalism and opposition to official idealism; and Ferrari, with his positivist and practical conclusions. These, with such other names as De Grazia the eclectic, Collecchi, and Borrelli, the influence of which last on the philosophical development of Southern Italy was not of the happiest kind, cover pretty well the first half of the nineteenth century. A period, let it be said, in which we find philosophy in Central Italy marked by constant empirical tendency, while the tendency in Northern Italy was idealistic. But the influence of Ferrari, Franchi, and Mamiani ran on into the second-half of the century. Early in the second half of the century must be noted the Thomist philosophy of Liberatore. During the last three decades of the century, the philosophical activity of Italy was great. Gabelli, by the clearness of his thought and the freshness of its form; Villari, distinguished by his learned historic researches; Spaventa, by his metaphysic, and criticism of Kantian concepts; Siciliani, by his positivist predilections; Cantoni, by his eminent Neo-Kantian endeavours; Lombroso, by his important legal and positivist inquiries; Ardigò—the Italian Spencer,

as one may call him—by his pronounced and systematic positivism; Conti, by his services to sound metaphysics; Angiulli, by his positive and experimental methods; Labanca, by his finely inclusive dialectic; Corleo, by his ingenious philosophy of identity; De Sarlo, by his lucid and critical labours,—these have been among the influences which have made Italian thought in the nineteenth century a rich and varied treasure-house of philosophical activity. Nor do they by any means exhaust the influences, for there have been (the Herbartian) Labriola, Mariano, Ragnisco, Sergi, Cesca, Peccenini, Di Giovanni, Valdarnini, Peyretti, Morselli, Trivero, Croce, Vailati, and many others besides. Chief among the forms of the Italian treasure-house of thought are the Positivist idea, the Neo-Kantian view, the Evolutional view, and theories that turn on the voluntaristic aspect of Reality. Positivism has been more slowly overpassed in Italy than in any other country. It suited the genius of the Italian mind, and it found there favouring conditions. Pluming itself upon being a philosophy of *fact*, it did not see how it essentially failed to recognise the fundamental concept of Evolution, in not admitting the *process*. Mamiani seems to be the thinker to whom Francesco Bonatelli, who is now specially to occupy our attention, most approximated in his Platonising tendencies. This Platonising tendency is quite undisguised in Mamiani: in Plato's light he is continually seeing things clearly; but Mamiani is really more realistic in the cast of his thought than the ontologists, and holds that we know directly finite relations, and

also arrive at ideas immediately connected with Absolute Reality.

It is a particular purpose of this chapter to give some account of the place and influence of Francesco Bonatelli in Italian Philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century. For it seemed to me that Bonatelli deserves to be better known among us. His volumes are now so largely out of print, and his work is so scattered over Journals and Transactions, as to make this chapter more needful and desirable. In the endeavour to make him known, I have been greatly helped by the able and interesting paper on Bonatelli published by Professor Francesco de Sarlo, of Florence. In the period just mentioned, Bonatelli was the most strenuous representative of spiritualism. At a time when such treatment had not found vogue in Italy, it was his merit to treat psychological questions in a method analytical and positive, in the sense of a genuine observation of facts. He was reared in the school of metaphysicians who adorned Italy in the second quarter of the ~~nine~~ nineteenth century, and who—with the exceptions of Rosmini and Galluppi—showed little interest in the analysis and accurate observation of internal facts. Now, critical penetration and analytic attitude are marks of Bonatelli's work. He had made himself conversant with the German philosophy of his time. Hence he was a prime factor in introducing Italy to the knowledge of the fundamental ideas of German thinkers like Herbart, Fortlage, Trendelenburg, and Lotze. Just in his time, and under the impulses given by Herbart, Beneke, and others, was instituted that movement of psychological research which

has since reached the height of its development through the influences of a Helmholtz, a Lotze, a Wundt, and others. Bonatelli first transplanted empiric psychology to Italy, and introduced the taste for exact observation of internal facts. A marked feature of his work was the tendency to set forth, in form precise and clear, the phenomena of conscience. Not less outstanding seems to have been the moral nobility of the man than his intellectual eminence, so that his work partakes of the nature of a deep and convinced effort to rectify the dominant philosophical currents of his time. Strong he was in his insistence on the fundamental difference between sensibility and intellect. The objectivity of extension, of movements, of time, and so forth, he admitted. Feeling he was not disposed to treat as a form of knowledge. To perception he attributed the exclusive function of conceiving the real concrete. He left to thought, as object, the world of the idea. In general, Bonatelli seems to have followed the views of Herbart ~~and~~ Lotze. But, in their tendency to oppose feeling and intellect, Bonatelli diverges from them, for, according to him, it is only through thought that we arrive at the knowledge of that which is. In connection with these mutual influences of feeling and ideation, I would only recall how strongly Lotze has, in his metaphysic, linked ideas with some particular vital feeling. Change the feeling, and there is no roadway to the ideas connected therewith. The line which Bonatelli, on the other hand, pursues, seems to me a sufficiently strange and striking one. The antithesis between thought and feeling, now so frequent, he does not follow. In a word,

he makes conscience the equivalent of thought. He takes conscience to be the first that knows; but there is no true and proper conscience without thought. Conscience is to him essentially an act of affirmation, a true judgment, but there can be no such conscience without something being presented—in fact, without thinking. That is, no doubt, a strange procedure which identifies conscience with the act of judging, but the objection to conscience being reduced to a judging act is taken to be due to a mechanical conception of judgment. I do not propose to state *in extenso* the grounds on which Bonatelli maintains these positions, for there are other points I wish to notice. Enough to remark that it has been claimed for this identification of conscience with an act of thinking, that it renders the whole cognitive process intelligible, the fixed point required as ultimate term of reference being found in the act of conscience, which is already an act of cognition.

A cardinal point with Bonatelli is the distinction of sensitive perception from that which is intellectual. ~~The~~ The basis of sensitive perception he finds in sensation. I do not propose to go into his positions as to projection and objectivisation. It must suffice to say that the elaboration of thought carries with itself, as an instinctive and rational belief, the conviction that what is affirmed is true and exists independently of the subject. That is to say, objective validity is inherent in every elaboration of thought, as such. Bonatelli also deals with the important modern problem of the worth of perception. He takes it to be the precise function of thought to reflect reality. Not so with sensibility, which has for its task

to constitute reality in union with the objective element. The determination of the peculiar nature of this objective element he holds to be the real question. In making for the worth of perception, Bonatelli seems to steer his way between the Scylla of a purely idealistic view and the Charybdis of a dualistic realism that treats the primary qualities of bodies as objective. He takes the thing to be but the law or formula of all the perceptive possibilities, obviously a tolerably idealistic view in respect of the fact that objective reality figures as a truth or principle. On the other hand, he insists that such law is not something merely thinkable, but is a force effective, real, and independent of us, in this world of time, space, and movement. I am inclined to agree with Professor de Sarlo in thinking it impossible for Bonatelli's spiritualism to remain in equilibrium between these two modes of conception. For it seems most pertinent to ask how Bonatelli's law can be something other than merely thinkable; how it can present those characters of ~~sub-~~existence, reality, and particularisation which are inherent in our apprehension of real and particular existences; and how space, time, and movement are to be treated as things in themselves. Bonatelli himself recognises these distinctive features of true perception—perception of the real. He seems to me to have adopted these positions, with this unsatisfactory result, because sensible of the drawbacks to a purely idealistic view while clinging to a desire to do justice by the real, to which he has given no proper effect.

I pass, however, to touch on Bonatelli's views of the characteristics of thought. He is critical of Lotze's

position in making thought consist in the living activity of reference. Bonatelli holds this to be so far true, but thinks it fails to determine that essential, in the character of thought, which we call affirmation. Ideas, psychologically considered, are only consolidated judgments, with language as their cement, and are neither intuitively discerned nor beheld, but solely thought. They are thought in two ways, Bonatelli thinks: implicitly, or with conscious feeling that the system of judgments in which they consist will be capable of being turned to use, and, explicitly, or by affirming these judgments anew. When we come to the objective existence of ideas, a form of existence is not to be claimed for them equal to that of concrete realities. In which connection I would say,—Perhaps not; but thought must be conform to reality just as perception is; I find no valid reason for holding otherwise than that the object determines our thought, in which case our thought, as rational, seems to me as real as anything can be. But to return. After the Lotzean mode, the form of the ~~existence~~ of ideas consists in their worth or value—they are of the possibility of the essence—modes they are of apprehending that in which we seek the essences of things. They need not be merely subjective. All our science is based on faith in the objectivity of the idea. Laws, essences, types, are substantially idea. I would remark that, on the Lotzean view, however, the complete human subjectivity of all our knowledge is unambiguously maintained. And it appears to me that Bonatelli was pursued by the same sense of difficulty that seems to have haunted Lotze, causing the latter to

say that "thought and existence certainly seem to be so connected as that they both follow the same supreme laws; which laws are, as regards existence, laws of the being and becoming of all things and events, and, as regards thought, laws of a truth which must be taken account of in every connection of ideas." So that here again we seem to have in Bonatelli—as indeed in Lotze—a mediate view, and one not particularly thorough-going with either of them. Ideal entities are, in the Bonatellian view, determinations of conscience, then thoughts and nothing more, having an existence only in our minds. Bonatelli emphasises the fact that religious philosophers have posited for ideas a place and substantial foundation in Deity Himself. Hence accrue to them the characters of mentality, absoluteness, immutability, independence of time and of all finite thought. He lays stress on the sense these philosophers have had of the insufficiency of the order of ideality or possibility, in consequence of which they ~~postulate~~ an absolute *Prius* as the true and absolute reality—in virtue of which conception they identify the ideal absolute with the absolute that is real. Everything knowable thus comes to be considered as that which is known by the Absolute Mind. In all this we have but Bonatelli's way of representing those modern endeavours to find the unity of thought and being which have found large favour amongst ourselves. In these, we take God to be the Absolute which rational thought is necessitated to think—the Infinite Mind, the *Prius* of all thought as of all things, through Whom we are able to think God. Such a notion of Deity is, no

doubt, very incomplete. It does not yield the God of Theism; it does not even suffice to exclude Pantheism. But it bears in its bosom, as a necessary datum of consciousness, proof of the validity of its objective existence, all merely logical proofs notwithstanding. It takes us beyond the finite and contingent, and that is much. It rectifies the mistakes of Kant. It posits Being as given, not predicated, in its idea of God. It recognises the neglected volitional element in the assertion of the actuality of its infinite ideal by spirit. It claims reality for what has been found a necessity of thought, a datum of feeling, and a necessary offspring of reason. For it disallows a world of reality different from the world as it is to thought, and to which thought-conditions do not apply. To revert to Bonatelli. Thought as thought has a limit. Its limit is logical necessity, whose negative aspect mainly comes into view as unthinkable. Then there is the question as to whether logical necessity is a fact. Thought, as being essentially reason, accepts no bond which does not justify itself to reason. Thus we see that logical necessity, taken in the negative aspect of which we have spoken, is simply a mark or sign of that higher or rational necessity, in virtue of which laws ontological and ideal rule at once thought and being. Of course, it is not impossible to think the absurd. We may not be able to figure a quadrilateral triangle, but we can think it well enough, for the contention of Bonatelli is that, in the thought of a concept, we have but two known elements and the relation in which they have to be placed. When one thinks in this contradictory

way, says Bonatelli, his thought as a function of the spirit is active, but the practical result is nil, for his concept has held in it two judgments, one of which may be the negation of the other. Hence springs a new proof of the objectivity of the idea; for to true thought there always corresponds an object independently of the exercise of the subjective function of thinking, while to false thought there corresponds no such object. But, of course, thought may be harmonious as a thinking act, and not represent concrete reality: in which case we are not to think the objective reality remains no more than a possibility; the important point is, that the object is here able to become real, while in the other case—the case of false thought—no such result is possible.

Bonatelli's doctrine of the will corresponds to his theory of knowledge: the will is, with him, an irreducible activity, as thought, in its originality, is a function *sui generis*. He seems to postulate a continuity in the unfolding of the different forms of human activity ~~relating~~ to the volitional act, in such wise that desire and will are presented rather as differentiations of a single process than as heterogeneous functions of the spirit. This reminds one of the tendency of some recent German psychologists to distinguish between will as ruled by feeling and will that is predominantly swayed by thought. It seems to me that thus may arise in experience a duality at times so strong as to give point and meaning to Goethe's saying—

“Zwei Seelen wohnen ach! in meiner Brust.”

Italian philosophy, however, takes the matter differently

from Bonatelli, and is content to find in desire and will only this in common, that they are alike principles of activity. Bonatelli reduces them to a process of psychic mechanism, in which the various constitutive elements are necessarily united, will being a free activity shot through with intelligence. The root of desire is feeling, that of volition is judgment: in desire we act in a particular way according to our psycho-physiological constitution, in will we are in our action illumined by reason. Desire consists essentially in impulse, will in a decree of the intellect transmuted effectually into fact. To these positions of Bonatelli it seems well to add that of psychologists who have insisted on impulse as a knowing of only a single motive or possibility, whereas will in its proper sense develops through motives and possibilities various. It is a position of Bonatelli that, if we do not wish liberty to mean caprice, and if we do not want will to break the law of causality, then we must admit (in our treatment of volition) reason and the cause of the volition. Bonatelli maintains that, in a single volitional act, there is implicitly involved an infinity of other volitional acts, such infinite series being included or shut up in a single volition relatively ultimate. The true character of volition, according to Bonatelli, is to will willing the volition of the volition up to the infinity of a given thing. His purpose, in this very strange method, apparently is to run the volitional process back into a ratiocinative one *par excellence*. That is to say, he wishes to show that, in willing we follow really the pathway of reason, no matter how little the volitional act may be

reducible to a single reasoning. I think one may allow that recent psychology accords with this so far at least, that it yields larger recognition to the intimate psychological connection of the phenomena of volition with ideas or cognition, sometimes even holding the volitional process to consist simply and entirely in the prevalence of the motive idea, whatever it may happen to be. Bonatelli takes the decision to be always derived from other antecedent affirmations, the specific character of the volitional act consisting in this, that it renders practical what was simply a theoretic position. Bonatelli finds it necessary to admit a First Cause as giving reason to all the series, and order to all the facts. The finite and dependent human being, although for him a prototype of causality, remains but a secondary cause. I certainly think Bonatelli justified in this demand, that things be reduced to intelligibility; such demand is a rational necessity, not to be overridden by scientific conception of law: even Spencerian thought feels obliged to admit such First Cause, in view of the law and order of the phenomenal world, as a necessary datum of consciousness—a cause, however, which that thought, in the most inconsequential fashion, would make utterly unlike ourselves; such a bond of real unity as Bonatelli seeks in God is not to be denied us, I hold, in virtue of any blind mechanical necessity. We are thus only being true to experience in its highest and most rational necessities. Bonatelli thinks we can, by reflection, form a certain notion of the characters which ought to be present in a real First Cause. Mechanical causes he dismisses as insufficient, these being merely intermediary

terms. Certainly he is right; experience outruns the mechanical; spirit and spontaneity have not been banished—they have not even been touched by the law of causation in the physical sphere. A Dynamic Cause is Bonatelli's primary demand, such that from it the whole series of secondary causes may take start. In this I take Bonatelli to be entirely justified, for any scientific interpretation of phenomena must be inadequate so long as power, creative or formative, is excluded from our notion of causation. Power, and no mere antecedence, is what the metaphysical idea of cause proclaims. This notion of efficient power or force is retained by the human mind, in its idea of cause, in the most natural and instinctive manner. When Kant restricted the validity of the principle of causality to the sensuous world, he overlooked how synthetic thought is of itself, and how unwarranted his denial was of every sort of causality but that which finds play within the range of experience. Such a Dynamic Cause as Bonatelli postulates would be one whose power should work through all Nature, and not be resident in single objects. The sheer impotence of science, then, is certainly implied in this coming of metaphysics to the rescue, that the causal concept may not mean the mere succession of antecedents and consequents, but the relation of phenomena to that which is real. Philosophical thought knows no finer progress than that which has been made towards establishing the principle that the secret and ground of our knowing is just real being—in other words, that all true knowing is fundamentally knowledge of real being. Rational Will must pertain to the First

Cause, for, Bonatelli asserts, we have no other way of representing a true cause than by the attribution of will. In this connection I may recall how impossible it admittedly is for philosophical thought to explain the way in which causal action works or comes into force. It has just had to accept the fact of efficient causation, and to postulate, as ultimate Ground or immanent Cause of the world, an Infinite Spirit Whose Will is supreme. The core of the causal concept is to be found in the determination of its ontological significance. Will is the one true cause of which we have any knowledge. But this type of cause operates *ab extra* in a way that must not be transferred to the working of immanent Deity. No good reason has been advanced why we may not infer, not only causation in God, the self-related causality, but also Infinite Will as necessary fundamental cause of all things. The thought and force of the world would harmoniously centre in such a Supreme Mind as the free First Cause and the self-determining Will, Whose self-determining causality conditions, from the centre of the cosmos outwards, every other cause. There can be no complete causality, as I maintain, but the causality of self-consciousness, for there is no other form of being that is free. No sooner have we Will as cause, efficient, final, and formal, than, declares Bonatelli, the Prime Cause can present no other characters than those of personality and creative skill. On which position I remark that such a causal agent must be Intelligence, supreme, personal, and free. A spiritual Absolute appears to me the presupposition of natural causation and mechanism. The transcendent activity of such Absolute

is the ultimate *rationale* of the world. Cosmical substance is neither mind nor spirit. We are led at last to something higher than the mere category of causality, to existence unconditioned save by the laws and resources of its own personal being. We are further led to a world that is founded in freedom, and are delivered from the nightmare of mechanical necessity.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPAIN.

IT cannot be said that Spain has taken the place in the History of Philosophy which she has done in the history of letters and arts, and in political history. Even in these latter aspects Spain has been, from time immemorial, lacking; for, in the days of her primacy, ideals of liberty and freedom of thought were crushed out. It cannot, however, be forgotten that Isidore of Seville helped to introduce Aristotelianism into Mediæval Theology, nor what a seat of early Arabian learning Spain was, and continued to be, long after Avicenna. The rendezvous, in the tenth century, of the most diverse races, Spain remained till the thirteenth century the theatre of an intense movement of ideas. Avicbron, a Spanish Jew of the eleventh century, bore noted influence. Among the Arabs of Spain were Avempace, who died in 1138, and Abubacer, whose death was in 1185, both of mystical tendency. They, with Averroës, carried on, after Avicenna's death in 1036, the work and renown of the Arabian philosophy, which had declined in the Orient. Born at Cordova in 1126, Averroës proved a great commentator on Aristotle—the philosopher κατ' ἐξοχήν to the Arabic philosophers—and lived till 1198. Averroës

held to the eternity and potentiality of matter, which, for his cosmic dualism, was an universal power containing in a germinal way all forms. The Prime Mover simply drew forth or called out the active forces of this eternal matter, or developed the form involved in the matter. He also set forth the emanation and hierarchic subordination of the spheres, the first sphere having been set in motion by the Prime Motor, and each sphere having been endowed with an intelligence of its own, which is its form. Last of planetary intelligences is human intelligence—a form immaterial, eternal, impersonal, objective. A form of teaching dangerous as denying our personal individuality. A disciple of Averroës, Moses Maimonides, most famous Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages, essayed to reconcile Aristotelianism with Judaism. Born at Cordova in 1135, he pursued his aim of showing the supreme end of religion and science alike to be true knowledge of God, though persecuted by fanatical sections of his own countrymen until his death in 1204. Maimonides by no means blindly follows Arabic Aristotelian system. Last great representative of the Jewish philosophy, Maimonides rejected the eternity of matter, and treated human intelligence as individuated and separate.

Raymond Lully and Raymond of Sabunde owed to Spain little more than their birthplace, but Lully's influence long remained behind him. Lully was born in the Isle of Majorca in 1235, and, after early love of pleasure, developed in mature years devout piety; he engaged in continuous attack on Averroism. In the interests of Lully were included literary and artistic, as

well as philosophical, affairs—indeed, there is reason for regarding him as the most brilliant Catalan writer of the Middle Ages. In his theosophist tendencies, Lully proceeded, in deductive fashion, to what he supposed was, by means of his *ars magna*, an exposition of all truth, not realising that such a purely deductive method was chimerical and delusive. Raymond of Sabunde, a Spanish physician who became professor of theology at Toulouse, followed the logical method of Lully in his *Theologia Naturalis*, which, aiming to unite the soul with God, is marked by theosophic tendencies. It was in the sixteenth century that a remarkable and autonomous movement of ideas took place in Spain, having its rise among the Dominicans at the University of Salamanca. But free philosophic inquiry was greatly blighted in Spain—practically the greatest Power in Europe for most of the sixteenth century—by the rank flowering of the Inquisition, and the introduction in 1502 of the censorship of the press. Philosophy among the Jesuits, who established themselves in Spain about the year 1548, was at first pretty much pure reaction against Protestantism. The Dominican, Bannez, who was born at Valladolid in 1527, put forward the doctrine of “physical premotion” as part of the teaching of Aquinas. Louis Molina, who had studied under Petrus Fonseca, the Lusitanian Aristotle, defended in his theory *de scientiâ mediâ* the semi-Pelagian views of the Jesuits against Dominican attacks. The Dominicans had become Thomists, as their antagonists, the Franciscans, were Scotists. Thus it will be seen how far the activity of the Jesuit philosophers in Spain was, by the middle

of the sixteenth century, from overlooking philosophical interests. Fonseca (1548-1597), the Aristotle of Coimbra, led the way in commentating on the work of Aristotle, at the College there, the close of such commentary work resting with Balthazar Alvarez. The most famous of these Jesuit philosophers was Fr. Suarez (*doctor eximius*), born at Granada in 1548. His great philosophical work, *Disputationes Metaphysicæ*, is one of the most clear and complete *répertoires* of the metaphysical teaching of the time, dealing with being, substance, accident, cause, and effect in detailed form. This was no commentary, but an original treatment of being, categories, and causes. Suarez, clear, acute, and expressive as a thinker, is the most eclectic of the Spanish Scholastics. His philosophy essayed an interpretation of the scholastic synthesis with conspicuous success. He is no mere follower of the great Aquinas, but it was his signal merit to recall the teachings of Aquinas to an age that sorely needed such reminder. From Aquinas he differs by rejecting the real distinction of essence and existence, denying the difference between them which Aquinas had drawn. It is interesting to note that, of the laws of thought, Suarez says that they are, at the same time, the determining principles of the essence and nature of things. Suarez takes unity, goodness, and truth, to be universal properties of all that exists. He disagrees with Aquinas when the latter maintains that the soul gives to the human body not merely humanity, but also corporeity. Suarez thinks happiness or beatitude is constituted by an act of the will—the resultant love; whereas Aquinas had contended that an act of intelligence—namely, contemplation—is

the thing required. On many minor points, indeed, Suarez really agrees with Scotus, but he is still so far under traditional constraint as to be with Aquinas on weightier matters of philosophic import. Not a little striking was the failure of the Spanish movement in philosophy during the sixteenth century to impress itself in more durable forms, and more extended limits, than the Iberian peninsula, but it was yet in itself a sufficiently striking philosophic revival—a return to the great systematisings of the thirteenth century, and, above all, to Thomism. Suarez was, however, a great name in Spain's philosophical history, representing, as he does, the final effort of expiring philosophy. To Suarez, "substance stands under the accidents in such a way that it itself does not require a similar support." His view of the existence of things is such that he holds the sciences, in speaking by themselves, not to suppose the actual existence of their objects, since this is accidental, so far as concerns the reason—or eternal ideas—of science. This position was taken because of the Scholastic view that the concepts we form of things would remain for ever true, did the things themselves not exist, and that knowledge or science rests on the perception of the intrinsic truth of our concepts. The Infinite, he thinks, cannot be more precisely defined than as that which can have nothing more of the perfect in it. Suarez opposed the notion of an immediate knowledge of the Absolute, for to him the Divine Essence could not be so contemplated without a knowledge of all the Divine perfections. To Suarez the claims of moral law rested upon those dictates of natural reason which appeared to him in-

trinsically necessary, and independent of all volition, even of that which was Divine. The power of Emperors Suarez held to be derived from the Pope, and such rulers he regarded as not without responsibility to those ruled ; hence it is not altogether surprising that it was his fortune to be considered a republican by Philip II. of Spain, and to have his writings burnt by the Parliament of Paris. But the real concern of the Jesuit philosophers was with religion—not secular politics—to which, as the spiritual order of things, they bore, in such a century as the eighteenth, noble and impressive witness. Here, however, we have been concerned only with their thought developments in the sixteenth century, and at the opening of the seventeenth.

From the brief after-bloom on the Iberian branch of Scholasticism, we have passed to the beginning of the seventeenth century, to which period must be referred the treatises on moral philosophy by the famous Spanish writer, Quevedo. That century dawned amid Jesuitical controversies that tended to sink Scholasticism into always greater disrepute. There came the age of the lesser men : Suarez died at Lisbon in 1617, to be followed by the inferior lights of Alphonsus, Mendoza, and Gonzalez, in historic sequence. With no lack of metaphysical subtlety, the controversy between the Dominicans as Thomists and the Franciscans as Scotists was continued down to the eighteenth century, the fundamental divergence remaining the dissolution by Scotism of that unity of faith and science—of theology and philosophy—in which Scholasticism had found peculiar pleasure. But intellectual torpidity came at length to both parties, and

in the eighteenth century Spain was given over to *philosophie* legislation and sway, with more material than mental progress. In the nineteenth century, the Churchly-Scholastic Philosophy had most representatives in Spain. Among these may be reckoned Francisco Alvarado, J. L. Balmez, Donoso Cortés, Zeferino Gonzalez, Orti y Lara, J. J. Urrabura, and others.

One of the chief aims of the present chapter is to speak of the great nineteenth century representative of neo-Scholasticism which Spain furnished in the metaphysician Balmez, who can scarcely be said to have come to his own. Born at Vich in Catalonia in 1810, he became professor of mathematics for some time in the college of his native town, and his mathematical predilections were not without influence upon the form of his philosophical expositions. His death took place in 1848. Whatever defects may mark his philosophy, it cannot be denied a highly honourable place among spiritualistic influences and movements in the nineteenth century. In our present connection it claims the attention due to the most notable philosophical presentation that has appeared in Spain for some centuries. This was his *Fundamental Philosophy*, wherein he follows the ancient division into logic, metaphysics, and ethics, and ranges over such subjects as certitude, sensations, space and time, ideas and being, unity and number, infinity and substance, necessity and causality. His method throughout is really psychologic—without, however, giving to psychology any special place or treatment—and at times, as, for example, in his rejection of Kant's objections to the intuition of the ego, under paralogisms of the pure reason,

his psychological force is quite remarkable. The philosopher of Vich is not of the dry-as-dust type, but always vital, and alive to all religious ideas and political interests of his time. Capable on occasion, it must even be said, of playing the part of violent partisan. Severely critical he was of contemporaneous philosophy; found nothing original in the Scottish School; viewed the philosophic teachers of his time as humble disciples of Cousin; regarded Cousin himself as mere follower of Hegel and Schelling; fought doughtily against the sensualistic philosophy of Condillac; cherished a great and sympathetic regard for seventeenth century metaphysicians like Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz; was generally just towards the great philosophers of antiquity; and proved of Scholasticism critic as well as disciple. Balmez summons to his aid *common-sense* as a criterion—an *absolutely infallible* criterion—whose marks, as given in his great work on *Fundamental Philosophy*, are the following: such a tendency towards assent as the mind can neither resist nor dispense with; a certitude so absolute as to be valid for the whole human race; a submission of every truth to the examination of reason; and the satisfaction of some great law of life, sentient, intellectual, or moral, as the object of every truth of common-sense. The claims Balmez makes for his common-sense one cannot but regard as impossible and extravagant. He invests it with a force which is irresistible, without giving us its titles to reason or its proofs in experience. The influence of Reid and the Scottish School is very apparent in his theory of certitude and the part played by common-sense. Certitude is for Balmez a fact to be explained rather than

established; its triple criteria he finds in conscience, evidence, and common-sense. "Certitude," says Balmez,¹ "does not originate in reflection; the spontaneous product of man's nature, it is inherent in the working of the intellectual and sensitive faculties." "The Creator, in calling beings out of nothing, gave them their faculties in accord with the place they occupy in the scale of creation. Now, being, as intelligent, had need of belief." "Certitude exists independently of all systems: theories live, and will exist, without influencing this fact." "Philosophy has for its rôle the examination of the grounds of certainty, with the view of knowing more thoroughly the human mind, and the laws which rule it, but without flattering itself that it can change the nature of things." Thus, for Balmez, certainty of the strongest kind springs from natural instinct—the irresistible force of nature; an immovable adhesion resting upon evidence, it is yet the result of an involuntary impulsion, never the product of a series of reasonings.

We may not call his system original, for it is an eclectic spiritualism, and not sufficiently free of subservient relation to theological dogmas. His theological preoccupations seriously hamper his philosophical freedom and independence. He is too prone to justify Christian mysteries, and too little happy in the attempt. Avoiding the subordination of reason to faith as in Scholasticism, and the necessary conformity of reason and faith found in the seventeenth century, Balmez is yet prone to confound these territories, and to appropriate the dogmas and mysteries of religion, in order the

¹ *Fundamental Philosophy*, Book I., chap. iii.

better to defend them. But he is not alive to perils involved in such confusion, alike from the philosophical and the theological sides. He does not realise the virtue of interrogating reason, and mayhap convincing one's self, rather than asking of her answers to all facts, wherewith to confound one's adversaries. Hence he will make logical demonstration of all religion; will show a revelation to be possible, and necessary; and will prove the place of authority in these matters, not realising sufficiently that reason cannot be dispensed from making her own particular examination of these dogmas.

Balmez refers to the conception of First Cause, hoping by the principle of causality to demonstrate the existence of God. He refers to Saint Thomas Aquinas, who held that Being is, in the First Cause, intelligence itself. Aquinas maintains that all effects pre-existing in God, as in their Cause, must be in Him in a manner intelligible, since they are not other than His intelligence. For Balmez, God, as Universal Cause, contains in Himself, virtually and in highest degree, all real and possible beings, and he maintains that causality must be origin and principle of the representation of Him. The agreement of the effect with the cause is to Balmez no mere logical or successional affair, but implies the idea of a producing force or activity. Far from being an inert mass, the corporeal world presents to his view an activity of prodigious power.

Balmez sees in the doctrine of the Trinity the "sublime type" of the necessary distinction of subject and object to "the most profound intelligence." But

his explication was not happy, being of a sort that would leave one for choice polytheism or pantheism.

Balmez held the idea of extension to be inseparable from that of body, but he did not, like Descartes, make extension the essence of body itself. Space is to Balmez abstract extension—extension possible and unlimited. With some leanings towards the position of Leibniz, Balmez remains at the state of conjecture as to whether we can know the real essence of matter. He introduces, into his discussion of space and extension, certain mathematical categories of ideas. Real time, for him, does not exist save in things, ideal time being, for him, an abstraction. Indefinite time is but indefinite possibility of succession in things. The notion of time Balmez traces to the principle of contradiction, holding that a thing cannot both be and not be simultaneously, which can scarcely be held to be a simplification of time, after all. For attention may be fixed either on the simultaneity, on the one hand, or on the contrast of being and not being, on the other. The power and validity of memory, as marking the *before* and the *after*, must surely be taken into fuller account, or—if any prefer—the different contents of feeling which mark continuous duration.

Balmez takes the infinite to be distinguished from the indefinite, as Descartes also had done. The infinite is negative in appearance only. Everything, taken in itself and in abstraction from all other things, can be conceived as infinite, that is to say, as disengaged from the limitations proper to it. But this relative kind of infinite is an object of conception, rather than of ex-

perience. Balmez¹ has said, as touching the difficulties of the assumed divisibility of matter or finite space into infinite parts, that there are "absurdities in the supposition of infinite divisibility, and absurdities if we suppose the opposite; obscurities if we admit unextended points, obscurities if we deny them. Victorious in attack, reason is unable to set up an opinion, and helpless to defend one. And yet, reason cannot be in conflict with itself. Two contradictories would, if proved, be the absolute negation of reason. The contradiction is, therefore, only apparent; but who shall untie for us the knot?" But we may very well hold that no possibilities, so far as Infinite Being is concerned, lead to any proved contradiction, but only to a demonstration that our conceptions of finite and infinite, in their relations to each other, are based on insufficient data. They may be true, so far as they go, but they remain incomplete and inadequate. But the recognition of the partial character of the truths we know is a very different thing from a proved contradiction, and there seems no good reason why the limited powers of our understanding or reason should not be recognised without our running up into the position of proved contradictions. The speculative reason or impulse can be thus allowed to do its best or highest, without being in any way proscribed.

Again, Balmez holds the idea of being to be determined by the idea of substance. To him the name of substance pertains to God, implying, as it does, only the permanence of being. But if, in belonging to God, it does so in a sense that forbids the inherence of Deity in

¹ *Fundamental Philosophy*, Book III., chap. xxiv.

all other beings, it does not yet imply any making His independence absolute—which things pantheism fails to understand. Material substance is the object of necessary belief. The substance of the ego manifests itself directly to the conscience in all interior phenomena. Existence is for Balmez the act which gives being to substance, or it may be taken as that by which essence exists. Balmez takes the idea of existence to represent pure reality, while to him the idea of essence is that which determines and specifies said reality. Essence is that which constitutes a thing, what it is, as distinguished from everything else, and the essences of all things are to be found in God. Existence belongs to the order of the real, essence to the order of the ideal; the distinction he holds to belong to the realm of ideas, not of reality.

In his ethical position, Balmez takes conscience to be essentially active, as in sensibility, and, above all, in liberty. Liberty, in independent beings, supposes a law. This law, he thinks, does not emanate from the arbitrary will of God, and has not its principle in Deity save as metaphysical truths themselves have. It is the representation of that moral order which is the co-ordination of the creatures with God, according to their degree of perfection. The principle of morality Balmez takes to be the love of God, and of all things that God loves, in the same order as He loves them. The theory, which wrongly makes duty rest on a sentiment, the love of God, and subordinates it to empirical and incomplete knowledge of the universal order, is yet an elevated one, derived from Malebranche. For Male-

branche had said that 'tis the Divine love that moves us—"the same love wherewith God loves Himself and the things He has made." But Malebranche was without any conception of a life wherein sense is transmuted into thought, and passion transformed into duty.

Among philosophic writers of Scholastic sympathies in more recent years may be named Gonzalez de Arintero, Marcelino Arnáiz, A. Gómez Izquierdo, to mention no others. Of Donoso Cortés, who led the reaction against modern philosophy in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it should be said that he represented strict Catholicism. This spirit of narrow Catholic orthodoxy was also shared by Orti y Lara, professor of metaphysics in the University of Madrid. Materialistic philosophies, like that of Pedro Mata, worked in opposition to the philosophies already mentioned, while Positivism and Spiritualism increased in the latter part of the nineteenth century. These materialistic and positivistic tendencies have been ably combated by various philosophic writers presently to be described. J. Sanz del Rio, who studied under Krause's disciples, Roeder and Leonhardi, exerted, during the second half of the nineteenth century, an astonishing influence in Spain. He founded, in fact, a philosophical school which still exerts powerful influence through such representatives as Professors Frederico de Castro, Nicolaus Salmerón, Giner de los Rios, and Gonzalez Serrano. When, however, the Hegelian and Kantian philosophies became better known in Spain, the Krausean philosophy suffered in consequence, even though it seemed to correspond more with the Spanish mind in

general. Next to Krause, Hegel is the philosopher who has attracted most attention in Spain. In recent years, not a little philosophical activity has been shown in Spain. Meliton Martin has proved an able and genial philosopher; A. Gómez Izquierdo has been noted for his researches in historical philosophy, and his editorial labours for the *Cultura Española*; Marcelino Arnáiz has attempted a synthesis of contemporaneous psychology with that of Augustine and Aquinas, and, while following Scholastic lines in his psychological studies, has yet founded on experience; Martinez Nuñez has combated the theories of modern mechanists; Gonzalez de Arintero has assailed materialism and positivism, and given an able presentation from the Thomist point of view; P. A. Lemos has opposed scientific positivism; besides whom are Rubio y Diaz, A. Lopez Muñoz, M. P. Olmedo, E. A. de Besson, and many others. But, after all allowances for the philosophical merits of Spain, it must be said that the Spanish *Weltanschauung* still remains too nationally self-contained, and too greatly lacking in objectivity.

CHAPTER XX.

METAPHYSICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF OUR TIME.

OF no one thing does the thought of our time stand more in need than of a revived interest in Metaphysics. A scared Ritschlianism has fled before metaphysics: the almost universal attitude of the scientist towards metaphysics is that of the scorner: much even of the ethical philosophy of the time has grown squeamish before metaphysic. However, signs of quickened interest in metaphysics have not been wanting. In the recent speculative thought of Germany, metaphysical boldness has not been wanting, as witness the works of Eucken, Busse, Külpe, Thiele, Wundt, Paulsen, Rolfes, and others that might be named. In England, we have had the great metaphysical works of Drs Shadworth Hodgson, Bradley, and Ward, while America has rendered important service through Profs. Bowne, Ladd, Howison, Royce, Fullerton, and others. To which must be added the labours of Renouvier, Fouillée, Boutroux, Pillon, Dauriac, &c., in France; of Spaventa, Conti, De Sarlo, &c., in Italy; of Höffding in Denmark; of Tiberghien, D. Mercier, D. Nys, &c., in Belgium; of Rauwenhof, Land, G. Heymans, P. H. Ritter, in Holland; of Balmez, de Arintero, Martinez Nuñez, and others in Spain.

Subjective and individual moments will inevitably enter into the treatment of metaphysics—charged as it is with inquiries into the real unity of the universe, its goal and its ground, the nature of man's soul, and other such matters—and the need presses that metaphysics go out in search of objective materials. I mean, we cannot keep too close to palpitating Reality. For Metaphysics is just the philosophy of the Real. The mind's healthy instinct for reality must be maintained in our quest for the highest categories. The metaphysician's sphere is the realm of the categories—the realm of reality—but it is not alone that of the intellect; it is also the realm of conscious and explicit moral illuminativeness. The adequate hypothesis—the all-comprehending concept—will thus be no vain abstraction. Shunning the atmosphere of illusion, metaphysics must take primary account—in a way not always done—of Evolution as principle of becoming, and must show the end which Evolution subserves in compelling thought to recognise the necessity of teleology or the fact of purpose in nature. The need of our time is to maintain the primary position of Metaphysics, whereby, as presupposition of the special problems of Ethics, Psychology, and Logic, it must take precedence of them, and profoundly affect their direction and treatment, even while Metaphysics may receive, from their detailed out-working, fulness of form and content.

Never, I believe, was the need for a true metaphysic more deeply felt, Ritschl, Comte, and Littré notwithstanding. Not a little of the metaphysic of recent times has been but a metaphysical abortion, with a theory of evolution almost all-embracing, but evolving no possible

communion with Deity. The metaphysic we crave will ground its laws, not in any molecular movements of things physical, nor even in any mere volitions of the Will Divine, but in the Divine Nature or Essence. An ethical metaphysic it must be, with the metaphysical attributes of its Deity all keyed up to the eternal ethical essence of which we speak. For the Unconditioned Being with whom we have to do is One wholly ethical in His nature. But I do not mean to suggest, in saying this, any pursuance of metaphysics merely for the satisfaction of ethical needs, and apart from the sheer intellectual worth and discipline of metaphysic itself. The science of metaphysics we to-day most deeply need, that it may determine for us what can and what cannot be known of being and the laws of being *à priori*,—in other words, from those necessities of the mind, or laws of being, which, though first revealed to us by experience, must yet have pre-existed, in order to make experience itself possible. Chastened and critical, the metaphysic of the time is such that Paulsen has said, "There is to-day probably not a metaphysician who believes that he has the key to unlock the mysteries of the world." But, for all that, I think we do well to remind ourselves that, when we think we have done with metaphysics, we are—whether we understand it or not—having done with Deity.

Nor can any thoroughgoing metaphysic do without theology, as its touchstone and support, even though the need exists in no servile fashion or unduly dependent form. It must, as metaphysic, deal with the reality of things as mirrored in thought; but if that which theology

teaches is true, metaphysical truth cannot be unaffected by it. For metaphysics must seek the whole truth discoverable by, and in, experience. Metaphysical treatment has, in like manner, its own peculiar light to shed on the basal problems of theology. The problem of metaphysics is found in the world opened to our view by the vast and varied constructive activity involved in experience. Of that activity in its whole range or extent metaphysics is critical. It is concerned with the total sum of experience, not merely individual experience. For it embraces all being and knowing—ontology and epistemology—and a complete theory of experience in the sense just indicated would mean a metaphysic that should be perfect. Metaphysical knowledge aims at reality, as that is given to us in outer and inner experience; it wants not only coherent system, but truth.

Experience marks the limits of scientific knowledge. Metaphysics grasps the inner essence of reality, the last ground of being. Being may be one or many—may be found in the Real or in the Ideal. The metaphysical view of the world, which comprehends the world of becoming, also takes various forms. Metaphysics seeks a connection with the Whole, and the unity of the Ideal and the Real. Metaphysics must needs be a metaphysic of Spirit no less than of Nature, for reality is a unified whole. It is for metaphysical science to show wherein reality as Whole has its final ground. Speculative thought asserts that there is such a Whole. We call it Idea: Reason demands this All-ness—the Whole. The metaphysical need now is to keep the Whole in

view. The task of metaphysics lies in the deepening, expounding, and interpreting, of experience. The metaphysic of experience, in its possibility, necessity, and reality, must be scientifically comprehended. No one who reflects on the magnitude of the difficulties in the way of metaphysical science, will think slightingly of metaphysical attempts at solution. So great is the task that metaphysics must be always on the way to the solution, never at the end of it. The History of Philosophy proves there is here a really significant progress or development. We acknowledge the impossibility of a metaphysic of the transcendent, or the impossibility of an absolute metaphysic, but a monistic tendency in metaphysics recognises a transcendent causality.

By virtue of a necessity of reason, or a necessary inference of reason, we raise ourselves from the manifoldness of appearances to the thought of a final unity, an Ultimate Ground, a Primal Cause,—in other words, to the conception of the World-Whole, and of the ultimate world-elements. We cannot possibly represent an intuition of these ultimate metaphysical objects. This Allness—the Whole—is, in an especial sense, the demand of Reason. This All is God. To-day, as in the days of Aristotle, metaphysics has to do with reality taken in whole, inquiring into the principles of all ‘reality.’ Aristotle rightly took metaphysics to be concerned with the real and objective principles of all being, and not with mere formal conditions of cognition. Its central task is to determine the principles of ‘substance.’ For the notion of substance as “a sort of Kantian *Ding-an-sich*” is one from which we simply cannot get away.

The old and troublous category of substance has had its truth transferred to the conception of self-activity as fundamental fact. This self-activity is no arch-juggler. It is the metaphysical answer of to-day to the old queries as to *Ding-an-sich*, Being, or Substance. This just means activity which carries its primal impulse in its own bosom. Not Kant alone, but also Fichte, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann, each in his own way, had some sense of the implied truth, which is simply that of the indissoluble connection of the inner actual self with the exterior and essential.

This notion of substance is simply fundamental in our cognitive experience. It springs up in experience every time my self-activity is inhibited by anything whatsoever. It is but the inevitable making real of *that which* I must so interpret in terms of my real self. It is thus an ultimate in experience, beyond or behind which you cannot further go. And, when thought passes up to higher matters, there too one may find place and room for the notion of substance in a conception of the World-Ground so sought. Thus the Aristotelian doctrine of substance as a self-active principle, though not without its shortcomings, is a really philosophical one. Descartes and Spinoza both missed it; not so Leibniz, when he sought to restore dynamic categories for the static relations in which these thinkers had left matters. We can even overpass Aristotelian insight, and rise from subjective intelligence to the energy of self-conscious personality when we ascend to the idea of the Absolute Personality. In such ways we retain the notion of substance, rather than flux or stream of being, while we at the same time

avoid the Spinozan conception of its kaleidoscopically changing performances, which yet could not prove ground of a real yet advancing development. But the substance conception has thus yielded to that of spirit.

But we are not done with difficulties. No sooner do we try to determine the Absolute as Absolute Spirit than we carry over to this conception of the Absolute the analogy of the human life of spirit. But in this we come only to analogies of consciousness, and the advance of thinking the Absolute in an absolute way remains actually unfulfilled—unfulfilled for metaphysics as exact science. Spirit is, in us, a unity of the manifold, and is the antithesis of mechanism. We, by virtue of our independence, are exalted above the changing manifoldness of our life of representation. So God rules the world, and is exalted above it. What metaphysic does is to determine the concept of the Absolute—the Unconditioned or Absolute Being—after Time, Space, and Causality, and to raise itself, through Causality, Space, and Time, to the idea of unity and of the whole, of the infinite and the eternal.

It is this unity which forms the basis of speculation. The question of the essence and the quality of the Eternal Being is indeed the question. The Eternal Being must be not only original and necessary, it must also remain what it is—an essence, a self-existing essence. The Spirit of this essence is the Absolute Spirit. So metaphysics, as a science of the Absolute, has the need to seek to present, so far as it can, an Absolute as ground of the possibility of all subjective and objective being—as indeed

the highest, all-embracing, subjective-objective principle. A real God who makes His existence known in concrete manifestations stands in no kind of contradiction to the idea of a world-grounding principle. The idea of an absolute unity is determined in itself, without as yet a concrete to be represented. Such an Absolute as this involves is but existential counterpart of the unity of experience, and only in course of metaphysical inquiry is its nature determined—as real, or causal, or personal. The essence which represents this absolute unity must in the end be personal. So we understand the world-grounding principle. Metaphysics apprehends this principle only as an original unity, only as self-conscious unity, which is the eternal and primal cause of all consciousness. A Schopenhauer represents this unity, as for him the concrete monism represented by Absolute Will: a Lotze conceives the unity in a way which has been blamed for being much too abstract—the inner essence of the unity not being defined—under the form of the Absolute Personality.

It may very well be asked whether we can really think anything more concrete or more reasonable under the notion of Absolute Will than under the conception of Absolute Personality—a world-informing Person. What is needed is, that we press beyond the metaphysics of self-consciousness in Deity to the metaphysics of the eternal ethical essence of God, the central Personality, Who is real and universal ground of possibility to all beings and things. In such an absoluteness of Deity I find the objective of my being and thought. I take such Absolute to be ground of all unity, root of all being, and

condition of all consciousness. I affirm a synthesis of my thought and such transcendent Absolute as, for me, something which meets all the higher integrations of my life and thought—meets, confirms, and completes them. I thus find the Absolute peering in upon me through every pore of the universe. Why not make one thing of all reality, of all experience, whether possible or actual? Why should not the transcendent, too, be experience, not something in itself erected outside experience? In the conception of an absolute experience, the transcendent will, of course, be included, the transcendent being transcendent only in respect of my finite and relative experience.

To such an absolute experience I ascribe intensive infinity, and, while making experience thus one, hold reality always to transcend vastly our finite experience. I cannot believe we are left only with the world and ourselves on our hands, and no knowledge of the Absolute. Of the Absolute I claim a true knowledge. Not, of course, a perfect knowledge, but yet a real knowledge. Knowledge, to be knowledge at all, must be no merely subjective thing, but the apprehension of reality. It can, of course, only be a knowledge “for us,” but it is knowledge of the Absolute—the Absolute as it is. The Absolute is what it reveals itself as being, and is an infinite deal beyond what is cognised. The universe is a thing instinct with life and vital possibilities, and, in its interpretation, it would be the despair and negation of all thought to make the Absolute an unknowable thing-in-itself. Because my life and my thought enter into the all-embracing life of the Absolute, that

Absolute can be for me no unknowable thing-in-itself, for that were an impossible and contradictory conception.

A glance at the History of Metaphysics will show how far from easy is the task of which we have spoken at such length. The weightiest task of the present consists in the determination of the Infinite, but the conception of the really efficient which we to-day have, mediated only through Causality, springs from what affects the human mind. This conception will always mean an imperfect one as to the essence of God, but one by no means fundamentally false. If one thinks of God as perfectly unrelated to the individual, and quite isolated from the human subject, one has a fundamentally false conception of God. But it is impossible to apprehend the essence of God in such a fashion. "Metaphysics," says Koenig, "seeks to bring reality to absolute conceptions, while the concrete sciences content themselves with notions relatively perfect." Yet the metaphysician will not hold his own positions to be absolute truths, for he knows that these must become modified by later insights of the understanding. This does not drive us to Bradley's criterion of the truth—namely, self-consistency—and does not bring us to treat truth as one of the things, that is to say, appearances, which more or less exist. But it will make us feel that the absolute truth is with God—is His.

Kant called metaphysics the science which advances from the knowledge of the sensible to the knowledge of the supersensible by means of reason. Reason demands the Whole, but reason does not demand form and unity

here, matter and manifoldness there. It demands the closed, harmonious Whole, while the principle of unity perpetually rules. Metaphysics holds the office of censor in the kingdom of the sciences. The scientific interest culminates in the metaphysical interest, to which a unitary conception of the world is necessary. This metaphysical interest has been needlessly confounded with that which is religious by Dr E. Caird and others. The metaphysics of Criticism teaches us to apprehend the world and all its products as appearances, that is to say, mere representations. Kant was contented with scientific investigation and representation of the knowledge of experience, and gave, no doubt, an impulse to science in the narrow sense of the term. But, on Bradley's criterion, all experience must prove itself unreal. Bradley has no satisfactory solution to give of the problem how degrees of reality are possible, how what is not real—has only more or less reality—falls into the kingdom of reality. With Bradley, no individual moment of experience is in itself real. All reality consists in psychic experience, and the relative is only real in the measure in which it is absolute. Drs Bradley and E. Caird cannot be said to solve the metaphysical problem at all. For the difficulty remains, wherein the difference between the degrees of reality consists, and how this difference is in general to be apprehended. From "shallow pantheism" and undifferentiated unity we are not yet delivered.

The contempt of metaphysics so common in our time we can neither share nor excuse. We see in the transcendent a domain of abiding hypotheses. These hypo-

theses are scientifically necessary. In their right use and proportional valuation we catch sight of the essence of scientific modes of view. The despisers of metaphysics in the interest of science see in the completion of experience which metaphysic offers nothing but "mere subjective play without value," in fact "an altogether purposeless, yea, foolish venture." For to them the rationalising of experience is the end neither of science nor of philosophy. To them science is only the one-sided mechanical inquiry into nature. They do not perceive how impossible it is for human thinking to stop at the scientifically known, without pressing on to an interest in the whole—in the connection of things. They take it for the task of science to measure, not to value—to discover, not to explain. But a metaphysical view of the world seeks to explain or to rationalise it. And yet our metaphysics must not wear a too rationalistic character, for man not only enjoys reason but is related to the higher order of things by virtue of that peculiarly qualified metaphysical element or part of his being which we call the spirit. The metaphysical completion of experience arises out of the problem of the unity of the world. The end of the scientific method is not a determinate personal relation to things, but the knowledge of their ground and connection. Metaphysics determines the last ground of the world-connection as spirit. But the Absolute Spirit is not a merely abstract monistic principle. It is not necessary that metaphysic solve the difference between spirit and nature in an abstract unity. To metaphysics, the world-connection is that of the world of immanent spirit. But this is not to break down

all relation to what transcends the world. It is as spirit that man is raised above nature, and possesses the capability of looking into the higher order of things.

We are compelled to no modes of thought wherein the world is absurdly deified, and set above God. For if the universe be, in some sort, His environment, He must yet be free to transcend it. The increasing need of metaphysics, in respect of method, is to be thoroughly scientific. Like the other sciences, it is a theoretic discipline. Herbart viewed philosophy as science because of the comprehensibility of experience. Science, on the other hand, until she grows philosophical, remains a mere bureau of registration. One may very well affirm that experience is the indispensable foundation of knowledge. Metaphysics, in so far as it is science, does not conduct us beyond experience. Scientific metaphysics has only to do with our world of experience,—not with an *ens extramundandum*,—but intensively metaphysic leads us beyond experience. Intensively it does so, for no one has a right to lay narrower pretensions on metaphysics than on the other sciences. Metaphysics, like the other sciences, serves a theoretic need. “Man,” says Schopenhauer, “is a metaphysical animal.” Metaphysic springs out of the scientific endeavour to know the most universal trains or courses of the world-connection.

The proper presupposition of metaphysics is the homogeneity of God and the world. Its principle is, being that is grounded in itself. Metaphysic determines for its main fact the world as whole: it rests entirely upon experience, and moves towards the world-whole. It embraces the world as totality. Metaphysical insight

this new mode of stating the case were an explanation of it!

I do not take the conception of extended substance to be fundamental in monism. Extension, Spinoza forgot, is too subjective a quality to be erected into an independent attribute apart from experience. The unitary character of being we cannot escape, postulating, as we do, absolute spirit as the self-existent principle of all things. There is nothing irrational in the supposition of a spiritual substratum—a continuous, permanent, unitary soul-substance, distinct from and higher than the physical organism, but co-related and interacting with it—in fact, such a supposition is the most rational we know. The fact is, soul is impossible to our knowledge save as a realisation of spiritual potency, and such realisation must be rooted in an immanent spiritual principle as its world-ground. Thus the dualistic process becomes transcended, and receives final expression in terms of soul or spirit.

The truth is, scientific monism to-day not only persists in making the psychical depend on the physical, but is so radically lacking in epistemological understanding as to make matter its ultimate rather than mind or consciousness. It strangely fails to see that, in making mind depend on matter rather than create it—as Idealism fundamentally asserts—it bars its own way to the monism it desires to reach. It must stoop to pass through the lowly gateway of epistemological science, and so learn that man knows all he does only in the medium of consciousness, his knowledge moving always within the sphere of human thoughts and ideas. In its

contentment with the relative, it never attempts to define the transcendent, to which, in its ultimate forces, atoms, energy, ether, &c., it is brought, or to seek some form of spiritualistic monism, with an ideal Absolute, for the world as grounded in such ideal Reality. It never occurs to such monism that one may very well take its world-forces, not as facts, but only as transcendental hypotheses, however likely these may be. It comprehends the absolutely real far less than it dreams, in its study of the world's phenomena of motion. For its mechanical philosophy of Nature does not reflect what need and room remain for some non-spatial and non-perceptible element to enter as causal factor of the problem. Only in such an element do we find an efficient cause for these world-movements. Dr James Ward has clearly shown how impossible is a complete mechanical system of the universe, to the great gain of metaphysical inquiry.

I find no foothold here for rationality till the physical is so transcended, and a spiritualistic monism reached in which the manifold forces and disconnected elements are unified by no merely abstract entity. Then we have passed from the realm of epistemology into the sphere of metaphysics. "It is the Absolute," as Busse rightly remarks, "which is active around us and within us, in our inner life as in all other essences, but whose workings rise not all up into our consciousness." So, then, we are confronted with the question, How can these workings be, except on the supposition of theistic representations? We cannot sensibly view God in His essence, but we can think Him, and, thinking Him, take hold of Him. But,

in order to do this, we must seek Him and constantly advance in the knowledge and living conception of Him. The fulness and the fulfilment of thought is God. He is the whole possibility of thought. He is also the entire fulness of possible being. God is a real, indivisible, and sole essence—the whole fulness of thought. His unity must be perfect. God alone is One; with this One we can first begin to speak of being. It need not be denied, though we are speaking of the Absolute, that there is a sense in which our Absolute is relative. Each age or stage finds its own Absolute—forms, that is, its own ideal or conception of the Absolute, which is, in this sense, relative.

Although we can find no such perfect essence, as thought is necessitated to think, in reality, yet the thought of the most real essence of all proceeds from what is empirically given. Says Thiele, "Not only the philosophy of an Aristotle, or a Kant, or a Herbart, but also that of a Plato, or a Fichte, or a Hegel, rests finally on what is empirically given." Our method of inquiry is the synthetic, which is so valuable and indispensable for the knowledge of real events. The metaphysical interpretation and working up of the inner and outer facts of experience will give a conception of the world and its connection, in which subject and object, thought and being, spirit and nature, present a unity, and, in this unity, the essence of the world. Such a unity metaphysical thought must seek. The metaphysical view of the world sees the given world not merely from the standpoint of scientific method, but demands, for the setting forth of the deepest essence of the world, the

acknowledgment of a Divine World-Ground. God is the First, and He gives to everything its true, full worth.


- In His essence, in His unity, we must find the fulness of thought and perfection itself.

Not that the human will is identical with the Divine, but that with pluralism we must unite monism, for pluralism possesses not the same worth of reality as does monism. Lotzean doctrine joins a real pluralism to a deeper monism. Man is free. Free-will is pluralistic. But free-will must be connected with the conception of a theodicy, and this last is monistic. Morality demands an ethical end—a God; and it is quite evident that God cannot be originator of sin. Man is a cause, but God as Absolute Causality is true cause of all being—the cause of all causes, the soul of all souls. But yet the will is free, and our selfhood is not mere appearance. Every free action is fruit, ontologically, of reason and will—of reason's purpose and will's energy. The informing power of creative reason alone determines will, and to deny liberty is to negate will. God is free and unbound, but God in His action makes Himself dependent on human relation or behaviour. Yet God has His own life.

The puzzle has been said to be the *mode* of an activity so pure, self-conscious, and free, not its reality. If the *mode* of it be "inconceivable," we are told there is an end to it as a solution. But is not this an extraordinary attitude to assume? Do we treat all ultimates in such a fashion? For we are here dealing with an ultimate, such pure, free self-activity being but our present-day equivalent for the thinking substance of Descartes, and

the *purus actus* of Aristotle. What indeed are ultimates but just facts—the most illuminating facts—whose modes we yet may not know? A spiritualistic monism is certainly warranted in maintaining that there is only one principle of being, even that primal form of self-activity which we have postulated. Neither religious thought nor true metaphysic must for a moment falter in claiming for God all the possibilities so involved in Absolute Personality, working in perfect freedom. Philosophy and religion are both fatuous and blind, if they do not see that just upon the basis of such divine possibilities must rest the whole religious superstructure of fact, doctrine, and ideal.

Philosophy, for all that has now been said, joins with religion in maintaining that no mere Being of transcendent order is sufficient to set up religion for us. Such a Being has not yet worth or value for us. So comes it that, by His spiritual power and working, He must enter into real relation with us. A higher world He sets up within the world we see, and, above all, within the life of man. Bradley inveighs against an “empty transcendence,” but what transcendence can be more empty than that he has left himself after reducing the world of appearance to illusion? But again, by others it is said, such transcendence as there is, is only an inference from immanence, and so is a “secondary” consideration. Now, no doubt, God pervades the universe as we know it. But, by what right shall we make immanence, rather than transcendence, the real note of the Divine relationship? By what right shall we make events of one order—an order “deriving from Divine necessity”? Because



God is in the world, and all things are through Him, and to Him, are we therefore to deny that He is *before* all things, for that He was before them? And is the order of events so necessitated that His volitional working no more raises Him above and beyond the world? For our relative finite experience the transcendence remains so real, and, in view of the just demands of thought, so necessary, that we must claim for it the primacy, and refuse to make it only a "secondary" consideration. Why forget that the transcendence is implicated in the whole texture of experience, and that the positive content of experience can carry us further than is often imagined in the way of intelligent apprehension of the nature of the transcendent? No reason is there why the Divine Life should be a segregated thing, as in some deistic sort, instead of the Divine Personality being for us renewed or rejuvenated in the life universal.

Certain forms of idealism have held that a world without God is irrational, and that a God without the world would be equally irrational. It is perhaps enough that we do not know the one without the other; but we can, and must, think of God as having a life of His own, and existing in and for Himself. Working in freedom, He works in, but also upon, the world. Not from the outside only does He work, for He is ever within the universe. But He is free to work upon it, as also above it, in His transcendent love and power. These things make His self-revealings possible. And the possibilities must be infinitely great, as He is infinitely free so to work. Hence arise spiritual facts, events, transactions, in the historic field. The presence of God in the universe, then, does

not keep us from distinguishing Him from the universe, and maintaining for Him, as supramundane and self-existing subject, an existence in and for Himself. Till then, He is not God.

The religious consciousness renders here, in our view, the highest service towards the clarifying of philosophical thought, when it shows how much the religious interest owes to this very transcendence of Deity; since it is in the ceaseless interaction of immanence and transcendence that our spiritual life becomes filled with its deepest and richest contents. And, indeed, we ask, Must we cast the religious consciousness into the abyss, as the price we pay for immanence? Such a procedure is not in the line of our philosophy. True metaphysic makes no such demand, when most true to its own principles. The truth is, a supplementing or completing of one-sidedness is here the real need. Time was when, in Oriental thought, transcendence assumed overbalancing proportions, and the world side receded; while the same result happened to Occidental thought, but in less theoretic and more practical form.

But now we see immanence overbalancing, alike on the sides of man and of the world; while the Divine is shunted always more. What is really needful and perfectly practicable is, to do justice to both these moments, or to seek out some higher conscious unity which shall mean the harmony or agreement of both. God must not be reduced to complete subservience to a "scientific" conception of His relation to the universe, in which free and exceptional initiative shall be denied Him.

On the question of the future life, metaphysics declares a scientifically demonstrable knowledge of its necessity to be by no means possible, but asserts it to be a reasonable belief. This faith is no enemy which speculative thought has to combat and conquer. One defends the faith in immortality metaphysically through the proof which springs out of the singleness or simplicity and immateriality of the soul. This argument no metaphysic can destroy. Goethe's word, "Kein Wesen kann zu Nichts zerfallen," has become an axiom. If one tries to grasp spirit as the finest sublimate of the corporeal organisation, why should spirit go under? The Eternal Spirit of the universe expresses its own infinite life in our countless immortalities. Theistically, the love that is in Deity knows no limit to the lives it must needs endow with the capacity to love. The immediate philosophically grounded consequence of the faith in immortality is the hypothesis or acceptance of a new world. "Personal being," as Eucken rightly says, "is not a mere appropriation of a given world, but it is the expression and breaking through of a new world, new within the life of the spirit." Spinoza's eternity of the mind was lacking in individual elements. To Hegel, immortality was but the vague ideal possibility of thought to eternity, meant, that is to say, the eternity of thought. But this immortality has found neither self-conscious personality nor self-conscious actual thought. We have need to think our essence as being. Also, to distinguish our being, as transient, from an unknown, absolutely non-transient essence. Yet we must also require the positive striving after ideal perfection, in the consciousness of the infinite worth of the human person-

ality. The hope of immortality indeed enjoys a position of solidarity with the belief in God. Finite beings as we are, we are unique and individual in our differences, and this unique and finite individuality must run on into God's eternal purpose. The individuality, which is essential to our present and purposeful lives, finds, and only can find, its full and perfect scope in a life linked to God, whose meaning is genuinely continuous with that of our present life. It is in virtue of its union and communion with God that our life finds individual and immortal expression. The universe itself, as not devoid of meaning, moves in its energies to a spiritual goal commensurate with its struggle and travail.

We cannot escape belief in the persistence and permanence of the soul. Metaphysical thought regards the future life as not other than the life that now is; here and now eternal life is ours, in the midst of time. In and through the life that is, we know the life that is to come. It is thus much more sure and real to us than its mere revelation, to us from without would have made it. It weakens none of the grounds of our belief that there is a metaphysic which treats the belief as a chimera. Fashioner of our frame, and Father of our spirit, in God, as so related to us, we have the ground of all our hope of immortality. Our knowledge of that life may be small; our vision of its possibilities may be dim; but such knowledge is ours as may be adequate for this life, and we are not God. To our knowledge we add a sure and strong outreaching hope, whose light of immortality glows and burns within us the more brightly as we make the "life more abundant" our own. In this endeavour

we have the invaluable support and aid of true philosophy, which teaches religion to claim that she be sought for her own intrinsic value, as more than all the world beside. For that is an aim with which philosophy must thoroughly sympathise. Never shall those problems of God, freedom, and immortality, towards which religion continually runs out, be solved by the highest thought or culture without the aid of metaphysic. The empiric life of the soul hath need of the creative powers of the mind; for truth is one, and reality is one, though known from different sides of approach. The idea and essence of religion, its relation to other domains, its theory of the universe and of reality, its conception and ideal of life,—these all require the aid of a true, a theistic metaphysic. The Absolute is the Absolute, and we do not at any rate know any reason why we should faint or stagger before His eternal and illimitable purposes. Metaphysics plants its feet on primal certainties of being here. Our life shall on and upward go, and man is still, as always, right in thinking he was not made to die, as among the implications of spirit. Theistic doctrine, with its concern for the conception of personal being, accords better than any other form of theology with practical and experiential interests and demands, but a satisfactory theistic metaphysics can only come from full account being made of all we know of the universe in other ways, and full justice being done to the results of theoretic knowledge. This shows how much remains to be done in the metaphysical field. Take, for example, so great a metaphysician as Lotze. Remarkable for his power of thought and the richness of its content, Lotze has yet plenty of room in his system

for contradictions and half-truths. Yet his singularly sharp and eclectic mind has enriched thought with much that makes for metaphysical progress. It is the metaphysical need of our time to bring such systematised truth to harmony, which it will do by purging out the leaven of contradiction, garnering the truth amid obscurities of thought, and setting it in consistent and harmonious relations. His views on such matters as monism, freedom, immanence, the soul, self-consciousness, substance, the individual, the one and the many, are among the numerous points on which his thought still deserves attention. Or take the recent metaphysics of Bergson. His theories of memory, instinct, personality, mind and body, time abstract and time actually passed, reality or existence as activity in evolving life, the nature and vital functions of intelligence, spatial unreality, &c., suggest points of view worth consideration, but open to question as too abstract at times (*e.g.*, liberty), too psychological, too little ethical.

From these inquiries and scrutinies there must eventually accrue great gain both to philosophy and theology, and the need abides that they be pursued with enthusiasm and thoroughness born of full belief in their value. The fact is being always more recognised that the need is for a metaphysic that shall be empirically well grounded, and steadily rear its superstructure on basis of fact. In spite of the unmetaphysical spirit which to-day makes metaphysics a discipline despised and rejected of men, we must hold fast, in more purely factual ways, to the attainment of metaphysical conclusions. For though there are the signs of quickened interest indicated at the beginning

- of this chapter, still it must not be forgotten that even in Germany, classic land of metaphysical thought, metaphysical speculation is to-day rather more languid than it should be, and the same is yet more true of countries like France, Spain, Holland, and Italy. The revived metaphysical interest of Britain and America is the more surprising, since abstruse metaphysical thought comes not so naturally to these countries, so deeply immersed in concerns of the practical life. Great need remains that properly metaphysical subjects of inquiry be prosecuted—such as Ultimate reality and the significance of the world—on the basis of exhaustive study of nature and human life. For metaphysical insight, for the future, must be based on the universal culture of our time: every advance in universal culture—particularly the advances in the sciences of nature—will carry some modifying power or influence for metaphysics. To come into such perfect harmony or touch with the culture of his own time is the highest the metaphysician can do.

“Wer den Besten seiner Zeit genug gethan,
Der hat gelebt für alle Zeiten!”

Transcending present interest and reality, we must press on to know to what the whole world tends; what we ourselves are, and why we do exist; yea, and for what reasons we bear ourselves as we now do.

CHAPTER XXI.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF OUR TIME.

PSYCHOLOGICAL developments have, in our time, been many, but none higher than those which are concerned with the soul. The soul has been made the base of religion in virtue of its peculiar depth and essence—the peculiar experiences and implications of the inner life. The thought of our time is prone to find the first and the final religious evidence in the psychological sphere—in that spiritual sense wherein the soul is seen in the splendid and significant functionings of faith. Psychology sets out from consciousness, which makes for reality the great difference of awareness, and is a general and indispensable pre-condition of value. We are now to take the soul where psychologising philosophers are mainly content to leave it. We are concerned with it only in its highest reaches, where its ideal functionings are left by formal psychology undeveloped and untouched. The psychology of the soul is here taken to embrace all inner operations—not alone the cognitive powers, but all psychic processes that are volitional and emotional as well—though we are to deal only with some of the higher aspects of psychic experience. In so doing, we accept, of course, the teachings of modern

psychology as to the evolution of the soul from Plato and Aristotle onwards, and proceed upon them. We agree, with Fiske, that the Platonic view of the soul as a spiritual substance—an effluence incarnated under certain conditions in perishable forms of matter—is “most consonant with our present state of knowledge,” but, for all that, we must hear modern psychology’s statement of the case. We are quite content to agree with Professor James that mind and world have been evolved together, and in consequence are something of “a mutual fit.” Soul is the last term of an evolving series, and highest synthesis of mechanism, life, and spirit. It evidences itself in complete psychic processes, in pulses of life wherein feeling, thought, and will are all concerned. As such, it is that “simple and permanent spiritual being” which, as James remarks, has “combining medium” as its chief function. For man is more than a mass of states: he is these in combination: his experience is unified—one. The modern conception of the self has taken the place of the teachings of Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Wolff, and Baumgarten, as to soul or substance.

We may begin by accepting such a valuation of the soul as Bosanquet has given when he says, “We have to remember that, after all, the soul, the contents of the soul as we know it, form an individual system full of character and personality; that it is quite as characteristically individual and belonging to itself as the body is, and certainly at a higher level; and that, while its constituent elements include of course the qualities of the body, they include also a whole world of other

Soul of our souls. Bradleyan and Ritschlian thought alike have their self-appointed limitations writ large here. In what is called the Oversoul, we shall find due, yet regulative, outlet for the affectional part of our nature, in the fellowship of what Prof. James is pleased to call the 'Great Companion'—the Absolute Mind. Hence we find Maine de Biran, the 'philosopher of inner experience,' saying that "in the psychological aspect, or as regards cognition, the soul draws all from itself, or from the Ego, by reflection; but in the moral aspect, as regards the perfection to be hoped for, the good to be obtained, or the object in life to be aimed at, the soul draws all and receives all from without—not from the external world and sensations, but from the purely intellectual world above, of which God is the centre." This may, no doubt, be still too intellectual. But it is interesting to find Biran, later, saying of three kinds of temperament in the intellect or soul, that there is a group of those "who are illumined by the unique and unchanging light which religion affords."

Apropos of Biran, it is interesting to find, from some manuscripts of his, only recently edited, that this philosopher, to whom existence was known in and through the activity of the ego, expressly notes, wellnigh a century ago, the tendency—so frequent in our time—to confound "the psychological origin of ideas" with the metaphysics of existence. Much interesting discussion has lately taken place as to the relations of psychology to religion, or the founding of religion upon psychology. Religion is, without doubt, an essentially psychological study, its phenomena being purely psychical. Now, it

- must, for all that, be said that, though psychology has a large part to play in the scientific treatment of religion, it is pure lack of clear thinking which has thought a psychologic grounding of religion is all we need, and that metaphysics can be dispensed with. There are questions of transcendental, and not merely genetic, moment—of experience content, and not merely experience origin—involved, and it must be noted how truly we are metaphysicians in life and in thought. Psychology cannot walk very far without treading upon problems of metaphysical and epistemological character, and psychology is no more without its presuppositions or hypotheses than any other science. Certainly the *what*—the nature—of the soul must be stated in terms of the *how*—its genesis and growth; but the soul is not known until its present use and function, with their teleological bearings, have been set forth. The soul's relations to reality are such that the world-problem cannot be set aside, and no more can a metaphysic be dispensed with. Psychology cannot teach us in any direct fashion about God or His dispositions towards us, since these come not within the range of observation. Psychology has plenty still left to do in the way of setting forth the individual workings of religion in the soul or human experience, and the historic developments of soul-life in all noteworthy relations and aspects, without subsuming metaphysics under psychology. But the content of spiritual life, and its creative forces, are not to be confused with their conditioning processes, however true it may be that experienced content and experiencing process can never be sundered. It is pre-

cisely such creative forces Wundt seems to have had in view in formulating his law of increase of spiritual energy, which he, in fact, opposes to the law of conservation of energy. And if there be, indeed, no limit to the increase of spiritual being, there may lie therein some compensation for those disadvantages, which Lotze so finely set out, of psychological doctrine in comparison with scientific doctrines of energy.

Yet must it not be forgotten that all perceptual activity involved is, in its forward-looking and selective character, a thing of quality in the psychologic sphere, however we may seem to speak in quantitative terms. And what indeed may not be so perceptually present will, in the sphere of the soul, be furnished by the spiritual imagination—that picturing faculty which the Germans call *Einbildungskraft*—in its power to give vividness to religious realities or relations. We are, of course, as far as may be from agreeing with Münsterberg in dropping the soul from psychology, for the soul or subject is certainly no purely logical fiction, without unity or permanence. Rather is the soul for us a growing vital unity, its unity of aim and purpose the foundation of our real personal identity. This self-unified, self-identical principle which we call the soul is one which not only springs up in experience, but gives to it unity, and not only persists in experience, but progresses with it. For we certainly do not mean to say that consciousness has had no history, but is in its manifestations an unique and inexplicable fact of awareness. This is a very different result from the merely hypostatised abstractions of thought and feeling,

so dear to a psychologist like Münsterberg, which have left the real worlds of instinct and impulse—both higher and lower—so far behind. But of this Münstersberg is by no means unaware, for it is just he who has said that “this is the point which even philosophers so easily overlook; as soon as we speak of psychical objects, of ideas and feelings and volitions, as contents of consciousness, we speak of an artificial transformation to which the categories of real life no longer apply.” That is just the trouble, that he has carried the psychic states of psychology to so remote a distance from any “real life” that we know—a divorce of psychological truth from mental reality for which there is no scientific necessity or warrant. Is psychological theory—unlike all true scientific theory—not to find its base in the “real” world, whose facts give the theories their value?

The soul, in the high spiritual sense, may be ever so difficult to define, or may completely elude or transcend definition; but its distinctive power, place, and working can be quite clearly realised and acted upon. For, as Stuckenberg properly remarks, “to make a theory of the essence of the soul the principle for the explanation of its operations, is both unphilosophical and unscientific. No more in mind than in nature have we a knowledge of the substance otherwise than from its operations.” Certainly the essence of mind—in the broad sense already indicated—or soul is no more inscrutable than, in the same sort of inquiry, is matter. Of course, the supposed essence of soul must remain mere postulate, and not “dominate the entire investigation.” There is no reason why our psychology

should not take full account of the psycho-physical views of Wundt, who recognises the centralised unity of our inner life and its unlimited capacity for growth. Then we may go on to inquire into the process whereby, leaving the lower levels on which formal psychology has been content to deal with the soul's ascent, the soul is seen to reach its highest centre. For, though we may take all psychological facts to be necessarily processes, we shall still need that inter-connection of all individual psychical experiences which is for Wundt the soul or ego. And the saying of Heraclitus we shall find to be as true as it is ancient, that, though you trod every path, you could not find the limits of the soul, so deep is its essence. The same thing would doubtless have been said by Emerson, who would have traced his own most illuminated thinking to the domination of the soul over the senses and the understanding.

Much of the discursive thinking of philosophical writers to-day is not greatly illumined, and cannot be, because it is carried on at a level to which the soul does not descend—because, while the speculative impulse must, at every cost, be maintained in full power and meridian splendour, its work is not carried on, so to speak, in the soul's irradiating presence. Consequently, the lack of illuminated thinking is chief lack of the philosophical thought of the time. For in such thought, the lack of full experience of reality, and of the whole truth of life, is often betrayed, and that to a painful degree. 'Tis a lack for which nothing can compensate. The soul must be restored to her place and rights; she must sit as queen of the psychologic realm. Mind must obey her behests;

intellect must fulfil the pleasure of her will. It is, of course, as far as may be from being suggested that reasoning processes do not mingle with the soul's functionings; they do so at every step; but the spiritual sense is, for all that, perfectly to be distinguished from all mere processes of reasoning. For psychological experience is immediate, and consists of processes that are subjective, though objective in content. If the mystical consciousness be deemed as real as the consciousness that is rational, that does not keep philosophy from being of great religious help and value. Soul, in the spiritual sense, is a vast reservoir of energies locked up from us by our strangely blind consent. Our dialectic may vigorously lay about in valleys or plains of sheer mentality, but that mentality would immeasurably gain in heightened vision, if it made the ascent of true union with soul. The light of the soul must sit behind the reasoning and perceptive powers, to guide them with her counsel and bring them to her glory. Psychological study of the soul, as it figures in religious experience, tends to enlarge our estimate of the powers of the human mind. Why not realise more deeply the unity and reality of the soul—as set forth in modern psychological teachings—to the self—and learn, in more vitalised experience, that to *be*, that is, to grow in height and breadth and depth of soul, is of more pressing moment, and more enduring value, than to know or discuss or perform? For such spiritual being cannot but illumine our thinking, and carry it to higher planes of thought and perception than those of the merely logical understanding.

But, of course, such being does not dispense the soul from effort—the effort to fulfil every new and present duty; it only gives new light for such fulfilment. The higher knowledge of God, and the super-terrestrial outlook upon man's life, are really to be sought in developed life of the soul, wherein the immediate consciousness of God and of His enveloping presence gives new elevation to thought, and deeper insight to speculative power. Both Kant and Aristotle have here been greatly overpassed, in the matter of original and penetrating psychological analysis. But Kant and Schleiermacher paved the way for study of the subjective experiences of religion. Hence the inquiries of James, Starbuck, Leuba, and Coe, which, however, lack on the epistemological side. The presence and operation of the Eternal Spirit within us have awakened new and diviner emotions and ideals than either Kantian or Aristotelian reason knew. These higher regions of the soul's life are the most difficult for psychology, and the frequent limitations of psychological treatment here spring from the inability to seize the processes, and not merely reckon the products. The superficial aspects are, of course, easily enough abstracted and defined, but it is another matter to surmise the secret of the soul's deepest workings. The limits of the soul, it seems safe to say, are never found, and no psychological analysis can ever be really exhaustive. Ours is a perpetual becoming, and surface impressions of the soul which is our own we certainly get, but never full soundings of the sub-conscious deeps that lie behind. Man is one, and man is spirit, and it is as such a spirit that man must be raised to full spiritual endowment and the height of true soul-vision. To pierce

to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit was beyond the power of Aristotelian psychology, and spiritual psychology came to the rescue. If, therefore, we still speak of soul—soul and spirit in their union being essential to life—it must not be in forgetfulness of the fact that, to a spiritual psychology, the spirit is supreme. The psychical nature in its widest reaches marks the life of the soul—organ of science and philosophy; but the spirit is marked by that highest of faculties known as God-consciousness. If we would see the importance of explications of the nature and relations of the soul, we have only to turn to the vague generalities on the soul, found in a discussion such as Haldane's *Gifford Lectures*, where the soul is represented as “merely the highest aspect in which the man appears in everyday experience!”

The spirit—or soul in the all-inclusive and most spiritual sense—is distinguished from the reflective understanding in virtue of the immediateness of such spiritual life. This is the rich result of the spiritualisation or internal appropriation of the not-self by the expanding soul or ego. And, even without any outside compulsion, the knowing soul or ego has an initiative of its own in the higher phases of knowledge. The cognitive spiritual mind, as subject, is receptive of spiritual truth according to its own categories and laws. The life of the spirit wears an intellectual aspect, but its spiritual intelligence is distinct from, and higher than, mere intellectual insight and process. In consequence of which, only the intellect that is spiritually illuminated will really be in a position to understand or explore the highest realities—thought, consciousness, life, truth, destiny.

The clear psychological insight of Augustine enabled

him, twelve centuries before Descartes, to perceive great things of the soul. Augustine recognised the simplicity of the soul, and its activity, as an entirety, in all actions, such activity of the soul depending upon the ceaseless action of God. Also, the self-certainty of the ego, as the point of departure of all certainty, was clearly brought out by him. But, with this whole or entire activity of the soul, Augustine recognised its limitations in knowledge due to the soul's finitude, its subjection to the law of development, and its falling within the range of the hampering noëtic consequences of moral evil. Accordingly, he early and clearly saw the need, in order to the attainment of higher knowledge and certitude, of the whole soul or self being surrendered to its quest. Omniscience was not to him, as to certain modern philosophers, the soul's foible. It still needs to be more fully realised how much shortcoming and failure lies behind present-day philosophising about life and its higher problems, because these are dealt with as though they were exclusively intellectual, and did not really depend on added spiritual illuminativeness. And thus it often remains all unperceived how the deepest clues, or nearest solutions, of such problems will be found within the distinctively spiritual sphere—will be opened to the deep and subtle perceptions of the intellectual-spiritual thinker, and to him alone. But the spiritual instincts, for all that, do greatly require the accentuating, confirming, and sustaining aids of philosophical thought and inquiry. These will help us pass beyond the mere subjectivity in which psychology might leave us. Psychology, like every special science, has to do with experience, and

must not, if it would, get away from the facts of its selected range or point of view. The soul, as seat of living knowledge, of faith, and of belief, is more open to the scrutiny of modern psychological methods, in respect of the nature and genesis of these states of mind, than has been quite fully realised. The conscious life of man, at his more developed spiritual stages, has peculiar content of its own, which, in the essential continuity of being, is capable of fuller psychologic inquiry than it has yet received. In this realm of the soul—of free and spiritual personality—there is a world of observation and induction affecting our description of the nature and working of the soul, which psychological examination is far from having conquered. For the psychological standpoint at once claims the universality of religion, and objective psychology studies the permanent sentiments of religion. But, even more than these inquiries and aspects, we are here concerned to maintain for the soul its worth and reality—its growth, sensibility, and astonishing power, so finely set forth long ago by Socrates in his *Apology*, and by St Augustine in his *De Animâ*. Aristotle made soul the form of the body—a too objective psychologic attitude, identifying mind with life. Aquinas expressly took the soul to be something incorporeal, and self-subsisting. External stimuli and environing conditions have an influence which Aristotle did not know. The soul may, no doubt, choose to be a fount of creative power, but only as living subject related to its environment, which saves from the too purely subjective psychology of Descartes, divorced as it was from concrete reality.

Here may fitly be noticed those psychological developments which concern the relation of body and mind, or the two series of processes, the psychical and the physical, as matter of supreme philosophic interest since the days of Descartes. These inquiries are keenly pursued to-day from various points of view. There is the impossible materialistic theory, as we shall term it, in which the physical processes are treated as the cause of the psychic processes. Attractively as the defence of such position has been presented, there are grave initial difficulties. If physical causes produce their physical effects, the latter equalising the former, must we not then conclude that the psychic effects flowing from these same physical causes must be strangely superfluous or unbalanced effects? Or are we to say they are altogether uncaused? Are the inner psychic sources, such as feeling and desire, not creative of psychic effects, speech for example? We may, as on the theory of parallelism, hold there is no causal relation between the physical and the psychical. The two fields are then closed against each other: there is, in each case, an unbroken causal nexus. A theory which claims the support of Wundt, Riehl, Höffding, Paulsen, Jodl, Stout, Ebbinghaus, and Münsterberg is deserving of all attention. But the principle of causality has been shown to be no obstacle to the relation of mind and body, which are left in so unrelated and artificial a form by parallelism—in fact, suspended in the air. Parallelism is no fact of experience, but only a theory for the interpretation of facts. But one may well allow the theory to be one with the advantage of clearness in its issue, and scientific pretensions in its favour, though not

without important biological and psychological consequences for the soul and its life. But the interaction theory seems to me the most natural conception of the relation between spirit and body, and corresponds better with the logical need of thought to view the world as a unified whole. The interaction theory avoids absurd and paradoxical issues, and is in closer agreement with idealistic metaphysics and an ideal conception of the world. The real strength of the interaction theory is never apparent until its difficulties have been faced and its contentions properly set forth. It gives a better account of the facts—no small token of superiority. There is, of course, the stupendous difficulty as to causal interaction between two apparently disparate series, but the disparateness is by no means absolute, and the difficulty can be very reasonably resolved in entire consistency with the law of the conservation of energy. In fact, the difficulty is due to misconception of that law, for the quantitative relations of these causal connections is all there is any need to maintain. As a result, interaction has been shown to contradict no known law, rightly interpreted, and to be, at the same time, in happy accord with the testimony of experience. These results are due to thinkers like Lotze, Sigwart, Erhardt, Wentscher, Rehmke, Külpe, Busse, Stumpf, Bradley, Ward, James, Taylor. No doubt, there is the difficulty, in dealing with the psychic phenomena, that modes of consciousness and forms of material energy seem incommensurable. But it must not be overlooked that it is not necessary to the interaction theory to maintain that the psychic phenomena *create* the physical changes, but merely that

the latter cannot occur without the former. The psychic state is a cause in the sense that the physical movement requires it as an element or factor. The *how* of the physical change so caused may be hidden from us, but this is not more puzzling than other cases where we do not know the *how*. In this connection I may be permitted to express doubt whether the psychic phenomena as possible forms of energy—not in the mechanical foot-pound sense—have ever had full consideration made of them. What if they are not only forms of energy but of the most real energy? What is our consciousness when you have abstracted from it all that is energetic? What if our inability or reluctance to do justice to these intensive forms of purposive human activity be born only of scientific *habitudes* of mind? It is so much easier to do scientific justice to the physical than to the psychical phenomena. More serious, to my mind, than the question of the incommensurableness of the two series of forms of energy is the consideration whether, in adopting the interaction theory, we may not come short of doing justice to the perfect spontaneity of mind. Yet I do not myself feel this difficulty to an extent that prevents my accepting that theory as a reasonable and even necessary postulation. It is only as mistake that states of consciousness are taken to be incapable of producing changes in the physical world. The relation of mind and body flatly contradicts the idea that physical occurrences can be due only to physical causes. There is to me nothing inconceivable in transeunt action. The psycho-physical organism called man unites in himself these two kinds of existence, but he does so in ways whereby their relation

is a very intimate one—one of function or interpretation or meaning, rather than of difference of ontological character. The dualism exists only in relative sense—that is, in functional sense; for experience is one in regard to reality, and is organic throughout. One of our modern gains has just been the evolution of the psychical, in the psychological sense of the term, and all experience or reality may be taken as psychical in respect of end or value. Psychologically, however, we are not concerned with the ultimate reality of soul or self, but only with its place and function in the world of selves. The unique, persistent, and related character of the soul or self has been more clearly and fully explicated in our time than ever before, psychology, as science, having to do with this relating of the differential.

A nameless power and inexplicable laws attend the soul, and wait upon its silent conclusions and unspoken deliverances; and these things are not less true, although text-book psychology is ignorant of them, and formal psychology acknowledges them not. They belong to a psychology too transcendental and spiritual for the discursive treatment of the logical understanding, in the outer circles of power. The soul is always active; in its most heroic frames and feats the soul is never passive. At lower levels, "this element of activity" has, as Höffding says, been, "in all intellection," the thing dwelt upon "chiefly" in modern psychology. This activity, implied in consciousness, pertains to all experience, which even runs up into consciousness of the activity of consciousness. The external world has its own determinate order, but that does not keep

human thinking from being self-determining in the directive influences of its own thought-activities. Psychology has not yet determined the precise nature of mental activity, whether it consists of mere change, of impulse or conation, or—better—of development, but such activity has its ideal measure. This activity in the highest spiritual sphere is in perfect keeping with the teachings of what is to-day termed functional psychology. Functional psychology tries to do justice to the immediate self and its inner self-initiated movements. So doing, it lays stress on the conative aspects of consciousness—the end-positing or teleological character of our spiritual self-activity. The categories of functional psychology are therefore dynamic rather than static, but their teleological tendencies must be stated in sufficiently spiritual terms. Mystical states have often been described as though they were void of ideational content. Many of the mystics have, no doubt, written as though their states of blessedness, peace, and love were, psychologically viewed, void of ideational contents. But were they really so void as they themselves thought? Surely not always. For is not the idea of God so fruitful, that its presence in the mind, and its influence upon the stream of consciousness, may make our perceptions of Him, or of truths that relate to Him, more than our awareness takes full account of? Hence, do we not find that, when the soul is described as most lost in God, God is still conceived as a Being of positive qualities—love, wisdom, power, goodness—Whose qualities the soul surely apprehends? We must not forget how what some psychologists have termed “relative inatten-

tion" keeps us little aware of our own states, and little able correctly to describe them. We dare not say that, in these higher insights or experiences, cognitive consciousness has ceased to exist. Besides, mystics are not wholly wanting—rare though they be—who have been wise enough to perceive or recognise that "emotion is valueless when it stops in itself, and becomes nothing more than merely emotional experience;" and that actions or states, "without attendant perception and reflection," cannot possibly be good. In such cases, the function of "the perceptive and judging powers" in the higher life of the soul has been explicitly acknowledged. This fact has been wellnigh universally overlooked, when mystical experience has been treated. The psychology of mysticism shows the mystic life to be a progress rather than a state, albeit it owes much to sub-conscious aims and ideas.

We can learn, from mystic deliverances about the soul, the benefits accruing to our mental peace, to our sense of intellectual unity and power, and to a finely universalised regard for the will of God as law of all life and action, without lending the least countenance to indolent quietisms or the vacuities of an idle piety. The inward-mindedness of the mystics, their sabbatic resting of the soul in itself and in thought of its Divine ally, their holding of the attention upon God, and their quiet contemplative vision of the Unseen—these are things we in our measure must share, albeit we strive better to understand how often these seeming passivities are, in psychology truth, potent forms of activity. The tendential ideas present therein are surely of great psychological

importance and value. There is surely great lack of delicate perception and fine taste in comparing the influence of God's presence on the consciousness of the mystical soul with the control exercised by the hypnotiser over his subjects. We can surely welcome the unification of the soul with God—or of the human will with the Divine—without accepting an identification, in which all differences have disappeared. For the human soul or self is just such a growth or process as is required for this—no static, self-identical substance.

The finite soul, though it be but a segment of being, is one and indivisible. But the soul, in its indivisibility, has too often been conceived as a separable entity in ways that explained nothing, because they made of it a mere abstraction, void of content. A spiritual psychology cannot rest in racial or phylogenetic aspects of the soul, though these have their necessary value. Goethe has very well said, "If during our lifetime we see that performed by others to which we ourselves felt an earlier call, but had been obliged to give up, with much besides, then the beautiful feeling enters the mind, that only mankind together is the true man, and that the individual can only be joyous and happy when he has the courage to feel himself in the whole." But, while the soul feels humanity to be thus essentially one, it yet cannot but be sensitive to that largest of aspects in which God is the spiritual environment or objective complement of the soul's unitary activity and experience, and is, in some sort, the base and support of racial developments and communal connections as well, through their grounding and growth in the immanent God. Our psychology will, then, be

both spiritual and rational, with light of its own to shed for any empirical psychology that may be large-minded enough to receive it. And if, with James, our psychology is content to find a substantial principle of unity like the soul "superfluous," that is only because such psychology is in the unstable equilibrium of a merely natural and truncated science.

We do not think of the soul or spiritual personality as a substantial entity so much as a process forever resulting in self-conscious spiritual activity. For its nature is such that it grows from latency into life, and from possibility into actuality. But its psychical states or events are meaningless save as they are modes or modifications of mind, soul, or self—states or events in and through which the soul has its awareness. The soul's principle of actuality or rational spontaneity causes it to transcend the phenomenal causal order. Its free, spiritual personality is, to newer psychology, a true union of parts—of thought, emotion, and will—whose abiding marks are unity and identity. In each and all of its activities, the whole personality is present. Our psychological experience is an experience of ourselves as knowing, in which an ultimate principle in the self knows the soul or ego to be no mere formal unity or *Bewusstsein überhaupt*. The true soul or ego cannot be, as with James, a mere stream of "passing thought," but a dynamic unity or centre, which is more than any psychological continuity of fleeting thoughts. The existence of psychological data, and our psychological recognition of them, would be devoid of meaning, did we not presuppose a soul or ego which perceives the data, and reflects upon them. To make the "passing

thought" the only knower must be to leave us epistemologically unsatisfied. For nothing can be true in epistemology which is false in psychology. The finite soul has its own unique experience, and is proximate initiating centre of its own deeds. Hyper-empirical is the soul or self in the unity of its active, conditioning aspects; in its aspect as conditioned, it is, of course, empirical. The universe is not alien to us; and there is a wider self—a social organism—of which the soul forms part, which, too, has its spiritual matrix in immanent Deity. All history and social culture are, in fact, conditioned by the hyper-empirical presuppositions of such active spiritual selves or centres. The presence, activity, and aspiring power of the soul constitute a cosmic fact as real as any with which science has to do—a fact second to none in significant reach and inherent inspiration. In its aspirations and ideals, the soul finds a vital contact with God, and wonders not that unexplored depths are in Deity when our own "subliminal self" remains so much of a silent land. In all this we see how modern psychology has replaced the older psychology, with its soul or self as independent entity at start, by teachings like those of Wundt and other psychologists who make of the unity of the soul a problem.

The creative spiritual energy works as a transcendent and judging element in our personality, raising it above itself, and leading it to judge itself in respect of attainment and of shortcoming. Thus does the soul, as determined by the Divine or creative Spirit, work out its world-destiny as a quasi-independent entity or activity, with endless power of conscious choice. It is not on

the plane of the psychic volitions of the soul, but—what is so often overlooked—above the level of merely conscious personality—at the level, namely, of the spirit or spiritual nature of man, as free, and transcendent, and open to the Creative Spirit, that true freedom is realised.

“So schaff’ ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.”

The redemption of the soul lies just in its becoming, in its turn, creative—active sharer in those cosmic movements of the Eternal and Absolute Spirit which mean the salvation of the world. The soul would remain spiritually incomplete, did it not come into vital relation with this larger whole.

CHAPTER XXII.

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF OUR TIME.

THE development of the science of ethics is now seen to be a necessity of the advancing growth of the ethical consciousness, or of developing personality. The development has proceeded from the individual to society rather than in reverse fashion. There is seen to be not merely an evolution of morality, but also a development of the moral judgment or power of ethical appreciation and formulation. There have not only been higher ethical standards reached objectively, but also, subjectively, higher degrees of ethical realisation. More clear has it always become that the ontological conditions of this moral evolution alone can be taken to afford the light necessary for its true interpretation, even though current ethical teaching has been so far from doing any manner of justice to these conditions. The underlying needs and processes of ethical reconstruction have grown always more apparent from works like those of Spencer, Janet, Stephen, Gizycki, and many others. The special scientific requirement in the shape of ethical sympathy and spirit has been more generally recognised, so that the study appears in this respect to ask only what is accounted a reasonable and necessary demand in every

other scientific pursuit. Always clearer does it grow that ethical philosophy is one of the most susceptible things in the universe, receiving, as matter of fact, the impact of all the scientific advances of the time. Embryonic morality every human being may be said to carry within himself, that is, in his own conscience; hence the vastness of morality, which is confined to no temples made with hands. Such moral beginnings man is here to perfect, and no seeming indifference of Nature to such moral interests must damp his ardour in the least. To moral consciousness—with its certitudes as to virtue—he must still cleave. Ethics has in our time assumed a most conglomerate character: it has become a compound of elements psychological, evolutionary, biological, and sociological. One of the most significant ethical developments of our time has been the tendency—to which Dr Rashdall has properly drawn attention—on the part of speculative thinkers, to treat Morality as non-rational, and moral obligation as mere subjective experience of man's mind. Not only thinkers of naturalistic leanings like Simmel, Höffding, and others, regard morality as feeling of little or no objective significance, but even Professor James participates in this ethical reduction to feeling. On the other hand, Von Hartmann is found asserting the objectively valid character of morality, because he sees that it makes for the true end of the universe. Hartmann's ethical principle is, that the ends of the Unconscious are to be made the ends of our own consciousness. For him there is a real world, and a real world-process; and, the development of consciousness being the end of the activity of

the Unconscious, its working must be towards the emancipation of the intellect from the will. Such an ethical foundation is, no doubt, very abstract, but Hartmann really holds to the reality of ethics, every moral act of ours being, in his view, conducive to the true ultimate end of the universe. Morality is at least not delusive. For us, the end of the universe can be no other than the good, whose ultimate and unanalysable character has been so forcibly represented by the late Prof. Sidgwick and Mr G. E. Moore. Sidgwick really treated the good in highly abstract fashion, and with some lack of philosophical thoroughness. The simple irreducible idea of the good belongs so little to either Sidgwick or Moore that, to say nothing of Plato, it is the precise position of such rationalist moralists as Cudworth and Price. The answer to the inquiry as to the good was, for them, a tautology, for to them good was good, just as time was time, and space was space. But Mr Moore objects to Professor M'Kenzie's resting ethics on a metaphysical basis, and making the good depend on its being real, because the good is "unique in kind," and "unaffected by any conclusions we may reach about the nature of reality." Now, we need not deny the distinctive quality of ethical truths, nor the independence of the moral judgment, in true and proper sense. But this is not to say that there are no metaphysical postulates or presuppositions involved. It is not to say that "no truth about what is real" can have any bearing upon the good. A thing, to be good, it is maintained, need not be involved in the constitution of reality, whether that of the real self or the rational universe.

But there is surely, in all this, a serious overlooking of the criterion of the good, as something that must be determined by the laws and ideals of reason. There is lack of insight into the fact that the good is not quite so deep and unanalysable a notion as has been contended, for it presupposes the true, and the knowledge of it is founded on being. The good has been too abstractly conceived by Mr Moore also, as the seeking of an object, rather than the serving of a being or beings, with which latter ethical character is primarily concerned. The good, resting upon the true, is our rational end. Hence Kant held that there is nothing, either within the world or out of it, which is good without qualification, save a good will. Rightly enough, since the good raises life to the plane of a timeless reality. Ethicists must not too readily assume their "good"—even with the addition "in itself"—to be something really ultimate and unanalysable. Nor must they confound the being "unique in kind," on the part of ethical good, with its absolute unrelatedness to truth or reality, else ethics may become a science of the visionary and unreal. The ideal is the fundamental reality, so that metaphysical presuppositions cannot be so easily got away from. When we are told that "good is good and nothing else whatever," as something which the ethicist has "established," and are yet told in almost the same breath that such fundamental truths of ethics are "self-evident," in the sense that no reason can be given for them, we feel that a somewhat irrational cast is given to ethics. The ethical philosopher can, in the ways we have been describing, easily make the good and its recognition much too axiomatic an affair

for any but a rarefied atmosphere far removed from life and its vital interests. Our interest in ethical method, as such, need not, and should not, blind us to primal concern with ethical beings—their characters, choices, volitions, self-determinations. Moral distinctions exist for such beings as rational, for only bad psychology grounds these in feeling rather than in reason. Feeling presupposes reality present to consciousness or thought, and ethical feeling presupposes knowledge of moral distinctions. There has been a somewhat prevalent tendency in the ethical thought of our time to shunt the question of the *right* in favour of the question of the *good*, on account of the less abstract, more fundamental character of the latter. The former is, however, of great importance in relation to human volition. Sidgwick very admirably pointed out their difference when he said that the 'right' involved the idea of an authoritative prescription to do a thing, whereas the 'good,' as conceived by us, leaves us waiting for some standard, whereby we may estimate the relative values of different goods. But the ethical idea of the 'right,' with its conformity to prescribed law or standard, has been gradually felt to go not so deep, and to prove not so adequate and concrete, as the conception of the 'good'—or of Worth—as ethical end. But it must, for all that, be admitted that not all the attempts that have been made to determine the universal validity of the concept of the good—of moral value—have issued in any universally recognised result. Good that is *moral* is one with the right: the right is unique good. Ethical theories remain as diverse as those which are metaphysical, partly as result of varying historical points of view, and

partly as consequence of personal ideals of different philosophers. But the autonomy of the moral ideal must not be lost sight of or the individual will not do what, in the exercise of his moral consciousness, he sees to be right, as for him the ethically supreme. Philosophical ethic is concerned with the purity of the moral act obtained through reverence for the law, as revealed in reason, without admixture of any foreign or heterogeneous element whatsoever. Its autonomous acts are spontaneous and independent. Its law is, doubtless, abstract, but it nevertheless regards man as essentially constituted for the practice of virtue, and capable of realising this destiny in virtue of his freedom. For inner freedom is the first requisite of moral action. Hence it recognises an ideal element in the performance of natural duty, and calls man to ideal conduct—without particular thought of divine command or supernatural sanction—as ethically best for himself and for humanity. Ethical personality is thus built up in a self-development that is not selfish—not free from self-repression. This connection with personality or the movement of life shows how concrete in content the moral act really is. Even if we take the good to be the strictly ethical element, morality will still lie in the will to Good, which, in the ethical man, becomes, to use Carneri's phrase, a second nature—his sense of duty being joy in duty. Man's unconditional good can never, as Green well showed, be completely defined, for the moral ideal seems to elude perfect definition. This does not keep us from being able to realise, in large measure, the moral ends, purposes, powers, and possibilities open to us. The direction and aim of these

moral endeavours should be found in *being* rather than in *doing*, in character rather than in conduct, in will-direction rather than in acts. This, without forgetting that the Good has its objective reference, as pertaining to a world-order on which it is dependent, no less than its subjective side or reference—possesses, that is to say, an ideational, no less than an affective content. Nor is the concept of the good, however primary in ethics, to keep justice from being done to other notions, such as duty, virtue, freedom. It is really a case of these latter depending, in their teleological reference, for their very meaning, force, and justification, on the good as ethical end. One is not readily inclined to follow Fouillée, who has recently relegated obligation to a quite subordinate position, as no longer an ultimate and irreducible category. It seems to me the *ought* of obligation is capable of more and higher objectivisation than Fouillée supposes, and absolute values we are not quite content so lightly to dismiss from ethics. But we are quite willing to admit that the concept of worth or value—the attractive power of the Good—may, with the growth and elevation of the ethical personality, replace, at least to a very large extent, the ethics of obligation.

The independence of ethics, in regard of the world-view, has been especially felt since Kant. We are not content, however, with a mere science of conduct, which is not such as to be, at the same time, a metaphysic of morals. The metaphysical treatment of ethics is also scientific—is the science of ethics *par excellence*. For such a method takes up into itself all that belongs to ethics as a purely natural science, all the inescapable

natural sanctions of human conduct, and all the natural indications of morality found in human experience and history. It simply takes all the grist so brought to the metaphysical mill, and seeks to co-ordinate all the ethical issues involved, so that the life of God, so far as manifested in its inspiring influence, sustaining power, and quickening impulses, in human lives, shall not be needlessly obscured, or thoughtlessly ignored. For it knows we may as well try rid ourselves of our own shadow as think to frame a science of ethics irrespective of metaphysical beliefs—beliefs in the ultimate nature of the universe and of man. The true scientific method must, in such a science as that of ethics, be that which is most conformable to the character and condition of the facts with which it has to do. A merely descriptive treatment of ethics may do well enough for ethical treatment of man at dull levels and conventional stages, but is quite incapable of producing a really inspiring ethic, because it has no power to explain man at his ethical highest. Of course, the advocates of ethics as a strictly scientific discipline are quite content with these levels—"the findings of common-sense"—since "there is no transcending common-sense," even in such a sphere as the ethical. But ethical ideal can never be satisfied by empiricism in such cases as, for example, those of the artist or the martyr, wherein the ideal transcends, beyond doubt, the empirical standpoint. Man, in such cases, is not found in the moral warfare at his own charges, but is armed with the pledges of that Infinite Moral Spirit, in Whom, behind the moral order as its

Guarantor and Author, his faith is rooted and grounded. Thus we see the superiority of the metaphysical treatment of ethics over that which is merely scientific—cares only for given facts, without due regard to their ultimate philosophical interpretation. Ethics is quite independent of metaphysical inquiry, so far as description of facts touching moral phenomena is concerned, but the case stands otherwise when we come to consider their value, and the nature of the reality that lies behind such phenomena. Nothing is more certain than the influence of certain metaphysical conceptions upon our ethical theories, and upon the sort of categories and terms we shall use for construing and classifying ethical facts. What is to hinder, if it be taken otherwise, our employing merely naturalistic categories for man and his moral characteristics, in complete disregard of the true ontologic significance of his personality and his real relation to the universe? The nature of man, and of that reality which constitutes his environment, can by no possibility be left unconsidered in any rational treatment of ethics. But nothing in such necessary metaphysical reference need in the least weaken the insistence that ethics be drawn from, and conform to, the truth of things. German method is much superior to British method here, when the former puts metaphysical bases and implications in the fore-court of system, for the postponement of these till “after” seems both unnecessary and unscientific. There is no system of ethics which is not affiliated to a metaphysic of some sort, just as there is no system of metaphysics which does not

carry with it an ethic of its own. Paulsen is undoubtedly right in his contention that a man's *Weltanschauung* is not without relation to, and influence upon, his moral conduct. If, on the other hand, we take the world, with Plato, to exist through and for the good, we shall have ideal elements in our lives. If we have ideal elements in our lives—if we cultivate a good will and ideal aims—we shall find the world reflecting our idealistic conceptions. For there is a truth behind the contention of Fichte that our philosophy or world-view is conditioned by what we are. Why should the sphere of ethics be unreasonably narrowed by being dissociated from the sense of metaphysical unity and spiritual relationship with the Absolute Ground of all existence? A real science of ethics must surely take account of the totality of things, in order to an apprehension of an ethical world. Not even the aboriginally moral Being or ethical Deity need be excluded, since consideration of that reality, which constitutes man's moral environment, and is objective complement of man's spiritual being, is necessary to any thorough handling of the subject. Of course, when the Absolute is so ethically conceived, the standpoint of mere metaphysic is already transcended, so that ethics cannot be derived from it. But the point to be remembered is, that the basis of ethics lies in the metaphysical relation of the finite to the Absolute in the sense explained in the present chapter. Is there nothing savouring of the grotesque in current ethical modes of treating the presence and working of the Absolute Ethical Personality as unconsidered trifles, with

no light to shed on ethical processes of inquiry? Such a product may be ethical science, but it is science grown mechanical rather than vital, and science no longer conformable in method to the truth and reality which it investigates. Sidgwick and Stephen reduce it to mere working ethical rules. This is not to say that such ethical science may not be among the rich data which it is the business of metaphysic to interpret, but it is to affirm that the ultimate problems of ethics must be viewed in the light of Reality taken in whole, that is, on the ethical side of metaphysics. For even those who make of ethics only a science of conduct show the halting and unsatisfactory character of their scientific treatment by having to append acknowledgments of the place of morality as an element in a larger whole—as set in, and related to, cosmic processes and order. Certainly, this is not ethics in the highest; there is always something not thoroughgoing about such a procedure. The case of ethics is very different from that of other particular sciences, where metaphysical presuppositions may be involved: the difference lies in the fact that particular metaphysical theories of the nature of knowledge or of reality—whether the reality of mind or of matter—are continually capable of being used, and are used, for the overthrow of the fundamental assumptions of ethical science. The special sciences simply assume the ultimate principles of metaphysics, without feeling any call to validate or investigate them, but the dependence of ethics—in its percipience of Reality behind moral phenomena—is too great for it not to need the help

which a true metaphysic can supply. This by no means implies that ethics is a purely derivative science, but is meant to assert for ethics a relation to metaphysics other than that sustained by any of the particular—that is, natural—sciences. The metaphysic we hold will have—though L. Stephen had no perception of the fact—a very different influence for our ethics than it will have for our physical sciences. The business of ethics is with the “Ought” consciousness, not merely the “Is” consciousness, and the “ought” is for man other and higher than it was. The abstraction, in short, with which the special sciences draw off particular parts or aspects of reality from the rest of it can only, with far greater difficulty, and with much less satisfactoriness, be practised in the case of ethical science. The part abstracted is here so large and so closely inwoven with the Whole of Reality, that, to all intents and purposes, it cannot be adequately dealt with in severance from metaphysical postulates or prolegomena. It is impossible to agree with Taylor and others who make ethics a merely empirical science, based upon the broader science of psychology. This is not to say that psychological method must not have larger place in ethics, as Ladd and others have properly insisted, but such ethical psychology will consist of ethical analysis rather than of strictly psychological analysis, with its greater exactness. The laws of moral action may surely be taken as immanent ends or ideals of humanity, supplying, as such, psychological foundation for ethics as a science. Ethics can, and must, analyse for us the moral consciousness, must deliver it

from all distressing inconsistencies, and must improve and perfect it. In so doing, ethics must have a philosophic basis, and realise, as clearly as may be, the relations in which we stand to the Universe as a whole. So doing, ethics becomes supremely rational; and such it must become, for ethics has not even a beginning without thought. Ethical science has not only to do with the given, but with the Ideal which reaches out far beyond our empirical knowledge. This, because of the dynamic character of man. This concern with the Ideal takes us ultimately into the ontological sphere, to which psychological bearings are at last driven. In the sphere of metaphysical presuppositions, ethics must reckon not only with the developments of the human self or personality, but also with the metaphysics of the Absolute Being—the metaphysical *Urgrund*—of Whom knowledge is indeed relative, but Who is yet self-revealing. So, too, has ethics to do with the metaphysics of the world—the *Ursache*—wherein the true and essential being of nature will be found in spirit, carrying with it the implicate of purposiveness, and not in any mere mechanism of nature. Metaphysics is thus metaphysic of spirit no less than of nature. Nature does not exist alone, and spirit is certainly not something which nature can annex as her own. Metaphysics, as science of the nature of reality, conditions the perfected results of ethics, and that to a greater degree than it does the results of the other sciences. For, alike in matter and in method, ethical science differs from the physical sciences. These latter may, in respect of their results, be tributary to ethics,

but ethics is, in primary aim, quite independent of them. The natural phenomena, with which the physical sciences are concerned, are, in respect of their causes, really opposed to those phenomena of will and moral value, with which ethics has to do. Of course, ethics may call itself scientific, and pursue only the end of conduct, in its study of that end-positing activity which is the distinguishing mark of the ethical spirit. Viewing itself thus as purely empirical science, it will confine its interests to psychological descriptions of emotional and ethical processes and developments, thus remaining purely and frankly anthropocentric. Caring not to seek the metaphysical Ground of morality in the Absolute, it must be content to ignore the fact that, to every determinate ethical activity or direction, there corresponds a determinate metaphysical position. For the two disciplines stand in closest correspondence with each other, and if we rid ethics of all dependence upon metaphysics, it will only be to leave ethics in a realm of subjective representations, and not of realities. But ethics consists not of mere Ideal, but is Reality as well—Reality resting on metaphysical pre-suppositions. The gleaming Ideal is, of course, the everlasting Real; the Absolute Being remains the source of Ethical Ideal in us—ideal set up within us by the moral law. Man is always related to the Ideal, such Ideal being for him the norm or law discerned with more or less clearness. Ethics enters with our sense of responsibility for the realisation of the Ideal. I am the ethical being I am just because I am the rational and responsible being I claim to be. A concrete

moral life may be mine, but I must needs pursue the unity of a rational and self-consistent moral ideal. That is not something unreal and purely imaginary; it is, in fact, part of me, is the most real of realities. An advancing Ideal is that whereof we speak, something that is fruit of our ethical development, and not fixed and absolute. We postulate a progressive development for morality, for we hold no moral ideal to be final in the sense of stationary. Finality in a sense, no doubt, does pertain to that ideal, but not in the sense of anything so ultimate as to preclude further progress. Ethics is one of the world's real factors, and, to be redeemed from sheer phenomenalism and possible illusionism, must have metaphysical postulates, these latter to be established in as firm and scientific a manner as possible. This metaphysical grounding gives to ethics or morality its unconditional character, and keeps it from being reduced to the realm of subjective judgments. One cannot help feeling some surprise alike that ethicists have so often been slow to perceive the fallacious identification of ethical character with mere constitutional motive or natural impulse in hedonistic theories, and to realise what a resolution of ethical right into a mere amiable desire to please or make happy is involved in Utilitarianism, with its unsatisfactoriness as to motives. Spencer, when taking a psychological point of view, is frankly hedonistic, pleasure being for him the final aim of all activity. But he wants pleasure to somebody, and a maximum of pleasure. He takes length and breadth of life as his criterion of the end, not seeing how little pleasure makes for true fulness of life.

Pleasurable feeling, as accompaniment of the attainment of desirable ends, is no warranty for hedonistic ethics making pleasure the sole object of desire. "Uniform conjunction in experience" does not create identity. The bases on which even Sidgwick sought to rest his Universalistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism were by no means strong, largely because of his treatment of the Good in abstraction from the nature of the beings for whom it should be good. Sidgwick's Utilitarianism was of a halting kind, especially on the evolutionary side, and came short of the idealistic ethics of Green, with its insistence upon goodness of will or character as ethical end. Utilitarianism, indeed, with its faulty account of the genesis and development of our moral ideas, and its degradation of virtue to the position of means rather than end, carries so many unsatisfactory—and even, one feels tempted to say, ignoble—implications, that it has lost ethical caste more than in the nineteenth century. Proposing the well-being of mankind for its end, its end is yet curiously sought—in virtue of its hedonistic element—by reduction of society in general to interested motives or considerations. The ethics of expediency—of prudence and the satisfying of merely human ends—stands as far removed as ever it did from what has been termed "the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation."

It is enough for us to hold by an ultimate category (ultimate for practical purposes, even if not conceptually so) of moral obligation, as that which may be regarded as fundamental in ethical conception. It is plain that therein is the ideal perceived by us, and that such ideal binds itself upon us as being divine in its origin, and as

being identical with divine purpose for us. For, is not man's own ideal really one with the idea or purpose of Deity for him? Does not arbitrariness disappear from morality when conceived as something that reveals the moral ideals of man to be in harmony with the purpose of God for him, as partaker of the Divine Nature? The ethics of infinite obligation, howbeit they wear a unique character and are set in a background of mystery, still stand high above those of utilitarian need and prudence. For the ethical phenomena remain insufficiently accounted for by Utilitarianism, whose vision moves in too limited a sphere of the subjective and the emotional. It is still true that the right is no sooner discerned than obligation supervenes. For us the obligation comes with the enlightenment of reason under the development of self-consciousness. The main use of the Utilitarian theory is as a godsend to social and political philosophers, who have no difficulty in making capital out of as many sophistical applications as possible of its principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number—a principle whose unsatisfactoriness has been well shown by Spencer. Why cannot pleasure or happiness be replaced by the greatest *good* of the greatest number—by the well-being of society? In reality, perfection of activity as constitutive principle of the good need not conflict with, or exclude, happiness as but another aspect of the matter. There is no need to deny a place to pleasure as efficient cause in human activity, since wisdom's ways are pleasantness, but not a choice of pleasure. Conventional sanctions and miserable utilities are poor substitutes for unconditional morality and moral eleva-

tion, even when evolutionary considerations are added by Spencer to the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.

- Mill quite unnecessarily denied the ethical significance and value of self-development, without which ethics, in any true sense, were impossible. The further development of altruistic principle, and the justice due to claims of society, have no need of such denial. The ethics of self-sacrifice needs only a severance from the psychology of self-seeking or psychological hedonism. Strictly speaking, psychological hedonism, as a mere quality of psychological activity, is not moral at all: it is only in its material aspect, as pertaining to the thing desired, that pleasure assumes any proper ethical place. No racial accumulations of utility-experiences can satisfactorily explain, on Spencerian evolutionary theory, man's consciousness of duty or moral law. A moral basis to begin with is always wanting. Surely the standing marvel of ethics is just the originality of ethical consciousness, with the all-inclusive character of the moral judgment. Institutional appeal by evolutionary ethics is vain, and constitutes a grand *ὑστερον πρότερον*. Stephen has duly shown the ethical atomism of Spencer's individualistic positions, and has declared for morality, not as evolved conduct, but as something related to the good or welfare of the social organism. Gizycki, too, has taken the good of society or the general welfare to be the right final end of life. But the truth is, that ethical science cannot, by any collectivist considerations, really validate for us the ideas of virtue, of duty, or of good, for in the end we have but an inexpugnable conviction of their sovereignty over us. No evolutionary considera-

tions can keep me from being in ethical character just what I make myself; they do not affect my power so to realise myself in virtue of the freedom of my will. A true freedom cannot but belong to the very nature of our spiritual self-activity, the fact of the self being part of a series nowise destroying such freedom, as the determinist is prone to suppose. We are free, but we are so as we *become* free. Our freedom is fact, yet it is achieved: it is the freedom of the ripe, self-conscious will; it lies in moral perfection, wherein our very capacity of free and responsible choice becomes strengthened. Freedom, as Siebeck has properly insisted, remains an ideal never wholly realised, but reaching on even into a realm of freedom lying beyond the world. The freedom and independence of ethical life must be maintained against deterministic monisms of every sort, and an ethical basis found, not in psychology but in metaphysics, for freedom and objective moral law. For freedom is the postulate of moral judgment, and the moral judgment consists of insight, while prudential judgments are merely matters of foresight. Ethics moves in the sphere of the abstract, whose principles are continually actualised in our concrete personality, swayed by the sublimity and ideality of moral law. But the objectivity of moral law is something to be learned in all the vast experience of life, just as the great objectivities of the arts and the sciences are learned. Hence evolutionary considerations are not without their interest and value, albeit ethics, as a normative discipline, reaps no real gain for the validity of its norms from such considerations. In that respect we agree with Külpe. The results of current evolutionary

ethics, in whatsoever respects unsatisfactory, are at least suggestive of progress in method as in ethical spirit, and have helped to put ethics on the highly useful track of tracing out historic morality, the evolution of moral ideals and institutions, in a scientific manner. Evolutionary ethic has shown psychological analysis of the nature and authority of conscience vain, save as full account is taken of the growth of conscience in the race as in the individual. Wundt has shown the value of evolutionism very well in his law of the heterogony of purpose, wherein unforeseen sources of new ideas of purpose spring up, so that altruistic developments may accrue from egoistic motions or beginnings. Wundt's differentiation of the stages in the evolution of moral ideas is a fine exemplification of valuable application of evolutionary doctrine in ethics, but one that is not above question, both as to whether original moral elements are not at times assumed rather than discovered, and as to whether real norms have been extracted from empirical ethics. The modifying effects of evolutionary view are too palpable to be denied, and, in the tendency they have fostered to seek a non-hedonistic basis for ethics, they must be reckoned with by every one who would put ethics on a scientific basis. But it is still too soon to forecast the ultimate conclusions of the activity in subjective psychology, in physiology of the nervous system, and in evolutionary interpretation of ethical problems. Herbart made morality not something pertaining to the essential nature of an object, but merely a judgment of value. This judgment of value finds its standard of comparison in the ideas of inner freedom, perfection, and benevolence. The moral

judgment is a kind of esteem or estimate of value; the judgment of value has its subjective and its objective aspects; and the need has, in the ethical as in other spheres, arisen for an universal theory of value. Broad beginnings in investigating the subject of value were made by Brentano and Lotze. In our own day, the Austrian philosophers, Meinong and Ehrenfels, have carried out the idea of Herbart's judgments of taste or determinations of value into more comprehensive sphere of treatment, and the universal theory of value is seen to be one of no merely psychological character. By Ehrenfels value is taken to mean the relation of a thing to desire, and he tends to set feeling—all feeling being to him feeling of value—and irrational impulse above our ends as determined by reason, in a rather unsatisfactory way. Meinong gives more place to rational reflection; he, in fact, tends to give knowledge—and the desire for it—in *abstracto* rather too large a place; he recognises an element of judgment in every estimate of value; but to him the appreciation of value partakes of the nature of feeling rather than of judgment. Such feeling, however, he takes to be no element detached from, or independent of, content. The subjective aspect of value is that emphasised by Meinong, as being the aspect with which we are concerned from the psychological point of view. Meinong's subjectivism does not, however, keep him from distinguishing the objective fact of value itself from the merely subjective appreciation of value—the *Werth* from the *Werthhaltung*. But a merely individualistic psychological point of view is by no means a final or unsurpassable one, since moral personality calls, in its

explication, for more. Theory of value must ultimately drive us to implications, in short, of more metaphysical character, as Prof. J. S. Mackenzie has had the merit to recognise. But the whole question of these judgments of worth or value throws us back upon the metaphysical relations of ethics, since these judgments are transcendental, and have their ultimate validity tested by metaphysics.

In fine, all the strands of ethical thought, whether they be those of good, of duty, or of virtue, lead us at last to view morality as a totality, a totality to which all these lines of ethical thought converge, and in which they are conserved. The unconditional character of morality shines out from the concepts of law and duty. Virtue is not going to be superseded in our modern world, but, as embodied in moral personality, will keep in proper check the too exclusively social character of present-day ethics. Nor will the good be sought as merely formal and abstract thing, but as the making of actual life into an ascent towards those unattained ideals which belong to the City of God. Moral faith in these ideals is the concern of ethics in the highest, for its prime concern is with character, of which conduct is but the resultant. It is precisely in the consciousness of such moral faith that ethics stretches out "lame hands of faith" to metaphysics. Only an ethic, which is bound to an historic world-view, can build up ethics of universal character—an ethic that shall not see, in the myriad quantitative forms in which ethical life appears, nothing that can be called progress, and nothing that is absolute.

INDEX.

- Absolute, the, 4, 67, 72, 83, 106, 112,
 114-115, 158-159, 167-168, 194-195,
 202, 209, 210, 216, 219, 224, 226-227,
 242, 245-246, 262, 268, 274, 291-294,
 298-299, 301-302, 345, 349
 Absoluteness of God, the, 87, 95, 125,
 149, 158, 167, 203, 217-218, 234, 236-
 237, 262, 290-294, 296, 304, 316, 345,
 348
 Abubacer, 270
 Accident, 133, 150-151, 273-274
 Acosmism, 168
 Activity, 210, 252, 264-265, 272, 279,
 282, 287, 303, 310, 318, 324, 328-333,
 349-350, 352-353, 355; Absolute, 136,
 156, 225, 268, 301; philosophical, 255,
 261, 284; spiritual, 140, 199
 Actualism, 48, 165, 198-199, 223, 263,
 333, 354, 357
 Æons, 68-69, 75-76
 Æschylus, 30
 Æsthetics, 200, 245
 Agnosticism, 4, 82, 120, 134, 142, 207
 Ahriman, 9
 Ahura-Mazda, 9
 Albertus Magnus, 118, 126, 129, 139, 142,
 149
 Alexandria, 3-4, 72, 75, 95, 129
 Allegorising, 70, 102
 Alphonsus, 275
 Altruism, 166, 353, 355
 Alvarado, Francisco, 276
 Alvarez, Balthazar, 273
 Ambrose, 128
 America, 285, 311
 American ethics, 161
 Ammonius Saccas, 100
 Analogy, 109, 131, 150, 192, 207, 291
 Anaxagoras, 15, 39, 53
 Anaximander, 15
 Anaximenes, 15
 Angiulli, 256
 Anselm, 118-119, 123-126, 136, 185-186
 Anthropomorphism, 9, 29-30, 39, 95, 108,
 115, 155
 Apocatastasis, 100
 Apollonia, 15
 Apologists, the, 40, 55-56, 63-64
 Aquinas, 118, 121-124, 126, 128-144,
 254, 273, 279, 284, 325; on Creation,
 132-133; ontology, 142; philosophy,
 128, 135, 140; psychology, 136; the
 soul, 135, 140; his *Summa*, 128-129,
 131, 136, 139
 Arabia, 129, 141, 270-271
 Archetypes, 32, 38, 63, 96, 121, 126, 131,
 149, 223
 Ardigò, 255
 Areopagite, the, 129, 142
 Aristides, 40
 Aristotelianism, 270-271
 Aristotle, 51, 78, 105, 109-111, 118, 121,
 123-124, 126, 128-130, 135-136, 142,
 144, 147-149, 169, 273, 289-290, 302,
 304, 313, 322, 325; the *Categories*,
 18; Causation, 20-27; Cosmology, 38;
 Deity, 33-34; Form, 18-19; Matter,
 18-20; *Metaphysics*, 18-19, 25-27;
Physics, 25-26; Prime Mover, 25-26,
 34, 37; Reality, 37; Substance, 17-20
 Arnáiz, Marcelino, 283-284
 Arts, 354
 Asceticism, 8, 113, 166
 Asiatic philosophy, 1-3, 13
 Assyrians, 11
 Atavism, 184
 Athanasius, 59, 64, 128
 Atheistic monism, 170
 Athenagoras, 40, 57
 Atomism, 15, 353
 Attributes, 131, 133, 156-159, 169, 287,
 299, 300

- Aufklärung*, 174, 178, 182
 Augustine, 52, 78, 80-82, 109, 117-118, 123, 128-129, 135-136, 151, 284, 323-325; ethics, 78-79; evil, 83-87; foreknowledge, 79-80, 88-89; psychology, 79, 82, 323-324; the will, 84-85, 324
 Austria, 145
 Austrian philosophers — Brentano, 356; Dziewicki, 145; Ehrenfels, 356; Meinong, 356
 Avempace, 270
 Averroës, 270
 Averroism, 271
 Avesta, 1, 9
 Avicenna, 141, 270
 Awareness, 312, 318, 330, 333

 Babylonians, 11, 66
 Bacon, 4, 241
 Ballanche, 238
 Balmez, J. L., 276-282, 285
 Bannez, 272
 Bardaisan, 69
 Basil, 128
 Basilides, 69, 75; Absolute, 72; psychology, 71; suffering, 71; transmigration, 71
 Baumgarten, 313
 Baur, 181
 Beauty, 40, 87, 108, 113-114
 Beccaria, 254
 Beer, Dr., 145
 Being, 67, 72-74, 94, 106-107, 110, 112, 125-126, 130-132, 134, 140, 143, 149, 155, 157-158, 185, 187, 210, 212, 217, 222, 227, 236-237, 245, 262, 267, 273, 276, 279, 280-281, 287-289, 291, 297-298, 300, 302, 304, 307, 313, 339, 341, 345
 Belgium, 285
 Belief, 192, 194, 232-233, 247-248, 259, 278, 282, 306, 308, 310, 343
 Beneke, 257
 Bentham, 353
 Bergson, 248, 250, 252
 Berkeley, 147, 207, 225, 231-233, 313
 Bersot, 242
 Bible, 174
 Bibliolatriy, 174
 Biedermann, 236
 Biology, 327, 337
 Body, mind and, 313, 325, 326-329
 Boehringer, 145
 Boëthius, 141
 Bonatelli, Francesco, 256-269
 Borrelli, 255
 Bosanquet, 313
 Bousset, 65
 Boutroux, 245-246, 248-249, 285
 Bowne, 285
 Bradley, Dr., 285, 294-295, 304, 316, 327
 Bradwardine, 153
 Brahma, 5, 6
 Brahmanic philosophy, 5-8
 Brentano, F., 356
 Britain, 311
 British ethics, 161, 344
 Brochard, 246
 Bruno, Giordano, 169
 Buddensieg, 145
 Buddhism, 7-8, 74
 Busse, 285, 298, 301, 327

 Caird, Dr E., 2, 295
 Cantoni, 255
 Carneri, 341
 Caro, 242, 244, 250
 Cartesianism, 111, 154, 158, 169, 238, 252
 Catalan, 272
 Catalonia, 276
 Categories, 18-19, 106, 147-148, 187, 189, 210-211, 214, 222-223, 247, 273, 280, 286, 290, 299, 323, 330, 342, 344, 351
 Catholicism, 127, 283
 Causality, 6, 8, 14, 20-21, 27, 130, 133-134, 141, 155, 188-189, 265-269, 276, 279, 289, 291, 294, 301, 326
 Causation, 20-27, 80-83, 126, 130, 132-133, 138, 165, 267-268, 273
 Cause, Absolute, 150-151, 155, 160, 176, 190, 268, 303
 Cerinthus, 69
 Certitude, 162, 243, 247, 251, 276-278, 324, 337
 Cesca, 256
 Chalcedon, Council of, 57
 China, 12
 Chinese thought, 3-4
 Christ, Person of, 76, 98, 180-181
 Christendom, 143
 Christian Theology, 40, 77, 129, 222
 Christian thought, 52, 65
 Christianity, 172-174, 182, 242
 Christology, 54, 59, 95-97
 Chrysostom, 128
 Churchly-Scholastic Philosophy, 276, 283-284
 City of God, 84-85, 91, 357
 Clement, 40, 58, 60, 72, 75, 92
 Coe, 322
 Cognition, 99, 103, 113, 140, 162, 184, 211, 224, 232, 242, 259, 289, 290, 316, 323, 330

- Cohen, 230
 Coimbra, 273
 Collecchi, 255
 Comte, 239-240, 251, 286
 Conceptualism, 111, 120-121, 149, 229
 Condillac, 252, 254, 277
 Condorcet, 239-240
 Conscience, 192, 194, 199, 202, 204-205, 246, 250, 252, 258-259, 262, 282, 337, 355
 Consciousness, 110-112, 115, 155-157, 162, 203, 214, 219-220, 226, 232, 242-243, 247-249, 263, 266, 291-293, 300-301, 312, 318-319, 321, 323, 327-329, 330, 337, 357; God-consciousness, 203, 219-220, 228, 236, 306, 322-323; moral consciousness, 193, 195, 307, 315, 321, 337, 347, 353
 Conservation of energy, 318, 327
 Constanz, Council of, 151
 Conti, 256, 285
 Contingency, 86, 137, 151, 190, 245-246, 263
 Cordova, 270-271
 Corleo, 256
 Corporeity, 307, 310, 313, 325-329
 Cortés, Donoso, 276, 283
 Cosmic order, 6, 24, 29, 32, 43, 45, 47, 50, 54, 72-73, 160, 237, 250, 269, 271, 334-335
 Cosmogony, 29, 65, 94
 Cosmology, 22-23, 53, 56, 59, 100, 103, 107, 187-190
 Cournot, 251
 Cousin, 242-243, 245, 277
 Cracow, 145
 Creationism, 21-22, 33, 57-58, 65, 67, 81-82, 94, 96-98, 126, 132-133, 138-140, 142, 149-150, 152, 250, 278
 Criticism, 295; Neo-, 246-248
Critique of Judgment, 192
Critique of Practical Reason, 192, 200, 205
Critique of Pure Reason, 192, 200
 Croce, 256
 Cudworth, 338
Cultura Española, 284
 Cusa, 171
 Damiron, 242, 245
 Dante, 123, 127, 135, 143
 Dauriac, 246, 250, 285
De Animâ, 325
 De Arintero, Gonzalez, 283-285
 De Besson, E. A., 284
 De Biran, Maine, 242, 316
 De Castro, Frederico, 283
De Civitate Dei, 78, 129
De Divisione Naturæ, 118
 De Grazia, 255
 De Sarlo, 256-257, 285
 Deism, 172, 179, 182, 197, 305
 De los Rios, Giner, 283
 De Maistre, 238-239
 Del Rio, J. Sanz, 283
 Demiurge, 11, 22, 65, 67, 69, 75, 107
 Demonology, 80
 Denmark, 285
 Descartes, 4, 169, 239, 241-242, 254, 277, 280, 290, 302, 313, 324-326
 Desire, 164, 264-265, 351, 356
 Destiny, 51, 323
 Determinism, 51, 138, 141, 150, 165, 179, 354
Deus ex machinâ, 201
Deus sive Natura, 158
Deus sive Substantia, 159
 Deussen, 2
 Development, 78-79, 87, 90, 97, 102, 110, 117, 166, 171, 173, 177, 182, 185, 193, 196, 200, 211, 213, 251, 275, 289, 291, 317, 324, 326, 336-337, 348-352
 Di Giovanni, 256
 Dialecticism, 126-127, 142, 214, 256, 321; Greek, 93, 118
 Diaz, Rubio y, 284
 Diogenes of Apollonia, 15
 Dionysius, 120, 142, 181
Disputationes Metaphysicæ, 273
 Divisibility, 111, 332; of matter, 281
 Docetism, 68, 74
 Dogma, 92, 119, 126-127, 150, 278
 Dogmatism, 182, 200, 212, 234, 251
 Dominicans, 272, 275
 Dualism, 6-9, 16, 35, 60-61, 66, 68, 71, 86, 94, 114-115, 124, 142, 152, 158, 168, 191, 194, 208, 224, 228, 264, 271, 300, 329
 Duns Scotus, 118-119, 122-123, 127, 139, 153
 Durkheim, 251
 Duty, 341-342, 353, 357
 Dziewicki, M. H., 145, 147
 Eastern thought, 2-3, 10-12
 Ebbinghaus, 326
 Eclecticism, Cousin's, 242-243; French, 242, 244-245, 249, 251-252; Gnostic, 66; Italian, 255; Lotze's, 310; Origen's, 92; Spanish, 273, 278
 Ecstasy, 105, 112-114
 Education, Divine, 171-172, 177-178
 Efficient causation, 20-27, 80, 83, 101, 131, 133, 189, 301, 352

- Ego, 8, 173, 207, 209, 214, 241, 315-316, 320, 323
 Egoism, 167, 355
 Egyptian thought, 11, 129
 Ehrenfels, 356
 Eleatics, 29, 31
 Emanations, 4-5, 35, 58, 60, 62, 76, 81, 96, 112, 142, 271
 Emerson, 320
 Emotions, the, 197, 204, 211, 349
 Empiricism, 143, 148, 189, 200, 214, 226, 229, 252, 254-255, 258, 282, 302, 314, 331, 334, 343
 Energy, 20, 25-26, 28, 230, 237, 301, 318, 327-328, 334
 England, 285
 Enlightenment, the, 174, 178, 182
 Epictetus, 41, 45, 50, 169
 Epistemology, 123, 141, 148, 216, 223, 232, 247, 288, 300-301, 317, 322, 333
 Erdmann, Benno, 187
 Erdmann, J. E., 145
 Erhardt, 327
 Erigena, Scotus, 118, 124-126
 Eschatology, 100
 Essence, 19-21, 59, 84, 97, 106, 122, 131-132, 134, 136, 142, 157, 160-161, 166, 261, 273-274, 280, 282, 287-288, 291-292, 294, 301-303, 307, 314, 319-320
 Ethical Deity, 203, 244, 287
 Ethical dualism, 68
 Ethical interests, 24, 47, 79, 86, 194, 247, 287, 340
 Ethical law, 10, 49
 Ethical monism, 227
 Ethical philosophy, 49-50, 102, 135
 Ethical spirit, 31, 101, 161-162, 178, 197, 292, 349, 355
 Ethical theism, 88, 193-194
 Ethical theory, 41-42, 47, 88, 102, 127, 193, 246, 340, 344
 Ethics, 276, 286, 336-357; Augustine's, 79-89; empirical, 343, 347-349, 351-355; evolutionary, 336-337, 342-343, 351-355; Green's, 341, 351; history of, 144, 357; individualistic, 195-196; Kant's, 192-200, 339, 342; method of, 161, 336-337, 343, 345-349; metaphysics and, 343-349, 357; Origen's, 92, 101-102; practical, 35, 42, 47, 164, 351; psychology and, 347-348; scientific, 336, 342-344, 346-349, 353, 355; social, 195, 219-222, 232, 238-239, 251, 334, 352-353, 357; Spinoza's, 160-161, 164, 167-168; Stoical, 51, 52
 Eucken, 285, 307
 Euripides, 30-31
 Europe, 127, 272
 Europe, Mediæval, 120
 European philosophy, 10, 12, 127, 136, 253
 Evil, 8-10, 44, 48, 67-68, 76, 82, 139, 151, 164-165, 198, 201, 209, 245; origin of, 83-84, 86-87, 89, 101, 113; negative character of, 139, 324
 Evolution, of ethics, 336-337, 342-343, 351-355; of evil, 9-10, 82-87, 89; of mind, 249, 329; of religion, 61, 171, 177-178, 213; of world, 73, 91, 178, 208, 224, 234, 239, 250, 256, 286; of soul, 313
 Evolutionism, 241-242, 355
Exegetica, 71, 76
 Experience, 126, 165, 168, 181, 188-190, 194, 196, 200-201, 209-211, 213-214, 216-218, 220-221, 225, 229, 233, 236-237, 242, 248, 264, 266-267, 287-290, 293, 295-298, 300, 302, 305, 313, 316-318, 321, 329, 343
 Experimentalism, 241, 243, 256
 Extension, 111, 155-156, 225, 258, 280, 300
 Falckenberg, 145
 Fall, the, 85
 Fatalism, 46, 94, 112, 246
 Fate, 35, 39, 141
 Fathers, the post-Apostolic, 55, 128-129, 177
 Feeling, 196, 258, 263-265, 280, 319, 337, 340, 350, 356
 Ferrari, 255
 Fichte, 195, 202, 290, 302, 315, 345
 Filangieri, 254
 Final Cause, 24, 34, 134, 191, 245
 First Cause, 21-26, 107, 123, 130-131, 133, 187-188, 266-268, 279, 289
 Fiske, 313
 Florence, 257
 Fonseca, Petrus, 272-273
 Fore-knowledge, Divine, 79-80, 88-89
 Form, 15-16, 19, 106, 133, 135, 139-140, 152, 169, 294, 325
 Fortlage, 257
 Fouillée, 249-250, 285, 342
 Fourier, 239
 France, 238, 242, 250-253, 285, 311
 Franchi, 255
 Franciscans, 272, 275
 Franck, 242
 Freedom, 84, 88-89, 101-102, 137-138, 149-150, 160, 165, 193, 198, 202, 209, 220, 227-229, 236, 269, 304-305, 309-310, 341-342, 354-355
 Freewill, 84, 87, 112, 150, 303

French Eclecticism, 242, 244-245, 249, 251
 French philosophy, 238-253
 Fullerton, 285
 Functional psychology, 329-330
Fundamental Philosophy, 276-277
 Future Life, the, 48, 250, 306-309

Gabelli, 255
 Galiani, 254
 Galluppi, 254, 257
 Garnier, 242
 Gaunilo, 126
 Genetic method, the, 193, 316-317, 325, 351
 Genovesi, 254
 Geometry, 159, 161, 167
 German literature, 171
 German method, 344
 German philosophy, 257
 German psychology, 264
 German spirit, 182
 German transcendentalism, 147
 Germany, 184, 285, 311
 Geulincx, 170
 Giannone, 254
 Gioberti, 255
 Gioja, 254
 Gizycki, 353
Gnosis, 65, 67-68, 70, 75, 104
 Gnosticism, 54, 64, 65-77, 103, 113;
 Clement on, 75-76; Hellenic, 70-73;
 Judaic, 69; Pagan, 69, 74
 Goethe, 169, 175, 264, 307, 332
 Goetze, 174
 Gonzalez, 275
 Gonzalez, Zeferino, 276
 Good, the, 16, 21, 24, 33, 36, 38, 44, 48,
 49, 82-85, 107, 136, 163, 198, 202, 338-
 342, 351-353, 357
 Gospel, the, 180, 183
 Grace, 137-138, 143
 Granada, 273
 Gratry, 239
 Greece, 63
 Greek thought, 2-3, 10-12, 28-29, 35, 38-
 39, 60, 65-67, 100, 129
 Greek tragedy, 30-31
 Green, 236, 341, 351
 Gregories, the, 128
 Guyau, 250

Haeckel, 299
 Haldane, 323
 Hamelin, 252
 Hamilton, 219
 Happiness, 166, 193, 273, 352
 Harnack, 62, 104

Hartmann, 290, 337-338
 Hatch, 59, 94
 Hauréau, 145
 Hebraism, 8
 Hedonism, 106, 350-351, 353, 355
 Hegel, 14, 72, 89, 125, 142, 168-169, 175,
 182-183, 187-188, 191, 204, 207, 211-
 212, 214, 222-223, 230, 236, 238, 240,
 277, 283, 302, 307
 Hegelianism, 255, 283
 Heine, 175
 Hellenism, 65, 69, 93
 Helmholtz, 258
 Heraclitus, 15, 31-32, 53, 61, 320
 Herbart, 256, 257-258, 297, 302, 355-356
 Herder, 87, 178
 Hesiod, 29-30
 Heterogony, 355
 Heymans, G., 285
 Hindu thought, 4-5, 8-9, 11
 Historical philosophy, 1, 3, 145, 239, 243,
 246, 270, 274, 284, 289, 294
 History, 171, 173, 177-178, 180-181, 184,
 193, 196, 200, 203, 241, 254-255, 270,
 305, 317-318, 340, 343, 355, 357
 Hobbes, 121
 Hodgson, Dr Shadworth, 285
 Höffding, 145, 285, 326, 329, 337
 Holland, 285, 311
 Homer, 29-30
 Hooker, 123
 Howison, 285
 Hugo of St Victor, 122
 Hume, 232, 248, 315
 Hylozoism, 31
 Hypnotism, 331
 Hypostasis, 16, 54, 96, 106

Iberia, 274-275
 Ideal, the, 35, 36, 49, 63, 88, 93, 130-131,
 167, 186, 194-195, 199-200, 202, 219,
 223-224, 244, 252, 263, 282, 288, 304,
 327, 339-341, 343, 345, 348-351
 Idealism, 52, 101, 123, 125, 165, 169, 170,
 207-209, 217, 226, 229, 233, 244-245,
 249, 255, 260, 300, 305, 345; Berke-
 ley's, 147, 231; ethical, 216-217, 226;
 Hegelian, 207-215, 219-224, 229-230;
 Neo-Kantian, 230, 253; Origen's, 101-
 102; Plato's, 53, 101; of Plotinus, 110-
 111; theistic, 207, 213-215, 219-237
 Idealist, the, 121; ideality of, 314, 354
 Ideas, 15-17, 19, 27, 38, 93, 132, 141,
 162, 194, 216-217, 232, 249, 261, 270,
 274, 276, 280, 282, 300, 316, 319, 351,
 355
 Ideation, 258, 330, 342

- Imagination, 318
 Immanence, 19, 26, 34, 55, 58-61, 130, 160, 165, 185, 203, 219, 228, 235, 268, 296, 300, 304, 306, 310, 332, 334, 347
 Immortality, 100, 143, 162, 179, 250, 306-309
 Impulse, 265, 330, 356
 Incarnation, 56, 58-59, 64, 67, 81, 93, 96, 104, 149
 Indeterminism, 101, 248
 India, 1, 12, 66
 Indian thought, 2-3, 5, 8-9
 Individualism, 41, 44, 99, 121, 163, 178-179, 203, 238, 353, 356
 Individuality, 46, 50, 62, 119, 140, 146, 165, 168, 179, 214, 271, 298-299, 308
 Individuation, 139, 222, 271
 Infinite, the, 6, 8, 95, 105, 115, 126, 129-130, 150, 154, 157, 159-160, 169, 212, 219-220, 227, 229, 233-234, 236, 244, 268, 274, 276, 280-281, 291, 294, 343
 Infinitude, 95
 Infinity, 235, 244, 293
Innerlichkeit, 118
 Inquisition, the, 272
 Inspiration, 178
 Intellect, 137, 140-141, 155-156, 192, 200, 217, 225, 240, 258, 286, 321, 329, 338
 Intellectualism, 163-164, 167-168, 172, 196, 199, 211, 213-215, 247, 316, 323
 Intelligence, Divine, 160, 191, 268, 279
 Intelligibility, Divine, 134, 156, 167
 Interaction, theory of, 327-329
 Intuition, 125, 245, 276, 289, 315
 Iranian thought, 9-10
 Irenæus, 64, 65
 Isidore (son of Basilides), 71
 Isidore of Seville, 270
 Italian mind, 256
 Italian philosophy, 254-269
 Italian psychology, 258-259, 265
 Italy, 254-256, 258, 285, 311; Central, 255; Northern, 255; Southern, 255
 Izquierdo, A. Gómez, 283-284

 James, Prof. Wm., 313, 316, 322, 327, 332-333, 337
 Janet, 242, 336
 Jesuits, the, 272-273, 275
 Jesus, 76
 Jewish thought, 66, 69, 169, 176, 270-271
 Jodl, 326
 John, St. on Logos, 54-55
 Jouffroy, 242-243
 Judaic Gnosticism, 69
 Judaism, 69, 172, 271
 Judgment, act of, 164, 186, 255, 259, 265, 334, 353-354; value, 252, 261, 342, 355-357
 Justice, 30.
 Justin Martyr, 10, 40, 55-57, 60-61

 Kant, 161, 172, 183-206, 212, 219, 223, 230, 238, 242, 247-248, 290, 294-295, 302, 315, 322, 339, 342; Cosmological argument, 187-190; freedom, 198; metaphysics, 186, 192; Moral proof, 192-196; Ontological argument, 185-187; philosophy of religion, 184, 193, 196, 201-203, 205-206; reason, 199
 Kantianism, 134, 245, 247-248, 255, 283, 289, 322
 Karma, 8
 Kingdom of God, 199
 Kinkel, 230
 Knowledge, theory of, 89, 102-103, 122, 140, 148, 155, 160, 162-164, 170, 211, 214, 216, 222, 224, 230-231, 233, 240, 258, 264, 293-294, 356
 Koenig, 294
 Krause, 283-284
 Krausean philosophy, 283
 Külpe, 285, 327, 354
 Kuno Fischer, 185

 Labanca, 256
 Labriola, 256
 Lachelier, 245, 249
 Ladd, Prof. G. T., 285, 347
 Lamarck, 242
 Lamennais, 238
 Land, 285
 Lara, Orti y, 276, 283
 Latin, 145
 Law, 9, 17, 35, 51, 53, 78, 83, 124, 261-262, 266, 277-278, 282, 318, 323-324, 327, 329, 341, 357
 Lechler, 145
 Leibniz, 121, 139, 171, 179, 189, 242, 245-246, 277, 280, 290, 313
 Lemos, P. A., 284
 Leonhardi, 283
 Lessing, 171-183, 201
 Leuba, 322
 Leucippus, 15
 Liberatore, 255
 Liberty, 245-246, 265, 270, 282, 303
 Life, 10, 47, 51-52, 85, 102, 163-164, 167, 175, 192, 196, 200, 206, 210, 214, 217-218, 229, 233-234, 250, 277, 293, 305, 308, 310, 315, 319-320, 322-323, 340, 350, 357
 Lisbon, 275
 Littré, 241, 286

- Livy, 181
 Locke, 121, 148, 254, 313
 Logic, 126, 145, 147, 150, 158, 186, 217, 220, 234-235, 263, 272, 276, 279, 286, 327; Hegelian, 210, 214, 219
Logica, 146
 Logos, the, 10-11, 38, 53-64, 69, 94-96, 150
 Lombard, the, 129
 Lombroso, 255
 Loserth, 145
 Lotze, 17, 20, 149, 233, 235, 257-258, 260-262, 292, 303, 309, 318, 327, 356
 Love, Spinoza on, 156-157, 162, 165-167
 Lusitania, 272
 Luther, 125
 Lutheranism, 173

 Mackenzie, Prof. J. S., 338, 357
 Madrid, 283
 Maimonides, Moses, 271
 Majorca, 271
 Malebranche, 139, 170, 176, 254, 277, 282-283
 Mamiani, 255-256
 Manichæism, 66, 83, 109
 Marcion, 69
 Marcus Aurelius, 45-46, 50, 52; ethical philosophy of, 41-52
 Mariano, 256
 Martin, Meliton, 284
 Martineau, 205, 229
 Mata, Pedro, 283
 Materialism, 4, 106, 111-113, 120, 158, 208, 231, 238, 249, 283-284, 326
 Materialist, the, 121, 227
 Mathematics, 214, 276, 280
 Matter, 7, 16-20, 36-37, 98, 108-110, 112, 115, 133, 135, 139-140, 147, 152, 158, 208, 216, 225, 233, 237, 249, 271, 280, 294, 300
Maya, 6
 Mechanism, 265-267, 268-269, 284, 291, 296, 301, 313, 348
 Mediaevalism, 139, 169
 Mediaeval philosophy, 117-118, 123, 126, 147
 Mediaeval theology, 270
 Mediator, 56, 59-62, 203
 Meinong, 356
 Melanchthon, 125, 144
 Mendoza, 275
 Mercier, D., 285
 Messianic Kingdom, 70
 Metaphysics, 58, 107, 109, 126, 135, 147, 149, 154, 160-161, 210, 213-214, 230, 246, 248, 250, 255-267, 275-276, 283, 286-288, 292, 294-297, 299, 301-302, 304, 306, 308, 310-311, 316-317, 327, 338, 342-344, 346-350, 357; Aristotle's, 18-19, 25-37; of Aurelius, 42; of Basilides, 71-72; Bergson's, 248, 250, 310; Buddhist, 7; Cousin's, 243; Kant's, 186, 192; Lotze's, 20, 309-310; method of, 298, 304, 309; Plato's, 23; science of, 289-298, 302; Spinoza's, 154, 161, 168; of Suarez, 273-275; transcendental, 57, 309
 Metempsychosis, 115
 Middle Ages, 115, 128, 141-142, 144, 271-272
 Milhaud, 251
 Mill, J. S., 88, 225, 353
 Milton, 153
 Modern philosophy, 60, 63
 Molina, Louis, 272
 Monad, 72, 97
 Monism, 65, 303, 310, 354; Brahmanic, 6, 8; Eleatic, 29, 31; of Fouillée, 249-250; Haeckel's, 299-300; Lessing's, 179; of Plotinus, 110; scientific, 300-301; Spinoza's, 158, 160, 170; spiritualistic, 90, 94, 227, 289, 292, 296, 299, 301, 304, 314; Stoical, 42
 Monotheism, 9, 33, 39, 45, 70
 Moore, G. E., 338
 Moral act, 338, 341, 347
 Moral end, 205, 240, 303, 340-342, 351
 Moral ideal, 30, 36, 52, 163, 194, 195-199, 202, 206, 217, 341, 349-350, 352-355
 Moral interest, 10, 122, 216, 218
 Moral law, 5, 122, 124, 185, 192-194, 196, 203, 274, 315, 349, 353-354
 Moral nature, 173, 192
 Moral obligation, 193, 218, 337, 342, 351-352
 Moral philosophy, 275, 336-357
 Moral postulates, 192-193, 196, 202, 204-205, 247, 319, 354
 Moral reason, 39, 124, 194-195, 200, 206
 Moralism, 106, 120, 169, 192-200, 202, 212, 215-216, 235, 245, 354-355
 Morality, religion and, 172, 183, 193-194, 202, 204, 243, 245, 282, 303, 336-338, 346, 349, 352-353, 355, 357
 Morselli, 256
 Motion, 20, 23, 25, 111, 136, 225, 260, 301
 Muñoz, A. Lopez, 284
 Münsterberg, 318, 319, 326
 Mutability, 86
 Mysticism, 3, 38-39, 70, 75, 106, 108,

III, 113-114, 118, 122, 125, 142, 197,
330-331
Mythology, Greek, 29-33, 40, 65, 67

Nathan the Wise, 172-173

Natorp, 17, 230

Natura naturata, 160, 163

Natural theology, 129-130, 171-172, 178,
244

Naturalism, 29, 106, 351, 337, 344

Nature, 6, 8, 134, 233, 237, 241, 249, 267,
288, 296-299, 301-302, 311, 337, 348;
Hegel on, 222; Origen, 100; Plotinus,
110

Neo-Criticism, Renouvier's, 246-248

Neo-Hegelianism, 212, 224-225, 229-231

Neo-Kantism, 230, 246, 248, 252-253,
255-256

Neo-Platonism, 11, 35, 60, 80-81, 93,
105-106, 111, 113, 115, 118, 125

Neo-Scholasticism, 276

New Testament, 76, 173, 182

Nice, Council of, 57

Nicene Christology, 59

Nicholas of Cusa, 171

Nicolai, 174

Noëtics, 324

Nominalism, 120-122, 147-149

Nominalist controversy, 120-122, 148-149

Noumenon, 247-248

Núñez, Martínez, 284-285

Nys, D., 285

Objectivity, 104, 113, 141, 175, 189,
204, 211, 228, 236-237, 241, 244, 248,
251, 258-261, 263-264, 271, 284-285,
289, 292, 321, 332, 336-337, 342, 345,
354, 356

Occidentalism, 1-3, 10-11, 306

Ockam, William, 120, 123-125, 127,
146, 153

Old Testament, 70, 179

Ollé-Laprune, 252

Olmedo, M. P., 284

Omnipotence, 95, 98

Ontology, 4, 53, 67, 236, 244, 263, 268,
287, 303, 336, 344, 348; of Aquinas,
142; Plato's, 32; Spinoza's, 158, 160;
ontological argument, 125, 185-187;
ontologism, 131, 255-256.

Optimism, 6, 44, 46, 101, 139

Orient, 2, 270

Oriental philosophy, 1-5, 8, 11-12, 306

Orientalism, 8, 12, 66-67, 69

Origen, 40, 60, 62, 71, 92-104, 117, 124,
171; ethics of, 92, 101-103; idealism
of, 101-102; psychology, 99-101

Orphicism, 29

Oversoul, 37, 316

Oxford, 2, 146

Ozanam, 78

Pagan thought, 52, 69, 74

Pantenus, 92

Pantheism, 2, 5-6, 41, 80, 94, 105, 118,
120, 125, 142, 150, 155, 179, 221, 227,
242, 245-246, 280-282, 295

Parallelism, theory of, 326-327

Paris, 275

Parsee, 86

Passion, 46, 164-165, 167, 197, 283

Paulsen, 285, 287, 326, 344

Peccenini, 256

Pedagogics, 170

Pelagianism, 272

Perception, 161, 225, 248, 258-260, 274,
318, 321; sense, 140, 225-226; spir-
itual, 181, 225-226, 324, 330-331, 346

Perfection, 73, 83, 90, 93, 134, 161-162,
165-166, 179, 244, 250, 282, 303, 307,
352, 354-355

Peripateticism, 106

Persia, 1

Persian thought, 9, 66

Personalism, 246-247

Personality, 22, 45, 50, 52, 54, 59-61,
90, 94, 96, 109, 111-112, 157, 167,
179, 193, 215, 221-222, 229, 231, 235-
236, 244-247, 268, 290, 292, 304, 307,
310, 315, 341, 344-345, 354, 356

Pessimism, 6-8, 30, 45, 87

Peyretti, 256

Phenomenalism, 170, 188-189, 246-248,
267, 327-328, 350

Philip II., 275

Philo, 35, 38, 53-55, 61-63, 68

Philology, 120

Philosophy, Arabian, 129, 141, 270-271;
Chinese, 3-4; Eastern, 2-3, 10-12;
Egyptian, 11; French, 238-253; Ger-
man, 147, 182, 257, 264, 285, 311,
344; Greek, 1-3, 10-13, 38-40; Indian,
2-3, 5, 8; Italian, 254-269, 285;
modern, 60, 63; organ of, 323; of
religion, 12-13, 33, 36, 39-40, 65-66,
70, 74, 77, 106, 134, 171, 183-184,
193, 196, 200-202, 206; Sankhya, 5-7;
universality of, 13; Upanishads, 4,
6-7; Vedanta, 5-6; Western, 1, 6, 8,
10, 12.

Philosophy of history, 77-91

Philosophy of Nature, 210

Philosophy of Spirit, 210

Phœnicians, 11

- Phylogenesis, 332
 Physics, 25-26
 Physiology, 314, 355
 Platonism, 184
 Pilon, 246, 285
Pistis, 68
 Plato, 11, 55, 78, 80, 82, 105-107, 109-111, 129, 256, 302, 313, 338, 345; on causation, 21-24; on Creation, 21-23; Final Cause, 24; Form, 15-16, 19; the Good, 16, 21, 24, 33, 36, 38; idealism of, 53, 101; on Ideas, 15-17, 19, 27; *Laws*, 22-23; on Matter, 16-17, 20, 36; metaphysics, 23; mythology, 33; ontology, 32-33; *Parmenides*, 17; *Phaedo*, 23; *Phaedrus*, 23; *Philebus*, 17, 22; philosophy of religion, 33, 36; psychology, 21; Reality, 36; religion, 36-39; *Republic*, 17, 21-23, 38; *Sophist*, 17, 20, 23; soul, 33; *Statesman*, 23; substance, 15-17, 19-20; *Theatetus*, 17, 23; *Timaeus*, 15-16, 21-23.
 Platonism, 16-17, 19, 32, 38, 55, 62, 67-68, 75, 81, 99-102, 106-107, 112, 116, 128, 143, 146, 158, 169, 179, 256, 313
 Plotinus, 35, 37, 38-39, 105-117; his philosophy of the One, 106-108
 Pluralism, 108, 214, 222, 248, 303
 Poincaré, 248
 Political philosophy, 238-239, 275, 277, 352
 Polybius, 181
 Polytheism, 2, 6, 29, 30, 35, 280
 Pope, the, 275
 Porphyry, 81
Positive Politics, 240-241
 Positivism, 120, 148, 239, 245, 255-256, 283-284
 Potence, 125, 315
 Prayer, 6
 Predestination, 101, 137, 151
 Pre-existence of the soul, 74, 99, 101
 Price, 338
 Prime-Mover, 21, 24, 25, 37, 126, 130, 271
 Proclus, 35
Proslogion, 125
 Protestantism, 272
 Protestant theology, 153
 Providence, 43, 87, 101, 141, 182
 Psychology, 123, 225, 230, 236, 242-244, 250, 257, 260, 265, 276-277, 284, 286, 316, 318, 320, 322, 324, 326, 337, 347-350, 353, 355-356; of Aquinas, 136; of Aristotle, 322-323; of Augustine, 79, 82, 136, 323-324; of Basilides, 71; of cognition, 266, 316; of Cousin and Jouffroy, 243; empiric, 258, 314, 334; ethics and, 347-348; functional, 329-330; German, 264; Hume's, 315; Italian, 258-259, 265; Kant's, 315; metaphysics and, 317, 348; Neo-Platonic, 108-109, 111; objective, 325; Origen's, 99-101, 103; Pauline, 99; rational, 314, 332; recent, 266; religion and, 316-317; of Socrates, 32; of the soul, 312-325, 329-335; Spinoza's, 157, 162; spiritual, 323-325, 330-332; subjective, 254, 325, 355-356; of volition, 266-267.
 Ptolemies, 3
 Pythagoreans, 129
 Quevedo, 275
 Quietism, 3, 5, 47-48, 331
 Ragnisco, 256
 Rashdall, Dr H., 337
 Rationalism, 111, 159, 174, 184, 199, 202, 214, 251-252, 255, 301, 338, 344, 348, 356
 Rauwenhof, 285
 Ravaisson, 242, 245, 249
 Raymond Lully, 271
 Raymond of Sabunde, 271-272
 Real, the, 223-224, 248, 261, 267, 282, 286, 288, 298, 301, 319, 338
 Realism, 120-121, 125, 147-150, 170, 247, 254-255, 260
 Realist controversy, 120-121, 142, 146, 149, 153
 Reality, 16-20, 24-25, 36-37, 39, 94, 111, 126, 155, 164, 167-169, 185, 203, 205, 207, 210-213, 216-217, 220, 223-224, 226-227, 229-230, 246, 248-249, 256-257, 259-261, 263-264, 282, 286, 288-289, 293, 295, 298-299, 301, 309, 317, 320, 323, 325, 338-339, 344-350.
 Reason, 23, 33, 38-39, 42, 45-46, 51, 59, 61-62, 92, 102, 106-108, 114-115, 118-119, 122, 124, 126-127, 130-136, 143, 161-162, 164, 174, 176, 178, 184-185, 188, 193-194, 199-200, 205, 212, 217, 219, 223, 226, 230, 236, 244-245, 263, 265, 278-279, 281, 288-289, 294, 298-299, 303, 322, 338, 340-341, 356.
 Redemption, 67-68, 111, 125, 161, 199, 334
 Reformation, the, 153, 173
 Rehmke, 327
 Reid, 277
 Reimarus, 174, 180-181
 Relations, 190, 212, 214, 217, 221, 237,

- 243, 247, 263, 267, 294, 296-297, 304, 308, 314, 344-345, 348, 356-357
 Relativity, 87, 168, 216, 247-248, 293, 295, 300, 302, 348
Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason, 184, 193, 197, 199, 201, 203
 Religion, Assyrian, 11; Babylonian, 11; centre of, 64, 320; Chinese, 3-4; Egyptian, 11; evolution of, 61, 171, 177-178, 213; of Greece, 12, 28-32, 39-40; of India, 2, 5-8; of Jesuits, 275; Kant's, 184-206; Lessing's, 177-178; morality and, 172; nature of, 203; Persian, 9-10; philosophy and, 12-13, 33, 36, 39-40, 65-66, 70, 74, 77, 106, 134, 171, 183-184, 193, 196, 200-202, 206; Phœnician, 11; Plato's, 36-39; psychology and, 316-317; universality of, 203
 Renaissance, 115, 117
 Renouvier, 245-248, 250, 252, 285
 Restorationism, 100
 Resurrection, 100, 180
 Retribution, 100
 Revealed theology, 129-130
 Revelation, 36, 57, 61, 63, 70, 82, 126-127, 130, 143, 172-173, 176-178, 192, 200, 217, 246, 254, 279, 308
 Richter, 176
 Riehl, 326
 Right, the, 340-341
 Ritschl, 286
 Ritschlianism, 285, 316
 Ritter, P. H., 285
 Roeder, 283
 Rolfes, 285
 Romagnosi, 254
 Rome, 63
 Roscellinus, 121
 Rosmini, 128, 131, 139, 255, 257
 Royce, 220, 285
 Royer-Collard, 242
 Sabellianism, 58, 97
 Sacrifice, 6, 51, 202
 Saisset, 242, 245
 Salmerón, Nicolaus, 283
 Salvation, Brahmanic, 7; Buddhist, 7; Gnostic, 68, 71; world, 335
 Sankhya philosophy, 5-7
 Schelling, 125, 169, 242, 245, 277
 Schleiermacher, 169, 196, 204-205, 322
 Scholasticism, 117-119, 122-124, 128, 146-147, 152, 238, 275, 277-278; method of, 127; Spanish, 273, 275
 Scholastic philosophy, 117-118, 139, 273-274
 Schoolmen, the, 130, 145, 153, 169, 177
 Schopenhauer, 223, 290, 292, 297
 Schweglar, 145
 Science, 135, 188, 239, 246, 248, 250-252, 261, 267, 271, 275, 284, 288-289, 291, 294-298, 300, 302, 306, 316, 323-324, 326, 328-329, 334, 336-337, 342-344, 346-350, 354
 Scotism, 122, 272, 274-275
 Scottish School, the, 277
 Scotus Erigena, 118, 124-126
 Scriptures, the, 70, 102
 Secrétan, 245
 Self, the, 7, 84, 89, 94, 110, 162, 165-166, 207-209, 219, 221, 229-230, 232, 290, 299, 313, 315, 321, 329, 332
 Self-activity, 26, 34, 211-212, 225-226, 236, 242, 289-290, 304, 330, 354
 Self-consciousness, 60, 110, 113, 211, 219, 221-222, 268, 292, 310, 352
 Self-determination, 93, 151
 Self-development, 50-51, 341, 353
 Selfishness, 166, 353
 Self-sacrifice, 166, 353
 Seneca, 41, 45
 Sensations, 189, 225, 232-233, 259, 276, 316
 Sensationalism, 242, 252
 Sensibility, 258, 282
 Sensism, 238, 254
 Sergi, 256
 Serrano, Gonzalez, 283
 Seville, 270
 Shirley, 153
 Siciliani, 255
 Sidgwick, 338, 340, 346, 351
 Siebeck, 354
 Sigwart, 327
 Simmel, 337
 Simon, Jules, 242, 244-245
 Simon, Saint, 239
 Sin, 85, 139, 151; original, 80
 Social ethics, 195, 219-222, 232, 238-239, 251, 334, 352-353, 357
 Sociology, 239-240, 337
 Socrates, *Apology* of, 325; method of, 129; moral reason, 39; psychological mode, 32; rational element, 32; teleological reasonings, 32
 Sophocles, 30
 Soul, the, 6, 7, 33, 36, 45, 50, 71, 107-111, 122, 135, 139-140, 157, 250, 273, 286, 300, 306, 308, 310, 312-325, 329-335
 Space, 95, 152, 260, 276, 280-281, 291
 Spain, 270-272, 274-276, 283-285, 311

- Spanish literature, 272, 275
 Spanish mind, 283-284
 Spanish philosophy, 270-284
 Spaventa, 255, 285
 Species, intelligible, 123; origin of, 120
 Speculative Impulse, the, 88, 90, 99, 127, 162, 179, 202, 204, 218, 238, 281, 298, 320, 322.
 Speculative philosophy, 2, 3, 4, 10, 50, 59, 65, 70, 92, 115, 210, 214, 221, 239, 288, 307
 Spencer, 4, 115, 219, 240, 242, 255, 266, 336, 350, 352-353
 Spinoza, 115, 125, 144, 154-170, 171, 179-180, 196, 203, 227, 290-291, 300, 307; attributes, 156-159, 169; causality, 155; ethics, 160-161, 164, 167-168; God, 154-159, 176; metaphysics, 154, 161, 168; modes, 156-160, 168-169; monism, 158, 160, 170; ontology, 158, 160; personality, 155, 157, 167; psychology, 157, 162; substance, 154-159, 165, 168-169
 Spirit, 99, 108, 158, 182, 185, 189, 193, 200, 207-208, 210-211, 222, 226-227, 232, 236-237, 263-264, 269, 288, 291, 296-297, 300, 302, 313, 322-323, 334, 348
 Spiritism, 3, 28
 Spiritualism, 80-81, 85, 94, 106, 109, 112-113, 222, 238, 242-243, 245-246, 248, 249-250, 257, 260, 276, 278, 283, 315
 Starbuck, 322
 Stephen, L., 336, 346-347, 353
 Stoicism, 35, 41-42, 50-52, 55, 100, 106, 242
 Stoics, the, 49, 51, 53, 61-62, 112, 169
 Stout, Dr G. F., 326
Stromata, 75
 Stuckenbergh, 319
 Stumpf, 327
 Suarez, 127, 273-275
 Subconscious, the, 322, 331
 Subjectivism, 110, 114, 166, 184, 188-189, 191, 218, 226, 231-232, 236, 244, 248, 254, 261, 290, 296, 300, 322, 324, 352
 Subliminal self, the, 334, 349-350, 356
 Subordinationism, 62, 96-97
 Substance, 7, 14-20, 111-112, 120, 131, 133, 135, 140, 150, 154-159, 165, 168-169, 203, 210, 227, 242, 246-247, 269, 273-274, 276, 281-282, 289-291, 300, 302, 310, 313, 319, 332
 Substratum, the, 16, 112, 139, 300
 Suffering, 71, 199
Summa Theologica, 128-129, 131, 136, 139
Summum bonum, 85, 161, 199
 Supranaturalism, 69
 Syllogisms, 118, 146, 223
 Symbolism, 121, 181
 Syncretism, 30, 65-66
 Syrian thought, 66
 Tacitus, 78
 Taine, Hippolyte, 241
 Tatian, 69
 Taylor, Prof. A. E., 327, 347
 Teleology, 34, 42, 86, 90, 107, 234, 286, 317, 330, 342; teleological argument, the, 190-191
 Tennemann, 145
Teodicea, 128
 Testament, New, 76, 173, 182
 Testament, Old, 70, 179
 Thales, 15
 Theism, Kant's, 184-192; Origen's, 93; speculative, 4, 209, 227, 236, 263, 309
 Theistic philosophy, 185, 211, 227; theistic tendency, 80, 105, 209, 301, 307
 Theodicy, 9, 68, 94, 303
Theologia Naturalis, 272
 Theology, 40, 63, 67, 82, 92-93, 129-130, 169, 171-172, 278, 287-288; Alexandrian, 95; Origen's, 103; Protestant, 153
 Theophilus, 40
 Thiele, 285, 302
 Thomism, 122-123, 128, 143, 146, 255, 272, 274-275, 284
 Thought, 107, 109, 111, 113, 136, 142, 148, 151, 156, 161, 172, 186-188, 203, 208, 210-218, 220, 224, 226, 230, 249, 252, 258-259, 261-263, 267, 273, 287, 293, 298-299, 302-303, 305, 307, 323
 Thucydides, 78
 Tiberghien, 285
 Time, 81, 94, 98, 132, 134, 149, 152, 162, 172, 181, 214, 226, 229-230, 258, 260, 262, 276, 280, 291, 308, 310, 339
 Toulouse, 272
 Transcendence, 26, 33-34, 38, 59, 62, 68, 72, 95, 107-108, 150, 185, 202, 224, 228, 233, 289, 293, 295, 301, 304-306, 315
 Transcendentalism, 57, 120, 147, 189, 191, 240, 317, 329
 Transmigration, 6, 71, 179
 Transubstantiation, 151
 Trendelenburg, 257

- Triadogus*, 151
 Trinity, the, 73, 96-97, 146, 152, 183,
 222, 279; Plotinic, 106
 Trivero, 256
 True, the, 241
 Truth, 104, 119, 127, 167, 173, 175-176,
 178, 182, 217, 259, 262, 272, 274, 282,
 287, 294, 298, 309-310, 319, 323, 338,
 344
 Ueberweg, 145
 Ultimate Cause, 23, 189
 Ultimate Reality, 5, 94, 155, 187, 207,
 210, 216, 220, 224, 289, 303-304, 311,
 339
 Unconditioned, the, 4, 189, 210, 247,
 287, 291
 Unconscious, the, 337-338
 Unity, of being, 106-107, 125, 200, 209,
 214, 228, 230, 262, 291-292, 299, 306,
 314-315, 320, 334, 345; Divine, 4, 59,
 143, 157, 159, 179, 235, 262, 266, 292,
 299, 302-303; organic, 93, 127, 139,
 212-213, 239-240, 252-253, 292, 299,
 302, 306, 318, 334; undifferentiated,
 154, 168, 295; of the world, 42-43,
 90, 99, 158, 187, 200, 209-210, 220-
 221, 224, 226-227, 239, 243, 276, 286,
 289, 291, 294-296, 299
 Universalism, 125
 Universality, 6, 13, 34, 43, 49, 51-52, 68,
 112, 120, 130, 132, 161, 195, 200, 203,
 217, 219, 271, 273, 279, 285, 297, 305,
 311, 325, 331, 340, 356-357
 Universals, 120-122, 124, 126, 130, 146,
 147, 149
 Universe, the, 42, 87, 89, 110, 126, 141,
 160, 190, 192, 207, 211, 214-215, 219,
 222-223, 225, 234, 236-237, 241, 252,
 282, 286, 293, 297-298, 301, 304-309,
 334, 338, 344, 348
 Upanishads, 4, 6-7
 Urrabura, J. J., 276
 Utilitarianism, 350-353
 Vacherot, 242, 244
 Vailati, 256
 Valdarnini, 256
 Valentinus, 69, 74-75
 Valladolid, 272
 Value-judgments, 252, 261, 342, 355-357
 Varro, 80
 Vaughan, 153
 Vedanta philosophy, 5-6
 Vedas, 1, 6
 Ventura, 254
 Vich, 276-277
 Vico, 254
 Villari, 255
 Virtue, 7, 46, 47, 49-50, 85, 114, 162,
 166, 182, 337, 341-342, 351, 353, 357;
 Greek, 101
 Volition, 137, 160, 199, 211, 215, 249,
 263-266, 275, 287, 305, 319, 340; psy-
 chology of, 266, 334
 Voluntarism, 256
 Ward, Prof. J., 285, 301, 327
 Weber, 145, 202
Weltanschauung, 1, 345
 Wentscher, 327
 Western thought, 1, 6, 8, 10, 12, 119
 Will, 49-51, 79-80, 82, 84-85, 101-102,
 112, 122, 136-138, 199, 211-212, 242-
 243, 264-265, 267-268, 303, 338-339,
 354; Infinite, 94, 107, 155, 292
 Windelband, 1, 12, 145
 Wisdom, 47, 162, 221; Hebrew, 62,
 170
 Wolff, 313
 Word, the, 58, 62, 132; Spermatic, 61
 World-Ground, 112, 188, 219, 290-292,
 300, 303, 349
 World-Soul, 7, 10-12, 94, 107-108, 111
 World-View, 92, 143, 172, 284, 342, 345,
 357
 World-Whole, 3, 13, 190, 288-289, 291,
 294-297
 Wundt, 1, 258, 285, 318, 320, 326, 334,
 355
 Wyclif, 145-153; Society, 145
 Xenophanes, 31-32, 36
 Yahveh, 9
 Zarathustra, 9
 Zeller, 182, 185
 Zeus, 30
 Zoroastrian thought, 9-10

